What happens now? – the post-2015 agenda after the High-level Panel

Alex Evans and David Steven

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Table of Contents

What happens now? – the post-2015 agenda after the High-level Panel

Alex Evans and David Steven

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A New Agenda</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Big Questions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Process From Here</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Open Working Group</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MDG Special Event and the first High-level Political Forum</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Expert Committee on a Sustainable Development Financing Strategy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing the Goals</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Summit on Financing?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Other Post-2015 Agenda: climate change</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Politics of a Global Partnership Worth the Name</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: The Immediate Action Agenda</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex: The High-level Panel’s Illustrative Goals</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Authors</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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A New Agenda

At the end of May 2013, the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda published its report, setting out an ambitious vision for tackling poverty and sustainable development after the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – and a new set of goals that could potentially replace them.

The Panel proposed that the post-2015 agenda should be based around five transformational shifts:

- **Leave no-one behind** – moving from reducing poverty to ending it, with no person, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, or disability, being denied basic economic opportunities and fundamental human rights.
- **Sustainable development at the core** – a shift away from destructive patterns of economic development towards sustainable patterns of production and consumption.
- **Transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth** – ensuring growth benefits the societies and people who need it most, while ending the jobs crisis and harnessing the energy of youth.
- **Build peace and effective, open, and accountable institutions for all** – recognizing that peace and good governance are essential to human well-being and sustainable development.
- **Forge a new global partnership** – build a broad partnership able to deliver the post-2015 agenda and harness the finance needed to invest in change.

Public reaction to the Panel report has been broadly positive. Civil society groups have generally welcomed its scope and ambition. The headline ambition to eradicate absolute poverty received most attention, while the green lobby has praised the report’s emphasis on greater integration of development and sustainability. Media coverage was also mostly favorable.

Not all stakeholders were satisfied. Critics from civil society focused primarily on the Panel’s decision not to call for a headline goal to reduce income inequality, with the report instead proposing global minimum standards for the poorest (in other words, targets are only considered to have been achieved if they are met “for all relevant income and social groups”), together with broader-based growth to ensure a fairer distribution of the benefits of globalization. Others criticized the lack of explicit goals on planetary boundaries or on population aging.

The reaction of UN member states to the report is most important, of course, with most governments yet to make a public response. Indonesia, Liberia, and the United Kingdom, whose leaders chaired the Panel, are obviously supportive, while the European Commission has emphasized the importance of a development agenda that applies to all people and all countries. The US government has also welcomed the broad thrust of the Panel’s recommendations.

On the other hand, there are indications that Least Developed Countries regard the Panel’s report with a degree of wariness, unsure of the extent to which it reflects their concerns and priorities. Some countries may feel also uneasy about the Panel’s recommendations in areas such as peace and security or governance, while others are likely to have reservations about the proposal for a single set of goals for both poverty and broader sustainability issues.

Opinion on the need for a Panel in the first place was also mixed. While some governments saw the Panel as an opportunity to develop a vision that would both inform and challenge the intergovernmental process, others questioned its value and legitimacy. Many states have been more focused on the Open Working Group (OWG) of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, discussed in more detail below, which was launched as an outcome of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).
The next few months will therefore determine whether the Panel is able to influence the post-2015 debate effectively or whether its report is forgotten, as attention switches to other processes and publications. For the Chairs and those who served as panelists, in other words, the important work has only just begun.

The Big Questions

Now the Panel’s report has been published, the post-2015 agenda will begin to shift into a new phase, culminating in September 2014 when the OWG submits its own report to the UN General Assembly. While the Panel has made a strong start in setting out a possible post-2015 agenda, a number of substantive questions will be debated over the next year. Among them are the following:

- **One set of goals or two?** While the Panel proposed a single set of goals covering both poverty eradication and sustainability, it is still possible that two sets of goals could be adopted. To date, Brazil has been the principal advocate of such an approach, but other member states made similar suggestions in the first session of the Open Working Group. Support for this approach remains limited, but could build again if consensus on sustainability objectives proves hard to reach.

- **What does universality mean?** The Panel emphasized that its goals should be universal – covering all countries, not just developing ones. That said, the focus on absolute poverty means that many goals are not obviously applicable to high income countries – with obvious exceptions such as sustainable energy. This would clearly change if the eventual post-2015 framework included goals on inequality (see below), relative rather than just absolute poverty, or more explicit language on sustainable production and consumption or planetary boundaries.

- **What happens now on inequality?** As noted, some constituencies criticized the Panel’s approach to inequality and it remains to be seen how this agenda will now play out. Some advocates are pressing for a goal on income inequality (expressed, for example, in terms of Gini Coefficient or Palma Ratio scores); some are more focused on inequalities in opportunity and/or exposure to risk; others again support the Panel’s focus on basic economic rights. An income inequality goal could represent a red line for some countries: the United States, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa all fall into the most unequal quartile using the Palma ratio.

- **How will global goals/national targets work in practice?** Within both the Panel process and the OWG, there has been much discussion of the idea that post-2015 goals should not apply rigidly to every country, and that a global framework should instead be adaptable to countries’ individual situations – perhaps as a ‘menu’ of priorities to choose from. On the other hand, such an approach would seem to be in tension with the logic of ‘zero goals’ (e.g. a goal of eradicating poverty by 2030), where by definition all countries must achieve the desired outcome.

- **How will issues such as conflict and governance be handled?** The Panel proposed goals to ensure stable and peaceful societies and good governance and effective institutions. The need to include specific targets to build peace and strengthen societies will prove controversial with some countries, especially those concerned by the securitization of development issues or threats to national sovereignty. Conflict-affected states are generally supportive of the need for a greater focus on effective governance and tackling instability, however, and much will depend on how strongly they lobby in support of a common position.

- **Where will sustainability and climate change fit in the goals?** The Panel’s proposed goals include both ‘manage natural resources sustainably’ and ‘secure sustainable energy’, and also suggest second-level targets on sustainable agriculture, sustainable fresh water use, and the need to keep global average warming to 2°C. A key question is whether the OWG will propose bringing climate change and sustainable production and consumption into the top-level goals.
• How clear is the implementation agenda? In focusing on social sectors like health and education, the MDGs prioritized areas of work where there was already extensive knowledge of what needed to be done: what was missing was the resources to do it. By contrast, it seems likely that much of the post-2015 agenda will lead towards areas of work where development actors are less sure of how to make progress, and more experimental approaches will be needed – such as building capacity and accountability in fragile environments, moving to green economies, or promoting climate resilience. Consensus will be harder to achieve on the post-2015 agenda if doubts grow that it can be effectively implemented.

• Above all: what will be the political deal at the core of the post-2015 agenda? The architects of the MDGs were clear that the new goals were ultimately a means to the end of rebuilding Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows after the ‘lost decade’ for development of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Accordingly, as soon as the Millennium Summit had agreed the ‘what’ of the MDG agenda, work started on preparing for the 2002 Monterrey summit on financing for development (the ‘how’). This time around, ODA and other financial flows will remain critical; but they will also need to be matched by a much broader global partnership, and recognition of a wider range of responsibilities for richer countries. So far, at least, there has been relatively little thought about what the key elements of such a partnership would need to be, or the political prospects for securing them. We return to this question more fully below.

The Process From Here

As member states and other stakeholders wrangle with these questions of substance, they will also face the challenge of keeping up with a complex, time consuming and – at times – fragmented process.

The Open Working Group

While there are proposals for a new intergovernmental process to negotiate the post-2015 development agenda, for the moment the Open Working Group will continue to act as the main forum for debate, with its focus on Sustainable Development Goals.

Initially, the OWG suffered from protracted wrangling over its membership, with some member states unhappy that it was restricted to 30 ‘seats.’ This membership structure may, however, now prove to be a source of strength with most regions choosing to share seats between two or three countries that must work together to develop a common position on the issues under discussion. Moreover, the fact that any government can attend and speak at OWG meetings, whether or not it actually has a seat, is also being seen as a source of inclusiveness and legitimacy.

The OWG has now met three times, with five further sessions planned before February 2014. Sessions are organized around sectoral (employment, cities, oceans, etc.) and cross-cutting themes (inequality, the needs of ‘countries in special situations’), with time also set aside to consider implementation and partnerships. The work plan after February is yet to be finalized, but the OWG is expected to report to the General Assembly in September 2014.

The challenge for the OWG is to produce proposals that are succinct, focused, and resonant both with member states and audiences outside New York. After February, OWG co-chairs are expected to start focusing on narrowing gaps between constituencies and building the blocks of the final report, as member state missions begin to move into negotiating mode. Some observers, however, predict the hard work of bargaining over priorities will be left to the last minute, with the OWG facing a tough challenge...
if it is to produce a focused set of recommendations in September 2014.

**The MDG Special Event and the first High-level Political Forum**

Over the next few weeks, attention will switch to preparations for a Special Event of the President of the General Assembly, to be held on 25 September 2013, and to the first High-level Political Forum (HLPF) that will be held back-to-back with it.

The Special Event is intended to “follow up efforts towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals” while also exploring the development agenda after 2015, and has been described as an opportunity for the General Assembly to begin developing “a single holistic and comprehensive development agenda.”6,7

A key input to these preparations will be a report from the Secretary-General, expected to focus mainly on progress in implementing the MDGs, but also to make important proposals on future development priorities. The report will draw not only on the Panel report, but also the recommendations of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda,9 national and thematic consultations facilitated by the UN Development Group,9 a report on the UN Global Compact, the report of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network,10 and the global consultation conducted through the MyWorld web platform.11

The HLPF, meanwhile, is a new body established at Rio+20 as a replacement for the Commission on Sustainable Development, with a remit to “provide political leadership, guidance and recommendations for sustainable development… [and] a dynamic platform for… agenda setting to advance sustainable development.”12

The incoming President of the 68th General Assembly (John Ashe, the widely respected Permanent Representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations), will have an historic opportunity to promote the Special Event and the HLPF as a key agenda-setting platform, while also establishing the Forum as the apex body for providing a high level oversight of the UN development agenda after 2015. There will also be an opportunity to draw on the expertise of other stakeholders, while ensuring the Forum retains its intergovernmental nature.

Overall, a strong report from the Secretary-General, combined with effective political leadership from the Special Event and the Forum, could provide decisive momentum for the post-2015 process, while providing an opportunity for governments to focus on the overall scope of the new development framework – before divisions over more controversial issues become entrenched.

**The Expert Committee on a Sustainable Development Financing Strategy**

The Open Working Group will be complemented by an intergovernmental committee to “propose options on an effective sustainable development financing strategy to facilitate the mobilization of resources and their effective use in achieving sustainable development objectives.”13

Unlike the OWG, members of the Financing committee will be around thirty individuals rather than governments themselves, although in practice it seems likely that governments will nominate their own officials or diplomats, rather than independent experts, as representatives. The committee is supposed to report to the General Assembly in 2014, but the conclusion of its work may be delayed until 2015 if wrangling over representation causes delays.

An important question is how the committee will interpret its mandate. At one end of the spectrum, it could focus on assessing Official Development Assistance needs, and comparing these against current levels. Alternatively – and more usefully – it could look at finance more broadly, for example considering areas like climate finance, private sector investment, and innovative financing. Even more broadly, it could use the identification of financial needs to explore all means of implementation of the post-2015 agenda.

In any case, the committee offers an opportunity to ensure essential analytical work is completed that will be needed to underpin a delivery plan for the post-2015 agenda. It also provides a mechanism to begin ensuring that
ministries of finance become closely involved in the post-2015 discussions, complementing the work of ministries of foreign affairs, as well as the work of environment ministries on the Rio+20 agenda.

**Agreeing the Goals**

Once the OWG has submitted its report to the General Assembly in September 2014, the post-2015 agenda will move into the home straight – during what is likely to be one of the busiest periods for multilateralism in years.

Most important will be the question of what happens once the OWG has submitted its report on Sustainable Development Goals to the General Assembly in September 2014. At present, there is no formal modality for submitting its proposals to a summit of member states. However, many in New York assume the September 2015 meeting of the High-level Political Forum (the HLPF’s second meeting) will in practice be the political ‘moment’ at which goals are agreed.

In the background, there is the question of what will happen between 2014 and 2015 if, as some pessimists predict, the OWG fails to reach consensus, or is able to agree only on an unfocused document. A new intergovernmental process would further complicate the calculus, especially if it starts before the OWG has concluded. The collective negotiation by all 193 member states not just of a broad vision and approach, but of specific goals and targets, will be unprecedented in its nature and complexity, and is unlikely to reach a conclusion without contentious and protracted debate.

**A Summit on Financing?**

One recommendation made in the High-level Panel report that has not so far received widespread attention is a proposal that “an international conference should take up in more detail the question of finance for sustainable development.” Such a conference “should discuss how to integrate development, sustainable development and environmental financing streams” on the basis that “a single agenda should have a coherent overall financing structure.”

While the logic for such a summit seems clear, a harder question is when it would make most sense to hold such an event. One option would be to hold such an event after post-2015 goals have been agreed (the Monterrey summit was held a full two years after the Millennium Summit in New York, for example). A second option – and the one endorsed by the Panel – would be to hold the event during 2015, for example a few months before the September HLPF, where it could draw on the work of the Expert Committee on Financing Strategy and provide a strong signal that the proposed post-2015 agenda will be backed up with resources.

**The Other Post-2015 Agenda: climate change**

Governments have agreed on a deadline of 2015 for reaching a new deal on climate change, for implementation in 2020. Just as in the run up to the Copenhagen summit, this will ensure that climate negotiations become an increasingly dominant item on the international agenda. This provides opportunities for integration with the development agenda, but also creates risks, especially if levels of distrust grow between countries from different regions and income groups.

While many observers believe that the two processes can be kept in their silos, experience shows that the lines are likely to become blurred over time, especially as heads of state become involved. September 2014, for example, will see not only the OWG’s report but also a head of government level summit on climate change convened by the Secretary-General in New York. There will henceforth be two simultaneous discussions seeking to chart paths towards sustainable production and consumption paths, each involving charged questions of equity and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’ It may make more sense actively to ensure these processes complement and support each other, than to allow tensions and contradictions to build.
The Politics of a Global Partnership Worth the Name

At present, many governments are just beginning to focus on the post-2015 agenda and have yet to develop a firm position on the key issues. Capitals and missions in New York are not always aligned, while few ministries of finance have engaged with an agenda that has potentially profound consequences for national policy. Over the next six months, however, an inflection point is likely to be reached as a critical mass of countries begin to engage at a serious and senior level, with key areas of agreement and disagreement becoming more sharply defined.

Delivering success by 2030 requires engagement across the full range of economic, social and environmental issues, leading to a global partnership with genuine commitment to delivering sustainable development. This work needs to begin immediately, identifying where shared interests allow for new partnerships to evolve, and the ‘stretch positions’ that might allow compromises to be made. Governments will need to work first individually, and then together, to identify the boundaries of the possible if they are to build a post-2015 agenda with ambition, credibility, and purpose.

In 2013:

- **African countries have the potential to play a decisive role.** African countries have fast-growing workforces and need an economic transformation if they are to provide young people with jobs and other economic opportunities. Africa is also projected to be home to up to 90% of the world’s poor in 2030 on a business-as-usual trajectory and therefore has a strong interest in ensuring broad commitment to an ‘end poverty’ agenda. They therefore have powerful incentives to insist on ‘getting to zero’ goals that complete the unfinished business of the MDGs, while advocating for the policies, strategies, and investment needed to enhance their productive capacity. African countries still emit very low levels of greenhouse gases and are worrying exposed to climate damages, and will therefore continue to be important advocates of a robust climate change deal that offers them fair shares of any global carbon budget.

- **Leadership from major powers will clearly be important.** In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Obama said that the “the United States will join with our allies to eradicate such extreme poverty in the next two decades.” China made a decisive contribution to poverty reduction and to economic transformation in the MDG era and has indicated that it intends to be at the forefront of shaping the post-2015 agenda in a “cooperative and win-win spirit.” In recent years, Brazil has demonstrated innovative approaches to inclusive development in areas such as food security and social protection, developing a model that is highly influential in South-South cooperation. India, meanwhile, is the single country that will most determine the world’s success in meeting its goals after 2015, given both the extent of its residual poverty and of its development opportunities. Europe, finally, is certain to play an active part, building on its role as a key architect of the MDGs. There is an unprecedented opportunity for these, and other, major powers to develop joint approaches to find common ground on the post-2015 agenda, even while they disagree on other geopolitical issues.

- **Any country, however, has the chance to exert disproportionate influence on the process.** Through its early advocacy for the SDGs, Colombia has demonstrated how effectively a single country, equipped with a clear vision and strategy, can define the post-2015 process. Many UN member states, especially smaller countries, will have their greatest chance to shape the debate if they make an early contribution, rather than waiting for 2014 or 2015. Advocacy around the High-level Political Forum and Special Event is likely to be particularly effective, but only if governments, or broader partnerships that include civil society and business, can present cogent and compelling proposals that rise above the formulaic jargon that dominates UN debates on development and if these messages are carried forward by effective member state representatives in New York.
It is important that the Secretary-General himself sets out a vision. The post-2015 agenda is, clearly, an essential legacy issue for the Secretary-General, drawing to a conclusion his advocacy on sustainable development that has defined his time in office. He needs to use the coming months to respond to the transformational shifts recommended by the Panel, and in particular to add his moral authority to the growing call to end poverty. He must also provide reassurance to key UN constituencies that controversial issues will be sensitively handled and that there will be no attempt to make commitments before a firm consensus has formed. Finally, he needs to begin the work of galvanizing the partnerships that will deliver key objectives after 2015, providing reassurance that the new framework is amenable to implementation.

The Secretary-General should also begin recruiting champions to help him guide the post-2015 process to a successful conclusion. The High-level Panel Chairs should be kept closely involved in the process, forming the nucleus of an informal ‘Group of Friends’. The President of Liberia has already committed to helping develop a common position among both African countries and conflicted-affected states. The President of Indonesia should be asked to play a similar leadership role in Asia, including after he finishes his second term of office in 2014. The British Prime Minister can also make an important contribution, drawing on the UK’s ability to influence a range of international institutions. The governments of Hungary and Kenya are also deeply involved in the post-2015 process, as chairs of the OWG process, as are the co-facilitators of the Expert Committee on Financing (Kazakhstan and Norway) and High-level Political Forum (Brazil and Italy). These and other countries can form the nucleus of a group that will help the SG build consensus over the next two years.

Conclusion: The Immediate Action Agenda

Despite early momentum, the scale of the task in finalizing a post-2015 agenda, and agreeing a coherent set of global goals, should not be underestimated. It took a decade for the original MDGs to reach maturity, with two further years to finalize the targets themselves. Effective technical work will play an important role in providing a foundation for agreement, but ultimately the challenge is a political one.

During 2013, champions of a bold but practical post-2015 agenda need to tackle seven key areas for action.

1. Seize the opportunity presented by the High-level Panel report.

The High-level Panel has set out a challenging vision for the post-2015 agenda, but the mark of success of its report will be whether it fulfills the Chairs’ stated objective of “stimulat[ing] debate over the prioritization that will be needed if the international community is to agree a new development framework before the expiry of the Millennium Development Goals.” The Panel report should be presented at the June meeting of the Open Working Group and an extensive program of outreach conducted over the summer. Most important will be informal meetings that help member states understand the nature of the Panel’s deliberations and why various options were adopted or rejected.

2. Start thinking much more seriously about implementation.

Business-as-usual will not deliver an end to income poverty by 2030, while many goals addressing other dimensions of poverty will be many times harder to achieve than the current MDGs (e.g. quality education, rather than simply access). The broader agenda poses even more profound challenges. New strategies are beginning to emerge for helping countries recover from conflict, but they are untested. The global jobs crisis has few easy solutions. Progress on climate stabilization and other environmental objectives is extremely weak. It is therefore essential that international organizations, and above all member states themselves, begin to
develop the plans and partnerships that will underpin
the new development agenda, turning a normative
conversation into a strategic one. Without a credible
route to implementation, political consensus is likely to
prove extremely hard to reach.

3. Ensure that the post-2015 agenda is not allowed to
fragment.

While there are powerful arguments for a twin-track
approach, the international system is unlikely to be
able to agree or to implement more than one set of
goals. Equally, while national flexibility is important, it
is also essential that there are clear global standards,
rather than a patchwork of voluntary targets that
sacrifice the coherence of the MDGs. Finally, there is
real danger in the negotiation itself becoming split
unless heads of state/government agree to a roadmap
in September 2013 for a smooth transfer from the Open
Working Group and Expert Committee on Financing to
a new intergovernmental forum in 2014 that will be
responsible for concluding the new agenda.

4. Start with commitments to end poverty.

At its heart, the MDG framework is a poverty reduction
framework, with large numbers of governments,
development organizations, and civil society groups
now aligned to its goals and targets. Any lack of
continuity would have a significant impact on efforts
to help the world’s poorest people. Equally, many of
the countries with significant numbers of people living
in absolute poverty are keen to secure commitments
that the focus on poverty will not be lost in a debate
on broader sustainability issues where there is less
international consensus. The commitment to ending
poverty should therefore be at the heart of discussions
in 2013, with provisional poverty goals set out by
September 2014 for integration in the wider agenda as
it is finalized.

5. Get underway immediately on harnessing the data
revolution.

At present, we lack the data to design a post-2015
framework effectively, let alone to set a business-as-usual
baseline or monitor progress after it is implemented.18
The High-level Panel called for the establishment of a
Global Partnership on Development Data to fill data
gaps and galvanize efforts to set a post-2015 baseline.
This work needs to start immediately, with a firm
commitment to funding, staffing, and supporting the
new partnership an important output from the High-
level Political Forum in 2013. Meanwhile, both Rio+20
and the Panel have proposed a Global Sustainability
Report, which has the potential to become a platform
for forcing international institutions to collaborate on
developing and disseminating the common data and
analysis the post-2015 agenda will rely on. The first
edition of this report is already in preparation, with a
wide range of UN agencies, and the World Bank, already
engaged.

6. Move now on the partnerships agenda.

There is broad consensus that the post-2015 agenda
will rely on new forms of partnership and will draw on
new sources of finance. But outside a few sectors such
as energy, little work has been done to demonstrate
that it is possible to turn the rhetoric on partnership
into reality. By building partnerships now, the UN will
widen the circle of those with a strategic interest in the
successful conclusion of the post-2015 negotiations,
while demonstrating to all participants the potential
scale of change that can be achieved.

7. Take the post-2015 debate outside the UN.

Broad consultations have played an important role
in the early stages of the post-2015 debate, but it is
now important to build on this outreach. While some
member states will resist this reality, it is inconceivable
that the post-2015 agenda will succeed in its more
ambitious objectives without active support from
the G20, designated by its members as the “primary
institution for [their] economic cooperation,” or from the
major institutions of global economic governance such as the IMF and the WTO. In particular, it will be essential that the 2015 G20 in Turkey issues an unambiguous signal of consensus and support for a final agreement later in that year. Other international summits and meetings can also play an important role, such as the 6th BRICS summit in Brazil in 2014, and of course the 22nd African Union Summit in January 2014. Much broader civil society and media campaigning support will also be needed, especially at national level, making it easier for governments to put their differences aside and reach an ambitious agreement.

No-one should underestimate the scale of the challenge in agreeing and implementing a post-2015 agenda that has implications for most, if not all, significant global process, from climate change to trade, economic to energy governance, peace building to biodiversity. In 2015, the culmination of the post-2015 and climate processes will put multilateralism under unprecedented pressure, with potentially extremely serious fallout if outcomes cannot be delivered, especially in view of the weak outcomes from both Copenhagen in 2009 and Rio in 2012. The clock is now ticking. The world’s governments must engage in open and serious debate today if an ambitious agreement is to be reached in two years’ time.
Annex: The High-level Panel’s Illustrative Goals

The High-level Panel of Eminent Persons was convened by the UN Secretary-General to advise him on a bold and at the same time practical development agenda beyond 2015.

In its report, it concluded that “its agreed vision and recommended priorities for the shape of the post-2015 development agenda cannot be communicated effectively without offering an example of how goals might be framed.” It therefore set out twelve illustrative goals and associated targets to “promote continued debate and deliberation” on the new agenda. These are shown in figure 1.

ILLUSTRATIVE GOALS AND TARGETS

1. End Poverty
2. Empower Girls and Women and Achieve Gender Equality
3. Provide Quality Education and Lifelong Learning
4. Ensure Healthy Lives
5. Ensure Food Security and Good Nutrition
6. Achieve Universal Access to Water and Sanitation
7. Secure Sustainable Energy
8. Create Jobs, Sustainable Livelihoods, and Equitable Growth
9. Manage Natural Resource Assets Sustainably
10. Ensure Good Governance and Effective Institutions
11. Ensure Stable and Peaceful Societies
12. Create a Global Enabling Environment & Catalyse Long-Term Finance

A NEW GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP


Figure 1 - Illustrative Goals & Targets

What happens now? – the post-2015 agenda after the High-level Panel
About the authors

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Alex has worked over the past year to support Unilever CEO Paul Polman on his membership of the High-Level Panel, and was seconded to the UN Secretary-General’s office as the writer for the 2011 UN High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, which first proposed the idea of Sustainable Development Goals. He also currently works with the Center for Global Development on future global climate policy. He lives and works in Ethiopia.

David is also an Associate Director at CIC, where he directs CIC’s work on international development, as well as a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program of the Brookings Institution. At Brookings, he is leading a research program into the geopolitical risks associated with natural resources and the environment. He is research director of the Pakistan Task Force on the Next Generation, which is exploring the country’s demographic risks and opportunities.

Their publications include:

The Future is Not Good Enough: Business As Usual After 2015 (Alex Evans and David Steven, background paper for High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, June 2013)

Goals in a Post-2015 Development Framework (David Steven, NYU Center on International Cooperation, January 2013)

Climate, Scarcity and Sustainability in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Alex Evans, NYI Center on International Cooperation, 2012)

Beyond the Millennium Development Goals (Alex Evans and David Steven, Brookings Institution, 2012)

Resource Scarcity, Fair Shares and Development (Alex Evans, Oxfam / WWF, 2011)


2020 Development Futures (Alex Evans, Action Aid, 2011)

Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalisation (Alex Evans, Bruce Jones and David Steven, Brookings Institution, 2010)

These and their other publications are all available at http://www.globaldashboard.org/articles-and-publications/

The authors would like to thank those who commented on earlier drafts of this report.

What happens now? – the post-2015 agenda after the High-level Panel
Endnotes


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