Political Missions 2012

A PROJECT OF THE CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
# Table of Contents

## MISSION ACRONYMS

### 1 STRATEGIC SUMMARY

*Megan Gleason-Roberts, Richard Gowan and Alischa Kugel*

### 2 THEMATIC ESSAY

2.1 Taking Risks: Sustaining Political Missions in Unstable Environments

*Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach* ................................................. 12

### 3 MISSION STATISTICS

3.0 Introduction to Statistics................................................................. 18

3.1 International Civilian Personnel Occupations in UN Field Missions

3.2 BINUCA ......................................................................................... 21

3.3 BNUB ............................................................................................ 22

3.4 CNMC ............................................................................................ 23

3.5 UNAMA .......................................................................................... 24

3.6 UNAMI .......................................................................................... 25

3.7 UNIOGBIS ..................................................................................... 26

3.8 UNIPSIL ......................................................................................... 27

3.9 UNOCA ........................................................................................... 28

3.10 UNOWA ......................................................................................... 29

3.11 UNPOS .......................................................................................... 30

3.12 UNRCCA ....................................................................................... 31

3.13 UNSCO .......................................................................................... 32

3.14 UNSCOL .......................................................................................... 33

3.15 UNSMIL .......................................................................................... 34

3.16 UN Envoys and Mediators .............................................................. 35
### Mission Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BINUCA</td>
<td>UN Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNUB</td>
<td>UN Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNMC</td>
<td>Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOGBIS</td>
<td>UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPSIL</td>
<td>UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCA</td>
<td>UN Office for Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>UN Political Office for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRCCA</td>
<td>UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOL</td>
<td>Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>UN Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the last year, multilateral political missions have played a central role in international crisis management. United Nations missions have supported elections in Libya, tackled coups in West Africa and attempted to find a solution to Syria’s civil war. In a year in which the overall numbers of troops deployed in UN and non-UN peace operations declined, the pressure on political missions to manage complex peace processes increased. This trend is likely to continue in the year ahead. However, many political missions continue to face financial constraints and security concerns that limit their impact.

In the last twelve months the number of political missions fielded by international organizations has increased slightly from 66 to 67. While the number of missions deployed by the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Organization of American States (OAS) have largely stayed static, in the same period the African Union (AU) increased its liaison offices by seventeen percent (from 12 in 2011 to 14 offices in 2012). While organizations have dedicated increasing focus to the utility of political missions for crisis management, these missions are operating under increasing budgetary and staffing pressures.

Budget requirements for UN political missions decreased six percent overall between 2011 and 2012, with significant decreases in some of the UN’s largest political missions – including in Afghanistan (10.5%) and Iraq (16.8%).1 UN political missions also operate under inflexible financing arrangements that leave less room for quick responses and fewer funds for mission start up, without access to special funding arrangements available to the UN’s military missions.

Against this backdrop, the 2011 review by the Secretary-General, which offered a number of recommendations to improve funding and backstopping mechanisms for political missions, provides an opportunity to strengthen political missions in the face of increasing budget restraints. In 2011, member states failed to come to an agreement on how to ease political missions’ current reliance on the regular budget. The five permanent members of the Security Council in particular objected to proposals for separate funding mechanisms for UN peacekeeping missions. In 2012, however, member states have agreed to reform the UN’s financial arrangements, which will likely improve the ability of political missions to budget their operations.

**Political Missions Deployed by Organization (2011 and 2012)**

---

* The authors would like to thank Tristan Dreisbach for his contributions to the summary, Morgan Hughes for the provision of data and graphs, and Ben Tortolani, Emily O’Brien and Vanessa Wyeth for their editorial assistance.
political missions, fearing that they would have to pay a higher percentage for a separate account, as is the case with the peacekeeping budget.\(^3\) Given the prevailing financial constraints that affect member states, it is unclear whether the Secretary-General’s proposal will gain traction. However, the General Assembly and Security Council’s stated commitments to strengthening conflict prevention and mediation throughout 2012 may be positive signals toward renewed willingness to tackle the issue. Still, recommendations to ease political missions’ current reliance on the regular budget, through for example establishing special accounts for funding, are likely to continue to be met by questions from member states.

Staffing shortages also impact the ability of missions to implement their mandated tasks, though vacancy levels have improved since last year for the majority of missions. The situation is particularly acute in regional offices, whose broad mandates cover prevention activities in individual countries as well as support to wider initiatives against regional threats, with a small team of experts. For instance, as of 31 July the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) operates with nine staff members, out of an authorized 30. While UNRCCA’s vacancy rate (70%) is the highest among UN political missions, the UN struggles with rapidly filling authorized posts, partially due to budgetary issues.

Notwithstanding these continuing pressures, political missions in the last year have grappled with rapidly unfolding regional developments requiring swift political action.

### MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The dynamics of the Arab Spring prompted a wave of democratic uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa that resulted in regime transitions in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and prompted two of the UN’s highest profile civilian missions to engage in events in Libya and Syria.

In Libya after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the UN deployed the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with a wide ranging mandate which, among its other activities provided support for the preparation and conduct of the July 2012 parliamentary elections, the country’s first democratic elections after decades of authoritarian rule. UNSMIL was initially authorized in September 2011 under a three-month mandate to provide immediate support to national authorities at their request and to allow the UN time to engage with Libyan authorities to determine the shape of a longer-term mission. However, the formation of an interim government was delayed, thus limiting UNSMIL’s ability to work with national counterparts, and the mission was provided a three month extension. This mandate also expanded the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Personnel in UN SPMs by Region: 31 July 2012(^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central and South Asia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of UN SPMs by Region: 31 July 2012(^5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central and South Asia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mission's activities to provide assistance to authorities in combating weapons proliferation, particularly man-portable air-defense systems. In his address to the Security Council prior to UNSMIL’s renewal in March, this time for one year, UNSMIL’s then head Ian Martin stressed the mission’s phased approach to ensure that it is responding to needs articulated by Libyans “in a flexible manner, which does not impose a heavy international presence.”

In 2012, UNSMIL provided technical advice to the government in the area of security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of militia members. The need for a comprehensive SSR/DDR strategy has become apparent through the increasingly volatile security situation. Violent clashes occurred between factions of the various militia groups, but attacks have also been launched against the international community, including on the convoy of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Libya and the 11 September attack against the US Consulate in Benghazi that killed the US Ambassador and three other US consulate staff members.

UNSMIL has employed a light footprint to provide advice and support to the Libyan government. It is one of the first to integrate the findings of the 2011 UN international civilian capacity review, prioritizing flexible staffing and funding approaches to improve the recruitment of appropriate and needed expertise.

In February, after months of violence in Syria between state security forces, irregular pro-government militias and anti-government groups, the UN and the Arab League named former Secretary-General Kofi Annan their joint Special Envoy for Syria. Annan set up an office in Geneva with 18 staff – a large team for a UN envoy – and was supported by deputies representing the UN (Jean-Marie Guéhenno) and the League (Nasser Al Kidwa). In March Annan presented a six-point peace plan calling for a cessation of violence and Syrian-led talks towards a political transition.

The Syrian military temporarily reduced its operations in April, but did not halt them altogether. The Security Council mandated the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to observe the security situation, but there was renewed violence while the observers deployed. UNSMIS was a peacekeeping operation directed from New York and was not under Annan’s authority, raising questions about the exact relationship between the UN’s political and peacekeeping roles in Syria. This was underlined in June when UNSMIS – having initially provided effective reporting on incidents including the Houla massacre – had to suspend operations due to security concerns.

In June and July with a significant deterioration of the security situation on the ground, Annan’s relations with the Syrian government and rebels worsened. The permanent five members of the Security Council clashed frequently over the crisis, despite agreeing to new proposals set out by Annan for a political transition in late June. In July, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution threatening the Syrian government with penalties if it continued to use heavy weapons. Annan resigned as Special Envoy in August and UNSMIS closed down in the same month. Annan was succeeded by Lakhdar Brahimi, who took office on 1 September.

The crisis has heightened tensions throughout the region. In October, Turkey and Syria exchanged sustained artillery and mortar fire across the border. In Lebanon, incidents of violence have already spilled over across the border. The UN’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559 have both noted the high risks the Syrian crisis poses for Lebanon’s stability. Clashes between supporters and opponents of the Syrian government in Beirut in August killed twelve people, highlighting the risk of an escalation of the conflict in the lead up to the 2013 elections.

In Iraq, the UN Assistance Mission remains one of the UN’s largest political missions. In August 2011 Martin Kobler was appointed the new Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Iraq. Since taking office, Kobler has expressed concern over the continued political stalemate and rising sectarian tensions. Deep divisions among the political elite, including the death sentence verdict in the trial in absentia of Vice President al-Hashimi, have led to a near breakdown of political dialogue. These political challenges are occurring against the backdrop of rising sectarian tensions and persistent violence since the departure of US troops in December 2011. In 2012, UNAMI facilitated the appointment process of the new Board of the Independent High Electoral Commission, tasked with organizing provincial and parliamentary elections in 2013 and 2014. The mission also continued to advocate the adoption of outstanding constitutional legislation, including for
the creation of the Federal Council, the upper house of the legislature. UNAMI also facilitated a peaceful and durable solution to the relocation of Iranian exiles in Camp Ashraf, including the relocation of residents to a temporary transit facility in Iraq, monitoring the humanitarian and human rights situation and, with UNHCR, the resettlement of recognized refugees to third countries. The mission continued to meet with key actors in Iraq and Kuwait on resolving outstanding issues between the two states, and it created an internal UNAMI taskforce to facilitate the adoption of an oil and gas law, which has been much-delayed due to disputes over revenue sharing and the demarcation of internal boundaries.

In Yemen, a year of protests finally yielded the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012 through a Gulf Cooperation Council initiative supported by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Jamal Benomar. Since April 2011, Benomar had made frequent trips to the country to verify the implementation of this initiative and oversee upcoming presidential elections and the institution of a democratic political process. He works closely with political leaders and regional actors to resolve political stalemates and prevent the former regime from hindering progress. Benomar had established a reputation in the Yemeni government as an effective impartial mediator, and in June the Secretary-General decided to deploy a field-based political mission, the UN Office in Yemen, to support the Special Adviser’s good offices function. In August, Benomar’s position was elevated to the level of Assistant Secretary-General.

The UN and EU Special Coordinators for the Middle East Peace Process continue to provide support for a comprehensive peace agreement despite the lack of progress made in adhering to the timeline proposed by the Middle East Quartet (comprised of the UN, EU, US and Russia) for an agreement by the end of 2012.

**AFRICA**

With eight United Nations field based missions, including two offices with regional mandates, 14 African Union Liaison Offices and numerous political envoys from ECOWAS and the EU, in 2012 Africa remains the continent with the highest concentration of political missions.

These presences undertake a wide spectrum of activities, from engaging in mediation efforts between conflict parties, a primary task of the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, to combating terrorism, as, for example, is the case with the UN Regional Office for Central Africa’s (UNOCA) efforts to help combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). These offices often work in close collaboration with each other; and UNOCA’s LRA activities are conducted alongside the AU’s Special Envoy and Task Force on the LRA under the aegis of a regional plan.

In 2012, UNOCA also enhanced its cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other UN presences in the sub-region, including the two political missions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burundi. These entities coordinate efforts to strengthen national and sub-regional conflict prevention mechanisms and to address the growing trend of election related violence.

The UN Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) grapples with the presence of a Chadian rebel group and the LRA in CAR that pose serious security risks and threaten peace consolidation efforts, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former Central African Republic rebel fighters. BINUCA continues to support the implementation of the national DDR strategy and wider security sector reform efforts and assists the government in raising funding for these efforts from the international community. The UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), which will transition into a UN Country Team presence with a focus on economic development over the next year, continues its institution building efforts, including in the judiciary and the security sectors. BNUB also supports reconciliation efforts between the government and opposition parties and other areas of democratic progress – an area of tension between the government and the UN Office in the past. Since the appointment of Karin Landgren as Special Representative for Liberia, BNUB is headed by Parfait Onanga-Anyanga.

Collaboration between offices also extends across regions: UNOCA, along with ECCAS and the AU, engages with the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and ECOWAS on tackling the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea through the formulation of a regional strategy.

UNOWA further engaged with ECOWAS, UN agencies and the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL) to fight the rise of drug trafficking and international organized crime in West Africa. To this end, UNOWA supported the extension of the West Africa Coast Initiative, a regional strategy to combat these threats, to include Guinea in April, and worked to reinforce greater political and operational engagement with international partners including INTERPOL and the EU. Progress was also made in the design of an ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy.

In early 2012, the absence of robust democratic structures in West Africa came to the fore with successive military coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS acted swiftly to address the unconstitutional changes in government in both countries, including through the appointment of special envoys.

Following the 22 March coup in Mali, ECOWAS named President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso as mediator for the crisis with the mandate to interact with relevant stakeholders and engage them in dialogue. Combined mediation efforts by Compaore and the head of UNOWA, Said Djinnit, led to the establishment of a transitional framework and the appointment of a unity government in August. ECOWAS has pursued a military intervention to address the ongoing Islamist insurgency in the country’s north and in October the UN Security Council declared its readiness to respond to Mali’s request for an international military force. ECOWAS Envoy Compaore and UNOWA head Djinnit will continue to engage with national, regional and international stakeholders to forge a sustainable political solution to end the crisis in Mali’s north. Their efforts will be further supported by the UN Special Envoy to the Sahel, Romano Prodi, appointed in October to address challenges in the region.

In Guinea-Bissau the army overthrew the interim government on 12 April. Following a dispute over the inconclusive presidential election held in March, ECOWAS had already appointed Guinean president Alpha Condé as mediator for the electoral crisis. In the wake of the coup, ECOWAS also headed mediation efforts to restore constitutional order, which led to the junta conceding power to a transitional civilian government on 23 May.

While ECOWAS took the notable lead in addressing tensions following the March elections and the subsequent military coup, the role of the UN Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) was limited to a coordination function to harmonize positions on and efforts toward the return to constitutional order among key national and international stakeholders. These efforts also aim at enhancing inclusive dialogue among national stakeholders. The African Union Liaison Office in Guinea-Bissau supports UNIOGBIS in these efforts.

In February, following a request by the government, the Secretary-General withdrew his Executive Representative (ERSG) for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Michael von der Schulenburg, who had held the post since 2008. Relations between the government and von der Schulenburg, once good, had deteriorated leading to his departure. The
immediate focus for UNIPSIL, since May under the leadership of ERSG Jens Toyberg-Frandzen, is on supporting a non-violent and credible electoral process for the November presidential and legislative and local council elections. Pending the peaceful conduct and acceptance of the elections, UNIPSIL will begin preparations for a transition to a UN Country Team presence, most probably by the end of 2013.

Somalia made some important strides toward stabilization in 2012. In January, following military advances by the UN-backed African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against Al Shabaab that improved the security situation, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) moved its headquarters to Mogadishu after 17 years in Nairobi, Kenya. As of August, UNPOS has deployed 40 out of 90 national and international personnel inside Somalia. While the mission expects to be able to relocate 12 additional international staff members in the course of the year, following the construction of additional accommodations and office space, the volatile security situation continues to impede staff mobility throughout the area of operations. In August and September, the Somali National Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution and elected a president. UNPOS will continue to support national efforts in achieving the next steps in finalizing the transition period, including the appointment of an executive government. The EU, through its Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, continues to address the regional dimensions of Somalia’s conflict, including maritime piracy. With the end of the transition period, the UN plans an interagency review of its presence in Somalia for the second part of 2012, with the view of beginning a new peacebuilding phase.

EUROPE

Both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union remain actively involved in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus and Moldova. The OSCE remains the biggest institutional player with ten presences across the region. The OSCE works alongside and often in close cooperation with the EU, which is represented through six high and special representatives (EUSRs) and also operates a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the coalition government that was only established in February (following a 14-month stalemate) collapsed in June over disagreement over the budget. Full implementation of the “5+2 agenda” that lays out requirements that need to be met to fulfill the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace agreement remains elusive. The Office of the High Representative, responsible for overseeing the agreement’s implementation, will remain in the country until the government has completed these steps. The OSCE mission and EUSR meanwhile will continue their respective work in consolidating BiH’s democratic institutions and providing political facilitation with a focus on EU integration.

September marked the end of a four-year supervised independence period for Kosovo and the departure of the International Civilian Representative who assisted the authorities in implementing much of the Ahtisaari peace plan, and supported Kosovo’s status settlement and integration into the EU. However, Serbia, along with other members of the international community, objects to Kosovo’s independence and tensions, particularly in the Kosovo’s Serb-dominated north, run high. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) liaises between Pristina and Belgrade and coordinates its work with the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). OMIK promotes and protects human rights, supports building democratic institutions and good governance and provides assistance in strengthening the security and public safety sectors, while EULEX builds capacity of rule of law institutions. In May, OMIK played an important role in reducing tensions by providing technical assistance to enable Serbs living in northern Kosovo to vote in the Serbian elections. Despite UNMIK’s engagement with Serbian leaders in northern Kosovo to improve relations with EULEX, the authorities continued to deny the EU mission full access to the region.

In early 2012, ethnic tension in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) increased in response to the death of two ethnic Albanians, which triggered further killings and gang violence. The OSCE Mission to Skopje strongly condemned actions of inter-ethnic violence and welcomed the authorities’ response to calm the situation. The mission continues its efforts to aid implementation of the 2001 Ohrid peace accord through police reform, strengthening good governance and the rule of law.

In Albania, Serbia and Montenegro the OSCE promotes democratization, the rule of law and human and minority rights. In Albania, the mission provided support to electoral reform and technical assistance to the Central Election Commission ahead of the 2012 presidential elections, which took place in June.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan intensified in mid-2012 with a rise in casualties along the border and heated rhetoric between the two countries. The OSCE coordinates efforts to solve the conflict through the “Minsk Process,” jointly co-chaired by France, Russia and the US. Its special envoy based in Georgia maintains regular contact with all sides together with the co-chairs to discuss developments at the line of contact between Karabakh and Azerbaijani armed forces. The EU has a presence in the region through its Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. In Georgia, the EUSR co-chairs the Geneva peace talks – currently the only remaining platform for institutionalized dialogue between stakeholders - along with the OSCE and the UN.

After a six-year hiatus, the 5+2 mediation talks on the Moldova - Transdniestria conflict were re-started in November 2011, with a meeting in April yielding agreement on principles and procedures, potentially opening space for progress on substantive issues. In September, the Moldovan and Transdniestrian sides agreed to an intensified meeting schedule to work toward agreement on outstanding issues. The OSCE mission, along with the other 5+2 participants the EU, Russia, Ukraine and USA, continues to facilitate a political settlement of the conflict. The EU’s border assistance mission conducts joint border patrols and provides technical assistance to Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities.

**Asia**

In Myanmar, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Vijay Nambiar, provides good offices and leads the UN’s political engagement. In January, Nambiar was appointed the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General after holding the position in an acting capacity for two years. The past year has seen fundamental political changes in Myanmar. Historic parliamentary by-elections in April saw the election of Aung Sang Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD), with the NLD becoming the largest opposition party in parliament. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a visit to Myanmar shortly after the elections, announcing that the UN would begin normalizing its development assistance and would support the conduct of the first national census since 1993. Over the past year Nambiar has visited Myanmar a number of times, including a notable trip to Rakhine state shortly after violent ethnic clashes erupted in June. Following the violence Nambiar underscored the UN’s commitment to supporting reconciliation and reform.

The primary focus for international engagement in Central Asia is maintaining stability in the region through Afghanistan’s transition as the International Security Assistance Force prepares to draw down its troops by the end of 2014. The number of violent incidents in July and August underscores continued instability in Afghanistan and challenges for international partners in supporting Afghanistan’s recovery. With ISAF’s departure, UNAMA will take on an increasingly central role at a time when the mission is reassessing its presence and support through the transition process. A 2012 comprehensive review requested by the Security Council and the Government of Afghanistan prompted a reorientation of UNAMA’s provincial offices. When he briefed the Security Council in June, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous noted that the Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s proposed budget for UNAMA would reflect reductions requested by member states; however, he cautioned that it was unrealistic to expect the mission to take on more responsibilities during the transition given these resource constraints. Against this backdrop UNAMA is also supporting preparations for the 2014 presidential and 2015 parliamentary elections while continuing its analytical and logistical support for the High Peace Council and, with UNDP, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration program.

The risks inherent in the Afghanistan transition loom large for political missions in Central Asia. The UN’s Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) highlights transboundary risks as its first priority for 2012 – 2014, stressing the risks of terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking to the Central Asian region. UNRCCA has also assisted in the implementation of the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, through a plan of action that was adopted at a high-level meeting in November 2011. In addition to transnational threats, the mission’s other priorities are addressing national crises and limiting their effects on regional stability as well as regional natural resource management in particular as it pertains to water and energy issues in the region.
In addition to the UN’s regional presence, the EU also maintains a Special Representative for Central Asia. The OSCE’s offices in Central Asia continue to provide support for regional security and stability through promoting border management and strengthening national institutions, including support to several electoral processes. The offices are also engaged on a number of transnational issues including combating trafficking, strengthening border management and resolving potential disputes over access to natural resources, particularly water.

**LATIN AMERICA**

The Organization of American States (OAS) maintains two political missions in Latin America. The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia continues to support to the peace agreement and particularly the rights of those displaced by the conflict. The OAS’s Office in the Adjacency Zone between Belize and Guatemala has asserted that the mission must continue to function at least until the completion of proceedings between the countries at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However the ICJ’s involvement is contingent upon a favorable outcome in both simultaneous referenda on the issue to be held in Belize and Guatemala in 2013.

**CONCLUSION**

The last year has seen political missions play an increasingly significant role in international security, especially in Africa and the Arab world. Although they have operated in a wide variety of settings, some of the most prominent have engaged in countries either in midst of war or the immediate aftermath of conflict, including Syria, Somalia and Libya. Other, smaller, political missions have faced deteriorating security in cases from Guinea-Bissau to Nagorno-Karabakh. As Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach highlight in their contribution to this report, such cases raise challenging questions about how political missions can function best in periods of major violence.

But the role played by political missions in responding to high-profile conflict also suggests that they are gaining traction as multilateral crisis management mechanisms, continuing a trend identified in previous editions of the Center on International Cooperation’s Review of Political Missions. The 2013 edition of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* will analyze political mission alongside military and police-led peace operations, giving a fuller overview of how multilateral crisis management is evolving.

**NOTES**

1. UN Budget requirements 2011 and 2012.
2. Includes the UN Office in Yemen, Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, and the Personal Representative for the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela.
3. For more information on the Secretary-General’s review and related discussions at the UN, see Richard Gowan, “‘Less Bound to the Desk’: Ban Ki-moon, the UN, and Preventive Diplomacy,” in Global Governance 18, 2012, pages 398-399.
4. UN Document A/66/354/Add.1, DFS FBFD.
   Figures for the Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Special Adviser for Myanmar, Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Special Envoy for Resolution 1559, and the UN and Arab League Envoy for Syria represent proposed staff strength for 2012, and are subject to change. Staff strength not available for the UN Office in Yemen, Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, or the Personal Representative for the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela.
5. For comparative purposes with the preceding graph, and as personnel information is not available for the UN Office in Yemen, Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, or the Personal Representative for the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela, these missions are not counted within this graph.
7. Represents a proposed figure for 2012, and is subject to change.
2.1 Taking Risks: Sustaining Political Missions in Unstable Environments

Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach
Taking Risks: Sustaining Political Missions in Unstable Environments

Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach

Although many political missions prioritize conflict prevention and crisis management, most operate in fairly safe places. Only a tenth of current UN and non-UN political missions are dealing with active wars or the immediate aftermath of conflict, whereas over half deal with longer-term post-conflict peacebuilding. Yet those missions that do operate in volatile or violent environments not only run unusually high risks but also have important opportunities to mitigate hostilities, mediate political bargains and help shape frameworks for lasting peace. A political mission working in a relatively stable country suffering from latent tensions may take months or years to affect local laws and debates. A mission in the midst of a fluid conflict can have the same effect in a matter of days or weeks.

The risks and opportunities of deploying political missions in risky environments have been underlined in a series of cases involving the UN in the last eighteen months, ranging from North Africa to Central Asia:

• The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) made its initial deployment to Tripoli within weeks of the fall of the city in 2011. The UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) permitted UNSMIL to deploy while limiting the number of humanitarian personnel able to enter Libya. In April 2012, a convoy carrying the head of mission, Ian Martin, was assaulted by unknown assailants.

• In January 2012, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) deployed personnel to Mogadishu. Although the mission was set up in 1995, security conditions had previously prevented it from setting up an office in the capital, and its base was in Nairobi. While African Union forces have secured large parts of Mogadishu, the new UNPOS office has been attacked and bombings and assassinations continue, placing limits on UN officials’ freedom of movement.

• The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), launched in 2002, has continued to operate despite a series of attacks on its staff and offices in recent years, including the murder of seven international staff in Mazar-i-Sharif in 2011. As the last Review of Political Missions noted, UNAMA and UN agencies are no longer able to operate in many parts of Afghanistan.

Yet in each of these cases, there has been a strong political case for keeping the UN mission going. UNSMIL played a significant role in assisting Libyan national elections in July 2012. Supported by UNPOS, Somali politicians have taken real though tenuous steps towards representative government. And while UNAMA has sometimes struggled to define its place in Afghan politics, it will almost certainly act as the primary flag-bearer for international support to the country after NATO withdraws in 2014.

These very different cases raise parallel doctrinal questions. How can missions craft political strategies that reflect the unpredictable dynamics of active conflicts and immediate post-conflict situations? What organizational and financial mechanisms are needed to prepare, mandate and deliver these strategies? And what security strategies can political missions deploy so as to operate effectively?

* Citations and references for this article are available online.
Some of these questions – especially concerning planning and financing – are relevant to all political missions. But in a period in which there are major obstacles to the deployment of new military stabilization and peacekeeping operations, there is a potential trend towards deploying political missions into more dangerous environments. This is not universally true, as the Security Council’s decision to deploy blue beret military observers to Syria in April 2012 demonstrated. Yet the strategic failure of this mission (notwithstanding the courage of the observers) has in fact raised further questions about the utility of sending “peacekeepers” to monitor active conflicts. In some cases, there may be fewer dangers associated with deploying a political mission than a military presence. UN political missions do not usually sustain fatalities in their first year of operation, whereas UN peacekeeping operations lose an average of two to ten personnel in the same start-up period. While this reflects the differing tasks of these missions – military peacekeepers tend to suffer casualties while out on patrol and are often mandated to take risks to protect civilians under threat – the Security Council and other multilateral bodies may perceive political mission as low-cost and low-risk crisis response mechanisms.

In Afghanistan, meanwhile, UNAMA faces the challenge of maintaining its political role in a security situation that is liable to deteriorate after NATO forces depart in 2014. In Somalia, UNPOS may need to expand its operations further to highly unstable parts of the country beyond Mogadishu. There is a need to consider the political, operational and financial implications of these high-risk missions – as well as improving the readiness of the UN to send further political missions into similarly high-risk countries.

**POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND MANDATES**

When a political mission operates in a country that is still in conflict or is in the immediate aftermath of war, there is a natural focus on security issues. But the mission is also likely to face a confused and fluid political situation. Even if a war has resulted in a clear victory for one side – as in Libya – there may be tensions among the victors. The confusion may be greater in a case such as Somalia, where the government has limited territorial control, or where serious fighting still continues, as in Afghanistan.

In such cases, it is necessary to define what goals a political mission can fulfill. Potential tasks fall into two broad categories. The first category involves political dialogues. Most political missions operate in environments where opposed parties are ready to engage in political dialogue (although in a few cases, such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the UN acts as a conduit for communications between parties that want to limit direct contacts). In such cases, the range of tools available – covered in detail in earlier editions of the Review of Political Missions – range from good offices to formalized mediation.

Secondly, missions can also design and support formal transitions to new political settlements. This year, UNSMIL and UNPOS focused on transitions towards representative government in Libya and Somalia. The framework for these transitional processes is often negotiated in advance. UNAMA was set up after four months of consultations in the country and negotiations between Afghan leaders in Bonn, Germany. The UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) emerged from peace talks between the government and Maoist rebels involving a personal representative of the UN Secretary-General, which laid the framework for a rapid deployment of personnel in 2007. More recently, the efforts of the UN’s envoy in Yemen, Jamal Benomar, led to the creation of a political office in Sana’a this year. But in some cases it is necessary for a political mission to work out its role after it has already received a mandate to deploy.

In the Libyan case, the UN undertook significant pre-planning for UNSMIL in 2011, but had to overhaul many of its assumptions after the fall of Gaddafi. The new authorities wanted a limited UN role. The Security Council granted UNSMIL an initial three-month planning mandate in September 2011. Because the formation of the Libyan government was delayed, the mission received a second three-month mandate in December 2011 and was only finally authorized to operate for a full year in March 2012.

This type of phased and flexible approach to making and implementing mandates can allow a mission to adapt to the fluid realities of a conflict or post-conflict environment. By contrast, a mission’s ability to adapt can be limited by an inflexible mandate or one overloaded with tasks. UNAMA, for example, has recently been asked to carry out an expanding number of tasks (including preparing for presidential elections in 2014 and promoting reconciliation) that hinder it from focusing on firm political priorities.

It is sometimes necessary for a political mission to clarify what it cannot do to avoid overstretch. At an early stage in the deployment of UNSMIL, for
example, planners concluded that the mission should not become directly involved in processes such as programming security sector reform. Instead it has acted as a de facto broker for international assistance to the new government, facilitating the Libyan authorities’ interactions with UN funds and agencies and other actors such as the European Union and World Bank.

However, there may also be cases in which political missions are required to perform either a monitoring role – such as ensuring that parties to a conflict maintain a ceasefire, a role played by UNMIN in Nepal – or play a facilitating function in sub-national political affairs. In the Balkans, missions deployed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have prioritized these civil affairs roles, building up municipal and regional governance. In Afghanistan, UNAMA has deployed large numbers of personnel to provincial and regional offices to tackle similar tasks. UNPOS may need to do something similar in Somalia. But as we note below, dispersing staff in this way increased a mission’s vulnerability to attacks. The dangers of monitoring in non-permissive environments were highlighted in Syria this year, where Arab League and then UN observers were attacked and compelled to withdraw.

PRIORITIES AND PLANNING

Overall, the UN’s recent experiences of deploying political missions to politically volatile settings highlight three priorities. Firstly, it is important that missions deploy on the basis of robust planning and (where possible) dialogue with domestic political actors. Secondly, missions need the flexibility to change plans at short notice to reflect fast-moving political dynamics, and they need adaptable mandates to permit this. Finally, these mandates should be as narrow as possible to be achievable.

These sound like relatively straightforward goals. Yet, at least in the UN context, they remain surprisingly controversial. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined in a report to the General Assembly in 2011, there are still no standard financial frameworks to fund the planning of political missions (in contrast to peacekeeping operations) or get them on the ground expeditiously. Even planning for UNSMIL – a high-profile project – was complicated in 2011 by UN financial regulations. The mission eventually deployed quickly (the first senior personnel got to Libya within three days of receiving their mandate) and maintained the political space to update its mandate regularly during its initial phase. But, as the UNAMA case shows, political missions are often constrained by complex mandates.

SECURITY ISSUES

Political and procedural issues affect all political missions. But in cases where political missions deploy to insecure environments, it is necessary to link political strategy to security strategy. The UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) underlines that primary responsibility for a mission’s safety lies with a host government. But this may be hard to guarantee where there is instability and a government is weak. UN missions also rely on the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) to assess the risks they face and work out how to protect mission personnel, vehicles and facilities. DPA, DSS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have taken steps to improve security planning and crisis response through better risk analysis, forming a new inter-departmental crisis response mechanism this year.

As a new report by DPA highlights, political missions can take numerous tactical steps to maximize security (see Box 1). In high risk environments missions can also take strategic decisions to reduce risks:

• While essential personnel deploy into a conflict-affected country, a mission can maintain a secondary base elsewhere. UNPOS continues to be supported from Nairobi, and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq has a rear base in Jordan. In some cases, a small number of in-country personnel can report back to a mission leadership based elsewhere. This is the model the OSCE has used for the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute: while officials are based in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the head of mission operates from Tbilisi, Georgia. In the Syrian case, the UN has proposed to set up a small liaison office in Damascus to back up the special envoy’s main team based outside the country.

• A mission may rely on international military forces for security, such as the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia or NATO in Afghanistan. This can be problematic, however. A military force may have multiple priorities – including active campaigns – that rank higher than ensuring a political mission’s freedom of movement at all times. Associating with the military force may reduce the mission’s perceived political autonomy.
And when the military leave, as will be the case in Afghanistan in 2014, a political mission can be left behind without effective security.

- Political missions can be protected by stand-alone international military or security forces. The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is guarded by a contingent of Fijian troops. The Security Council has asked the AU to provide a dedicated guard unit for UN staff in Somalia, and plans were made for military protection for a UN civilian deployment to Libya in a worst-case scenario. In Afghanistan, UNAMA is protected by a complement of gurkhas, who have used force on a series of occasions to protect UN bases and personnel. There are, however, concerns about using security contractors to guard UN missions elsewhere.

Any security mechanism constrains a mission’s ability to interact with politicians and the parties to a conflict. However, this is less risky than deployment models that spread international personnel thinly – and potentially vulnerably – across a conflict-affected country. The 2011 attack on the UNAMA office in Mazar-i-Sharif demonstrated the risks inherent in maintaining a network of offices in an unstable country. UNAMA is now cutting back its network of provincial offices, although for budgetary reasons.

Just as it is typically wise for a political mission in a volatile country to follow a relatively narrow mandate, it is also advisable to keep the number of staff deployed low to reduce overall risks. This may mean limiting total staff dealing with issues outside the core politics of a mission’s mandate, although any mission needs a sufficient complement of support staff to operate. Currently, of the UN’s three missions highlighted in this essay, UNAMA, UNPOS and UNSMIL, all have widely varying numbers of substantive staff in comparison to support personnel (refer to the table on page 20 for more information).

Moreover, if a mission lacks “eyes and ears” on the ground it may struggle to make good political judgments. In some cases, it may be important for a mission’s political profile to have an office in a sensitive area. UNAMI, for example, maintains a presence in the contested northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk while UNSMIL set up an office in the anti-Gaddafi center Benghazi to balance its base in Tripoli.

---

**DPA Guidance on Security Aspects of SPM Deployment:**

- The primary responsibility for the security and protection of UN personnel rests with the host authorities, but the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is responsible for operational support and oversight of the security management system. DPA staff should communicate closely and meet regularly with DSS, providing it with information about the nature and profile of the mission so that it can implement sufficient security measures for the mission and the UNCT as a whole.

- DSS must assess the potential security risk to staff and plan risk mitigation measures accordingly. Its assessment determines the number of security staff required and the location of the Mission Headquarters and field offices.

- In choosing security personnel, the mission may hire local staff, use host country police, contract local companies, or use Secretariat security officers. Close protection for the Head of Mission should always be included in the initial budget, even if it may ultimately not be necessary.

- In the start-up phase, mission managers should ensure that the security section addresses the immediate security of mission staff, and they must put a mission evacuation plan in place as early as possible.

- DPA staff must assist DSS in consulting with the UNCT on the ground and sensitizing the UNCT before the arrival of the mission.

---

**Top 10 Political Missions by Size:**

**31 July 2012**

*Figures reflect actual, not authorized staff.*
This brief overview has highlighted that political missions are able to operate in politically volatile and hazardous environments, but that they (i) require flexible and focused mandates and (ii) potentially need special basing arrangements and security arrangements if they are to be able to achieve their goals. The cases we have cited here show the need for continued efforts to meet these requirements. In security terms, there is a need for deeper analysis of the use of stand-alone security forces in protecting political missions in dangerous environments. Would it, for example, be possible for some UN member states to train contingents specifically for this security role, which differs from standard peacekeeping?

Secondly, the UNSMIL case offers useful precedents for the Security Council when debating and mandating other civilian deployments to dangerous places. The Council’s de facto adoption of a phased approach to developing UNSMIL’s mandate – and its acceptance that core elements of that mandate needed to be worked out through in-country talks – is arguably a good model for future missions. Council members should review and summarize the lessons arising from this episode (some of those countries that sat in the

Council in 2011-2012 and are now leaving it could lead a study of this type.)

A third priority is to ensure that financial and bureaucratic issues do not complicate already risky deployments. As we have noted, Ban Ki-moon highlighted in a 2011 report to the General Assembly that new political missions do not have access to start-up funds and strategic deployments stocks to speed up their initial operations. Member states postponed making any decisions on this last year, primarily because member states could not agree on Ban’s suggestion that political missions should be funded through a new dedicated budget, similar to the peacekeeping budget. This proposal remains contentious, but the General Assembly should at least approve reforms to the start-up mechanisms for new missions, which would involve smaller changes and have a clear impact on operational efficiency.

Whatever steps the UN takes to improve security, mandates and resources, deploying political missions to countries that are still experiencing (or could relapse into) severe violence will always be dangerous. A single attack similar to that in Baghdad in 2003, which killed over 20 UN personnel, could not only destroy a mission but also put a halt to similar deployments elsewhere. If there is a trend towards utilizing political missions in dangerous settings, the political and operational mechanisms supporting these missions have to be reinforced.

NOTES

1 The breakdown of substantive and support staff in each of these missions is as follows: UNAMA (244 substantive staff and 1,708 support staff); UNPOS (38 substantive staff and 51 support staff); UNSMIL (59 substantive staff and 98 support staff). “Substantive” occupational groups are defined as civil affairs, economic affairs, electoral affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, legal affairs, political affairs, public administration, rule of law and social sciences. “Support” staff includes personnel in all other occupational categories.
Mission Statistics
Introduction to Statistics

This section contains data for 23 current UN-commanded political missions. While the data presented here focuses on UN political missions, the 2013 edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations will include expanded and more detailed coverage of these missions, as well as statistics related to the political missions of other international organizations.

The data in this section is based on public UN documents and sources, combined with data provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), and the UN Volunteer (UNV) Programme in Bonn. Further description of the data is as follows:

Key Facts
This section lists latest key resolutions, dates and documents of initial mandates, and heads of mission.

Personnel Strength
This section covers staff strength as of 31 July 2012; further categorized as troops, Military Experts on Mission (MEMs), police, international civilian staff, national civilian staff, and UN Volunteers (UNVs) as applicable to each mission. MEMs include all military personnel engaged for peacekeeping service in an observer, liaison, or advisory capacity, including Military Observers (MilObs), Military Liaison Officers (MLOs), or Military Advisers (MilAds). When known, MEM personnel have been further classified as one of the three.

All figures on military personnel were obtained from the DPKO Force Generation Service (FGS). Statistics on police are based on reports from the Police Department (PD), and only include UN Police (UNPOL), and do not include professional staff. The Field Personnel Division (FPD) at DFS provided data on international and national civilian staff for all missions, while data on UNVs were acquired from the UNV Programme in Bonn. Of the field missions presented in this chapter, information on civilian staff for the UN Office in Yemen was not available.

Vehicles and Aircraft
Information on vehicles and aircraft, as obtained from the Logistics Support Division (LSD) at DFS, are reported as of 31 July 2012. Data on vehicles was not available for the following missions: Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, Personal Representative on the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela, Special Adviser for Cyprus, Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and UN Office in Yemen. Statistics on vehicles deployed to the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) are as of 30 April 2011. All aircraft in political missions are commercially contracted.

Budget and Expenditures
All 2011-2012 budgetary data have been derived from publicly available documents of the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) or the UN’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee). This section covers appropriations and estimated expenditures (1 January 2010 to 31 December 2011), as well as requirements for the following year (1 January to 31 December 2012). One exception is the
Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), which is funded through the regular budget. Due to the difference in reporting timeframes of those missions funded through the regular budget, financial reporting reflects resources from the bienniums from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2011 and from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013. All estimated expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. Appropriations, expenditures and requirements are further classified into the following three categories, with some variation as applicable to each mission:

- **Military and police personnel.** Includes missions’ subsistence allowances, travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation, death and disability compensation, rations and clothing allowances for military and police personnel.
- **Civilian personnel.** Includes provisions for salaries, staff assessment and common staff costs, overtime and hazardous duty stations allowances, as well as costs associated with UNVs.
- **Operational costs.** Costs associated with consultants and experts, official travel, facilities and infrastructure, ground, air and/or naval transportation in mission, communications, IT, medical, special equipment, other supplies, services and equipment and quick impact projects.
## Civilian Personnel Occupations in UN Field Missions: 31 July 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>BINUCA</th>
<th>BNUB</th>
<th>CNMC</th>
<th>UNAMA</th>
<th>UNAMI</th>
<th>UNIOGBIS</th>
<th>UNIPSIL</th>
<th>UNOCA</th>
<th>UNOWA</th>
<th>UNPOS</th>
<th>UNRCCA</th>
<th>UNSCO</th>
<th>UNSCOL</th>
<th>UNSMIL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Management</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Systems &amp; Technology</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management &amp; Programme Analysis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affairs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, Service &amp; Transport</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Management</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>3,734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DFS FPD
Note: Information on the UN Office in Yemen not available.
**BINUCA** (UN Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic)

### BINUCA Key Facts

| **Latest Key Resolution** | 21 December 2011 (date of issue); 1 January 2012 (date of effect) 
UNSC Res. 2031 (thirteen month duration) |
| **First Mandate** | 21 December 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect) 
UNSC Pres. Statement S/PRST/2009/35 (succeeding BONUCA, twelve month duration of BINUCA) |
| **SRSG** | Margaret Vogt 
SG letter of appointment 6 May 2011 |

---

**BINUCA Personnel: 31 July 2012**

- **International Civilian Staff**: 66
- **National Civilian Staff**: 85
- **UNVs**: 5
- **MEMs**: 2
- **Police**: 2

**Sources:** DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DFS FPD; and UNV Programme.

**BINUCA Aircraft:**

- BINUCA has one fixed wing aircraft.

**BINUCA Budget (in thousands of US dollars)**

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 APPROPRIATIONS**
  - **18,844.4**
  - **401.8**
- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES**
  - **22,164.9**
  - **319.0**
- **JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 REQUIREMENTS**
  - **12,062.4**
  - **224.4**

**Source:** UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

**BINUCA Vehicles: 31 July 2012**

- **4 x 4 Vehicles**: 57
- **Buses**: 4
- **Material Handling Equipment**: 2
- **Trucks**: 2
- **Vans**: 1

**Source:** DFS LSD.
**BNUB (UN Office in Burundi)**

### BNUB Key Facts

**Latest Key Resolution**
- 20 December 2011 (date of issue); 1 January 2012 (date of effect)
- UNSC Res. 2027 (thirteen month duration)

**First Mandate**
- 16 December 2010 (date of issue); 1 January 2011 (date of effect)
- UNSC Res. 1959 (succeeding BINUB, twelve month duration of BNUB)

**SRSG**
- Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon)
- SG letter of appointment 1 June 2012

---

### BNUB Personnel: 31 July 2012

- National Civilian Staff: 66
- International Civilian Staff: 54
- Police: 1
- MEMs: 1
- UNVs: 6

**Sources:** DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DFS FPD; and UNV Programme.

### BNUB Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 APPROPRIATIONS**
  - Operational Costs: 13,488.0
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 173.5
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 8,484.3

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES**
  - Operational Costs: 13,724.3
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 143.2
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 8,383.8

- **JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 REQUIREMENTS**
  - Operational Costs: 10,659.4
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 104.0
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 6,692.4

**Source:** UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

---

### BNUB Vehicles: 31 July 2012

- 4 X 4 Vehicles: 55
- Buses: 7
- Trucks: 4
- Ambulances: 3
- Material Handling Equipment: 2
- Vans: 2

**Source:** DFS LSD.
CNMC (Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission)

**CNMC Key Facts**

| Latest Key Resolution | 9 January 2012 (date of issue)  
| SG Letter S/2012/28 (twelve month extension of funding) |
| First Mandate | 17 March 2004 (date of issue)  
| SG Letter S/2004/298 |
| SRSG | Said Djinnit (Algeria)  
| SG letter of appointment 21 February 2008; Entry on duty 1 April 2008 |

**CNMC Personnel: 31 July 2012**

Source: DFS FPD.

**CNMC Budget (in thousands of US dollars)**

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

**CNMC Vehicles: 31 July 2012**

Source: DFS FPD.
**UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)**

### UNAMA Key Facts

**Latest Key Resolution**  
22 March 2012 (date of issue and effect)  
UNSC Res. 2041 (twelve month duration)

**First Mandate**  
28 March 2002 (date of issue and effect)  
UNSC Res. 1401 (twelve month duration)

**SRSG**  
Ján Kubiš (Slovakia)  
SG letter of appointment 22 November 2011; Entry on duty 1 January 2012

---

#### UNAMA Personnel: 31 July 2012

- **National Civilian Staff**: 1548
- **International Civilian Staff**: 404
- **UNVs**: 72
- **MEMs**: 17

---

#### UNAMA Aircraft: 31 July 2012

- **Fixed Wing**: 4
- **Rotary Wing**: 5

---

#### UNAMA Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

**OPERATIONAL COSTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 APPROPRIATIONS</th>
<th>JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES</th>
<th>JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNAMA</strong></td>
<td>297,642.5</td>
<td>288,280.4</td>
<td>115,509.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Personnel Cost</strong></td>
<td>195,750.5</td>
<td>220,075.5</td>
<td>124,724.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military and Police Personnel Costs</strong></td>
<td>2,590.7</td>
<td>1,633.0</td>
<td>1,299.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

#### UNAMA Vehicles: 31 July 2012

- **4x4 Vehicles**: 389
- **Trucks**: 16
- **Buses**: 5
- **Automobiles**: 2
- **Vans**: 2
- **Ambulances**: 1
- **Armoured**: 1

---

**Sources:** DPKO FGS; DFS FPD; and UNV Programme.  
**Note:** MEMs are further classified as Military Advisers.  
**Source:** DFS LSD.

---

**Source:** UN Document A/66/354/Add.4.
UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq)

UNAMI Key Facts

**Latest Key Resolution**
- 25 July 2012 (date of issue)
- UNSC Res. 2061 (twelve month duration)

**First Mandate**
- 14 August 2003 (date of issue and effect)
- UNSC Res. 1500 (twelve month duration)

**SRSG**
- Martin Kobler (Germany)
- SG letter of appointment 4 August 2011

---

**UNAMI Personnel: 31 July 2012**

- Troops 373
- MEMs 8
- Police 4
- International Civilian Staff 391
- National Civilian Staff 468

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; and DFS FPD.

**UNAMI Aircraft: 31 July 2012**

- Fixed Wing: 1
- Rotary Wing: 2

Source: DFS LSD.

---

**UNAMI Budget (in thousands of US dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>189,430.4</td>
<td>168,045.3</td>
<td>82,050.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Expenditures</td>
<td>138,280.8</td>
<td>153,195.7</td>
<td>67,427.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>25,883.0</td>
<td>25,750.6</td>
<td>23,312.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.5.

---

**UNAMI Vehicles: 31 July 2012**

- 4x4 Vehicles: 281
- Buses: 19
- Trailers: 13
- Trucks: 13
- Material Handling Equipment: 12
- Armoured: 11
- Aircraft/Artfield Support Equipment: 5
- Ambulances: 4
- Vans: 3
- Automobiles: 2

Source: DFS LSD.
UNIOGBIS (UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau)

UNIOGBIS Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution  
21 December 2011 (date of issue); 1 January 2012 (date of effect)  
UNSC Res. 2030 (fourteen month duration)

First Mandate  
26 June 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect)  
UNSC Res. 1876 (succeeding UNOGBIS, twelve month duration of UNIOGBIS)

SRSG  
Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)  
SG letter of appointment 27 January 2009 (as SRSG of UNIOGBIS)

UNIOGBIS Personnel: 31 July 2012

UNIOGBIS Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

UNIOGBIS Vehicles: 31 July 2012

Source: DFS LSD.
**UNIPSIL (UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone)**

### UNIPSIL Key Facts

**Latest Key Resolution**
- 12 September 2012 (date of issue); UNSC Res. 2065 (six month duration)

**First Mandate**
- 4 August 2008 (date of issue); 1 October 2008 (date of effect)
  - UNSC Res. 1829 (twelve month duration)

**ERSG**
- Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen (Denmark)
  - SG letter of appointment 1 May 2012

### UNIPSIL Personnel: 31 July 2012

- National Civilian Staff: 32
- International Civilian Staff: 36
- Police: 7
- UNVs: 7

**Sources:** DPKO PD; DFS FPD; and UNV Programme.

### UNIPSIL Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011**
  - Appropriations: 20,109.3
  - Estimated Expenditures: 13,347.2
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 5.8

- **JAN 2012 - DEC 2012**
  - Requirements: 10,201.3
  - Estimated Expenditures: 13,683.2
  - Operational Costs: 7,510.3

**Source:** UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

### UNIPSIL Vehicles: 31 July 2012

- 4 x 4 Vehicles: 37
- Trucks: 9
- Ambulances: 1
- Automobiles: 1
- Material Handling Equipment: 1

**Source:** DFS LSD.
**UNOCA** (UN Office for Central Africa)

### UNOCA Key Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest Key Resolution</td>
<td>29 February 2012 (date of issue) UNSC Res. 2039 (SC request for continued cooperation and information on the situation of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Abou Moussa (Chad) SG letter of appointment 11 March 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNOCA Personnel: 31 July 2012**

- National Civilian Staff: 6
- International Civilian Staff: 18

**UNOCA Budget (in thousands of US dollars)**

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 Appropriations**
  - Operational Costs: 1,779.6
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 1,725.6

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 Estimated Expenditures**
  - Operational Costs: 1,479.8
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 2,126.9

- **JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 Requirements**
  - Operational Costs: 2,893.0
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 1,531.0

**UNOCA Vehicles: 31 July 2012**

- 4 x 4 Vehicles: 13
- Buses: 2

Sources: DPKO FGS and DFS FPD.

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.
UNOWA (UN Office for West Africa)

UNOWA Key Facts

- **Latest Key Resolution**: 14 December 2010 (date of issue); 1 January 2011 (date of effect) SG Letter S/2010/660 (three year duration)
- **First Mandate**: 26 November 2001 (date of issue); 1 January 2002 (date of effect) SG Letter S/2001/1128 (three year duration)
- **SRSG**: Said Djinnit (Algeria) SG letter of appointment 21 February 2008; Entry on duty 1 April 2008

UNOWA Personnel: 31 July 2012

Sources: DPKO FGS and DFS FPD.

UNOWA Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 Appropriations**
  - Operational Costs: 436.9
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 6,032.4
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 7,446.9

- **JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 Estimated Expenditures**
  - Operational Costs: 397.3
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 6,342.7
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 7,127.8

- **JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 Requirements**
  - Operational Costs: 295.9
  - Civilian Personnel Cost: 4,793.1
  - Military and Police Personnel Costs: 3,768.5

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

UNOWA Vehicles: 31 July 2012

Source: DFS LSD.
UNPOS (UN Political Office for Somalia)

UNPOS Key Facts

| Latest Key Resolution | 18 September 2012 (date of issue)  
UNSC Res. 2067 (welcoming the relocation of UNPOS to Mogadishu) |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| First Mandate         | 28 March 1995 (date of issue)  
SG Report S/1995/231  
31 May 1995 (date of issue)  
| SRSG                  | Augustine P. Mahiga (Tanzania)  
SG letter of appointment 9 June 2010 |

UNPOS Personnel: 31 July 2012

- National Civilian Staff: 33
- International Civilian Staff: 56
- MEMs: 3

Sources: DPKO FGS and DFS FPD.

UNPOS Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

- JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 APPROPRIATIONS: 16,938.3
- JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES: 16,462.6
- JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 REQUIREMENTS: 8,638.4

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

UNPOS Vehicles: 31 July 2012

- 4 x 4 Vehicles: 43
- Automobiles: 1
- Buses: 1

Source: DFS LSD.
UNRCCA (UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia)

**UNRCCA Key Facts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest Key Resolution</td>
<td>26 August 2011 (date of issue) SG Report S/2011/552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Mandate</td>
<td>7 May 2007 (date of issue) SG Letter S/2007/279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Miroslav Jenča (Slovakia) SG letter of appointment 28 April 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNRCCA Personnel: 31 July 2012**

Source: DFS FPD.

**UNRCCA Budget (in thousands of US dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Operational Costs</th>
<th>Civilian Personnel Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 APPROPRIATIONS</td>
<td>4,080.8</td>
<td>2,212.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2010 - DEC 2011 ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES</td>
<td>3,952.5</td>
<td>1,985.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2012 - DEC 2012 REQUIREMENTS</td>
<td>2,054.9</td>
<td>1,057.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

**UNRCCA Vehicles: 30 April 2011**

Source: DFS LSD.
UNSCO (UN Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process)

UNSCO Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution
25 July 2012 (date of issue)
UNSCC Briefing S/PV.6816

First Mandate
16 September 1999 (date of issue); 1 October 1999 (date of effect)
SG Letter S/1999/983

Special Coordinator
Robert H. Serry (Netherlands)
SG letter of appointment 28 November 2007

UNSCO Personnel: 31 July 2012

UNSCO Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

JAN 2010 - DEC 2011
2,036.3
13,364.0

JAN 2012 - DEC 2013
3,054.5
13,894.7

UNSCO Vehicles: 31 July 2012

Source: DFS LSD.
UNSCOL (Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon)

### UNSCOL Key Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest Key Resolution</td>
<td>28 June 2012 (date of issue) SG Report S/2012/502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Coordinator</td>
<td>Derek Plumbly (UK) SG letter of appointment 12 January 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNSCOL Personnel: 31 July 2012

- **National Civilian Staff**: 60
- **International Civilian Staff**: 19

Source: DFS FPD.

### UNSCOL Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

#### JAN 2010 - DEC 2011
- **Appropriations**: 4,751.6
- **Estimated Expenditures**: 12,680.5

#### JAN 2012 - DEC 2012
- **Requirements**: 4,808.0
- **Estimated Expenditures**: 12,444.4
- **Civilian Personnel Cost**: 2,247.3
- **Operational Costs**: 6,959.2

Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.3.

### UNSCOL Vehicles: 31 July 2012

- **4 x 4 Vehicles**: 20
- **Buses**: 1
- **Trucks**: 1

Source: DFS LSD.
UNSMIL (UN Support Mission in Libya)

UNSMIL Key Facts

- **Latest Key Resolution**
  - 12 March 2012 (date of issue)
  - UNSC Res. 2040 (twelve month duration)

- **First Mandate**
  - 16 September 2011 (date of issue)
  - UNSC Res. 2009 (three month duration)

- **SRSG**
  - Ian Martin (UK)
  - SG letter of appointment 16 September 2011

UNSMIL Personnel: 31 July 2012

Sources: DPKO PD and DFS FPD.

UNSMIL Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

Sources: UN Document A/66/354/Add.6.

UNSMIL Vehicles: 31 July 2012

Source: DFS LSD.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Latest Key Resolution</th>
<th>First Mandate</th>
<th>Head of Mission</th>
<th>Staff Strength</th>
<th>Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur</td>
<td>13 July 2012</td>
<td>30 June 2008</td>
<td>Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane (Niger)</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSC Res. 2063</td>
<td></td>
<td>Note: Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane serves as both the Chief Mediator ad interim and acting head of UNAMID.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Envoy for Western Sahara</td>
<td>24 April 2012</td>
<td>19 March 1997</td>
<td>Christopher Ross (US)</td>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 2</td>
<td>Appropriations (Jan '10-Dec '11): 1,097.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.1, Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 699.9</td>
<td>Est. Expenditures (Jan '10-Dec '11): 881.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSC Res. 2044</td>
<td></td>
<td>SG letter of appointment 6 January 2009</td>
<td>Source: DFS FPD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Representative on the Border</td>
<td>20 April 2010</td>
<td>February 1990</td>
<td>Norman Girvan (Jamaica)</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Appropriations (Jan '10-Dec '11): 6,762.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela</td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of effect)</td>
<td>Appointment 20 April 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>Est. Expenditures (Jan '10-Dec '11): 6,080.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SG/A/1230 (appointing a Personal Representative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Adviser for Cyprus</td>
<td>19 July 2012</td>
<td>21 April 1997</td>
<td>Alexander Downer (Australia)</td>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 12</td>
<td>Appropriations (Jan '10-Dec '11): 1,914.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of effect)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.1, Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 1,391.5</td>
<td>Est. Expenditures (Jan '10-Dec '11): 1,391.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSC Res. 2058</td>
<td>(date of effect); 28 April 1997</td>
<td>SG letter of appointment 10 July 2008</td>
<td>Source: DFS FPD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(date of effect);</td>
<td>Entry on duty 14 July 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SG Letter S/1997/320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Adviser for Myanmar</td>
<td>24 December 2011</td>
<td>23 December 1994</td>
<td>Vijay Nambiar (India)</td>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 5</td>
<td>Appropriations (Jan '10-Dec '11): 1,283.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>Entry on duty 1 January 2010</td>
<td>Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.7, Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 1,200.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNGA Res. 86/230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: DFS FPD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy for Sudan &amp; South Sudan</td>
<td>2 May 2012</td>
<td>27 July 2011</td>
<td>Haile Menkerios (South Africa)</td>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 5</td>
<td>Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 1,283.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of effect)</td>
<td>SG letter of appointment 27 July 2011</td>
<td>Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSC Res. 2046</td>
<td></td>
<td>Entry on duty 1 August 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559</td>
<td>20 April 2012</td>
<td>14 December 2004</td>
<td>Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)</td>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 3</td>
<td>Appropriations (Jan '10-Dec '11): 1,279.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of issue); 3 January 2005</td>
<td>SG letter of appointment 14 December 2004</td>
<td>Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.1, Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 731.9</td>
<td>Est. Expenditures (Jan '10-Dec '11): 1,255.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SG Report S/2012/244</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: DFS FPD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy for Yemen</td>
<td>10 August 2012</td>
<td>21 February 2012</td>
<td>Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)</td>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 18</td>
<td>Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 7,488.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Arab League Envoy for Syria</td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of effect)</td>
<td>Appointment 17 August 2012</td>
<td>Source: UN Document A/66/354/Add.7, Requirements (Jan '12-Dec '12): 7,488.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC Letter S/2012/618</td>
<td></td>
<td>Entry on duty 1 September 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office in Yemen</td>
<td>12 June 2012</td>
<td>18 June 2012</td>
<td>Jamal Benomar (Morocco)</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>In 2012, DPA's support to the political transition in Yemen is estimated at $1 million USD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>(date of issue)</td>
<td>Entry on duty April 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSC Res. 2051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2012, DPA's support to the political transition in Yemen is estimated at $1 million USD.

**Political Missions 2012** is a product of the Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) Global Peace Operations Program. The Center is an independent institution housed at New York University.


This report was undertaken with the support of the UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN Department of Field Support, and the OSCE Secretariat.

The Government of Switzerland generously supported this publication.

The analysis and judgments in this report are the responsibility of CIC alone.

---

**COVER PHOTO:** Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrives for an unannounced visit to Mogadishu, Somalia, with Augustine P. Mahiga, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNPOS (in foreground), senior aide B. Lynn Pascoe (front, disembarking plane), the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (behind Mr. Pascoe), President of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly (9 December 2011). UN Photo