In its recent past, West Africa has been one of the most volatile regions of the world, suffering from devastating civil wars and acute political instability complicated and exacerbated by poverty, mismanaged natural resources, poor governance and vulnerability to external shocks. The past two years saw the president of Guinea-Bissau murdered and unconstitutional changes of government in three countries – Mauritania, Guinea and most recently, Niger. The region also continues to be a prime target for organized crime, especially drug trafficking, and its large numbers of underemployed and disaffected youth make it especially vulnerable. Civil-military relations continue to pose serious governance problems and elections, while providing hope for improved governance, can be rife with tensions.

There have also been positive signs of progress in recent years; overall levels of violent conflict have dropped, and the rhetoric of democracy and rule of law is gradually gaining ground. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken an assertive and progressive stance on addressing the region’s challenges and conflict prevention in general. Nevertheless, the region’s pursuit of stability is complicated by porous borders, which means that the political missions operating in the region do so in a complex environment where the threats and issues are cross-cutting and inter-related and instability can be contagious. The UN has four political missions in the region, UNIOGBIS, UNIPSIL, CNMC, and the regional office, UNOWA. There are also still two active peacekeeping operations, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) established in 2003, and the UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) established in 2004. As these missions drawdown, it is likely that they too will be replaced with political missions.

**UNIOGBIS/UNIOGBIS**

**Background**

The UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was established in 1999 with a mandate particularly focused on the implementation of the Abuja Agreement between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the self-proclaimed military junta. Its mandate was subsequently extended in 2004 and 2005 to assist with the country’s ongoing peace consolidation and stability needs of the post-transitional phase.1
In December 2007, at the request of the Government of Guinea-Bissau, the country was placed on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). UNOGBIS' mandate for 2008 was revised to reflect its growing responsibility in supporting efforts to combat the country’s increasing challenges with drug trafficking and organized crime. The 2009 mandate continued these efforts in addition to strengthening the capacities of national institutions in order to maintain constitutional order; implementation of security sector reform (SSR); respect of rule of law and human rights; as well as assisting all other partners in their engagement with Guinea-Bissau.

In January 2010, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) replaced UNOGBIS. The mission’s mandated responsibilities were further expanded to provide support to the work of the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), coordinate SSR efforts and address national reconciliation issues. The shift to an integrated mission also means more resource allocation towards these tasks, allowing for greater technical support to the government to enhance national capacities and better coordination of mission and UN Country Team (UNCT) efforts.

The mission has an office that supports the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and his Deputy and four substantive sections – political affairs, human rights and gender, SSR, and public information. There is also a strategic planning unit that undertakes joint planning; promotes integration of the political, human rights and development agendas of the mission; and coordinates the efforts of UNIOGBIS with the UNCT, the PBC and the PBF. UNIOGBIS operates with an integrated strategic framework that builds on that of the UNCT, the mission’s political and security sector mandates, as well as peacebuilding and national development priorities.
West Africa | 47

Key Developments

Several incidents in 2009 epitomize Guinea-Bissau’s precarious political situation and the deleterious role the military plays in the stabilization of the country. On 1 and 2 March 2009, the Chief of the General Staff and President João Bernardo Vieira were assassinated. After the attacks, the military restated their support for the constitution and the Speaker of the National Assembly assumed duties as the interim President of the Republic on 3 March. However, further assassinations took place on 5 June in the lead-up to the presidential elections when a presidential candidate, a former Defense Minister and two of his guards were killed. The authorities claimed that the victims were resisting arrest for an alleged coup attempt, the existence of which has yet to be confirmed.

Presidential elections were held without incident on 28 June and went to a second round on 26 July, with Malam Bacai Sanha of the governing party winning a majority of votes on a platform of ending violence and promoting development through peace and stability. In addition to providing training for election agents, funding unbiased media coverage and coordinating international electoral observers, UNOGIBS was also instrumental in urging the military to keep their distance from the proceedings, and in securing an MoU between the two main candidates to ensure that they respected the results.

While the peaceful election outcome boosted confidence after a particularly violent period, the preceding events served to highlight the critical need for comprehensive SSR in order to reduce the threat that rivalries, factionalization, and the involvement of the military pose to the political sphere. The transition of UNOGIBS to an integrated field presence has enhanced the coordinating role that the UN is able to play with respect to SSR, which is a priority for the UN, donors and
The continued volatility of the political and security situation in Guinea-Bissau reinforces the rationale for a UN integrated peacebuilding presence in the country to monitor and defuse situations that could otherwise rapidly escalate. Despite facing some very daunting challenges, UNIOGBIS is able to have an impact because it provides unique services to the country, including enhancing coordination amongst other partners. The increase in resources and capacity that has accompanied the shift of UNOGBIS to UNIOGBIS will better position the mission to support the government in building up their own sustainable capacities, as opposed to finding provisional solutions to crises as they arise. Yet, the mission alone can only do so much in an environment where there are still severe socio-economic problems, widespread impunity, and weak state institutions to deal with either of the above. All actors, including the government, the armed forces, as well as international partners, must remain committed to mobilizing, affecting and promoting change. The national conference, “Towards Peace Consolidation and Development” that the National Assembly is currently planning, will be an important step towards determining a common vision for the way forward. Additionally, although there have been positive signs regarding the volume of drugs transiting the country, implementation of the West Africa Coast Initiative will be necessary if this trend is to continue.

Of course, many of these initiatives rely upon the existence of more robust rule of law and a stronger justice system in general. Successful progress on SSR as a long-term goal will remain a challenge that will require cooperation between all actors. In the interim, addressing the politically motivated violence of last year and ensuring that those responsible are brought to justice will lay an important foundation for the future. Making sure the national commissions of inquiry move ahead with this process in a timely manner, which they have yet to do thus far, will be an important first step in re-legitimating the state and its institutions in the eyes of Bissau-Guineans.

### Conclusion

UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorization and Start Date</th>
<th>26 February 1999 (UNSC Letter S/1999/232)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First SRSG</td>
<td>Nana Sinkan (Cameroon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>$4.8 million (1 January 2009-31 December 2009)</td>
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UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS)

<table>
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<th>Authorization Date</th>
<th>26 June 2009 (UNSC Res. 1876)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>$19.0 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength as of early 2010</td>
<td>International Civilian:18 Local Civilian: 13 Military Experts on Mission: 1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For detailed mission information see p. 192

the government. The SSR unit within UNIOGBIS has developed a strategy for the mission and will liaise with national and international partners on its implementation. In addition, the unit has officers with various specializations, some of which will be seated within the government bodies responsible for SSR, in order to enhance the UN’s support to the country’s own process.

Unfortunately, Guinea-Bissau’s progress towards viable security sector reform and stability experienced further setback on 1 April 2010 when soldiers loyal to then Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces arrested the army chief, detained the prime minister and escorted former Navy Rear Admiral, José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who had recently returned from exile in Gambia where he had fled after a failed coup attempt in August 2008, from the UN compound where he had been seeking asylum. While the prime minister was later released, at the time of drafting, the former army chief remains in custody and the US government has just classified Bubo and the head of the Air Force as “drug kingpins” for their role in trafficking narcotics through Guinea-Bissau.
Key Developments

On 23 December 2008, a military junta led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power in Guinea after the death of the long-serving president, Lansana Conte. The takeover was widely condemned by the international community, despite the fact the junta initially signaled that they intended to hold elections within the year. When it soon became apparent that Dadis might stand for president, the opposition coalition began to hold protests, culminating in a large peaceful rally on 28 September 2009 that turned violent when the army opened fire on civilians, killing at least 157 people, and also reportedly committed other gross human rights violations, including brutal sexual assaults.

On 3 December, Dadis was shot in the head by an aide and evacuated to Morocco for medical treatment and authority was transferred to his Defense Minister who was more cooperative in establishing a timeline for democratic transition.

Throughout the mediation process, led by ECOWAS and its chosen facilitator, Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré, the SRSG was actively engaged in high-level negotiations. As one of a core group of advisors to the facilitator – as well as representing the UN at the International Contact Group on Guinea - he strongly encouraged a prompt return to constitutional order. Concurrently, UNOWA worked closely with the UN Country Team in Guinea to develop programs that address key areas of conflict prevention in order to prepare for elections, which are scheduled to take place on 27 June. UNOWA has also, at ECOWAS' request, been providing advice as to how SSR can be included in the facilitation process and be addressed during the transitional period.

Throughout processes such as these, UNOWA works in concert with ECOWAS and, now more frequently, the African Union as well. This cooperation further strengthens the entities’ tripartite partnership, and enhances the international community’s capacity to react against undemocratic incidents that occur in the region. In between these specific mediation efforts, the SRSG travels frequently in the region.
Mission Reviews

UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

Authorization Date 26 November 2001 (UNSC Letter S/2001/1128)
Start Date 1 January 2002
SRSG Said Djinnit (Algeria)
Budget $6.97 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)
Strength as of early 2010
International Civilian: 13
Local Civilian: 10
Military Experts on Mission: 4

For detailed mission information see p. 207

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)

Authorization and Start Date 17 March 2004 (UNSC Letter S/2004/298)
Chairman Said Djinnit (Algeria)
Budget $8.9 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)
Strength as of early 2010
International Civilian: 12
Local Civilian: 6
Military Experts on Mission: 2

For detailed mission information see p. 156

to monitor developing situations, raise key issues of concern, and communicate the UN’s commitment to West Africa.

In addition to dealing with political crises, UNOWA focuses on the region-wide necessity for SSR, especially the impact that the security sector has on electoral processes. In order to integrate the work of the UN system in this area, UNOWA has developed an internal strategy, in collaboration with ECOWAS, the UN Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, that will now be communicated to all UN actors in the region. The overarching goal of this process is to assess how the UN can best support ECOWAS in developing and implementing their own subregional SSR framework and action plan.

UNOWA has also continued to support ECOWAS in the implementation of their regional action plan on drug trafficking by mobilizing the necessary political support and commitment to roll-out the West African Coast Initiative. While seizure rates in the subregion have dropped, sustained engagement on behalf of the region’s governments will be key to ensuring that the threat posed by illicit trade is contained, particularly now that a potentially worrisome link between drug trafficking and terrorist financing has been identified in the Sahel region. UNOWA has recently strengthened its cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and other partners on this issue in order to sensitize national authorities and do its part in maintaining international attention so that the threat posed by the trade remains on the agenda.

Conclusion

UNOWA’s role in the mediation efforts that successfully prevented the situation in Guinea from deteriorating further and kept it from destabilizing neighboring countries, has been an important example of the unique contribution an office such as UNOWA can make. The mission will now need to turn its attention to facilitating preparations for credible elections in Guinea, as well as, where possible, preemptively attending to any issues that may arise from these or other potentially divisive upcoming elections in the region.

The predominant focus for UNOWA in this period has been on the good offices function of the SRSG, which is one area that a mission of its size can have the greatest impact regionally. Because of its mandate and the high profile of its SRSG, UNOWA has succeeded in creating the necessary political space so that other UN actors, such as the UN Country Teams, have been able to continue their work irrespective of situations that have arisen in their specific countries. Moreover, UNOWA’s especially strong working relationship with ECOWAS has further enabled it to provide support to ECOWAS initiatives and contribute in ways that are targeted to the region’s conflict prevention priorities.

However, UNOWA will continue to be challenged, especially if a similarly broad and complicated mandate, one that is neither tailored to its activities nor its resources, is forced upon it for another three years. Still, regardless of mandate,
The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) was established following the International Court of Justice ruling on 10 October 2002 on the disputed land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The demarcation process was divided into four different segments: the Lake Chad basin, the land boundary, the maritime boundary and the Bakassi Peninsula, the most contentious because of its offshore oil deposits and fish stocks. The framework for the eventual withdrawal of Nigerian forces and the transfer of authority in the peninsula to Cameroon was agreed upon in the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006.

Because of the politically sensitive inter-state scope of its work, the CNMC does not have a formal Security Council mandate, but instead is funded as a special political mission through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council. The mandate focuses on the highly technical aspects of the demarcation of the land boundary, as well as the more political and legal transfer of authority, demilitarization, and protection of the rights of those who are affected by the transition—including encouraging cooperative economic and environmental arrangements between the two populations.

Although a separate entity, the CNMC is located within UNOWA and since May 2009, UNOWA’s SRSG also serves as both the Chairman of the CNMC and the Follow-up Committee for the Greentree Agreement, which is in place until 2013. The SRSG’s good offices role has been critical in ensuring that implementation continues and that sufficient confidence is built and sustained around the process so that it is able to stay on track.

In August 2008, the final handover of the Bakassi Peninsula occurred between Nigeria and Cameroon. Since then, demarcation has advanced along the rest of the 1,950 kilometers of land boundary and, as of early 2010, approximately 300 kilometers of disputed territory are all that remains. In November 2009, the construction of the first permanent demarcation pillars began and will progress throughout 2010. Assessment of the land boundary is set to be completed by 2011, with boundary pillars to be in place by 2012. Throughout this period, the CNMC will continue to provide technical, political and legal guidance to ensure that any remaining areas of disagreement are amicably dealt with, and that implementation and confidence-building continues apace, including the monitoring of the affected populations and their rights.

The CNMC is widely lauded as an example of UN conflict prevention at its best, utilizing the UN’s technical, political and legal expertise, and good office functions, to firstly get the commitment to - and then to sustain the implementation of - an agreement between two countries on disputed territory. Compared to other political missions, it also has a very clear exit strategy. While these are certainly valid points, unique challenges also arise from a mission that is highly technical yet managed by a political department; the balance between the political, technical and administrative tasks required has not always been an easy one to find. Moving forward, an important aspect of ensuring that the CNMC remains a success story will not only be replenishing its trust fund to create the financial capacity for completion, but also guaranteeing that the rights and concerns of the populations along the border remain as high a priority as the more technical aspects.

Background

In December 2005, the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established to follow-on after the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force UNAMSIL. Its mandate was to assist the government with the consolidation of peace, as well as to help preparations for presidential and legislative elections to take place in 2007.
The UN presence transitioned again in August 2008 with the establishment of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL).\(^6\) The Office is mandated to support the government in resolving tensions and addressing areas of potential conflict; monitoring and promoting human rights and rule of law; strengthening good governance; assisting with the constitutional review; and coordinating the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and the UN Country Team. In September 2009, UNIPSIL’s mandate was extended until 30 September 2010\(^7\) with a request for the Office’s eventual transition into a UN Country Team presence, with special focus on issues surrounding preparations for the 2012 elections.

As one of the first fully integrated political missions, UNIPSIL is unique in several ways. It is headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), a post currently held by Michael von der Schulenburg, who also serves as the Resident Representative of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Resident Coordinator. The ERSG model is not widely utilized but works well in this particular context because it is accompanied by a peacebuilding strategy that aligns all aspects of the UN’s country presence, and thus having one person in charge streamlines the decision-making process and complements integration.\(^8\)

UNIPSIL also has one of the most targeted mandates of UN political missions. This was actively lobbied for by the ERSG so that the mission could have a focused strategy—providing the political platform, aid coordination and support (through a multi-donor trust fund), and technical advice—to assist the government with their own institution building and peace consolidation efforts. This is achieved by linking the mission’s guiding framework, the Joint Vision for the UN Family in Sierra Leone, to the government’s own Agenda for Change, which articulates its four main peacebuilding priorities as reliable power supply; increased productivity in agriculture and fisheries; improved infrastructure; and improved heath and other social services.

Covering the period of 2009-2012, the Joint Vision was developed in order to highlight the common priorities of the mission’s political, development and human rights mandates, and to provide a framework that offers full integration at the program, planning, evaluation and operational levels of the following four issues: integrating rural areas into the national economy; economic and social integration of the youth; equitable and affordable access to health; and accessible and credible public service. To allow for accurate monitoring, each agency retains its own workplan and deliverables. The idea of having one vision for the entire UN family is still an incredibly innovative one, despite the fact it has streamlined what was originally thirty-two different strategies into one, and has the government’s own priorities at its core.

UNIPSIL comprises an office to support the ERSG and then five substantive sections: Political Affairs and Peace Consolidation; Human Rights and Rule of Law; Democratic Institutions; Police and Security; and a Joint Strategic Planning Unit which is tasked with ensuring synergy across all of the mission’s activities. The Planning Unit also links the strategies of UNIPSIL with those of the government, donors and the PBC. The mission has plans for a total of eight regional field offices to connect with local communities, assist with implementation of UN programs and enable more effective outreach. Additionally, these field offices will provide space for liaison offices of local civil society and NGOs.

**Key Developments**

While Sierra Leone has made admirable progress towards stabilization, the country still struggles with poor socio-economic indicators, corruption, drug trafficking, and severe youth unemployment—all
“A Shared Vision” – Integration and UN Special Political Missions

In a Policy Committee decision of June 2008, the UN Secretary General reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has Country Teams (consisting of UN agencies, funds and programs), a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or a political mission. The aim of the integrated approach for field missions is to develop a shared vision among all UN actors on the ground, maximizing the UN’s efficiency and effectiveness by linking the various elements of peace operations, such as political tasks, development work, humanitarian assistance, human rights and the rule of law. However, the principle does not apply to missions mandated with strict military tasks, or to regional political offices, such as in Central Asia and West Africa.

Integration is by no means limited to one specific set up, but can take different structural forms depending on the specific country context. Generally, the more stable a country is, the more structurally integrated a mission can become. As of early 2010, only two missions, UNIPSIL and BINUB, are fully structurally integrated. Both missions are under the leadership of an Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG). The ERSG position is “triple-hatted,” because it combines the functions of the mission leadership, with that of the Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), which are responsible for the coordination and harmonization of the UN development and humanitarian actors, namely the UN Country Teams (UNCTs), on the ground.

In other cases, the roles of the RC and the HC are combined under the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRS). In these integrated missions, the SRS provides the overall leadership and political guidance, while the Deputy is charged with coordination of the UNCTs. Current examples of such missions include UNAMA and UNAMI. In a third model of minimally integrated field presences, for example in the case of UNMIN and UNPOS, the missions are under the leadership of the SRS but the RC/HC functions are filled outside the mission structure by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, who is institutionally attached to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and receives support from local offices of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Independent from the level of integration, all integrated field missions should have shared analytical and planning capacities as well as integrated strategic frameworks that should facilitate joint planning and shared objectives, divide responsibilities between the various actors and decide on mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. At headquarters level, task forces consisting of relevant Secretariat departments and offices, agencies, funds and programs, provide support and policy guidance to the integrated missions. Missions in countries that are on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), receive additional support through the PBC’s Support Office.

It is important to note that the integrated approach does not seek to incorporate one UN entity into another – while the function of the RC/HC is structurally integrated, the UNCTs maintain their institutional independence from the mission. As the various UN actors operate according to their own management systems, accountability and report structures, funding lines and budget cycles, integration implementation can be challenging. In addition, there continues to be a lack of basic guidelines for senior mission management as to how to carry out integration in field missions. Both elements can lead to ambiguities about the process and place heavy reliance on the mission leadership to get the task done.

Some actors in the humanitarian sphere voice concerns that the integrated approach diminishes the impartiality of the humanitarians, as they are perceived as intrinsically linked with the role of the mission in a country’s political transition process. Others argue that the set up in fully structurally integrated missions, where the ERSG also acts as the RC/HC, is an impediment to a more robust political role, because the mission leadership is not solely perceived as an impartial political mediator.

At the same time, while a political mission can not be perceived as partial to any party to a conflict, its good offices and mediation role can be instrumentalized to create the necessary conditions for successful conduct of humanitarian and development functions, that otherwise could not be achieved (as Ian Johnstone argues in his essay in Section II of this volume). While integration in this context does not come without challenges, it provides an important step toward a UN system that works in unison across institutional differences.
within a highly divisive political environment. Therefore, while calm prevails for the most part, it is extremely tenuous.

This was exemplified in March 2009 with an outbreak of politically motivated violence preceding local elections. Several days of clashes between sympathizers of the governing party, the All People’s Congress (APC), and the main opposition party, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) culminated on 16 March when the SLPP headquarters were attacked by angry crowds, resulting in injuries, extensive damage to the building and property, as well as allegations of sexual assault.

During this period, UNIPSIL actively worked to mitigate the situation, including personal intervention by the ERSG to ensure that the police were able to safely evacuate SLPP supporters trapped on the roof of their headquarters. The mission was also instrumental in encouraging dialogue between the two parties, which led to the signing of a joint communique on 2 April. Strongly condemning violence, the communique seeks to encourage political tolerance and multiparty respect for institutions and the political process, and agrees upon the need to pay special attention to the youth groups associated with the parties. While intense political rivalry remains, there have been increasingly positive exchanges between the parties’ leadership, including President Ernest Bai Koroma’s vocal support for inclusion.

An important function of UNIPSIL has been to ensure that the joint communique does not remain solely a document, but that adherence and implementation continue to happen—especially in the lead-up to the 2012 elections. UNIPSIL also transformed the UN radio into an independent public broadcaster to try to prevent the partisan broadcasting of the past from fomenting political rivalry; supported the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration Commission; and began building up national mediation capacity, although this has been somewhat constrained by the fact that the mission itself does not have a dedicated mediation specialist.

To enhance the capacity of the Sierra Leone Police to handle situations such as those that arose in March 2009, UNIPSIL’s police component has helped with the acquisition of the necessary equipment and training for crowd control. Additionally, the Office has successfully assisted the establishment of the Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force, which will now become the first operational Transnational Crime Unit under the West Africa Coast Initiative of the ECOWAS regional action plan on illicit drug trafficking and organized crime.

Conclusion

The next year will be a critical one for both Sierra Leone and UNIPSIL. The importance of sustaining national reconciliation, maintaining political dialogue at all levels, as well as closely monitoring interparty dynamics and campaigning in the lead-up to the 2012 elections cannot be underestimated. The incidents of March 2009 demonstrated how close to the surface tensions still are and how
they have the potential to quickly erupt into violence. The country’s other challenges, such as youth unemployment, drug trafficking, and corruption, only serve to exacerbate this underlying tension. However, the good relationship between the government and UNIPSIL has enabled the mission to provide the specific support, especially technical assistance, the government requires to build its own capacity and begin to address these critical issues.

UNIPSIL has attempted a unique model of integration—not only aligning the strategies of the various strands of the UN family, but also by breaking down bureaucratic barriers between international, bilateral, national and local actors, in order to channel focused support to the country’s peace consolidation needs. Yet these and other initiatives will not be achieved if the country’s international partners do not continue to support them. A donor conference held in November failed to raise enough money for the multi-donor trust fund, which will impede further implementation of the government’s Agenda for Change and the UN’s Joint Vision. Recent claims that funding for four additional years of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was equivalent to the costs for four months of the previous peacekeeping operation emphasize the value for money that political missions such as UNIPSIL can provide if given the resources to do so. As with any mission that has moved into peacebuilding, there is the risk of becoming complacent with relative stability. But given the upcoming elections, this coming year is precisely the time that momentum in Sierra Leone needs continue.

NOTES

1 The mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1233 of 6 April 1999, following a letter (S/1999/232) from then Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on 3 March 1999. In 2004, the Security Council decided in Resolution 1580 to extend UNOGBIS’ mandate as a special political mission, and expanded the mandate accordingly. In November 2005, nearing the expiration of that mandate, the President of Guinea-Bissau requested the Office’s extension.

2 Although, at the time of drafting, there is still no Deputy.


5 The Sahel region is a belt of land that lies on the southern edge of the Sahara desert and runs across the continent encompassing parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea.


8 Only UNIPSIL and BINUB currently have ERSGs.