Structural reform is not a panacea for challenges faced by the United Nations (UN) in effective mandate implementation and program delivery, including in peace and security.
But structures can interact with policies and procedures to create a system of incentives and disincentives that create and perpetuate turf wars and drive path dependencies that undermine the ability of the organization to respond flexibly to changing requirements.
This report, the last in a series of three reports on peace operations reform, draws upon three decades of experience with UN reform to explain how the current structures of the Secretariat came about and how these structures currently undermine the ability of the organization to respond coherently in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
It then provides recommendations for structural adjustments across three dimensions:
- The peace and security arrangements at UN Headquarters.
- The configuration of the UN system at the country level.
- The role and setup of the Executive Office of the Secretary‑General (EOSG).
Historically, major reorganization of the UN bureaucracy has only been possible at the start of a Secretary‑General’s term, as that is when Secretaries-General enjoy the greatest political support from member states and goodwill from the staff.
Therefore, this report is intended to inform the conversations and consultations between member states and the various candidates to succeed António Guterres as Secretary‑General, and to highlight some of the key structural considerations that the successful candidate should prioritize as part of their initial structural reform efforts.