Strategic Summary 2012

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As 2012 came to a close, violence in Syria continued unabated despite efforts by joint UN-AU Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi to mediate between the conflict parties and to reconcile differences between member states over the approach to the crisis. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, national forces cautiously returned to Goma after M23 rebels withdrew, but the situation remained volatile. In Mali, amid preparations for an African-led international intervention force to expel Islamist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, insurgents advanced farther toward government-held territory. The growing threat prompted the launch of a French military operation in early January 2013, at the transitional government’s request, to halt the Islamists and accelerate the deployment of African troops.

Events in 2012 demonstrated the critical role that peace operations can play as a tool for crisis management, but also brought their limits into sharp relief. Political and security advances in a number of countries allowed for reductions in deployments. However, across the Middle East and much of Africa, peace operations came under severe strain as they struggled to respond to deteriorating security conditions, as in eastern Congo, and to unraveling political agreements, as in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic. The confluence of the two in Syria resulted in the resignation of Kofi Annan from his post as Special Envoy and the withdrawal of the short-lived observer mission. The international community continues to struggle to develop a roadmap for the way forward, with divisions in the Security Council hampering progress in finding a resolution to the crisis.

In addition to the authorizations in Syria, in 2012 the Security Council upgraded the UN’s political presence in Yemen to assist with the transition process and established the post of Special Envoy for the Sahel. In December the Council authorized an African-led military force in Mali and asked the Secretary-General to submit detailed proposals for a multidisciplinary UN presence in Mali to support the political and security process.

These events took place against an evolving debate on the financing and support of both peacekeeping and political missions at the UN. At UN headquarters, the divide between troop- and financial-contributing member states continued, but the senior advisory group on troop costs presented a series of recommendations to be deliberated by member states in 2013 that have the potential to break the stalemate on this issue. Proposals to strengthen the funding and backstopping arrangements for political missions failed to move forward. However, there are some promising signs that agreements may be reached on some aspects of financing in 2013. While political missions still lack a dedicated forum at the UN, where all member states can express their views on these operations, a request by member states for the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive report on the UN’s political missions in mid-2013 may provide a venue for further discussion. Commitments by the Security Council and General Assembly to strengthen the UN’s conflict prevention and mediation capacities may be a harbinger of new momentum.

Regional organizations played a prominent role in addressing political and security
In 2012, nearly 85 percent of all multilateral peace operations were operating in parallel with another multilateral mission, coordination and cooperation between UN and regional organizations yielded mixed results both on the ground and in terms of institutional partnerships. The security gains in Somalia were achieved within a new strategic concept for AMISOM and greater UN support for the mission, demonstrating new high points in the UN-AU relationship. UN military planners also assisted the latest joint AU and ECOWAS planning efforts for the African-led force in Mali. Despite these joint efforts, however, the Secretary-General only guardedly recommended the approval of an intervention force. Continued questions on the funding of the mission and the lack of a strong endorsement for the intervention force from the Secretary-General represented a major setback to the relationship between the institutions.

Events in 2012 underscore the fundamental link between politics and security in crisis management. The work of both types of peace operations—political and peacekeeping—in moving processes in these areas forward has provided the foundational logic for combining the coverage of the Annual Review of Global
Trends in Global Peace Operations

Deployments to all military and civilian-led global peace operations shrank by nearly 11 percent in 2012, with 254,982 troops, police, and civilians in field-based missions this year as compared to 286,325 in 2011. This represents the first contraction of global peace operations in nearly a decade.

The number of civilians supporting UN field missions, both peacekeeping and political, saw a slight decrease of 2 percent, to 23,987, in 2012. With a decrease in civilian staff from 20,662 in 2011 to 20,132 in 2012, peacekeeping operations saw a bigger reduction than did political missions, which experienced only a small contraction of about 1 percent in the same period. The United States, Kenya, and the Philippines are the top three nationalities of international civilian staff in UN peacekeeping and political missions.

The vast majority of multilateral peace operations in the field operate alongside another mission, with approximately half of all political missions operating in parallel with military deployments. Africa hosts sixteen UN missions—the highest regional concentration of peace operations—with seven peacekeeping operations and nine civilian-led political missions, including two regional offices. Of these missions, 81 percent are deployed in the same region or subregion. Of the seven field-based missions that the UN operates in the Middle East, four are peacekeeping operations and three are political missions. In the Middle East, only UNAMI operates without another
UN peace operation alongside it within the same subregion.

There is also a growing trend of military and civilian-led missions of different institutions deploying alongside each other. In the Western Balkans in 2012, the EU, the OSCE, and NATO had three military and police operations and ten civilian-led missions deployed that worked in close cooperation with each other. Over 90 percent of all non-UN peace operations in Africa operate in cooperation with a UN mission in the same country or subregion. The EU, which fields four military and police operations and five civilian-led operations in Africa, runs eight of its nine missions alongside UN presences.

Peacekeeping Operations

UN military and police deployments to peacekeeping missions continued to contract, from 98,972 uniformed personnel in 2011 to 96,934 in 2012, a decrease of 2 percent. The reduction occurred across troop and police deployments and follows a contraction seen over the 2010–2011 period.

In Sudan and South Sudan, deployments to UNMIS and UNISFA, missions that were both authorized in 2011, increased as the missions neared their full strength, while deployments to UNAMID declined. Sudan and South Sudan continue to host over one-third of the UN’s total peacekeepers. In West Africa, UNMIL’s planned force reduction continued, amid an authorized increase in its formed police units, while UNOCI’s forces stayed level. The precarious security situation in Côte d’Ivoire delayed planned reductions in the latter’s strength. In Haiti, after a surge in troop and police deployments in response to the 2010 earthquake, both troop and police levels continued to decline, approaching pre-earthquake levels. Deployments to UNMIT also gradually decreased throughout 2012, leading up to its closure on 31 December.

Non-UN deployments shrunk by nearly 20 percent overall, with large reductions in NATO’s ISAF troops in Afghanistan accounting for much of the decrease. Bolstered by a near doubling of AMISOM’s authorized strength, and rapid additional contributions including the rehating of Kenyan troops, AU deployments to the organization’s sole peacekeeping mission grew over 80 percent in 2012, reaching nearly 20,000 personnel. Overall police deployments to non-UN missions decreased nearly 13 percent.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were once again the top three military contributors to UN missions. Brazil, though its contributions did not significantly change from 2011 (and indeed dropped slightly), was a top ten contributor in 2012. South Africa and China were respectively the twelfth and thirteenth largest contributors in 2012. India and Nigeria are top ten contributors across military, police, and civilian personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. In the AU, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya were the top troop contributors.

Political Missions

With the creation of the posts of Joint UN-AU Special Envoy to Syria and Special Envoy to the Sahel, the UN authorized two new political missions in 2012 and strengthened the country presence of the Special Adviser on Yemen. Following the peaceful conduct of the elections in Sierra Leone in November 2012, the UN is laying out plans for UNIPSIL’s exit strategy, while a transition from BNUB to a regular Country Team presence will also be discussed.

Overall, civilian personnel in UN field-based political missions experienced a slight decrease, from 3,912 in 2011 to 3,855 in 2012. With total staff strengths of 2,085 and 1,205 respectively, UNAMA and UNAMI remained the largest UN field-based political missions in 2012, accounting for 77 percent of all staff in UN field-based political missions. Uniformed personnel deployed in political missions increased by 47 percent, from 284 total staff in 2011 to 416 in 2012. This change was largely due to the increase in contingent troops deployed to UNAMI—the only UN political mission with a troop presence—from 221 to 352 between April 2011 and October 2012, amid a deterioration of the security situation in Iraq.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada represent the top three nationalities among international staff in UN political missions. Kenya, the Philippines, and India follow closely in fourth and fifth place. India is the only emerging power represented among the top ten nationalities of international staff in political missions.

While the number of political missions deployed by the UN, EU, OSCE, and OAS largely remained the same in 2012, the AU and ECOWAS both increased their field presence.

Note: Includes both military and civilian-led missions that were operational for any period between January and December of each year. The UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, EUAVSEC South Sudan, ECOMIB, the ECOWAS Envoy to Mali, and the ECOWAS Envoy to Guinea-Bissau are counted in the graph, but are not presented in the data sections of this Annual Review.
ECOWAS, which had zero political missions in 2011, deployed two in 2012,\(^\text{13}\) while the AU now operates fourteen liaison offices across Africa—an increase of 17 percent over 2011.

**Peace Operations in 2012**

Changing political dynamics as a result of the Arab Spring remain uncertain and are still unfolding, within varied national and regional environments. In Libya, UNSMIL assisted in the holding of the first elections in over forty years in July, whereas conflict continued unabated in Syria throughout the year.

By the end of 2012, it was estimated that nearly 60,000 people had perished since the start of the Syrian conflict in March 2011. In February 2012, Kofi Annan was appointed as the joint United Nations–Arab League Special Envoy for Syria. Amid Annan’s intense mediation efforts, in April the UN deployed the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, a peacekeeping mission with a limited observation mandate. However, the violence on the ground worsened, as did the divisions in the Security Council. After vetoing a Security Council resolution in February demanding the Syrian government to end the violence, Russia and China vetoed another resolution in July that threatened Bashar al-Assad’s regime with sanctions for failing to comply with Annan’s peace plan. In August, UNSMIS was discontinued and Annan resigned as Special Envoy. The failure of Annan’s successor, Lakhdar Brahimi, to secure a cease-fire during Eid al-Adha or since then has demonstrated the persistent limits of political engagement in the absence of a unified Security Council. The effects of the conflict have destabilized the region and coincided with the outbreak of overt hostilities between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza.
UN NATO Regional and Ad Hoc Deployments

Total Military Contributions to UN Peacekeeping and Non-UN Military Operations: 2002–2012

While 2012 was largely expected to be a year of drawdown of the presence of international peace operations in West Africa, the overall security environment, coupled with multiple military coups, limited more rapid reduction of peacekeepers in the region. Instead, the precarious security situation brought about the deployment of two new peace operation presences, the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) and the EU capacity-building mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). In December, two additional missions, the African-led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) and the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), were authorized. Ongoing force reductions for UNMIL continued, largely driven by pressure from the international community following successful elections in 2011 and amid larger budgetary constraints. The reductions occurred despite the Secretary-General’s assessment that national forces are still unable to maintain stability.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, over twelve years of peacekeeping in the country suffered a major setback when the M23 rebel movement took control of Goma as national forces fled. UN peacekeepers were criticized for their inability to halt the M23 advance despite deploying attack helicopters. MONUSCO troops engaged in limited activities to protect civilians in and around Goma and supervised the rebels’ withdrawal two weeks after the siege. The UN Group of Experts on the DRC has repeatedly stated that Rwanda and Uganda, despite their assertions otherwise, have provided critical support to the M23 movement, complicating the mediation role they have assumed between the government and the rebels.

Peace operations also faced rapid deterioration in the Central African Republic, where the emergence of an armed rebel coalition in December threatened political progress and peace consolidation efforts. As the armed groups advanced, eventually gaining control of approximately one-third of the country, the governments of Chad and South Africa agreed to send 2,000 and 400 troops respectively to halt the rebel coalition. The Economic Community of Central African States bolstered its peacekeeping operation
in the Central African Republic, MICOPAX, while the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BIN-UCA) engaged with the government and rebels to establish a dialogue and cease-fire. Both the Security Council and the Secretary-General condemned the violence, which resulted in the temporary evacuation of nonessential UN staff. Peace negotiations in early January 2013 yielded a cease-fire and an agreement on forming a coalition government, but the security environment in the Central African Republic remained precarious.

The considerable security advances by a reinforced AMISOM and Somali forces in 2012 paved the way for the relocation of the UN Political Office for Somalia to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years. These gains were matched on the political front, where the creation of a new government and parliament formally ended the transitional period. However, delayed political reforms and continued asymmetric attacks underscore that there is a limited window for securing the unprecedented achievements of 2012.

Sudan and South Sudan, which together host a total of nine multilateral political and peacekeeping missions, made only halting progress in resolving outstanding issues around the administration of Abyei and border demarcation in 2012, but did at least manage to register an agreement on revenue-sharing with the assistance of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. However, progress in negotiations was overshadowed at the close of 2012 by rising violence in the South Sudan state of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, where in December UNMISS sheltered 5,000 people at its regional base. At the same time, in Jonglei state, one of UNMISS’s helicopters was shot down by South Sudanese armed forces. A humanitarian crisis enveloped South Kordofan and Blue Nile states as fighting between rebels and Sudanese armed forces continued. In Darfur, the security situation remained unstable, posing continued threats to civilians and peacekeepers alike.

In Afghanistan, significant planning is under way for what will be the largest peace operation transition in the near future—the drawdown and withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by the end
of 2014. A key component of the withdrawal, the handover of security responsibilities to national authorities, has largely adhered to planned timelines, though the process has been beset by a surge in green-on-blue attacks. With ISAF’s departure and pending plans for an ISAF follow-on presence, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan will likely become the primary international presence in Afghanistan, at a time when the mission is also facing considerable cuts to its budget.

In many of these missions, security issues presented continued and in some cases growing challenges for operations on the ground in 2012. In Libya, the convoy of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General was attacked in April, and in December another attack on a UN convoy took place, while freedom of movement was restricted for mission staff in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, negatively affecting their ability to implement their mandates.

Both thematic chapters in this volume analyze the changing strategic context for peace operations, particularly in increasingly dangerous settings, and the implications for mission leadership and new missions.

Conclusion and Looking Ahead

The year 2012 presented a new terrain for multilateral peace operations. Overall deployments to missions fielded by the UN and other organizations decreased. Yet at the same time, several new missions were authorized in 2012, and new operations have been proposed for 2013, including a possible additional regional force in eastern Congo. While the direction of the volatile situation in Syria is difficult to predict, developments on the ground may necessitate a new peacekeeping or political field mission. The overall debate around peace operations at UN headquarters and national capitols has continued to focus on reductions pushed by financial necessities, but realities on the ground point to the continuing role for both political and peacekeeping missions in crisis management.

There is growing interest in strengthening conflict prevention measures and in the deployment of lighter-weight missions—both civilian-led and more specialized military missions involving specific thematic expertise and specialized assets. As this year’s volume of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations
demonstrates, various types of peace operations deployed by international organizations already commonly work alongside each other. There is also an increasing interest in stronger cooperation across organizations, though events in 2012 demonstrate that there is still some way to go before a division of labor based on comparative advantage is achieved. Overarching these changes is the question of whether and how Western nations will reengage with UN peace operations as they withdraw their troops and specialized assets from Afghanistan over the next two years.

Events in 2012 also demonstrated the limits and capacities of peace operations to stabilize environments and support political processes, heightened by the degree of political support from member states. While the stalemate in resolving the conflict in Syria in 2012 and its associated high human costs illustrated the limits of peace operations, especially in the context of a divided Security Council, the crucial security advances in Somalia that created the political space necessary for progress are in large part due to UN, AU, and EU consensus on increasing support to AMISOM.

Looking forward, peace operation deployments will encounter volatile and in some cases deteriorating security situations and challenging political realities, amid expectations from the international community to do more with fewer resources. But if lessons from the past year are to be a guide, the international institutions fielding these missions must be equipped with sufficient operational capacities and political backing to enable progress on the ground.

Notes
1. This figure includes peacekeeping and political missions, including regional offices with a mandate covering several countries.
2. These figures exclude civilian deployments to non-UN missions. Figures for UN deployments are as of 31 October 2012, while figures for non-UN deployments are as of 30 September 2012.
3. The last reduction of UN and non-UN combined deployments was in 2003. In 2011 there was a reduction of UN deployments and an increase in non-UN deployments that more than offset UN reductions, with overall growth in global peace operations.
4. This includes all field-based political missions and peacekeeping operations, as well as the Special Adviser for Cyprus, UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), UN Representative to the Geneva International Discussions (UNRGID), Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, and UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA).
5. The peacekeeping operations are MINURSO, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS, and UNOCI. The political missions are BINUCA, BNUB, CNMC, UNIOGBIS, UNIPSIL, UNOCA, UNOWA, UNPOS, and UNSMIL.
6. The peacekeeping operations are UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNSMIS, and UNTSO. The political missions are UNAMI, UNSCO, and UNSCOL.
8. The exception is EUCAP Sahel Niger.
9. Uniformed personnel include troops, military observers, and civilian police in UN peacekeeping missions. Year-to-year comparisons are made on actual deployments between September 2011 and September 2012 for non-UN-commanded missions, and between October 2011 and October 2012 for UN-commanded missions.
10. In 2012, UN military operations decreased from 84,735 personnel in 2011 to 83,300 in 2011, a reduction of over 1.5 percent. UN civilian police deployments decreased from 14,237 personnel in 2011 to 13,637 in 2012, a reduction of over 4 percent.
11. Uniform personnel in field-based UN political missions include troops, military experts on mission, and police. The 2011 figures of uniformed personnel are as of 30 April, as compared to 2012 figures as of 31 October.
12. Kenya and the Philippines have equal representation of staff.
13. This includes the mediators deployed by ECOWAS to Guinea-Bissau and Mali.