It has now been four years since the March 23rd Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars, M23) rebellion emerged, eventually seizing control over a large swath of North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
The armed group is currently engaged in stalled negotiations with the Congolese government led by the state of Qatar over a potential peace deal. At the same time, a new initiative for national political dialogue that could potentially address some of the M23’s demands regarding governance appears to be taking shape. Yet comparatively little about the M23’s internal organization and objectives is known to the public—Rwandan support to the M23, crucial though it may be, is perhaps the best-known feature of this rebel movement to the casual observer of Great Lakes geopolitics.
This policy brief seeks to fill in the gaps:
- The movement’s return to DRC.
- Its alliances with other armed groups and recruitment strategies.
- Internal tensions between the M23 and the Congo River Alliance (Alliance Fleuve Congo, AFC), the M23’s political umbrella created in late 2023.
This policy brief aims to provide policymakers and members of the public with an understanding of the movement’s internal dynamics, structure, and objectives, as well as its evolution over recent years.
The content herein is based on a combination of public sources, interviews with select key informants, and the Congo Research Group’s work in the region since 2014.
