National Prevention Strategies: Exploring the Overlap Between Violent Extremism and Intra-State Conflict

Violent extremism and terrorism^[1] are often thought of as distinct phenomena from intra-state conflicts^[2] (i.e., civil wars). Both types of violence are addressed through different prevention architectures. At the international level, the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) focuses on the prevention of intra-state conflict and the General Assembly's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on the prevention of terrorism. At the national level, conflict prevention is typically pursued through infrastructures for peace, peacebuilding, and social cohesion plans^[3], while violent extremism and terrorism are often tackled through Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) national action plans. Additionally, UN support for national and local actors in addressing different types of violence is often fragmented across the system (e.g., the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the UN Development Program (UNDP)). Even within the same UN Agency, Fund, or Program (AFP), prevention of violent extremism^[4] and intra-state armed conflict can be labeled differently, even though efforts to address both forms of violence may be nearly indistinguishable.

This blog post highlights similarities between violent extremism and terrorism (hereafter, those two terms are used interchangeably) on the one hand and intra-state armed conflict on the other, as well as opportunities for cross-field learning. The examples are drawn from a project funded by the UK government to systematically review the literature on the risk and protective factors for intra-state conflict and violent extremism/terrorism and to develop a tool for decision-makers and practitioners to contribute to more evidence-based decision-making. Recognizing commonalities across these concepts can help national decision-makers and practitioners improve coordination, reduce duplication, and develop more cost-effective, coherent efforts, including national prevention strategies.

1. Understanding the Similarities Between Intra-State Conflict and Violent Extremism

In practice, distinguishing between intra-state conflict and violent extremism is not always straightforward. First, since 2015, 95 percent of deaths from terrorism have consistently taken place in countries that have an ongoing conflict. Second, the same group may be labeled as both a terrorist organization and an armed group by different actors or at different times. Third, both forms of violence often share similar risk factors and protective factors.

1.1 The issue of definition: How does research separate violent extremism from intra-state conflict?

There is much debate about the precise definitions of violent extremism and terrorism and the extent to which they are conceptually distinct from other forms of armed conflict, and researchers approach these phenomena and the groups engaged in these efforts using a range of terminology. For instance, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are categorized in some studies as an armed group, while others classify them under suicide terrorism. Similarly, some research on rebel groups may include examples of groups that are designated terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda; groups that have at points been considered terrorist organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and other groups that are separatist organizations fighting in intra-state conflicts. The fact that the same group can be considered a terrorist group, a violent extremist group, and a non-state armed group by different researchers makes it more challenging to establish separate sets of risk and protective factors for terrorist groups and armed groups.

1.2 Shared roots? Unpacking the drivers of intra-state conflict and violent extremism

An examination of the two sets of literature reveals that some risk and protective factors for intra-state conflict and violent extremism may be the same. A search for individual significance—which includes the desire to see the world beyond one’s local community, to become rich or famous, or to obtain the power and status given by being a member of armed groups—is frequently cited as a reason for people, and particularly children, to join armed groups across different types of violence. This risk factor is consistent among self-identified terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, the Maoist armed groups of the Nepalese revolution, violent armed groups more generally, and lone-actor terrorists. On the flip side, disapproving community or parental networks are a protective factor for group recruitment for both terrorist groups and armed groups. When individuals—especially youth—benefit from an emotionally supportive family environment and receive strong social signals from family, religious leaders, or community members against participation in violence, they are less likely to engage with armed groups. At a structural level, trust in institutions may be a protective factor for both intrastate conflict and violent extremism. For instance, some studies show that acceptance of police legitimacy and having respect for the government/authorities reduce the likelihood of individuals resorting to terrorism. Similarly, leaders fostering positive relationships with their population, especially with youth, may help diminish the chances of their communities becoming embroiled in intrastate conflicts.

2. Opportunities for Cross-Field Learning: Exploring Potential Biases and their Impact on Policy

Some risk and protective factors have traditionally been studied in the context of only one type of violence, yet they may be relevant to both. For instance, research shows that online networks and social media create a space for extremists to reinforce their radical thoughts, legitimize violent action, and solicit financing for terrorist acts. However,  studies are limited on the role of the internet in civil wars. One notable exception is Walters (2017), who suggests that the internet may allow rebel groups to form more easily, sustain themselves, and spread conflict across borders. This suggests that online networks might still have a role when considering intra-state armed conflict, but the topic requires more attention.

Another example is the role of mental health, which has been widely studied in violent extremism, yet its influence on intra-state conflict remains largely overlooked in the literature. This imbalance may lead to skewed policymaking for both types of violence. In the case of violent extremism, policies might overemphasize mental health while neglecting the structural, personal, and social drivers of radicalization. Conversely, in intra-state conflict prevention, insufficient attention to mental health and psychosocial factors may overlook crucial elements—such as how adverse environments, including social injustices, discrimination, and lack of access to services, can lead to the development of post-traumatic disorder or how intergenerational traumas can fuel aggressive behaviors.

Policy Implications

A clearer understanding of shared risk and protective factors between violent extremism and intra-state conflict can enhance cost-effective prevention strategies. Comparative research could help inform evidence-based policies. For instance:

1. Upon request, the UN system should support national and local actors with collecting and analyzing context-specific data with the goal of identifying commonalities and differences in risk and protective factors between violent extremism and intra-state conflict in their contexts. This insight can inform national prevention strategies while allowing actors to build on existing frameworks. For example, if a PVE strategy already addresses certain risk and protective factors for armed conflict, a conflict prevention strategy can leverage and expand upon the PVE action plan.
2. Donors and the UN can enhance support for national actors by fostering a more cohesive approach to preventing intra-state conflict and violent extremism. Instead of supporting the adoption of multiple disconnected frameworks due to fragmented funding streams, they could create opportunities to address shared risk and protective factors across different forms of violence. At the same time, they should allow for tailored strategies where risks and protective factors differ. Efforts to include UNOCT in formulating the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) at the country level represent an important step in that direction.
3. During the Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), member states may consider calling for more integrated UN support to national actors to develop comprehensive prevention strategies upon request and across all forms of violence. They may also emphasize the need to align efforts to combat terrorism with broader conflict prevention strategies, ensuring that such initiatives do not inadvertently exacerbate risk factors for violence.

^[1] The terms violent extremism and terrorism lack a consistent definition compared to intra-state conflict. Notably, UN member states have yet to agree on an international convention that legally defines terrorism. The 2023 General Assembly resolution A/RES/78/210 refers to “violent extremism conducive to terrorism and terrorism.” In this blog post, we use violent extremism and terrorism—terms that are frequently employed interchangeably in the literature.

^[2] Intra-state armed conflict is a contested incompatibility between a state and non-state armed group inside the state’s territory that causes at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. See Therese Pettersson, “Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 23.1,” UCDP/PRIO, 1, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/replication_data/2023_ucdp-prio-acd-231.pdf.

^[3] Examples of conflict prevention strategies: Social Cohesion Plan, A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation.

^[4] Terrorism and violent extremism are usually both addressed under prevention of violent extremism (PVE) programs.