Syria Should Review the Lessons from Iraq

It took the rebels just 10 days to topple the Assad regime, whose father and son had ruled Syria brutally for more than five decades. However, rebuilding Syria and fostering national unity will take much longer than the rebels’ rapid takeover. Emerging from decades of dictatorship and a bloody civil conflict, Syria wrestles with multi-generational trauma and inherits a massive legacy of human rights violations, including killings, kidnappings, torture, and enforced disappearances by many perpetrators. United Nations (UN) reports highlight evidence of war crimes committed by all sides during the conflict.

Syria is deeply fractured along ethnic, sectarian, and geographical lines, reflecting divisions entrenched during the war, which has resulted in outbreaks of violence in recent months. Political and military interference by external players with conflicting agendas complicate Syria’s recovery. Widespread corruption, particularly within key institutions like the military, security forces, police, and the judiciary undermines trust in state institutions and the rule of law. Given these challenges, as Syrians are already saying, the country is a prime candidate for transitional justice (TJ) processes. Transitional justice is a set of processes and mechanisms that should not only focus on accountability, but also on addressing the legacy of violations to provide remedies and support the rebuilding of the country on the foundations of peace and justice.

On May 18, 2025, the Syrian government announced a new National Transitional Justice Commission, tasked with “exposing the truth about the grave violations committed by the former regime and holding those responsible accountable, in coordination with relevant authorities,” according to the Presidential l Decree No.20.

As international justice experts rush to offer Syrians their TJ expertise and services, the Syrians may do well to grasp the opportunity to draw relevant lessons from such experiences around the world—and more importantly from neighboring Iraq—while recognizing key differences between the two situations.

Parallels Between Iraq and Syria

What Iraq experienced after the 2003 fall of the Baath regime shares many similarities with Syria’s current situation. Both nations were ruled by the Baath Party for decades, with authoritarian families and their kin dominating power structures. In Iraq, the Sunni-dominated regime under Saddam Hussein mirrored the Alawite-led regime of the Assads in Syria. Both regimes created extensive paramilitary and security apparatuses to suppress dissent, relying on loyalists willing to use any means to maintain control. The nature and scale of the crimes and oppression committed by both regimes, particularly against dissenters, are similar.

The sociopolitical landscapes of Iraq and Syria are also similarly diverse. Both countries are home to a mix of ethnic and religious groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Sunni and Shia Muslims, Christians, and minorities such as Yazidis, Turkmen, and Assyrians. In Syria, the Druze form an additional minority. Before 2003, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, despite being less than 20 percent of the population, held power over a diverse society. Similarly, Syria’s Alawites, comprising around 10 percent of the population, had ruled since 1971. The military collapse of both regimes underscores the potential for Syria to face challenges akin to Iraq’s, but with the advantage of learning from its neighbor’s missteps.

There are also some key differences between the two situations. One significant distinction between post-2003 Iraq and present-day Syria lies in the nature of the transition of power. In Iraq, the United States-led invasion overthrew Saddam Hussein and transferred authority to opposition groups that had largely remained outside the conflict. In contrast, in Syria, opposition forces who assumed control following the fall of the Assad regime were themselves deeply involved in the decade-long civil war. Another important difference is the role of international involvement. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was governed by the United States-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for over a year. The CPA acted as an occupation authority and made key decisions that shaped Iraq’s political framework and power-sharing arrangements. In Syria, by contrast, opposition groups seized control without the establishment of a formal transitional international authority, instead unilaterally asserting control over political and security institutions

Transitional Justice in Iraq: Lessons Learned

In Iraq, a significant lack of expertise in transitional justice, particularly among Iraqi and Arab-speaking experts, led to, among other things, the absence of a coherent strategy. The steps taken were ad hoc, influenced by exiled Iraqi politicians who failed to assess the perceptions of local Iraqis and by outside powers who accentuated divisions rather than worked to bridge differences. The transitional justice policies heavily relied on punitive measures and compensated specific victim groups without a long-term vision for reconciliation and rebuilding.

Iraq faced numerous issues after the fall of the regime. Apart from the lack of security and stability, the country lacked local capacity and expertise to respond to the massive crimes committed by the Saddam regime. This resulted in a situation where transitional justice was largely shaped by external actors. The outside powers failed to properly understand and assess the challenges that Iraq would face to build peace and reconciliation. By contrast, in Syria the new authorities have been very clear in wanting Syrians to maintain control and lead the process and this is further helped by Syrian actors, inside and outside, who have deep knowledge of the key TJ processes and institutions even while they may lack practical experience in implementing them.

As seen in Iraq, sectarian violence can have a devastating impact on peace and reconciliation efforts. Continued violence not only adds to the number of victims but also complicates any plan or process of transitional justice. The recent outbreaks of violence in Syria’s coastal areas and the south should serve as a warning: the country must act urgently to prevent a descent into chaos.

Iraq’s transitional justice efforts reveal a series of missteps that offer six critical lessons for Syria:

1. Vetting and De-Baathification

Shortly after the fall of Saddam’s regime, the CPA issued orders that disbanded the Iraqi military and removed high-ranking Baath Party members from public service. These measures, known as de-Baathification, were implemented without proper consideration of their long-term consequences. Tens of thousands lost their jobs, creating a massive security vacuum and fostering instability. The process targeted individuals based on rank rather than their actions, fueling resentment and marginalization. De-Baathification became politicized and was, in some instances, used as a tool to unfairly sideline political adversaries and remove them from the political arena.

2. Accountability Measures

The CPA established the Iraqi Special Tribunal to prosecute senior regime figures, including Saddam Hussein, for international crimes such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed by his regime. Iraqi law does not include international crimes. Although the tribunal was an Iraqi court, it was created by the United States. It heavily relied on the United States, the occupying superpower, which in many ways deterred other international support.

For many Iraqis seeing the former president in the dock answering to a judge was a psychological turning point—at last believing the reign of terror had finally ended. However, from the outset, the tribunal faced challenges, including a lack of security, poor public outreach, and allegations of illegitimacy due to U.S. influence.

Ultimately political expediency overtook the judicial process. Saddam Hussein was convicted and executed after only one trial and one case of criminal behavior. For Iraqis waiting to see him held accountable for many other crimes committed during his period in charge, this was a major disappointment.

3. Reparations

Iraq has established several reparation programs over the years, primarily focused on material compensation. These programs cover a broad range of survivors—not only those affected by the Saddam regime, but also those impacted by the violence that escalated after 2003. In 2006, the government began compensating victims of Saddam Hussein’s regime, including those who were killed, imprisoned, or had lost their jobs and properties. As the conflict evolved, the government expanded the scope of reparations in 2009 to include victims of military operations and terrorist attacks.

These programs have been costly, with at least USD 5 billion disbursed in cash to date. However, they have faced significant challenges, including widespread corruption, limited institutional capacity, and inadequate data collection mechanisms—all of which have contributed to flaws in implementation.

Critics have also pointed to political and sectarian manipulation of these compensation initiatives, with some victim groups being prioritized over others.

In 2021, a dedicated program was established to provide reparations for female survivors of ISIS atrocities—an important, though limited, step toward addressing gender-specific harms, stabilizing regions formally occupied by ISIS, and broadening the scope of transitional justice. It is important for Syria’s transitional justice process to also prioritize gender-specific crimes and the needs of sexual violence survivors, including reparations.

4. Truth-Seeking

Iraq failed to establish a comprehensive truth-seeking mechanism, as policymakers prioritized prosecutions over uncovering the truth. This approach has left victims without an official record of past atrocities nor a broader understanding of why this had been allowed to happen. To ensure non-repetition it is essential to understand the reasons and to put in place the necessary institutional and legal safeguards to prevent recurrence. After 2003, Iraq experienced numerous waves of conflict and upheaval, which led to a reliance on ad-hoc fact-finding committees to investigate specific events and crimes. However, these committees were often neither impartial nor transparent, serving the interests of those who created them rather than prioritizing the investigation, documentation, and dissemination of the truth.

Moreover, these sporadic fact-finding efforts were rarely made public, depriving society of a shared understanding of its history and undermining efforts to promote collective healing and reconciliation.

5. Addressing Missing Persons

Iraq faced significant challenges in dealing with mass graves and missing persons. Iraq has one of the highest rates of missing persons in the world. So far, approximately 221 mass grave sites have been discovered, with around 96 attributed to Saddam’s regime. Arbitrary exhumations by victims’ families and inadequate technical capacity have compromised evidence and hindered justice. Iraq has a law governing mass grave exhumations and in contrast with other measures, the Iraqi institutions dealing with missing persons have, over time, developed significant technical expertise. As such, they are potentially well-positioned to pass on that experience to their Syrian counterparts in building their capacity in this critical area.

6. Civil Society Engagement

The role of civil society is crucial in transitional justice—not only in advocacy and promoting accountability and justice, but also in gathering evidence and amplifying the voices of victims. However, this was not the case in Iraq after 2003, despite the massive number of victims and the widespread legacy of human rights violations. Decades of dictatorship and the absence of fundamental freedoms prevented Iraq from developing a robust civil society. This vacuum in the post-2003 period weakened the design and implementation of transitional justice measures.

Recommendations for Syria

To avoid the pitfalls experienced by Iraq, Syrian policymakers and international stakeholders should avoid the Iraqi ad-hoc approach and adopt a comprehensive and inclusive transitional justice strategy. This strategy should involve consultations within all sectors of Syria, and include short-, medium-, and long-term goals supported by data collection—such as public polls—to assess public perceptions and inform resource allocation. Transitional justice in Syria should be based on a victim-centered approach while avoiding retributive justice. The establishment of the National Transitional Justice Commission is a positive step in the transitional justice process. However, while the Commission is mandated to address violations committed by the Assad regime, it will find that it cannot ignore violations committed by all parties to the conflict. The justice component of the transitional justice process should not reflect a “victor’s justice” approach. Instead, the rights and needs of all victims must be addressed equitably and without discrimination.

Truth-Seeking and the Protection of Mass Grave Sites

A national truth-seeking initiative should involve all segments of Syrian society. Given Syria’s long history of violence and abuses, documenting and acknowledging the past is essential for designing effective reparations, promoting accountability, and fostering national unity. Such an initiative must be inclusive and transparent to ensure widespread societal buy-in. Moreover, the right to know the truth should be upheld as a fundamental human right.

As part of truth-seeking efforts, one of the most urgent issues is the protection of mass grave sites. Syrians will need to develop a legal framework to secure and protect mass grave sites. Exhumations should only begin after building national technical capacity and establishing a national entity to take the lead in this area. Nationalizing the process of identifying missing persons is essential to ensuring the collaboration of victims’ families, building trust, and addressing their needs.

Syrians have the advantage of a newly established international mechanism, the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic. This institution will help bring expertise and capacity, coordination of international actors and a readiness to work inside Syria in partnership with an impartial and independent national body or bodies. Syrians should seek to benefit to the fullest from this new institution.

Conducting public surveys to understand public attitudes toward peace, justice, and reconciliation have been shown to be a useful way of gathering insights that reflect societal priorities and help shape transitional justice strategies.

Accountability

Syria should develop a comprehensive strategy for accountability for crimes committed over the past few decades. This strategy should reflect the following:

• Defining the threshold for accountability, including which crimes and perpetrators should face prosecution and who may be eligible for other forms of accountability or even pardons, along with the conditions for such exemptions.
• Ensuring the legitimacy of any justice process, it must address crimes committed by all parties to the conflict.
• Assessing the capacity and limitations of the current judicial and law enforcement systems to determine the most effective accountability mechanisms.
• Integrating accountability measures with other pillars of transitional justice, such as truth-seeking, reforms and reparations, to ensure a holistic and survivor-centered approach to justice and reconciliation.

To embark upon this strategy collecting data and mapping crimes and perpetrators to establish a clear record of violations will be an essential step and Syria can benefit from the data-gathering that has been done over many years by Syrian and international civil society organizations. It should also be able to call upon the Independent International Commission of Inquiry that has been gathering data on grave human rights and humanitarian law violations (including war crimes and crimes against humanity) since late 2011.

Syrian and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can also assist with data-sharing related to grave human rights violations. For example, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has meticulously documented the systematic targeting of Syria hospitals and health care workers during the civil war. This data and other credible sources can be used to inform Syria’s transitional justice efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for attacks on civilians and civilian objects committed during the war.

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has already visited Syria and the court may have a variety of useful roles in assisting Syria in its endeavors to deal with past international crimes, but even more importantly will be the strength of the partnership being established between Syria and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism that was established in December 2016 to assist “in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under International Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.”

The national legal and judicial system in Syria should be strengthened to the point where it can effectively address atrocities. It is imperative that all relevant international entities and stakeholders support efforts to build the capacity of Syria’s national institutions.

Institutional Reform

With the dissolution of the Assad regime’s army, security agencies, and Baath Party by the new Syrian authorities, the following issues must be considered in the process of rebuilding the military and security forces and other institutions:

• Vetting vs. Purging: Reforms should prioritize vetting individuals based on their actions and records rather than resorting to wholesale purges. This approach ensures fairness, minimizes disruptions, and preserves institutional functionality. A realistic objective and actionable plan must be established to guide this process. The institutional reform strategy should be forward-looking, emphasizing future resilience while safeguarding against potential abuses.
• Security Sector Reform: Professionalize the military and security forces to eliminate corruption and ensure they protect citizens rather than suppress dissent. Oversight mechanisms are essential to building public trust.

Reparations

Unlike Iraq, Syria may lack the same level of financial resources to effectively address all the needs of survivors, especially after the destruction from the state’s policies during the lengthy internal armed conflict it has endured since early 2011. This will be felt most directly if discussions around compensation or reparations focus only on financial payments to victims. So, it will be important to manage survivors’ expectations to avoid false promises that could inadvertently deepen their suffering.

That said, while Iraq relied heavily on one form of reparations programs (financial compensation) successful reparations programs from around the world and in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region (Morocco is an example) relied on several types of reparations including but not bound by financial compensations alone. Such programs have included communal programs, symbolic reparations and in some instances an official apology by the new head of state for the harm done to individuals or communities by the state. Programs have also been developed that extend the financial cost of reparations over several years as opposed to incurring the total cost in one year and for example have included subsidies in the health and education spheres for victims’ families and the survivors.

In many ways in a conflict such as the one in Syria, all of Syrian society has been victimized and programs recognizing this will likely help in the process of healing and restoring trust.

Strengthening Civil Society

Civil society organizations as well as survivors and families of victims should be empowered to participate in transitional justice efforts. Their involvement is essential and will enhance public engagement, ensure diverse perspectives, and build community trust. There will likely be differences in experience, knowledge, and perception between civil society activists abroad and also with those who remained inside Syria. That has been the case in many TJ processes around the world.

To ensure a broader involvement of civil society, particularly representatives of victims’ groups and different segments of Syria, the new Syrian authorities should establish inclusive consultation mechanisms that engage victims’ groups, women’s organizations, youth representatives, and minority communities in political and transitional processes. The authorities should also guarantee freedom of expression and assembly to allow civil society actors to operate without fear of reprisal.

The Role of Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has played a significant role in documenting and collecting evidence of crimes committed in Iraq and Syria, in addition to capacity strengthening support for medical and legal partners in both countries. For example, in Iraq PHR confirmed that the Saddam Hussein regime used chemical weapons—including mustard gas and the sarin nerve agent—against the Kurdish population in the late 1980s. PHR scientists and investigators collected soil samples from the Kurdistan Region and assisted in the exhumation, identification, and determination of probable causes of death of victims found in mass graves. This evidence was later used by the Iraqi High Tribunal in the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his aides for genocide against the Kurds, and in supporting compensation claims for Kurdish victims.

In Syria, since the start of the conflict in 2011, PHR has documented attacks on health care, including assaults on medical facilities and personnel. Based on this work, PHR has produced numerous reports and compiled substantial evidence of violations of medical neutrality. This documentation should serve as a key resource for any future accountability and reparations initiatives or programs in Syria.

Conclusion

The international community should provide technical and financial assistance to support Syria’s transitional justice process. Lessons from Iraq and other post-conflict settings can help guide these efforts. Syria’s situation remains fragile, and its political and social landscape risks collapsing or backsliding. Sustained international assistance is critical to help the country overcome these challenges.

Syria can benefit from existing international mechanisms and entities that can provide critical assistance, such as the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), established by the UN in 2016, and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP), established in 2023. The data collected by the Commission of Inquiry (COI), established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 to investigate the human rights and humanitarian law violations during the conflict in Syria, is essential for any accountability, truth-seeking, reforms, or reparations programs. The ICC and other international institutions should stand ready to provide additional much needed technical support.

While Syria lacks financial resources after the destruction wrought by the lengthy civil conflict, it does not lack capable people who can develop and run these TJ programs. In many discussions and debates before and after the December fall of the previous regime, this expertise has been there for all to see. Their actions that lead to the establishment of the IIIM and the IIMP are a testament to these abilities and their resilience. What they may lack today, through no fault of their own, is the practical experience of developing and running such programs. They would do well to now link up with counterparts who have implemented such programs, in the MENA region and beyond, because they can provide crucial assistance in pointing out what worked well, what pitfalls to avoid, and more crucially with the benefit of hindsight to say what they might have done differently.

By learning from Iraq’s experience and implementing a well-thought-out transitional justice strategy, Syria can navigate its post-conflict period more effectively. Although the United States and other countries plan to remove or ease the international sanctions, the new Syrian government should take tangible steps to encourage their full removal. These steps should address the root causes of division and promote inclusive governance that respects the rights of all Syrian factions. Such efforts are essential not only for achieving lasting peace and stability within Syria but also for contributing to regional security.

This is a guest post by Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi, an expert in transitional justice and rule of law initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. He serves as Technical Expert for Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). All opinions and views expressed in this article solely represent the views of the author.

Photo: Al Hajar al Aswad City, 4 kilometers south of the center of Damascus in the Darayya District of the Rif Dimashq Governorate, Syria. March 21, 2025.