It is a truth universally acknowledged that a conflict in possession of no military solution must be in want of more troops. Or so one would think from the recommendations on how to succeed in Afghanistan made by Gen. John Nicholson, the force commander in Afghanistan; Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of Central Command; and Republican senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham. More troops with “greater authorities” will “break” or “end” the stalemate that all agree exists. “Greater authorities” means putting U.S.
On December 17, 2016 Barnett Rubin made a presentation on the subject of “Security and Development Along the Belt and Road Initiative” at a conference hosted by the Belt and Road Building and Central Asian Studies Institute of Shaanxi Normal University in Xi’an, China.
In his first two weeks in office, President Donald Trump's "America First" pledge has proven more than an idle slogan. In word and deed, the White House has signaled an aggressive unilateral stance toward the world that's antagonized allies abroad and divided supporters at home.
On December 16, 2016, President Obama, speaking at his last White House press conference, suggested to Donald Trump that, “Since there's only one president at a time,” the president-elect should wait “before he starts having a lot of interactions with foreign governments other than the usual courtesy calls.”
Dr. Barnett Rubin recently gave a keynote speech entitled "Afghanistan's Road to Self Reliance" to the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in Stockholm, Sweden on 9 December 2016. A video and summary of the speech is available below.
Fifteen years have passed since the international community’s intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Since the drawdown of international forces, Afghanistan has not been able to secure peace and stability. What are the principal domestic and regional factors that deter and enable achieving these objectives? How can the country move forward?
On September 29th, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) of Afghanistan, signed a peace agreement with the Afghan government, by prerecorded video, from an undisclosed location. In the nineteen-eighties, Hezb-e-Islami was the most extreme of the seven mujahideen parties recognized by Pakistan, and Hekmatyar’s unblinking black eyes were framed by a black turban and full black beard. Three decades later, Hekmatyar, now sixty-nine, has a different look.
This report by Jonathan Caulkins, Mark Kleiman, and Jonathan Kulick contributes to the ongoing debate about counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, and in relation to counter-insurgency operations by adding a heretofore missing element–applied economic analysis of the effect of counter-narcotics policies. It does so by applying to a stylized depiction of the Afghan situation a standard model that economists and policy analysts have applied to a large range of policy areas.
In May of 2010 Tuft University’s Institute for Global Leadership gathered a select group of Afghan politicians and military officials, Pakistani journalists and scholars, United Nations officials, diplomats, humanitarian workers, and U.S. military representative to discuss on the opportunities for, and obstacles to, security and political reconciliation in Afghanistan. This report presents a summary of that meeting.
The absence of effective oversight and control of private security providers (PSPs) employed by the international community undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the Afghan government, the international military and diplomatic presence, and reconstruction organizations.