

Addressing Protracted Displacement: The Turkish case

I. Introduction:

As one of the most disastrous by-products of the rising number and intensity of today's conflicts, the world's displaced people are occupying an increasingly central role on the world stage. In its latest Global Trends report ([hyperlink](#)), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees notes that war and persecution have led to levels of displacement unseen since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, approximately two-thirds of refugees are trapped in protracted exile, lasting five years or longer.

Turkey has passed this five-year mark for protracted displacement in the spring of 2016. According to the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), more than 2.7 million Syrians are registered in Turkey, as of June 2016. While approximately 260.000 Syrians are housed in temporary residence centers (camps), nearly 2.5 million live in out-of-camp settings, alongside the Turkish population. Since the first Syrians crossed the border into Turkey as a result of the unrest in their country, the needs and expectations of the displaced, the attitudes and perceptions of host communities, and the nature of response has continuously evolved.

Kilis, a Turkish border city of 90.000 people, which has seen an influx of 127.000 Syrians over the past five years¹, offers a snapshot of the challenges that arise from this new normal. Despite a well-planned and executed humanitarian response, - Kilis has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to host refugees ([hyperlink](#)) - the mounting economic and social costs of displacement has strained the response capabilities of Turkish authorities to its limits. Most of the refugees in Kilis are living outside of camps, side by side with local populations. Despite recent efforts to improve the situation, access to education and formal employment remains limited in the out-of-camp areas. Unable to access livelihood opportunities, refugees are largely left dependent on humanitarian assistance, which is unable to respond to all the needs of the nearly 3 million Syrians in Turkey. The host community has been affected too: the presence of refugees has taxed local infrastructure and services, such as education and health services and waste and water management capabilities. As many were prepared to work under minimum wage without expecting social security, some of the town's residents started worrying that their own livelihoods might be jeopardized.

Yayladagi, another Turkish town bordering Syria, has also received its fair share of displaced people since 2011. In addition to camps hosting Syrians since the beginning of the violence – the first camp for Syrians has been established in Yayladagi – the town

¹ This figure reflects the latest data (2 June 2016) published on the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), and does not include unregistered Syrians residing in Kilis. See http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik for more information.

itself has become home to thousands that arrived through the open borders and rented houses. A resident of Yayladagi remembers how the Syrians were initially welcomed wholeheartedly as guests, who were temporarily taking refuge in Turkey until the unrest across the border ended. Their presence helped energize the sleepy town, bring international attention to it, and boosted its economy. As the conflict lingered on and they continued arriving first in hundreds, in thousands, and later in hundreds of thousands, the cultural and habitual differences of the Syrians became more pronounced. The possibility of their more permanent presence in Turkey brought forward concerns on changing demographics, land ownership, and which rights and services the displaced should be entitled to. The question was no longer solely about opening doors to a distressed population; it was how to learn to live together with them in the foreseeable future. However, the fact that many of the Syrians that came to Yayladagi spoke Turkish helped, both with their acceptance and integration, and also with their access to work and educational opportunities.

These examples exhibit how, as displacement lingers on, the nature of response has to evolve as well, to move from solely addressing immediate basic needs such as food, shelter and medical support, to more comprehensive and long-term solutions including employment, education, livelihoods, legal status and documentation. Furthermore, particularly in cases of mass influx, the response has to be expanded, to include perspectives for the host communities as well. However, despite this need for broader solutions, protracted displacement almost always sees a dwindling of resources and capabilities, especially as newcomers continue to flood into the country. In the case of Turkey, the additional displacement created by ISIS attacks in Syria and Iraq has been an additional source of mass influx. As a middle-income country, Turkey receives much less international humanitarian assistance than other refugee receiving countries: In 2013, while the Turkish government spent 1.6 billion dollars on the Syrian response, it received only 194 million dollars in international assistance for the response – equivalent to 12 percent of its domestic expenditure.

The 2015 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, for example, states that while Turkey reported 1.8 billion dollars of humanitarian aid² in 2014, most of which was dedicated to the Syrian refugee response, . A need for new ways of thinking and working is becoming increasingly clear, to address this conundrum.

The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, which was adopted in 2015 by UN member states, calls for “Leaving no one behind” in development processes. At the recent World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, many state leaders, senior UN officials, heads of humanitarian and development agencies, and civil society and private sector

² In 2013, 96 percent of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance was directed at the Syrian response. The full text of the 2015 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report is available at <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/GHA-Report-2015 - Interactive Online.pdf>.

representatives banded together to advocate that development perspectives be adopted in response to protracted humanitarian crises, in order to fulfill the 2030 Agenda's inclusive, people-centered vision. It is time to explore ways to turn these rhetorical commitments in reality, particularly in mass influx situations such as Turkey.

This study aims to demonstrate the most visible issues related to the prolonged nature of displacement of the Syrians in Turkey, and explore possible solutions based on the understanding reached at the World Humanitarian Summit, to ensure that the displaced have access to development opportunities. The study is based on the discussions held at a workshop co-hosted by New York University's Center on International Cooperation and Bahcesehir University's BAUCESS Center, and attended by Turkish and international officials working on displacement related issues in Turkey³.

II. The nature of displacement and main issues in Turkey:

Turkey's growing economy, strong state tradition and institutions, and dynamic business environment have differentiated its response from other refugee receiving countries. Turkey has been able to exercise strong national ownership and a government-led approach, over the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection to Syrians, from the outset of the Syrian crisis. Its efforts in camp settlements, led by AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent, have been widely celebrated: New York Times published an article titled "How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp" in 2014, referring to the exemplary nature of the camps in the Kilis area (hyperlink)⁴.

However, as instability in Syria (and Iraq) persists and consequent displacement into Turkey is expected to continue, the Syrian response needs to shift towards formulating a medium and long-term strategy to be able to efficiently deal with the situation at hand. The Turkish response already includes elements of such a long-term vision, with the provision of free healthcare, education, and (limited) access to labor markets. Of course, the provision of immediate basic needs and protection will remain equally important for Turkey, particularly for the most vulnerable Syrians. Yet, a comprehensive and broad longer-term strategy, more consistent implementation of good practices countrywide, and better and more coordinated responses will be needed, targeted at increasing the resilience of the displaced, building the capacities of national institutions, and addressing the concerns of host communities that live side-by-side with 2.5 million Syrians.

The Istanbul workshop focused on 6 particular areas, which need to be in focus when formulating such a strategy.

³ The organizers would like to thank M. Murat Erdogan, Fulya Memisoglu, and Osman Gultekin, for their direct contributions to the report.

⁴ See http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html?_r=0, for the full article.

The status of Syrians in Turkey: The temporary protection mechanism

Turkey has ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees with a geographic limitation, which means that only refugees from European countries of origin are offered the prospect of long-term legal integration in Turkey. However, the country implements a “temporary protection regime” for Syrians, granting them the right of legal stay, protection from refoulement, and access to basic rights and services, including free healthcare⁵. A 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection and a 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation confirmed Turkey’s obligations to protect displaced people, and created the Directorate-General of Migration Management (DGMM) to build and manage the group-based temporary protection regime for Syrians. UNHCR plays a key role in Turkey as a complementary protection actor, undertaking refugee status determination activities and making resettlement referrals. Turkey, from the outset of the Syrian crisis, has maintained an “open door” policy for Syrians and has not set limits on the duration of temporary stay⁶. To access temporary protection status, beneficiaries must register with DGMM and obtain an identification card. As of 2 June 2016, the number of Syrians under the temporary protection regime is 2.743.497. This number excludes the Syrians that have not registered, fearing that this might complicate their return to Syria if Bashar Assad clung to power, or disable them from moving on towards Western Europe.

The temporary protection regime, which provides immediate protection and addresses the basic needs of Syrians, still reflects the initial understanding of Turkey that once the conflict in Syria is over, most of the displaced will go back to their homes. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that many of the displaced should be expected to remain in Turkey for the decades to come. As such, properly responding to displacement in Turkey, first and foremost, requires a change in the mindset that dictates that the issue can be solved through short-term and humanitarian responses. While the response led by AFAD has been good, the capabilities of the humanitarian agencies were stretched to their limits. The camps in Turkey have been well-organized and managed, but they cannot provide durable solutions for the displaced, especially given that nearly 2.5 million Syrians with temporary protection status reside in out-of-camp settings⁷. Better registration and data management systems would also be required, as a result of a change in mindset towards more durable solutions. The overall conclusion of the Istanbul workshop was the need for a more comprehensive and long-term policy, to guide response efforts and mobilize public support for it. The workshop also discussed the possibility of providing longer-term or permanent status to Syrians enabling legal integration, as a more distant option.

⁵ For further information on the temporary protection regime, see the Asylum Information Database’s (AIDA) report on “Introduction to the Asylum Context in Turkey”, available at <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/introduction-asylum-context-turkey>.

⁶ The open door policy has been tightened due to security reasons after 2015.

⁷ These numbers reflect the June 2016 figures published on the website of AFAD, available at http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik

Expanding educational opportunities:

According to the Turkey Country Plan of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2016-2017⁸ (3RP), aimed at bringing together different partners in a coordinated region-wide response, approximately 400.000 children - around one third of the school age Syrians in Turkey - remain out of formal education. This is despite the efforts and success of the Turkish government, led by the Ministry of Education, AFAD, and the Presidency of Turks Abroad (YTB) and supported by UNICEF, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in enrolling more than 200.000 Syrian schoolchildren at schools. Turkey provides Syrian children access to education at Turkish public schools or temporary education centers offering a modified Syrian curriculum, and also waives the tuition fees and offered thousands of scholarships for Syrians attending state universities.

Despite these efforts, significant problems remain in the education sector of the Syrian response. Including Syrian children in national education systems have increased maintenance costs and strained infrastructure, yet the needed expansion of the school system is too costly. In the longer-term, difficult decisions on whether to continue integrating Syrian children in Turkish systems, or following a Syrian curriculum in temporary centers will be needed. The choice to integrate them into national schools will require more investment in Turkish language training for Syrian children, increasing both the quantity and quality of schools to accommodate the needs of Syrian and Turkish children alike, and commencing mid-term thinking on how to ensure that the graduates can be absorbed by the Turkish job market. Investing in expanding the Syrian curriculum in temporary centers could facilitate the returns of Syrians if the conditions in Syria became ripe, yet hamper the possibilities of better integration should the displacement was to persist. Supporting teacher incentives and training, improving the registration and data management related to children, providing special services to facilitate returns to school for children who have been out of school for many years, emerged as more immediate issues.

The workshop concluded that the education issue is a clear indicator of how different elements of refugee responses in protracted contexts should be connected and addressed jointly, under joint or linked strategies that are based on medium and long-term planning. For instance, the issue of access to education is tightly linked to livelihoods: school attendance figures drop significantly in higher grades when older children have to drop out to contribute to the family income. Education is also closely related to long-term resilience and cohesion: Children with better education and Turkish language skills are better integrated in the society, can find employment easier, and can be absorbed by the Turkish system. On the other hand, youth that do not have access to formal education can be easier targets of organized crime or extremist networks. As a

⁸ The full text of the plan is available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/turkey/>.

more dramatic scenario, the 200.000 babies that were born in Turkey in the last five years will risk becoming a “lost generation” whose lives have been shaped by conflict and displacement, if they are not provided with opportunities for the future⁹. Based on these propositions and building on the 3RP vision of enhancing protection and resilience simultaneously, one idea of the workshop was to engage stakeholders from the education and other sectors (such as livelihoods) in “education compacts”, to ensure that the education response would also be able to contribute to livelihoods of the displaced, supply the needed skills in host communities, and ensure integration and social cohesion in the long-run.

Ensuring sustainable health services:

The health pillar of Turkey’s Syrian response, strongly led by the Turkish government (Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Family and Social Policies) and supported by UNICEF, UNHCR, World Health Organization (WHO), UNFPA and IOM, seems to be working efficiently. Under the temporary protection regime, Syrian nationals are provided with the same health services as Turks, and the Turkish government covers their health insurance. Moreover, emergency healthcare is provided both to registered and unregistered Syrians. The health response sees several parts of the Turkish system working together towards collective outcomes: DGMM provides Syrians with temporary identification cards that provide access to free health care, the Social Security Institution (SGK) delivers health insurance, Turkish hospitals or temporary healthcare facilities provides them with health services, AFAD coordinates the response¹⁰.

However, as the displacement becomes more protracted, both Turkish institutions and international organizations are struggling to keep up with the rapidly rising caseload. The capacity to respond is decreasing, health services in host communities are strained, and the time allocated to patients per capita is on the decline. Moreover, the quality of the health response seems to vary from province to province, necessitating better coordination and standardization of practices. The persistence of language barriers, the high number of unregistered Syrians, the lack of information on available health services, and the absence of specialized services such as psychological support and reproductive health, are issues waiting to be addressed in the shorter run. As an immediate solution, efforts are underway to increase the numbers of temporary healthcare centers for Syrians, to integrate more Syrian healthcare professionals into the Turkish system, and to enable NGOs who want to provide health services, to cope with the rising demand.

The workshop concluded that the goal must be addressing the immediate needs of Syrians in the short run, while increasing the capacities of the Government healthcare system in the medium to long run, also to benefit host communities. The Turkish

⁹ See <http://nolostgeneration.org/>

¹⁰ For further information, see <http://www.ttb.org.tr/goc/gecicikoruma.pdf>.

Ministry of Health is developing a mid-term health strategy to address the health issues of non-camp refugees and impacted communities. Stronger partnerships with international organizations, NGOs, and private sector can facilitate the implementation of such longer-term plans. Moreover, the need for higher, more predictable and possibly multi-year levels of funding was pronounced, to support medium to long-term strategies.

Enabling access to livelihoods:

The emergency response in Turkey has been successful in addressing the basic and immediate needs of Syrians, particularly those in camps, including by providing the camp population with marketable livelihood initiatives. However, the lack of formal access to the Turkish labor market has limited the refugees in non-camp settings to informal, low-paid, insecure employment, and has led to an increase in child labor and risks of exploitation. It has also increased their dependence on the assistance of national institutions and aid agencies, whose response capabilities are already stretched. This especially harms women and youth. According to an AFAD survey of 2014, 97% of female Syrians out of camps had not been able to earn an income in the month prior to the survey. 78% claimed that they did not have sufficient amount of food for the next seven days, nor the means to purchase it.

While continued funding will be needed to ensure the survival of the most vulnerable families, alleviating the limits to formal employment should be considered for more sustainable solutions. The Turkish legal framework is crucial in facilitating access to the labor market. New legislation has enabled Syrians to gain work permits in Turkey, given that their employers provide them with necessary documentation that allows them to apply for it. However, applications have been limited, both due to the lack of available information and the unwillingness of some businesses to provide their Syrian employees with rights by legalizing their working conditions¹¹. Moreover, the legislation allows only up to 10 percent of the workforces of firms – including Syrian-owned businesses and NGOs - to be composed of Syrians, which is far from addressing problems in towns such as Kilis, where the number of Syrians exceed the number of Turkish citizens. On the other hand, discussions on providing Syrians better access to the labor market often meets with resistance from the Turkish people: Turkey already suffers from a 10 percent unemployment rate.

Reaching more durable and effective solutions again requires a change in mindset. Enabling access to formal employment should be thought as a win-win situation: Highly skilled Syrians can help fill gaps in the labor market, shrink the informal economy, boost local economic development, increase the self-reliance of Syrians and lessen their need

¹¹ See The Guardian's article on the issue, entitled "Fewer than 0.1% of Syrians in Turkey in line for work permits", 11 April 2016, available at "<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/11/fewer-than-01-of-syrians-in-turkey-in-line-for-work-permits>

for humanitarian assistance, and contribute to social cohesion. Many Syrian entrepreneurs have brought their businesses to Turkey. On the other hand, without formal employment, those who can contribute to Turkish economy and society – doctors, engineers, and teachers – are reduced to cheap labor. However, positive benefits can be reaped only through long-term and comprehensive strategies and multi-year planning, based on a model of collective outcomes. First of all, the supply and demand side of the labor market must be addressed, potentially through better public-private sector dialogue and partnerships with private sector institutions as well as other development measures to strengthen local economies. Livelihoods are also strongly connected to other elements of the Syrian response, particularly education, skills, and language training. Finally, a communication strategy with host communities is crucial, in order to inform them of the direct benefits of providing Syrians with employment opportunities.

Non-camp settings and host communities:

The traditional perception of refugees is that they live in camps in remote border areas. This is no longer the trend: today more than half of all refugees are found in cities. In Turkey, for instance, approximately 300.000 Syrians live in official refugee camps, compared with 2.5 million in host communities ([hyperlink](#)). While refugees in formal camp settings have good access to shelter, food, health, and education, those in host communities often live in bad living conditions in informal settlements, face problems of adaptation and language barriers, have much more limited access to health and education services, and are mostly underemployed and underpaid and face difficulties in meeting their basic needs. Capacity gaps in registration and data management present challenges for the identification of the vulnerable people in need.

The urban dimension of the refugee crisis also requires focusing on the needs of host communities. While the Turkish public has initially been generous towards Syrians, this has begun to change, as their more permanent presence became a possibility, mostly due to the competition over housing and jobs and the increased strain on public services. There are growing calls for Syrians to leave Turkey, and for new arrivals to be contained. The social acceptance of Syrians will be possible only through including host communities in response efforts and addressing their vulnerabilities and needs, as well as implementing a good communication strategy on the positive impact of Syrians on the economy and the society. The Turkish 3RP response is far-reaching, in the sense that it prioritizes host communities alongside Syrians, but the budget for these communities is chronically underfunded.

One crucial step to prioritize, in order to address urban needs, is boosting the capacities of local governments and municipalities to respond to the needs of both the refugees and the host communities. Supporting joint initiatives by local governments could also prove useful. The Marmara Municipalities Union, consisting of several municipalities in Northwestern Turkey, has been trying to improve and standardize municipal responses

by undertaking joint needs assessments and coordination – similar efforts could be encouraged. Several NGOs and their INGO partners also strive to improve the adaptation of refugees to their new environments, by delivering language courses, vocational training, and legal counseling. Better coordination between these initiatives must be prioritized to prevent duplication of efforts – some local municipalities such as Gaziantep hold regular coordination meetings with civil society representatives.

III. Addressing protracted displacement in Turkey: Ways Forward

As the exile of Syrians in Turkey becomes more prolonged, it is becoming increasingly clear that addressing displacement as a temporary issue that requires solely humanitarian responses leads to their exclusion from longer-term development and planning processes, which might breed marginalization, inequality, fragility and vulnerability. As such, a better response might include linking development and humanitarian response. This is also in line with the 2030 Agenda's commitment to "leaving no one behind" in development processes, while ensuring that both short and long-term needs resulting from displacement are addressed.

As the several examples discussed during the Istanbul workshop indicate, today's system – while delivering well on humanitarian response - is failing the long-term challenge. The panel aimed to address the question "what can be done", to address the development needs of the displaced and strengthening the resilience of both the origin and host communities.

1) A new way of thinking and working:

Linking humanitarian and development response requires a change in mindset; to work on building the resilience of refugees and host communities, instead of believing that displacement issues can be solved through short-term and humanitarian responses. Such responses that link humanitarian and development could be seen as complementary to the temporary protection regime, not as a push for a more permanent protection status in Turkey or a prioritization of integration over resettlement or return.

This, first and foremost, requires a change to the linear way in which many global and national actors perceive their roles within conflicts and disasters. Traditionally, the idea has been that humanitarian assistance is the best way to handle emergency response, and development actors take over in the aftermath, together with national governments. However, in protracted situations like in Turkey, overcoming operational and financial silos, to deliver responses that benefit the host communities and the displaced, decrease the strain on national and local governments and build resilience.

2) Reinforcing local systems, institutions and laws:

One dominant aspect of the Turkish response has been the streamlining of assistance to Syrians through existing national institutions from the outset. However, the relatively high standards of assistance cannot be sustained in the long run, without the physical and material support of the international community. In Turkey, in 2013, only %12 of the Syrian response has been funded internationally; the national government, aid agencies, municipalities, civil society continues to bear the grunt of the response efforts. As Turkey has a constantly evolving legal framework in place for Syrians and owns and leads the response efforts, the overall international strategy should be strengthening national capacity and institutions.

In line with this understanding, the 3RP response for Turkey commits to “reinforcing, not replacing national and local systems”, as requested by the United Nations Secretary-General’s report to the World Humanitarian Summit ([hyperlink](#)). This prescription applies to various areas, such as registration and data management, health and education systems, social protection networks. Supporting national health and education systems, expanding local social protection networks, developing livelihoods and private sector development programs benefiting both the displaced and the host communities, and supporting local peacebuilding initiatives emerge as focus areas. Beyond this, international actors could seek to provide incentives that encourage host governments to consider more permanent solutions for the displaced, to move from short to longer-term planning, and to include them in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the response.

3) Encouraging collective outcomes:

While Turkey initially tried to respond to the refugee crisis on its own, as the conflict in Syria dragged on and the numbers of the displaced expanded, it increasingly started asking for support from the international community for financial assistance and burden-sharing for resettlement. However, the Turkish government was relatively slow in developing effective cooperation with international NGOs and INGOs in Turkey. As a result, while Turkish institutions, agencies, and civil society have developed good ways to work together towards collective outcomes, as the previous examples from the national health sector indicate, there is still need for different response efforts in Turkey to join hands towards more efficient responses.

Building resilience requires the involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders. Different actors on the ground, including relevant parts of the national government, can work together to develop context-specific analysis, plans and programs, which help them to identify and mitigate some of the challenges and risks posed by ongoing conflict and displacement. Doing this would entail investment in strategic analysis and coordination on the ground. This has already started to happen: The 3RP, which includes Turkey, brings together a broad cross-section of actors, and helps clarify key vulnerabilities in refugee and host communities. The plan also helps different agencies to prioritize the immediate needs of Syrian refugees, such as food, shelter, and health, while looking

ahead to the provision of long-term benefits, such as education for children and jobs for adults.

4) Building on comparative advantages:

Better collective outcomes require focusing on the comparative advantages of the humanitarian and development communities, in which each take on roles that speak to strengths derived from their institutional structure and mandates. But how does this look like in practice, in a situation like Turkey? In camps, Turkish institutions such as AFAD, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Health, Education, Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Transportation and Finance, the Turkish General Staff, the Presidency of Religious Affairs work together in collaboration. A similar model could be applied to non-camp settings.

In terms of the international response, in the context of 3RP, UNHCR leads the Refugee Response, and UNDP leads the Resilience Response, which is a good step in bridging humanitarian and development assistance. For instance, the World Bank – which has a purely development mandate – can help find ways to overcome the social and economic vulnerabilities of affected population, the International Labor Organization can help improve the regulations on employment, while UNHCR can continue to support the Turkish government in meeting humanitarian needs and resettlement issues. Such linked action would help moving towards a more comprehensive and integrated government strategy, in support of the signs of a piecemeal already emerging on issues such as education and employment. In an emerging economy like Turkey, the private sector has important capabilities, and can help create opportunities for livelihoods among affected populations.

5) Moving towards innovative financing and multi-year funding:

Traditionally, funding for humanitarian assistance has been separate from development budgets, and limited to grant-based funding. This model is not sustainable in prolonged displacement situations, where donor funding tends to diminish as displacement drags on, while the number and needs of the displaced continue to rise. In these cases, more innovative and creative solutions, such as bond guarantees, public-private partnerships, and financing for private sector investment could prove beneficial. Increasing direct funding to local NGOs, and moving to a wider use of cash transfers, might be seen as more empowering and more stimulating for the local economy. Turkey already plans to scale up cash-based interventions in several sectors to allow refugees to respond to their own needs and make financial injections into the local economy. Moreover, predictable and multi-year financing and pooled funding mechanisms that unifies humanitarian and development incentives around longer-term strategies is key.

There is need for greater cooperation with the international community, especially to mobilize funds to support Turkey's efforts. The London Conference in February 2016

raised government pledges for more than \$11 billion. In addition to covering urgent humanitarian needs, they should also be used to help improve the resilience of host countries bordering Syria, especially on employment and education issues.

IV. Conclusion:

Of course, a development-humanitarian framework will not solve all displacement related issues, nor address their root causes – especially related to the failure of political will or governance. However, they would work towards empowering the displaced and meeting their needs in sustainable and manageable ways, while also benefiting host communities.

We must start thinking about such a framework, if we want to find ways to empower the displaced and meet their needs in a sustainable and manageable manner, while contributing to and benefiting their host communities.