A large, cracked bronze sphere at the United Nations reflecting nearby buildings and trees.

Exploring Member State Dominance Over UN Senior Appointments

Personnel appointments at the United Nations (UN) are supposed to be on the basis of the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.1 For senior leadership appointments at the Under-Secretary-General (USG) and Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) level, the UN General Assembly stated that, “as a general rule, no national of a Member State should succeed a national of that State in a senior post and there should be no monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any State or group of States.”2 However, since the start of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s term in 2007, the heads of several departments in the Secretariat have been held successively by nationals of the same member states.  

Last year, a study by Blue Smoke highlighted the phenomenon of prolonged dominance by a single country in specific UN senior posts. This practice, however, extends beyond a handful of senior posts at the UN Headquarters in New York. Since the start of Ban Ki-moon’s term in 2007, there have been at least 30 posts at the Under-Secretary-General or Assistant Secretary-General level across 30 UN entities3 that have been held by multiple nationals of a single member state.  

Here is a breakdown of these instances, sorted by duration.

NumberPostEntity TypeNationalityNumber of IndividualsYears (duration)
1Executive Director, United Nations Children’s FundFund or programUS81947–present (77)
2Executive Director, World Food ProgrammeFund or programUS61992–present (32)
3Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations4Field-focused entity (Secretariat)France61997–present (27)
4Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesFund or programUS51999–present (25)
5Director-General, United Nations Office at GenevaOffice away from UN Headquarters (Secretariat)Russia31993–2011, 2019–present (23)5
6Assistant Secretary-General for Support Operations8Corporate service entity (Secretariat)US32003–present (21)
7Director-General, United Nations Office at ViennaOffice away from Headquarters (Secretariat)Italy31992–2010 (18)
8Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security InstitutionsField-focused entity (Secretariat)Russia22007–present (17)
9Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs6Field-focused entity (Secretariat)US32007–present (17)
10Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsField-focused entity (Secretariat)UK52007–present (17)
11Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social AffairsHeadquarters-based entity (Secretariat)China42007–present (17)
12United Nations OmbudsmanCorporate service entity (Secretariat)US22008–present (16)
13Assistant Secretary-General for Supply Chain Management7Corporate service entity (Secretariat)UK32008–2023 (15)
14Deputy Special Representative for Kosovo, United Nations Mission in KosovoPeace operation (Secretariat)US42011–present (13)
15Deputy Special Representative for Rule of Law, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti/Special Representative for Haiti9Peace operation (Secretariat)US52010–2023 (13)
16Head of Mission and Force Commander, United Nations Interim Security Force in AbyeiPeace operation (Secretariat)Ethiopia82011–2022 (11)
17Commissioner-General, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near EastFund or programSwitzerland22013–present (11)
18Assistant Administrator and Director of the Crisis Bureau, UNDPFund or programJapan32014–present (10)
19
Special Representative for Kosovo and Head of Mission, United Nations Mission in KosovoPeace operation (Secretariat)Afghanistan22011–2021 (10)
20Deputy Commissioner-General (Programmes and Partnerships), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near EastFund or programUS22010–2019 (9)
21Deputy Executive Director, Programme Branch, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDSFund or programUS32010–2012, 2019–present (7)
22Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations Assistance Mission in AfghanistanPeace operation (Secretariat)UK32011–2020 (9)
23Force Commander, United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoPeace operation (Secretariat)Brazil52013-2015; 2018-present (8)
24Special Representative in Cyprus and Head, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in CyprusPeace operation (Secretariat)Canada22016–present (6)
25Assistant Secretary-General and Head of New York Office, United Nations Environment ProgrammeField-focused entity (Secretariat)India22018–present (6)
26Special Representative for Somalia and Head of Mission, United Nations Assistance Mission in SomaliaPeace operation (Secretariat)UK32013–2018, 2023–present (6)
27Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for LebanonPeace operation (Secretariat)UK22008–2014 (6)
28Deputy Special Representative for the Central African Republic, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African RepublicPeace operation (Secretariat)US22017–2023 (6)
29Under-Secretary-General for Safety and SecurityField-focused entity (Secretariat)US22009-2014 (5)
30Head of Mission and Force Commander, United Nations Disengagement Observer ForcePeace operation (Secretariat)Nepal32019-present (5)

Patterns in member state dominance over senior appointments 

Several patterns can be identified within this set of posts, with implications for the work of the UN. Of the identified positions, 23 are within the Secretariat, representing 15 percent of all funded USG and ASG posts,10 with the remaining situated within the funds and programs. Within the Secretariat subset, 11 posts dominated by individual member states are related to peace operations, constituting nearly one fifth of all field-based senior level posts.11 

Geographically, the dominance in UN senior appointments is primarily held by Western European and other states, which occupy 21 out of the total 30 positions. Following this, Asia-Pacific states have recorded five occurrences, while Eastern European states have two, represented solely by Russia. African states and Latin American and Caribbean states each have only one appointment. 

Some of these posts have been held by individual member states for remarkably long periods. Topping the list is the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which has seen eight US nationals serve as its Executive Director over its 77-year history. Similarly, the Executive Directorship of another fund or program, the World Food Programme (WFP), has been continuously filled by six US nationals over the past 32 years, since 1992. Additionally, the role of Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees within the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been held by five US nationals for 25 years. 

In the Secretariat, two out of three offices away from Headquarters have been under the tenure of individual member states for extended periods. The Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva has been predominantly occupied by Russian nationals for 23 years, albeit with non-continuous terms. This is complemented by a decade-long stint by a Russian national as Director-General at the United Nations Office at Vienna from 2010 to 2020. Additionally, the Director-General position at the Vienna office was occupied by three Italian nationals for 18 years from 1992 to 2010. 

Within the Secretariat’s core functions, the USG for Peace Operations has seen a succession of six nationals from France holding the position for 27 years since 1997. Moreover, US nationals have dominated the USG role for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for 17 years, starting from the tenure of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2007. Several other posts have also been dominated by individual member states for 17 years since 2007, including the USG for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (held by a succession of five UK nationals), the USG for Economic and Social Affairs (occupied by four Chinese nationals), and the ASG for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (held by two Russian nationals). It’s worth highlighting that this is not mere happenstance; rather, it reflects a deliberate pattern. These particular positions were allocated to specific member states by Ban Ki-moon at the onset of his term 17 years ago, and this practice has persisted under the leadership of current Secretary-General António Guterres. 

It is perhaps not surprising that, with the exception of Italy, the top five countries with the longest tenures in specific positions correspond to the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This alignment adds an intriguing dimension to the discussion, hinting at the intertwining of geopolitical power dynamics and UN leadership roles. Notably, these positions often hold the rank of USG or head of the entity, amplifying the influence of these nations at the apex of UN decision-making.  

At the same time, two of the permanent members have historically dominated the largest number of senior posts, namely the United States, leading the pack with 13 posts, followed by the United Kingdom, with five posts. Delving deeper, we observe a distinct difference in the focus areas of the two nations. Among the UK’s five positions, three are in peace operations, encompassing missions in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon. In contrast, the US demonstrates a more diverse portfolio, occupying five out of six positions in funds or programs, namely, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Additionally, the US holds four positions in peace operations, just one more than the UK. 

Implications and Reflection 

The phenomenon of prolonged tenures in senior UN positions sheds light on the intricate dynamics of geopolitical influence and leadership roles within the organization. This concentration potentially signifies an imbalance of power, which could significantly influence decision-making processes and shape global policy outcomes.  

Political considerations have always played a role in senior UN appointments, and it’s unrealistic to completely disregard them. On one hand, the secretary-general may seek resources and financial backing for UN operations. On the other hand, UN officials may face challenges in maintaining impartiality on national matters if they are expected to return to their home countries after leaving the UN.12 The 2011 Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) report on senior appointments emphasized that while no position is formally reserved for any member state, historical patterns suggest that no secretary-general has been immune to political pressure regarding appointments.13 Also, Secretary-General António Guterres has been observed to avoid upsetting permanent members of the Security Council in appointments, reflecting the complexity of navigating political pressures.14 However, it’s essential to reiterate the ideal that UN officials are independent international civil servants, prohibited by the UN Charter from taking instructions from member states.15 While both these observations and the recruitment patterns point to the fact that these obligations are not always observed, it’s worth noting that both the secretary-general and member states are contravening the Charter when they prioritize political considerations over meritocratic principles. 

The prevalence of prolonged dominance continues to raise broader concerns surrounding diversity, rotation, and accountability within UN leadership. Addressing this phenomenon becomes imperative for upholding the core values of democracy, fairness, and equitable representation within the UN. The organization has made commitments in this regard. Secretary-General António Guterres indicated, both in his vision statement16 and his statement to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office,17 that he pledged to achieve full gender parity at the USG and ASG levels and that the same concern applies to regional diversity. However, continuously assigning certain key posts to the same countries appears contrary to a commitment to increasing regional diversity in senior appointments. 

The General Assembly has called for action in the past, yet the secretary-generals appear to have not fully addressed these concerns. For instance, the General Assembly endorsed the secretary-general’s proposal to develop a framework for open and transparent nomination and selection procedures for senior management positions in 2006.18 However, subsequent concerns were raised by the General Assembly regarding the insufficient progress made in implementing this approach.19 In 2011, the JIU also proposed measures to enhance transparency in senior appointments, including systematic posting of senior leadership vacancies.20 While the secretary-general has posted some senior vacancies online through the UN’s official website,21 this practice has been highly inconsistent. Furthermore, a new requirement introduced by last year’s Ad Hoc Working Group on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly (AHWG) mandates that the secretary-general provide an annual written update “with details on the process for appointing and electing each of the executive heads.”22 This could potentially serve as a mechanism to hold the secretary-general accountable for these appointments. 

The selection of senior leadership is not simply a matter of ensuring due regard for recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as possible or avoiding having any one member state dominating—or appearing to dominate—certain functions. A synthesis evaluation of organizational culture conducted in 2020 by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) stressed that poor leadership is one of the main factors negatively impacting the achievement of results, while strong leadership was one of the most common enabling factors to positive performance.23 Within peacekeeping operations specifically, a 2021 OIOS evaluation found that “there was strong evidence that mission leaders and managers were pivotal in creating, contributing and changing the mission culture, both positively and negatively” and that the quality of managers and senior leaders “varied significantly from ‘very good’ to ‘totally ineffective.’”24 As such, it is crucial for the next secretary-general to prioritize—both in words and in actions—the appointment of senior leadership on the basis of criteria such as quality and effectiveness over considerations such as nationality. This is not only necessary to ensure that the United Nations is able to deliver on the purposes stated in the Charter, but it is also an important way of asserting agency in a manner that can help foster confidence in the UN, its leadership, and its agenda. 

References

1 United Nations Charter, Article 101.3. 
2 United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/232 of March 2, 1992. 
3 This analysis covers the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies, including the separately administered funds and programs. It does not include the specialized agencies and related organizations that are not legally part of the United Nations, but which are within the broader UN system.  
4 Before 2019, this post was the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. 
5 Given that a Russian national served as the Director-General at the United Nations Office at Vienna from 2010 to 2020, this is part of a roving ring-fence which switches between Geneva and Vienna. Hence is inclusion despite the two terms being non-consecutive. 
6 Before 2019, this post was the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. 
7 Before 2019, this post was the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services. 
8 Before 2019, this post was the Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support; before 2007 this was the ASG for Mission Support in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
9 The position of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rule of Law in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAHbecame the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Haiti with the transition from MINUSTAH to United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) (and the downgrading of the SRSG position from USG to ASG rank) in 2017. 
10 The latest report on the composition of the Secretariat (A/78/569) shows a total of 69 USG posts and 80 ASG posts in the Secretariat 
11 According to A/78/569, there are a total of 18 USG posts and 42 ASG posts in peacekeeping operations, special political missions and other political presences, and the resident coordinator system. 
12 Jeffrey, Feltman, “Restoring (some) impartiality to UN senior appointments,” Brookings, October 29, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/restoring-some-impartiality-to-un-senior-appointments 
13 M. Deborah Wynes and Mohammad Mounir Zahran, “TRANSPARENCY IN THE SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR MANAGERS IN T,” UN Joint Inspection Unit, JIU/REP/2011/2, 2011, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=JIU%2FREP%2F2011%2F2&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False 
14 Blue Smoke, “For British Eyes Only,” PassBlue, April 28, 2024, https://www.passblue.com/article/blue-smoke-2024-04-28_for-british-eyes-only 
15 Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
16  https://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/4-April_Secretary-General-Election-Vision-Statement_Portugal-4-April-20161.pdf 
17  Speech by the UN Secretary-General, “Challenges and Opportunities for the United Nations,” United Nations, December 12, 2016, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-1212/secretary-general-designate-antónio-guterres-oath-office-speech 
18 A/60/883, as endorsed in General Assembly resolution 61/245 of 22 December 2006. 
19 A/64/683, as endorsed in General Assembly resolution 64/259 of 29 March 2010. 
20 Wynes and Zahran, “TRANSPARENCY IN THE SELECTION.” 
21 https://www.un.org/sg/en/vacancies/index.shtml 
22 UN Secretary-General, “Senior Leadership Vacancies,” United NationsA/RES/77/335https://www.un.org/sg/en/vacancies/index.shtml 
23 “OIOS Evaluation Synthesis of Organizational Culture,” OIOS, June 11, 2020, https://oios.un.org/file/8685/download?token=USfODIVV20-004. 
24 A/75/803 

Stay Connected

Join our mailing list to receive regular updates on our latest events, analysis, and resources.

"*" indicates required fields

This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.