RESTRUCTURING THE UN SECRETARIAT TO STRENGTHEN PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACE OPERATIONS

SARAH CLIFFE AND ALEXANDRA NOVOSSELOFF

February 2017
The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict and insecurity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community.

CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict insecurity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections between politics, security, development and human rights and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict.
# Table of Contents

**Restructuring the UN Secretariat to Strengthen Preventative Diplomacy and Peace Operations**

By Sarah Cliffe and Alexandra Novosseloff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Authors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.  Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Evolution of UN Secretariat Structures in Peace and Security,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Current Challenges</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. For a New Kind of Leadership and Management</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Different Models for Restructuring</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Budget, Fiduciary Procedures and Human Resources</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Practical Policy Considerations</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A – The Secretariat and the Rest of the UN System:</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectors Across UN Silos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B – Chronology – History of UN Structures in Peace and Security</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C – Detailed Restructuring Models</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank a number of CIC colleagues for their support in preparing this report. Jim Della-Giacoma, Karina Gerlach, and Gizem Sucuoglu provided numerous comments on the text, Antonie Evans was responsible for preparing the organizational charts and the report’s layout, Ryan Rappa for data analysis, and Stephen Laifer for copy editing. Comments on drafts of this report by Arthur Boutellis, Ian Johnstone, and John Karlsrud were much appreciated. Recognition should also go to members of the UN Secretariat and independent analysts who provided inputs and advice. The research theme was supported by the Center on International Cooperation’s partners, including the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, but the views contained within are those of the authors.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sarah F. Cliffe is currently the director of New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. Prior to that, she was the Special Representative for the World Bank’s World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development, and the Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities to the United Nations. Ms. Cliffe has worked for the last twenty years in countries emerging from conflict and political transition, including Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, South Sudan, South Africa, Somalia, and Timor-Leste. At the World Bank, her work has covered post-conflict reconstruction, community driven development, and civil service reform. Ms. Cliffe was the chief of mission for the Bank’s program in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2002; led the Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group from 2002-2007; and was the Director of Strategy and Operations for the East Asia and Pacific Region from 2007-2009.

Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. She is also a research associate at the Centre Thucydide at the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2) and a senior expert at the Peace and Security Section of the Global Governance Institute in Brussels. She recently published with Olga Abilova “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine” (New York: International Peace Institute, July 2016); edited Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies: Entre impuissance et toute puissance (éditions du CNRS, 2016); and contributed chapters on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to the Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford University Press, 2015). She is a regular contributor to and part of the editorial team at the Global Peace Operations Review website.


# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>AGE</td>
<td>Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>DESA</td>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department for Field Support</td>
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<td>DM</td>
<td>Department of Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPET</td>
<td>Department for Policy, Evaluation and Training</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DSG</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department for Safety and Security</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>EOSG</td>
<td>Executive Office of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>HRUF</td>
<td>Human Rights Up Front initiative</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>International Commission on Multilateralism</td>
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<td>IOTs</td>
<td>Integrated Operational Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORCI</td>
<td>Office for Research and Collection of Information</td>
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<td>OROLSI</td>
<td>Office for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCPR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPMs</td>
<td>Special Political Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDIS</td>
<td>United Nations Development System</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1945, the United Nations has helped support many successful peace processes and protected millions of civilians around the world. Peace operations deliver results: research estimates suggest that the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission can reduce the risk of relapse into conflict by 75 – 85 percent; and that larger deployments diminish the scale of violence and protect civilians in the midst of fighting. Peace operations can be highly cost effective, with one General Audit Office assessment finding the cost to be roughly half of what a bilateral stabilization operation would cost. Different types of peace operations - from mediation and special envoys through to multidimensional peace-keeping and specialized justice and emergency health missions - have helped end long running conflicts and prevented violence from escalating or recurring in situations as diverse as Burkina Faso, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

Yet in 2017 the UN's peace and security pillar faces deep challenges. Three reviews in the past two years have highlighted serious inadequacies in UN peace and security responses at large. Many of the recent challenges are due to real world shifts in the nature of conflict and geopolitical dynamics – the tragedy of Syria, renewed fighting in Yemen and South Sudan, continued crisis in Libya, difficulties in preventing a political and humanitarian crisis in Burundi, longstanding missions that are struggling to deliver sustainable peace in DRC and Haiti, and newer missions in Mali and CAR where geography creates sustained cross-border security risks. These situations are also affected by divisions amongst Member States that have prevented agreement on action in some cases.

Part of the weaknesses, however, are managerial and structural. The sense of urgency pervading Member States at the UN, together with a new Secretary-General who has signaled his determination to reform this area, provides the opportunity to take a more fundamental look at what would give the UN's peace and security pillar the right form to deliver the functions that it is called to serve, now and in the future.

The purpose of this report is to analyze options for organizational restructuring in the UN's peace and security pillar. It focuses on headquarters structures since this has been identified as a primary source of overlap and competition: the purpose however is to deliver better results in the field, from prevention through crisis management to post-conflict recovery. It does not cover wider reforms across the UN's three pillars, which are supported in other CIC work streams.
Following an introductory section, Section II traces the history of UN peace and security structures since the UN’s founding (see Box). The UN has had no shortage of reform in the past, each designed to address specific weaknesses or new demands. Cumulatively, however, these changes have resulted in a structure that is no longer fit to fulfill the functions needed. Section III argues that current problems include:

- Operational challenges of large missions overwhelming a broader “culture of prevention” – despite achieving impressive preventative results in regions such as West Africa, the UN’s resources are often so overstretched in backstopping their larger field operations that there is little space to work on preventing future crises;

- Fragmentation of the system as a whole into silos, which undermine coherent action on prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping;

- Lack of a clear political strategy in peace operations that would help societies find sustainable solutions to crises;

- Insufficient authority and resources to galvanize system-wide action on peacebuilding;

- Competition between the departments of political affairs, and peacekeeping, in part due to the fact that both departments have become both political and operational: consequent delays in mission start-up and inability to deliver a spectrum of “right fit” operations and smooth transitions;

- Multiplicity of UN actors and fragmented initiatives for political, security and justice institutional support, although helping build these national institutions is key to preventing conflict onset and recurrence;

- A disconnect between operations and support;

- Inappropriate personnel and fiduciary procedures, and an administrative culture not conducive to dynamic field operations in the context of limited resources.

Section IV starts to look at possible solutions. From the outset, the report recognizes that changes in the UN’s organigram are not the only – or even necessarily the most important – changes needed. Most fundamentally, without strong leadership and management that ensure departments work together, and Member States support for new approaches, no organizational structure will deliver.

Within these limits, Section V considers the options for organizational structures laid out in the box below. A broad range of models is included, for different reasons. Some have been proposed by different reviews, such as a second Deputy Secretary-General and strengthening the political/operational delineation. Some are common currency in the corridors of the UN, such as merging the departments of political affairs and peacekeeping. Some are options indicated by basic principles of organizational design, such as the models that reorganize on a form versus function basis. The report considers the pros and cons of each of these.
Summary of Models Analyzed

**Dedicated management model.** This model relies on a strong dedicated layer of management and coordination to improve effectiveness in the peace and security pillar:
- A second DSG for Peace and Security.

**Fusion models.** These models seek to improve effectiveness and reduce duplication and competition by merging large functions currently run as separate departments:
- Merge DPA and DPKO;
- Merge DPKO and DFS.

**Reorganize on a “form follows function” basis.** These models seek to improve effectiveness and reduce duplication and competition by reorganizing based on stronger functional delineation of responsibilities:
- Strengthen the political/operational/support delineation;
- Strengthen political-operational links and specialized services;
- Strengthen regional focus and integration.

**Models to strengthen and integrate peacebuilding efforts.** While the models above look at the core peace and security organizational arrangements, these options integrate consideration of broader peacebuilding functions:
- Integrate peacebuilding more closely into EOSG;
- Integrate peacebuilding more closely with political affairs and preventative diplomacy.

Section VI underlines the importance of budget, fiduciary and human resource issues and considers options to strengthen this area. In line with much prior work, the report identifies a need for: (i) a unified budget process and rules for all large missions in the field, and; (ii) appropriate fiduciary and human resource procedures, designed for field missions operating in uncertain and insecure environments. Budget design more closely driven by political strategy and including a variety of inputs – a better balance between posts and non-personnel costs – would also be desirable to improve the link with results on the ground.

These are longstanding, acknowledged problems: the report tries to present some newer ideas to address them. On the budget side, in addition to grandfathering the scale of assessments for SPMs in a unified account, the report asks whether it would be worth Member States considering a systematic comparison of the UN’s budget spend in similar categories (e.g. operational versus non-operational) across the UN’s three pillars. More factual information may be a way to avoid past debates about whether “too much” is currently given to peace and security, to human rights or to development (see box).

On the procedural side, the report asks whether, rather than continuing to make small proposals for improvements to Member States as has been the case in the past decade, it might be desirable for Member States to consider a comprehensive proposal on a set of procedures designed specifically for field operations.
Comparing “non-operational” costs across the UN pillars

The 2016-2017 regular budget of DESA and the regional commissions is around $325 million annually for what are deemed non-operational activities (statistical and analytical, policy, country advisory services, capacity-building global and regional dialogue, Member State committees and conferences). An additional $150 million per annum is extra-budgetary. “Operational” development activities in the field are delivered through the wider UN development system, with voluntary funding. If the equivalent of these operational field activities – peacekeeping missions and SPMs – are removed from DPA and DPKO budgets (including their backstopping through DFS and the support account, and extra-budgetary (XB) activities such as the mine action trust fund), the amount remaining is around $120 million p.a. in the regular budget and $50 million p.a. XB. This must cover all analytical work, dialogue, capacity-building and advisory services in non-mission settings, and Member State processes.

Hence the economic and social pillar receives almost three times more than the peace and security pillar for activities that increase global knowledge, dialogue and country capacities. The human rights pillar receives less annual funding than either of the other two. These “non-operational” activities are part of both the economic and social and the peace and security pillar’s core mandated functions and include very practical country level advice: the terminology should not undercut their importance.

Section VII recommends the following practical considerations for policy makers:

- **Form should follow function.** Which form best fits the organization should be driven by which functions that need to be strengthened. For example, a strong focus on global preventative diplomacy might argue against strengthening geographical departments that could become silos of their own, preventing effective diplomatic outreach to actors in different regions. Equally, if it is important to ensure space for the primacy of politics and preventative diplomacy, this may argue against merging these functions with the day to day running of large field missions.

- **Span of control matters.** Merging a greater number of functions always increases the possibility for synergy. However, it also increases the span of control that any one manager is required to cover – requiring for instance one USG to remain on top of many different functions and a much larger human resource and budget responsibility than his or her peers. This is a primary drawback to the “fusion” models.

- **The larger the change, the greater the efficiency cost.** Changes in responsibilities, reporting lines, accountabilities and physical location all require effort from management and staff, and a necessary time period to settle into new roles. Some of the models described here – for instance the regional model or political-services model – require more change than others. Such a reorganization takes time and consumes a great deal of bureaucratic energy. There are however also opportunity costs in avoiding fundamental change when it is needed, and good change management can mitigate the disruption to activities.
Political feasibility matters. More major changes in relation to current structures or budgets are perhaps more likely to create divisions amongst Member States in the relevant governance committees. In addition, some of models described might bring incidental but important political pressures: concentration of too many sensitive files under a single USG, threatening the position of a USG role that has for some time been held by a powerful Member State or Member State grouping, as in the fusion models, or spurring pressure to appoint USGs from particular regions in the geographical model. If there is doubt about the surrounding Member State dynamics in 2017, following an option where the change is not too significant in relation to current structures may make sense.

Budget and fiduciary issues are linked to the effectiveness of restructuring. Most of the models discussed in this paper (with the exception of the second DSG) would not necessarily require additional resources. But it would be difficult to realize the best results from organizational change unless resources were reallocated to reflect new functions. The politics of gaining consensus on budget issues will also therefore need to be taken into account.

Any restructuring has second round effects. PBSO's creation was not accompanied by much analysis of the adjustment needed to DPA or DPKO's activities or the processes followed by country teams; DFS's creation did not lead to adequate changes in DM's role to realize the desired result. Not all of these effects can be identified upfront, but it is useful to identify the more major implications and set in place a follow up process to work these through.

These are models with elements that can be combined in practice. This paper looks at the series of models listed above as contrasting organizing ideas. In practice, ideas from more than one may be combined, and the paper gives examples.

Noting that no organigram is perfect, the report does not argue that one option must be better than all others. None of the options presented can work without effective management and governance arrangements. Indeed, whatever way departmental boxes are organized, there will a need for horizontal coordination arrangements and each option will require different coordination permutations. It does however conclude that for several of the models examined, the cons appear to quite significantly outweigh the pros. These include the addition of a second DSG which could increase bureaucratic layers and perpetuate silos; the fusion models which would create significant span of control problems; the regional model which would involve opportunity costs in global preventative functions, high temporary efficiency costs and difficulties in adapting over time; and the option of integrating peace-building under DPA which could face resistance because of the implied loss of a cross-pillar peace-building approach.

Conversely the paper argues that the political-operational and political-services model, as well as bringing peace-building closer to EOSG, have more pros than cons and are probably feasible options to consider. These options also appear to fit well with a “form follows function” principle, by reflecting the key functional priorities recently endorsed by Member States. These include the primacy of politics (by strengthening a department focused on political strategy for peace operations and preventative diplomacy) and diminishing silos (by considering ways to draw together departments working on the same area of specialized services to national counterparts).What is eventually proposed might also combine some of these elements. For example, a strong political-operational delineation of functions could be combined with a stronger center of excellence in institutional support services, focused on serving all departments and linked with the UN development system, as well as with strengthening cross-system prevention and peace-building functions in EOSG.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. Throughout its history, the United Nations Secretariat has shown a strong ability to adapt to a changing world. It has been regularly restructured, sometimes among crises or under pressure from Member States, but often as a result of leadership initiative. Each Secretary-General has taken office with his own “reform track” package, building on external studies, high-level panels or internal informal papers. All of these initiatives have cumulatively shaped the way the Organization functions today.

2. The UN peace and security pillar has helped foster many successful peace processes and protected millions of civilians around the world, but it currently faces deep challenges. Three reviews in 2015 and subsequent Member State debates highlighted serious inadequacies in UN operations at large (see Box 1).

Box 1: 2015-16 reports on UN reform related to the peace and security pillar

- The report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) of June 2015 recommended that the peace and security activities of the UN should be led by one DSG and that the structures underneath be streamlined and reorganized. The Secretary-General’s report responding to the HIPPO left the decision on that issue to his successor.

- The June 2015 Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture made some recommendations on revitalizing the role of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and on the relative roles of the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.

- The Global Study on the implementation of resolution 1325: “Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace” (2015) recommended structural changes to strengthen action on women, peace and security issues.

- The “UN70 Initiative” recommended that the Secretariat’s structures and processes be adapted “to avoid duplication and competition, and make the UN more agile and effective in the field”.

- The International Commission on Multilateralism pressed to “continue peace operations reform[s]” which “include restructuring the relevant Secretariat entities, developing new approaches for the financing and administration of peace operations, enhancing leadership of peace operations, and prioritizing unarmed strategies for the protection of civilians.”

- The outcome of the New York Leaders’ Summit, as well as London and Paris Ministerial Conferences on peacekeeping, particularly regarding the focus on planning, pledges and performance.

3. Many of the recent challenges are due to real world shifts in the nature of conflict and geopolitical dynamics. Prominent examples include the tragedy of Syria, renewed fighting in Yemen and South Sudan, continued crisis in Libya, difficulties in preventing a political and humanitarian crisis in Burundi, longstanding missions that are struggling to deliver sustainable peace in DRC and Haiti, and newer multidimensional missions in Mali and CAR where geography creates sustained cross-border security risks. Most of these situations are also affected by divisions among Member States that have at times prevented agreement on action. Yet part of these weaknesses are structural. The HIPPO noted that:
The present departmental configuration gives rise to, or exacerbates, significant problems affecting peace operations: assessment, strategy and planning are often delinked from in-depth knowledge about the affected country and region; solutions are designed by proponents of functional “supply-driven” perspectives on how the United Nations responds; peace operations are locked into a binary choice even as they struggle to adapt to shifting situations on the ground; planning across multiple departments to collectively stand up and then support one mission is hampered by difficult administrative transitions, different cultures and separate accountabilities; operational and administrative demands of large missions reduce the space for the development of political strategy; specialist thematic and support services are not readily available to all types of peace operations; and institutional divides drive unnecessarily complicated decision-making requiring senior-level interventions, which can resolve a particular problem but not the underlying dysfunctions.

4. Secretary-General António Guterres, in his statements as a candidate, in his inaugural speech and in his first speech at the Security Council, presented a strong vision to strengthen the culture of prevention and to reform the peace and security pillar. In 2017, Mr. Guterres has an opportunity to build on the previous reviews by presenting proposals that are strategic and carefully crafted to today’s challenges. In achieving this, the Secretary-General will need the support of Member States, who in turn will need to be persuaded that a more effective and efficient UN peace and security architecture is in their own interests. The aim of this paper is to inform debates on change by documenting the history of reform in the UN peace and security pillar, and by discussing in some depth the pros and cons of different organizing principles and structures that could be adopted to strengthen performance in future.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF UN SECRETARIAT STRUCTURES IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND PEACEBUILDING

5. The Secretariat is one of the principal organs of the United Nations (as described in Article 7 of the Charter). While the UN's founders envisaged the Security Council as the center of decisions on peace and security, they also noted that "the degree in which the objects of the Charter can be realized will be largely determined by the manner in which the Secretariat performs its task."16 There has always been a tension in achieving the right balance between the role of the Secretariat as a platform for Member States and as a strategic and operational Organization. It has also been a function of the degree of trust that Member States are prepared to place in the Secretary-General and the Secretariat:17 the preparatory commission noted that "the Secretariat cannot successfully perform its task unless it enjoys the confidence of all the Members of the United Nations." Ultimately, these are the critical parameters by which every Secretary-General of the Organization has had to frame efforts to adapt the Organization to new challenges and make it more effective.

BEFORE THE 1990S: CENTRALIZED AND PERSONALIZED DECISION-MAKING

6. From 1946 to the 1990s, the structures of the Secretariat were mainly conceived as supporting mechanisms to the other main organs of the UN. As underlined by the Preparatory Commission on the United Nations, “while the responsibility for the framing and the adoption of agreed international policies rests with the organs representative of the Members – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council – the essential tasks of preparing the ground for those decisions and of executing them in co-operation with the Members will devolve largely upon the secretariat”.18 As recommended at the outset, in 1946, the only “political” department of the Secretariat was the “Department of Security Council Affairs”: this took the name of “Department of Political and Security Council Affairs” in 1959.

7. The role of the Secretariat was not only to prepare the ground for Member States decisions, but also to execute them in cooperation with Member States: both roles were hence always in the founders’ vision. In line with that, the Security Council progressively saw in the Secretariat more than just a conference organizing body; it also conceived of it as an implementing arm for its decisions and, at times, under the Secretary-General’s good offices role, as a possible mediator and honest broker in various crises.

8. In the early 1960s, as mediation and peacekeeping roles evolved, an “Office of the Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs” was established within the Offices of the Secretary-General. Comprised of a dozen personnel, it took charge of all work related to the missions requested by the Security Council of the Secretary-General. It was primarily a political policy rather than an operational entity. It was this small office “which did the important work, providing political advice to the Secretary-General, maintaining contacts with the big powers, writing the Secretary-General’s policy speeches and statements to the Council, supporting his mediation work and managing the various small peacekeeping operations then in the field, such as in Cyprus and Lebanon.”20
9. At that time, the Secretariat structures in the peace and security domain had four main functions: to service the political organs, to oversee conflict resolution and the management of peacekeeping operations, to provide analysis and information, and to represent the Secretary-General when necessary. There was a clear distinction between the structures servicing the main bodies of the UN (with political appointees at the head of each of them), and the more "political" structures that the Secretary-General kept close to him in his "offices" (with a wider diversity and degree of independence from national interests in appointments).

10. The political sensitivity of those issues justified them being kept close to the Secretary-General himself. This is why peacekeeping operations were managed in a centralized way within UN headquarters (although always in a decentralized manner vis-à-vis the field). It is in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General that the position of Military Adviser was created in 1965.21 As the Council entirely delegated the management and the conduct of these operations to the Secretariat, over the years the Secretary-General gained a certain autonomy that the Council only questioned when it perceived the Secretary-General taking too much latitude on decisions, as in the case of the UN Operation in the Congo in 1960-1963.22

11. In this period, with a light and centralized structure in the management of peace operations, the organizational culture of the UN Secretariat was dominated by ad hoc practices and personalized decision-making. As Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann explained, “the operating style of the ‘founding fathers’ of peacekeeping exemplified and prized a reliance on personal relationships instead of formal, de-personalized reporting chains, case-by-case considerations instead of general templates and preserving ‘constructive ambiguity’ whenever instructions, mandates or budgetary regulations were put on paper, in order to maximize whatever political room for manoeuvre remained available to the UN.” Furthermore, “because of the persistent refusal of Member States to fund a more robust headquarters capacity to direct and support the slowly growing list of peace operations, there were no resources to develop a more professional organization to undertake conflict analysis for the support of strategic planning and crisis decision-making.”23 The lack of formal and more professionalized structures allowed the Secretariat to be flexible and to maintain a clear link between the Secretary-General’s overall political vision and the UN’s role in specific country cases. However, the lack of professional skills and systems became an issue as operations multiplied in number, scale and complexity.


12. From the outset of his tenure, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was eager to reorganize and rationalize the structures of the Secretariat. He abolished eighteen high-level posts and decentralized the structure by reducing the number of senior officials. He did this in his first two months (giving the old offices and departments just three weeks to discontinue their activities) and without preceding the reorganization with any proposals to Member States.24 He may also have been inspired by a report written by the “Wilenski Group,” composed of 30 Member States. The Group’s recommendations were, among others, to deny any national claims to senior posts, to streamline the Secretariat into a more pyramidal-like structure, and to increase the authority of the Secretary-General.25 The reorganization of the secretariat was done quickly (some would say with an element of surprise), within existing resources and capabilities, and by executive order.
It was helped by new harmony in the Security Council symbolized by the first summit of the Council of its history, held on 31 January 1992.

13. In February 1992, the old Office for Special Political Affairs was replaced by a new and operational Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which incorporated the logistical support functions for peacekeeping previously housed in the Department of Management. All other political offices, including the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI), were brought together to create the new Department of Political Affairs (DPA), with most staff coming from the traditionally Soviet-headed Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Everything “political” that did not concern peacekeeping operations was placed in that department, including support for the Security Council, Decolonization and Palestinian Committees, disarmament and support for good offices and preventive diplomacy.

(Although the new structure was a ‘rationalization’, there was never much clarity on the respective roles of DPA and DPKO. Boutros-Ghali and his Chef de Cabinet Jean-Claude Aimé insisted that it was simple: DPA was ‘political’ and DPKO ‘operational’. For a while, DPKO was even required to submit papers to the Secretary-General's office through DPA, though this was later rescinded. In practice, DPKO led all the new peacekeeping operations, whilst DPA was left looking for a role. Its theoretical principal function – conflict prevention – never really materialized.26

14. In March 1993, when Kofi Annan became the head of DPKO, some 50 staffers directed and supported operations of 80,000 uniformed peacekeepers (often deployed in complex missions such as in Bosnia, Somalia, Angola and Mozambique) with the assistance of little more than a hundred logisticians and administrators dealing with finance and personnel.27 Since then, DPKO started a long path toward operationalizing and professionalizing its structure.28 First, it was divided into an Office of Operations, overseeing all missions deployed, and structured around regional divisions, and an Office of Mission Support to help divisions with administration and logistics. DPKO has never been an operational joint staff, as it does not conduct any of these operations directly. It has a political function and is an operations monitoring body that supports the work of heads of peacekeeping operations in the field, with a ratio of about one person at headquarters to oversee every 120 people on the ground. That ratio has not evolved over time (since despite growth in HQ posts post-Brahimi, deployed personnel in the field have also grown). Such light backstopping from headquarters has become an issue in times of crisis or of high demands from the Council.29

15. Between 1995 and 2000, a series of new structures in DPKO were created and strengthened by both the 1995 and Brahimi reforms30:

- In 1995, a Situation Center of about twenty staff members was set up to function 24 hours a day and was tasked to gather all information coming from the various field missions. Its mission was to be able to present to senior management at any point in time the situation evolving on the ground. In 2013, the Sitcen integrated into a UN Operations and Crisis Centre31, since January 2017 reporting to EOSG.

- A Standby Arrangement System was created in 1995 to give more predictability to the planning of operations. It was transformed twenty years later, in 2016, into a Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell.

- A Lessons Learned Unit was also set up in 1995 and renamed in 2000 the Best Practices Unit, and Peacekeeping Policy and Best Practices Service in 2007.
• The office of the Military Adviser was strengthened with “gratis personnel” seconded by Member States (a system that was ended in 1999), before turning into a Military Division in 2000 (thanks to the Brahimi recommendations) and then an Office of Military Affairs in 2007 (following the lessons learned of UNIFIL’s Strategic Military Cell).32

• An Office of Mission Support divided into the Logistics Support Division and Administration Support Division replaced in DPKO the Field, Administration and Logistics Division previously located in the Department of Management.

• A UN strategic logistical base was also set up in Brindisi in 1994; a Regional Service Centre was later established in Entebbe in 2010.

16. The Brahimi Report certainly gave a boost to the structure and personnel of DPKO (in particular through the creation of 93 new posts, half of them located in the strengthened Military Division and Police Division) in the context of several tracks of reforms implemented since the appointment of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General in 1997.33 However, the Brahimi report did not touch upon the issue of restructuring. It only considered that the mechanism established to “coordinate” DPA’s and DPKO’s work – the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) – needed an overhaul: “Far from being a decision-making body, it functioned at best as an information-sharing mechanism and USGs often did not even turn up at its meetings.”34 In fact, while Lakhdar Brahimi and his team were aware of possible disconnects between DPA and DPKO, they did not recommend on broader restructuring of the peace and security functions of the Secretariat: “Back in 2000, we were already playing with the idea of saying that it is unnecessary to have two separate departments. However, we did not want to create a problem for Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was already thinking of his second term.”35

17. Later, the professionalization of peacekeeping operations was further developed by a new internal reform strategy entitled “Peace operations 2010” conducted by the USG for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, from 2005 onward. It focused on five key areas:

• Personnel (“targeted recruitment and development of personnel, accompanied by integrated management, leadership and occupational training designed to build expertise and enhance professionalism”);

• Doctrine (establishment of “standardized practices, procedures and guidelines,” linked to lessons learned, which led inter alia to the writing of the Capstone Doctrine in 2008);

• Partnerships (to establish predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations, and to develop relationships with international financial institutions);

• Resources (creation of a standing police capacity, strengthening of technological capacity, enhancement of strategic communications capacity; establishment of conduct and discipline units);

• Organization (establishment of integrated organizational structures at Headquarters and in the field).36
By 2007, DPKO had evolved into a large and powerful department with around 600 staff members, a strong leadership and a budget that is twice the size of the UN regular budget: a fact that created some tensions and competition within the UN system. At the same time, the number of challenging missions (particularly in logistical terms, such as in Darfur) kept increasing. Some were again talking about peacekeeping fatigue. By 2010, the sense of overstretch led to calls for substantial scaling back of large-scale peacekeeping operations in favor of smaller political missions. While this "pivot" was never fully realized – the number of peacekeepers has continued to grow – the increased emphasis on special political missions laid the groundwork for subsequent tensions between the roles of DPA and DPKO.

**2005: CREATION OF THE PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE**

Since 1997, DPA had been the focal point within the UN for post-conflict peacebuilding. However, over the years, the UN leadership and many Member States realized that there was a need for a better continuum of crisis management that would join together the work of the three pillars of the UN (peace and security, development and human rights). In 2001, the Security Council acknowledged the need for a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. In a Presidential Statement, it reaffirmed that “the quest for peace requires a comprehensive, concerted, and determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and social dimensions,” and recognized that “peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms.”

The idea that the UN needed a new peacebuilding architecture to address short and long-term challenges around a comprehensive and integrated strategy was central to the recommendations of the 2004 High–Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Following its report, Kofi Annan published his own report acknowledging that “no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.” He recommended to “Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) within the United Nations Secretariat, to achieve this end.” These organs, together with a Peacebuilding Fund established to support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to peacebuilding processes and address critical gaps, were established in 2005 following the World Summit.

In debates on the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, the initial idea was to foster a joined up strategy at every level (intergovernmental, between the three UN pillars, within the UN Secretariat and with agencies, funds and programs, and with partners such as the international financial institutions and regional organizations) and at every stage of the conflict cycle (i.e. from outbreak to recurrence or continuation of armed conflict). However, mostly due to intervention/sovereignty dilemmas among Member States, peacebuilding was restricted to the post-conflict terrain and prevention of the recurrence of conflict. Consequentially, the role of the PBC – and to some degree, of the PBSO – was targeted more narrowly on a small number of post-conflict countries.

The PBSO has been somewhat limited in its functions by that focus, but perhaps more critically by a lack of leadership to give authority to its role of linking the three pillars of the system around a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy, helping the PBC to bridge between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, and strengthening partnerships with other organizations. Furthermore, the PBSO was understaffed from the outset.
Having to dedicate most of its resources to providing secretarial support to the PBC, it had little time for dedicated policy analysis on drivers of conflict, or for bridging different parts of the system around a peacebuilding strategy. While it has successfully turned the Peacebuilding Fund into an effective mechanism to catalyze peacebuilding efforts, deliver country-level results and galvanize partnerships across the UN system, it has never had the resources to play the “strategic planning brain” function originally envisaged.

23. In June 2015, an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture released its report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as part of the regular 2015 peacebuilding review. It recommended a stronger and sufficiently financed PBSO, preferably from assessed contributions. According to the vision of the AGE, the strengthened and upgraded PBSO would resemble a strategic brain for peacebuilding, able to provide quality analysis, policy prescription and program advice to the Secretary-General, foster system-wide action to sustain peace across the conflict cycle, and support effective partnership. On 27 April 2016, the subsequent parallel resolutions of the General Assembly (A/RES/70/262) and Security Council (S/RES/2282) stressed that the PBSO should be revitalized to fulfill a broadened role: supporting the PBC, increasing synergies with other parts of the UN system, and providing strategic advice to the Secretary-General, drawing together the expertise of the UN system.

2007: CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR FIELD SUPPORT

24. 2006-2007 augured a major overstretch in DPKO, aggravated by a new surge of nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations, and the start-up or expansion of three missions in Lebanon, Chad, and Darfur (see Graph 1). Internal pressures mounted for changes to tackle these challenges, paralleling pressure from the U.S. administration for efficiency reforms. On arrival in office, newly elected Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed splitting DPKO into two departments: one political and operational, and one focused on field support. The proposals were made through a non-paper sent to the General Assembly and a “comprehensive report,” with the core arguments being that a realignment of peacekeeping was needed to 1) improve the speed and efficiency with which support is provided to personnel serving in the field, and 2) strengthen the management and oversight of resources provided by Member States.

25. Due to an initial lack of consensus among Member States (especially among troop-contributing countries), Ban sought to have his proposal approved for the creation of the Department for Field Support (DFS) by the General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted a resolution on “strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peacekeeping operations” which became effective on 1 July 2007. In a way, the UN recreated the “Office for Field Operational and External Support Activities” that supported all activities of the Secretariat’s departments before 1992. The leadership of DPKO and the new DFS were aware of several challenges posed by the new structures:

- potential disconnect between operations and support (contrary to generally accepted military principles);
- the difficulties of following Brahimi’s recommendations on integration when another new “silo” had been created; and,
- the possible tensions caused by having one USG (in DFS) report to another (in DPKO), leading to an inevitable autonomy of the former towards the latter.
26. UN leadership tried to overcome these design constraints by having a common DPKO/DFS chief of staff and a senior management team, as well as establishing “Integrated Operational Teams” (IOTs) within the regional divisions of DPKO, each responsible for the provision of day-to-day support for all aspects of peace operations. The newly established “Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training” (DPET) and “Office for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions” (OROLSI) also constituted a shared capacity between DPKO and DFS.

SINCE 2005: STRENGTHENED SUPPORT FOR GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND AN INCREASED OPERATIONAL ROLE

27. DPA has also evolved considerably since its creation in 1992. It has continued to focus on peacemaking, preventive diplomacy and support for the Secretary-General’s good offices as well as expanding its capabilities in the areas of mediation, electoral assistance and preventing and countering terrorism. It also continues to service the Security Council as well as the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Decolonization Committee. As can be seen from the graph above the number of field-based special political missions to be managed by DPA has also grown. Over time, there was growing recognition that the demands placed on the Department were increasing significantly and that it could not be expected to effectively carry out its global political responsibility and service the Security Council and related committees with the resources it was being provided. As underlined by the Secretary-General’s Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, DPA is organized to follow political developments worldwide, so that it can provide early warning
of impending conflicts and analyze possibilities for preventive action by the United Nations, as well as for action to help resolve existing conflicts.\textsuperscript{53}

Graph 2: Evolution of Special Political Missions since 1993

28. In 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a call for the strengthening of the UN’s capacities to prevent conflict, noting in particular his intention to strengthen support for mediation. His proposal was ultimately adopted at the 2005 World Summit, leading to the establishment of the Mediation Support Unit within DPA in 2006. The Unit quickly evolved into the UN’s center of expertise for all thematic issues related to mediation, proving to be a dedicated source of expertise for the Secretary-General’s good offices, for UN envoys missions in the field – peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as for regional partners and Member States.

29. Building on the momentum created by the World Summit’s decision on mediation, and in response to the chronic and well documented under-resourcing of DPA, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented in 2007 a proposal for the strengthening of the DPA with a view to “creating a more proactive and effective platform for preventive diplomacy and good offices, including mediation, in the service of Member States”.\textsuperscript{54} The proposal recognized that for preventive diplomacy to be effective, it needed to be more field-based and thus operational. The centerpiece of the strengthening proposal was an effort to de-centralize DPA through the creation of a network of regional offices which would be able to carry the Secretary-General’s good offices mandate in closer partnership with actors on the ground, including regional organizations, while being ready to address crises quickly before they led to violence. The proposal also sought to enhance DPA’s regional expertise and analytical capacities at Headquarters, and to professionalize and expand electoral
assistance and mediation support to meet ever growing demands. In total, the Secretary-General sought an additional 101 posts for DPA, 49 of which were approved (mainly in the regional divisions, electoral assistance and mediation). However, the strengthening fell short of providing all the required resources. In particular, there was significant resistance from the membership against the proposal to de-centralize DPA through the establishment of new regional offices, which proved sensitive for various regional groups. Despite the successful experiences of UNOWA, established in 2002, and UNRCCA, established in 2007 a few months before the DPA strengthening proposal, many Member States felt that UN political presences in the different regions could pose the risk of interference.

30. The response of the Department was to try to make up the shortfall in resources through extra-budgetary (XB) resources. These XB resources – which tripled between 2010 and 2014, but are still fairly modest at around $20 million per annum – have among other things allowed for the creation of the standby team of mediation experts, greater programmatic capacity to implement initiatives in prevention and peacebuilding, enhanced cooperation with regional partners, the ability to mount rapid responses and field deployments, and more broadly the ability of DPA desks to travel more frequently to establish networks with national authorities and civil society. They have also assisted in providing backstopping for the growing number of SPMs (see below). In addition, since 2009 and largely with XB funds, the Department has housed the secretariat of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) which coordinates UN actions to implement the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy. While XB funds have given DPA the agility and flexibility that the regular budget cannot, it is also true that many core functions that should be provided through the regular budget are not resourced this way.

31. As described earlier, the intention behind creating DPKO and DPA was to combine all activities relating to missions where there were “boots on the ground” into one department (DPKO) – and group all other “political activities” under DPA. In the early 2000s, to ensure a more transparent and clear budget presentation, the various civilian missions with a political mandate were grouped into a broad category called special political missions (SPMs). These missions expanded significantly in number between the late 1990s and 2010, but have since declined and stabilized at around 10-12 missions per year. Because of their civilian nature, these missions were and continue to be funded from the regular budget rather than the peacekeeping budget. SPMs cover a variety of mandates; the budget clusters them in three groups (see Box 2).

32. As of December 2016 there were twelve Cluster III special political missions, with about 4,000 personnel deployed on the ground. Seven of them are country-based: Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Somalia (see Graph 2). Other Cluster III SPMs also include the three regional offices, in West Africa and the Sahel, Central Africa, and Central Asia, which serve as forward platform for preventive diplomacy. Cluster I SPMs, which cover good offices missions by the various Special Envoys and Advisers of the Secretary-General (e.g. Burundi, Syria, Yemen, Cyprus), have also evolved in significant ways. Based on the understanding that preventive diplomacy and good offices require a link to the field, these missions increasingly have hybrid or field-based structures. For example, the Office of the Special

Box 2: What are Special Political Missions (SPMs)?

DPA categorizes its SPMs in three thematic Clusters:

- Cluster I: Special/Personal Envoys and Special Advisers of the Secretary-General
- Cluster II: Sanctions Monitoring Teams, Groups and Panels
- Cluster III: Political Offices, Peace-building Support Offices, and Integrated Offices
Envoy to the Great Lakes Region is based in Nairobi and deploys political officers throughout the region as part of its mandate. Similarly, the Office of the Special Envoy to Yemen is currently based in Amman, waiting for security conditions to improve so that it can be relocated to Sana’a. Despite their different models, mandates and structures, SPMs have a common “raison d’être”: “preventing and resolving conflict, as well as helping Member States and parties to a conflict to build a sustainable peace”.38

33. SPMs are in principle distinguished from peacekeeping missions by being purely civilian, even when they have small or unarmed military or police components, conducting non-operational tasks.39 However, in the case of large missions such as Afghanistan and Iraq, this difference is less significant. There are considerable similarities between functions, and indeed UNAMA has been managed by both DPKO (from 2003 to 2014) and DPA at different periods.

34. A particular challenge for SPMs has been the lack of a dedicated mechanism to fund their backstopping needs at Headquarters. SPMs are substantively backstopped by DPA, as the lead Department, but also receive support from a host of entities in the Secretariat, such as DFS, DM, DPI, DSS and DPKO/OROLSI. Because of a lack of dedicated mechanism for the funding of backstopping, these entities have had to rely on ad hoc arrangements to meet existing demands, such as relying on posts included in mission budgets, using extra-budgetary resources, or borrowing capacity from other areas. Since 2011, there has been a strong effort by the Secretariat to encourage the UN membership to review the arrangements for funding and backstopping of special political missions60, but these have so far not yielded a comprehensive solution. However, any SPM budgets now include limited backstopping capacity elements, albeit not the full range of advance planning and backstopping available to peacekeeping missions. It remains that bureaucratic stovepipes and different sources of funding continue to make transitions of missions between DPA and DPKO difficult.

35. The growth in SPMs has given DPA a more visible role if deploying operations to the field. In fact, contrary to the initial vision of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his colleagues, DPKO and DPA have by now – encouraged by Member States – become both political and operational. This in itself creates bureaucratic competition that has progressively hampered the Secretariat in designing missions to meet country needs rather than supply-driven perspectives.
III. CURRENT CHALLENGES

36. From its evolution of peace and security pillar as described in the preceding section, a series of issues has arisen over time that now seriously hampers the Secretariat from delivering the unified efficiently needed in challenging environments. These difficulties have been accentuated by a lack of leadership to arbitrate between the various departments, and by siloed mindsets throughout the system generating a lack of flexible approaches to requests put forward by the Security Council. Figure 1 shows the current structure: even a quick review of this illustrates some clear areas of duplication. The structure also gives rise to numerous less visible but serious challenges.

Figure 1: Current Secretariat Structures for Peace and Security

37. **Operational challenges of large missions overwhelming a broader “culture of prevention”** – While the professionalism of DPA’s analysis and preventative diplomacy remains strong, its growing operational role in supporting large SPMs – in particular since it has lacked dedicated backstopping resources for these missions – has distracted attention from its broader analytical, political and preventative role. The high demands in reporting on and servicing large SPMs tend to leave little time free to think more strategically about prevention. Across the Secretariat, there is too much focus on heavy missions as a tool, and not enough on a creative set of preventative options: this is in part driven by Council decision-making, but the organizational structures and tools do not foster a broader or longer-term view.61
38. **Fragmentation of the system as a whole into silos** – Despite policy and research advances, the AGE report notes that “there is general recognition that deep fragmentation persists, as each entity focuses on its own specific mandate at the expense of overall coherence”. There are still difficulties in adapting development programs to deliver prevention and peacebuilding results. On the peace and security side, there remains little understanding of how development programming works and how it can contribute to prevention and peacebuilding. Despite advances under the Human Rights Up Front initiative (HRUF), human rights instruments are far from fully integrated (except to some extent in multidimensional peacekeeping operations). The adoption of the SDGs which put peaceful, just and inclusive societies and rights-based approaches at the heart of the development agenda provides an opportunity to strengthen practice.

39. **A lack of clear political strategy in peace operations** – Over the years, the Secretariat seems to have lost an all-encompassing vision of how to bring solutions to current crises. That has several aspects: an inability to identify achievable goals and a strategy for meeting those goals, as opposed to ideal end-states; and an inability to develop an “honest” assessment of the situation on the ground and design solutions adapted to the needs of the local context. These shortcomings impact the whole cycle of peace operations, from early planning to transitions and exit strategies. For example, while the 17,000-strong mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was able to slowly decrease – through a political mission and then a peacebuilding office before handing over the remaining tasks to the UN country team (with strong bilateral partnerships at all times) – the planning for the transition of the mission in Liberia is not going as smoothly. For the planning of the phasing out of this mission, the option of a possible political mission for Liberia was not put on the table. These tensions are also driven by the policies and divisions of the Security Council.

40. **PBSO – insufficient authority and resources to galvanize strategic system-wide action** – The peacebuilding architecture was designed to act as a bridge between the development and peace and security pillar, with the PBSO also providing a small cell of policy and strategic planning advice to the Secretary-General on cross-pillar strategies. Due to lack of EOSG attention to developing and empowering this capacity, as well as a chronic lack of sufficient financial and human resources, PBSO has in contrast often appeared to be a “spare wheel” in the UN architecture. This has added complexity to the number of actors who have to reach consensus, rather than providing a strategic bridge.

41. **Competition between DPA and DPKO** – Competition between DPA and DPKO over lead department for mission planning and deployment of missions has led to unhealthy turf wars. It is well known that the planning of MINUSMA and (to a lesser extent) MINUSCA led to strong infighting between the initial special political missions deployed on the ground and the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. This has often reflected genuine differences over political strategy as well as bureaucratic competition: yet the key point is that structures and financing, together with a lack of strong leadership, fostered time-consuming competition rather than a constructive internal relationship.

42. **Multiplicity of UN actors and fragmented initiatives for political, security and justice institutional support** – A regular feature of Security Council mandates for peace operations is to help societies build capable and accountable political, security and justice institutions, as well as to support the extension of state authority. Capacities to achieve this are fragmented in the Secretariat between DPA (mediation, electoral, constitutional), DPKO-OROLSI (rule of law and security), DPET (civil affairs, protection of civilians), and OHCHR (human rights, transitional justice). The units are funded differently – some regular budget, some support account, some additional extra-budgetary funds – which constrains how their
expertise can be used. Aside from the police and justice units in OROLSI, none of these units are structurally linked to UN development system, although it is through the UNDS that much institution-building support will be provided even in peace operations settings (and ultimately through international financial institutions).

43. **A disconnect between operations and support** - The split between DPKO and DFS has at times led to a disconnect between operations and support, particularly when the assessment of needs done by DPKO could not be matched by DFS’s means and UN administrative culture and procedures. There is “a belief in the field that the autonomy taken by DFS from DPKO leads to competition rather than coordination.” A disconnect with DFS capabilities often constrains DPKO strategies. In Mali, for example, the mission strategy included recruitment of local civilian staff in offices in the North: these could not be paid on time, nor could their protection be ensured to allow them to carry out stabilization functions.

44. **Inappropriate personnel and fiduciary procedures in the context of limited resources** - DFS and the Department of Management (DM) have overlapping layers of oversight for budget and fiduciary issues, when very little delegation has been given to DFS by DM. The fiduciary and personnel procedures they use are also little different from those used in the UN’s regular budget, which does not require the same speed of turnaround as field missions. As pointed out by HIPPO, “Secretariat administrative procedures had not been reviewed to meet the demands of the field,” and “the current approach of separating responsibilities for delivering mandates from the authority to manage resources leads to duplication, delay and bureaucratic friction and does not provide the assurance that resources are being used most effectively, efficiently and transparently.”

45. **Diminishing consensus over the principles and purpose of peacekeeping** - All this illustrates a certain confusion in the purpose of peace operations, which results in inconsistency when choosing between various types of missions. Some special political missions deployed into theatres of active conflict (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Somalia) have more personnel and more extensive mandates than some peacekeeping operations. HIPPO’s use of the term “peace operations” was designed to address the reality of country needs.” Peace operations are, however, sometimes interpreted by Member States as implying more robust operations, although the aim was to encompass the “spectrum of operations.” This confusion over the peace and security portfolio has contributed to the emerging debate over the need to rationalize the Secretariat’s structures and to merge some of the departments. It has also raised the need to clarify the debate over the exact nature and features of peacekeeping operations, some years after the writing of the Capstone Doctrine (2008), as the conduct of these operations lack consensus among all stakeholders, especially when they are deployed in environments when there is no peace to keep.

46. **Overlapping uses of the terms “prevention” and “peacebuilding”** - The 2016 Sustaining the Peace resolutions clearly define peacebuilding as applying throughout the conflict cycle, including at the onset of conflict. This is strongly justified in the academic literature and makes pragmatic sense, since all societies have experienced conflict at some period in their history and none can state that they will have no vulnerability in future. The fluid nature of the spectrum of operations between prevention, peace operations, post-conflict recovery and renewed prevention is also ever-present. Key countries that were on the agenda of the PBC, including Burundi and CAR, have relapsed into conflict and now host SPMs and peacekeeping operations.
IV. FOR A NEW KIND OF LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

47. Almost ten years after the latest major reform of the peace and security structures within the Secretariat through the creation of DFS, there is new momentum for another round of restructuring that coincides with the appointment of a new Secretary-General. The remainder of this paper looks in detail at options for restructuring.

48. It is important to underline that no organizational chart is likely to be an answer to all problems facing a bureaucracy. In the case of the UN Secretariat, any restructuring in the peace and security area will also need strong leadership and efforts to strengthen and streamline strategic decision-making. It will also require improvements to budgetary and human resource procedures. Bureaucratic silos, cumbersome hiring practices, and outdated budgeting processes must give way to more fluid arrangements and stronger accountability processes at headquarters and in the field. The fundamental objective is for UN headquarters to better support field missions: ultimately, this also requires a change of mindset that favors cooperation over siloed approaches, and a field-focused rather than supply driven approach. Due to the importance of strategic leadership, we discuss it briefly here before going into restructuring options. Budgetary and human resource issues are covered in section VI.

49. By the end of 2016, the UN had reached an unprecedented level of proliferating coordination structures and reporting lines. There were too many authorities to report to in varying ways and times. In the Executive Office of Secretary-General (EOSG), there were too many small units (four on the substantive side; four on the administrative side; plus sub-units and extra budgetary units) reporting either to the Secretary-General, the DSG or the chef de cabinet, who was effectively another “deputy” to the Secretary-General. Several of these units – policy planning, political, human rights upfront, strategic planning, rule of law – had overlapping roles in cross-departmental advice and coordination. Clearly, the EOSG was then a juxtaposition of several entities that did not form an integrated executive management team able to clearly orient the work of the departments below.

50. Secretary-General António Guterres clearly recognized the need for a real “cabinet-style office” to address these problems. In his first days in office he created an Executive Committee to assist him in decision-making on issues of strategic importance requiring principal-level attention across all pillars of the Secretariat. The work and structure of the EOSG have also been reviewed in order to strengthen strategic thinking and coordination, under the leadership of the Chef de Cabinet and the ASG for Strategic Coordination as well as the Senior Adviser on Policy. The various small strategic units existing in the past have been grouped under the ASG for Strategic Coordination. These structures and processes should greatly strengthen the decision-making process, improve the strategic orientation of the UN, and help arbitrate between priorities, policy options and departments. It will still take some time to strengthen EOSG as a unified executive office that can synthesizes the analysis and policy work done by departments and create the appropriate strategic follow up on the instructions given by the Secretary-General.
V. DIFFERENT MODELS FOR RESTRUCTURING

51. This section looks at different models for restructuring: it comprises discussion of a series of organigrams, described briefly here and laid out in more detail in Annex C. It looks at options for restructuring UN headquarters rather than field structures since many analysts have noted that resolving overlap, competition and delays at HQ is crucial to empower better field level performance: the ultimate objective is to make headquarters more field-focused and responsive to needs on the ground, and to deliver better results at country level. Before considering different options, it is important to underline two basic principles.

52. *No model provides the perfect solution to every problem.* Any organizational structure, for any organization, will delineate functional breaks between responsibilities that need strong cross-cutting management to bridge, as outlined in the section above on cabinet-style processes. We therefore look at the pros and cons of each model presented. None of the options presented can work without effective management and governance arrangements. Indeed, whatever way departmental boxes are organized, there will a need for horizontal coordination arrangements and each option will require different coordination permutations.

<table>
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<th>Box 3: HIPPO’s recommendations</th>
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The options for a new structure should seek to deliver, inter alia, the following results.

- Political strategies must drive each UN peace operation with international and regional efforts mobilized in support.
- High-quality integrated assessment, analysis, and strategy formulation planning must produce context-driven and realistic solutions.
- Regional dimensions of conflict must be addressed systematically in close cooperation with relevant regional organizations.
- Unity of effort and integration must be strengthened across UN efforts in support of a mandate, including with peacebuilding activities and the UN Development Group.
- Clear headquarters/field authority, command and control must be provided for all military deployments: tighter integration of operational and logistics concepts of operations and delivery.
- Accountability must be strengthened through the alignment of responsibilities to deliver results with the necessary authority to utilize resources.
- Specialist civilian and uniformed capacities, as well as logistical and administrative support services must be available to all UN peace operations as required.
- Organizational resilience to ensure the effective management of crises in missions, including multiple concurrent crises, must be strengthened.
- Evaluations must be undertaken, independent of the implementation entities, to inform strategic reviews and course corrections.
- Legislative support and reporting must be strengthened for the Security Council and its subsidiary organs, the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee – including the C-34, the Fifth Committee, and the Peacebuilding Commission.
53. *The purpose of restructuring – the function that new forms are trying to deliver – is crucial for success.* The HIPPO report’s criteria for restructuring are shown above. These rest on the following strategic principles covered in the report: the primacy of politics, leading to a planning process that looks at the whole spectrum of operations and can develop more context-specific approaches and partnerships; strong links between political and operational strategy and support, including agility and adaptability as conditions change; the ability to apply specialized functions and capacities (such as electoral support and security and justice capacity-building) in a coherent way according to needs on the ground.

54. Since HIPPO considered only peace operations, we would add that any restructuring should ensure that a culture of prevention and peacebuilding is strengthened across the organization as a whole. This would break down silos and ensure the full capabilities of the peace and security, development, and human rights pillars of the UN, and its humanitarian efforts, are used in strong alignment, as recommended in the AGE report.

**SUMMARY OF MODELS COVERED**

55. The types of models described are arranged according to the type of change they involve, as shown in Box 4. The following section briefly describes each of these models and identifies possible pros and cons. Annex C contains more detailed organigrams for each model. Cross-cutting issues such as strengthening gender units as recommended by the 1325 study are dealt with there.

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**Box 4: Summary of types of models analyzed**

**Dedicated management model.** Recommended in the HIPPO together with further restructuring within DPA and DPKO, this model relies on a strong dedicated layer of management and coordination to improve effectiveness in the peace and security pillar:

- A second DSG for Peace and Security

**Fusion models.** These models seek to improve effectiveness and reduce duplication and competition by merging large functions currently run as separate departments:

- Merge DPA and DPKO
- Merge DPKO and DFS

**Reorganize on a “form follows function” basis.** These models seek to improve effectiveness and reduce duplication and competition by reorganizing based on stronger functional delineation of responsibilities:

- Strengthen the political/operational/support delineation
- Strengthen political-operational links and specialized services
- Strengthen regional focus and integration

**Models to strengthen and integrate peacebuilding efforts.** While the models above look at the core peace and security organizational arrangements, these options integrate consideration of broader peacebuilding functions.

- Integrate peacebuilding more closely into EOSG
- Integrate peacebuilding more closely with political affairs and preventative diplomacy
56. One option that has been recommended is a new Deputy Secretary-General responsible for peace and security. The intent is to give dedicated strategic direction to the peace and security pillar and strengthen the alignment of the functions provided by DPA, DPKO and DFS: “With one Deputy Secretary-General focusing on the economic and social development work of the United Nations, the second DSG should oversee a significant change in the way that existing Headquarters peace and security structures are configured and how they deliver to the field.”

57. **Pros**: This option could use dedicated strategic and managerial leadership in the peace and security pillar to resolve competition and duplication between DPA, DPKO and DFS. Strong strategic leadership could provide better synergy between the political and operational aspects of crises and missions on the ground, and greater continuity in the political oversight of all missions.

58. **Cons**: Creating a DSG for peace and security would add another bureaucratic layer, in particular in the presence of a Secretary-General with strong experience and leadership in managing crises. Key decisions would still need to come to the SG’s attention given his ultimate responsibility, but an additional level of direction and approval would be injected. It would likely become more difficult for the political, operational and logistical functions in DPA, DPKO and DFS to receive fast guidance on challenges in the field. In addition, the creation of the post would be costly: a DSG could not work without support, and the existing DSG function is estimated to cost approximately $3 million per annum, even if some posts were seconded from departments. Even more importantly, creating two DSGs would tend to undermine a more integrated, coherent UN and lead to greater fragmentation: it would take the silo effect up to the highest levels of management.

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**Box 5: The UN Deputy Secretary-General**

Originally, the position of Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) was created by the General Assembly resolution 52/12 of 9 January 1998 “to help manage Secretariat operations and to ensure coherence of activities and programs; the purpose was also to elevate the Organization’s profile and leadership in the economic and social spheres.” The position was also conceived as the incumbent being able to decide and direct policy, and act as an impartial broker between rival departmental positions. Over the years, the position has been very much dependent on the different personalities of the various people appointed to the post, some focusing on development, some involved in peace and security aspects, others focusing on management.
59. UN analysts often talk about “merging DPKO and DPA.” This model would aim to avoid competition between DPA and DPKO by simply merging the two departments, leaving aside DFS. In practice, what would it involve? Logically, the regional divisions of DPA and DPKO would be merged into one entity. The IOTs would remain to backstop missions in the field, integrating elements of DFS. There are variants of the substructures that could be adopted: the graphic above shows a combined political affairs and operations office, but this could be split into two offices, each led by an ASG. The main difference with the preceding model lies in a stronger integration between the political and the operational in a single department, which could be named the “Department of Political Affairs and Peace Operations.”

60. **Pros:** This model would indeed avoid competition between DPA and DPKO in mission planning and encourage more emphasis on a clear political strategy for missions and a “spectrum of operations.” It would deliver cost efficiencies with regard to senior posts and regional division staffing, which could be deployed to broader prevention work.

61. **Cons:** The model has two main drawbacks. First, the range of responsibilities fulfilled by the head of department would be large, particularly when compared to other USGs in the Secretariat: accountability would be held for all political analysis and strategy, all field operations, specialized services such as rule of law and electoral assistance, as well as key peace and security partnerships. The required span of control for some of the sub-entities (e.g., an office of political affairs and operations) would also be very large. Second, because of this sizeable span of control, the department would risk being absorbed by immediate operational problems in large missions in the field, failing therefore to strengthen attention to a culture of prevention and a clear political strategy for missions. This problem has already been underlined within DPA due to its increasing involvement in managing SPMs, and it would likely be exacerbated in this structure. Finally, recreating in some sense the “Department of Special Political Affairs” that existed before 1992 could be seen by some as a “backward” step.
62. As noted above in the section on the history of reform, the separation of DFS and DPKO has led in some situations to a disconnect between strategic and operational considerations and the realities of support capabilities. This model would address this by focusing DPA on political and regional affairs and creating a second department in charge of peace operations and their support, effectively rejoining DFS with DPKO, named Department of Peace Operations and Field Support (DPOFS). Field-based SPMs would be moved to DPOFS. Considering the recommendations of the 2016 Police Review and the increasing number of police personnel in missions, an Office of Police Affairs could be created. It should be understood that all offices of this Department would work in support of the Office of Peace Operations and its various IOTs (whether regional or covering single multidimensional missions).

63. **Pros**: This model would link logistics and support functions more closely to operations, as indicated by normal military principles. It would also clarify the division of labor between the political and the operational.

64. **Cons**: This would be seen as a return to the past, recreating a large department with span-of-control problems too great for one USG to manage. Unless political strategy and guidance was removed from DPOFS, it would perpetuate the tensions caused by having two political departments in the Secretariat. Last, it is not clear that a simple decision on reconnecting DFS’s functions more directly under the authority of DPKO would address the principal problems raised regarding field support. These problems relate primarily to the lack of a full set of field-oriented procedures in DFS, and delays and complexity in DFS and DM’s budget, fiduciary and personnel oversight functions. These issues would have to be dealt with independently from any restructuring process and are discussed in section VI.
65. This model would merge the regional and political units of DPA and DPKO under DPA (renamed Department of Political Affairs and Preventative Diplomacy, DPAPD). Responsibility for field-based SPMs (e.g. Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya and Somalia) would be transferred to DPKO, renamed the Department of Peace Operations. DPAPD would be responsible for political strategy and lead planning and strategic budgeting for all missions and transitions, as well as regional approaches and relationships. The “office of peace operations” would oversee daily follow-up and backstopping of all UN missions on the ground in coordination with DPAPD’s political and regional affairs office, the office of military affairs and the police division, through regional or country specific IOTs. Regional offices (such as the UN Regional Office for Central Africa, the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, or the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia), special envoys, sanctions monitoring teams and other instruments classified as SPMs would remain under DPA, backstopped by the operations department and DFS.

66. **Pros:** This model would give clear accountability for political analysis and strategy (in DPAPD), and for operations (in DPO). It would allow DPAPD to concentrate on strengthening prevention and political strategy in both mission and non-mission settings, without the constant operational challenges involved in running large field missions. It would allow DPO to focus on a spectrum of operations adapted to country needs and changing over time, without the turf fighting driven by whether an operation is led by DPA or DPKO. Similar to a DPA-DPKO merger, it would deliver cost effectiveness in relation to regional division staffing.

67. **Cons:** While this model would give DPA clear accountability for political strategy, it would not necessarily guarantee collaboration between political strategy and operations. The colocation of DPAPD regional/political offices with IOT heads, as in the instruction sent out by the Secretary-General, would help, as could budget incentives.
The “Political and Services Model”

68. This model would consist of three departments: one political and operational, one for services, and one for support. The Department for Political Affairs and Operations (DPAO) would look like the fusion of DPA and DPKO described above, but would not include the office of rule of law and security institutions or the electoral assistance division. The Department for Thematic and Institutions Support (built out of the nucleus of the current Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions) would bring together all specialized thematic and institution-building functions needed for successful prevention and peace operation functions. These include electoral and constitutional institution-building, security sector development, police, justice and corrections, and civil affairs. As is currently the case with police, justice and corrections, the electoral/constitutional and civil affairs units within this department could be made global focal points working closely with UN development system counterparts, in particular UNDP. All other cross-cutting functions, such as strategic communications, strategic planning policy and best practices, conduct and discipline, evaluation and senior appointments would be gathered in an Office for Policy and Planning. The Department of Field Support would remain as currently configured.

69. **Pros:** As with the DPA/DPKO fusion option, this model would create better synergy between the political and operational aspects of crises and missions on the ground, and greater continuity in the political oversight of all operations as well as the integration of DPA and DPKO’s policy work. An advantage over the simple merger is that it would not create such a large department, since the electoral, constitutional and rule of law functions and all other services functions would be removed from the span of control of DPAO. It would allow the development of a much deeper center of excellence in political, security and justice institution-building, an area that is a gap in the current international architecture for assistance to states, and one that is crucial for both prevention and post-conflict recovery.

70. **Cons:** The issue of short-term operational issues swamping a more political and preventative approach to peace would not be solved in this model. In addition, the organizational and political changes caused by such a large restructuring, albeit temporary, would be considerable.
This is a conceptually quite different model, but one used in many organizations: dividing responsibilities by regional and geographical organization, integrating all other operations, services and support functions into these “geographical offices.” Each geographical office would therefore have a political affairs section, a military section, a police section, a rule of law and security institutions section, a civil affairs section, an electoral section, a human rights section, a training section, a field support and logistics section, a budget and finance section, and a communication and information technology section. The Intergovernmental Organs Office would be a standalone entity working with all three geographical departments, as would the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. The latter would also integrate strategic communications, mediation, conduct and discipline, evaluation, and senior appointments.

Pros: This model would favor integration on all fronts – between politics and operations, as well as between operations and specialized service and operations and support. It may result in more customized and context-specific missions geared to the needs of each region, with fewer cookie cutter approaches imposed from HQ.

Cons: It would be a complex system to manage, with a lot of duplication that could increase costs in some areas. This would be particularly true in support functions and specialized services where there are considerable economies of scale and global knowledge effects to having a shared global rather than region-specific organization. The geographical divisions would need to be regularly adapted over time (ten years ago it would not have been obvious that a strong Middle East and North Africa would be needed; ten years from now that focus may change). There may be a tendency to appoint a national of each region as the USG of that region, which would diminish the multilateral nature of the Secretariat as an international civil service. The lines of decision-making could be somewhat blurry, especially when it comes to military and policing aspects and the relationship of the geographical military and police sections to the Military and the Police Advisers.
Integrating peacebuilding with political affairs

74. This model and the following one look specifically at how the PBSO functions might be addressed in an overall restructuring of the peace and security pillar. PBSO contains three principal functions: providing the Secretariat to the Peace Building Commission; policy, analysis and knowledge work on peacebuilding; and managing the Peacebuilding Fund. Following the logic of the political/operational model described above, if DPA was made a purely non-operational, political department (removing the day-to-day management of large SPMs to DPKO), this might provide an opening to more fully integrate the functions of the PBSO within DPA. The policy functions could be integrated with DPA policy and planning, while the PBC secretariat functions could be combined into an office servicing intergovernmental organs, including the Security Council, the PBC and other intergovernmental committees serviced by DPA.

75. **Pros:** This model would remove the “spare wheel” aspect of the PBSO and integrate it into a department designed to drive the primacy of politics and a strategic approach to sustaining peace in all crisis situations. It could generate knowledge and effectiveness gains in combining PBSO’s cross-pillar policy and expertise with DPA’s policy and planning function. It could help ensure that the PBC is better drawn upon by the Security Council, one of the key recommendations of the AGE report and the simultaneous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Sustaining the Peace.

76. **Cons:** The PBC and its supporting capacity in the PBSO were deliberately designed by Member States not to “belong to” the Security Council or DPA/DPKO but to bridge the three pillars of the UN. The PBC’s membership is drawn, in a negotiated format, from the Security Council, the General Assembly (in regional groupings) and ECOSOC. It may be difficult to keep this delicate balance if its Secretariat functions were provided alongside the Security Council affairs unit, and the cross-pillar policy and convening function of the PBSO would be difficult to play from within DPA. One way of overcoming this might be to simultaneously strengthen the PBC connection to ECOSOC, as has taken place in the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) dialogue: however this would be unlikely to produce a balance across the three pillars.
77. This model would keep the PBSO’s current EOSG link, but integrate it more closely with other cross-pillar strategic objectives and functions in EOSG. These include the policy/planning functions for the whole of the UN system (including the new Executive Committee), the small strategic planning capacity for peace operations, the Human Rights Up Front team and the vision that the incoming Secretary-General has laid out for prevention. As a senior policy adviser post has already been announced for EOSG, focusing on prevention, the ASG for peacebuilding could playing a key role in relation to those functions. The PBC secretariat and the Peacebuilding Fund are already linked to EOSG, through the ASG Peacebuilding’s direct report to the Secretary-General. This link could be maintained to reflect the cross-pillar nature of those functions, although to avoid EOSG being drawn into transactional committee secretariat and trust fund management functions they could be physically located in different offices.78

78. **Pros:** This model would elevate peacebuilding closer to the Secretary-General, and could endow it with a stronger convening authority deriving from that proximity. It would cluster peacebuilding with prevention and other cross-pillar strategic planning functions, allowing a strategic direction and prioritization to be made between cross-pillar issues, and avoiding the possibility of duplicative initiatives or frameworks for action. It would bring together resources from different parts of EOSG and the PBSO, strengthening the strategic analysis, policy and planning capacity in the Secretary-General’s office at no additional cost.

79. **Cons:** Drawing the PBF and PBC Secretariat more closely to EOSG may be perceived to make the office more transactional, but in fact these functions already report indirectly to EOSG through the ASG Peacebuilding, and locating them in separate physical offices should avoid any distraction to EOSG’s immediate and more strategic work.
VI. BUDGET, FIDUCIARY PROCEDURES AND HUMAN RESOURCES

BUDGET AND FIDUCIARY PROCEDURES

80. There are two principal constraints in the current budget and fiduciary processes underpinning the peace and security pillar:

- **Funding sources for peace operations, and their related backstopping in HQ.** SPMs are financed under the regular budget, while peacekeeping operations are paid for from the peacekeeping budget. The support account provides funding for advance planning and backstopping which are not available under the regular budget. This has led DPA to seek other mechanisms to fund advance planning and backstopping, particularly of SPMs. It also creates an artificial incentive for financing countries to advocate for special political missions, and for the secretariat to advocate for peacekeeping missions (even, as noted above, when the mission functions are indistinguishable on the ground). These funding environment also constrains some of the options for restructuring, such as moving SPMs to DPKO (the political-operational and DPA/DPKO fusion models) and forming a shared division of institutional support (the political-services model).

- **Procedures and the DFS/DM/DPKO relationship.** The current human resources and fiduciary procedures applied to peace operations are not designed for field operations, but rather to the original conference services functions of the UN Secretariat. There are duplicative layers of management between DM and DFS, rather than DFS holding clear authority and accountability for managing the fiduciary and human resource aspects of peace operations in the field. Applying clear HQ management accountability and the appropriate level of delegation to the field would potentially enhance both effectiveness and transparency and timeliness of reporting to Member States.

81. With regard to the first problem, the Report of the Secretary-General of 2011, Review of Arrangements for Funding and Backstopping Political Missions, clearly lays out the constraints. In summary, it indicates that (i) the biennial program, albeit reviewed annually, budget is not the optimal vehicle for funding special political missions (because unlike other elements of the program budget these are fast-changing operations that are not readily predictable at the beginning of the biennium); (ii) start-up and expansion of special political missions are impeded by the lack of a well-defined mechanism to finance them between conferral of a mandate and approval of a budget; (iii) much of the backstopping capacity that special political missions, both the substantive backstopping from DPA and the thematic or support backstopping provided by DFS, DM, DPI, DSS or DPKO/OROLSI.

82. To understand the constraints this poses in practice for SPMs, it is useful to illustrate the range of departments that access the peacekeeping support account and those that do not: as Box 6 shows, thirteen departments use the support account, but DPA does not currently, even if the HIPPO has recommended the possibility for DPA to can access the peacekeeping budget – eventually the support account – for the mediation and electoral services it provides to peacekeeping operations. And the 2011 report lays out a range of options to address this together with pros and cons. Options run from making the support account available to all offices and departments to allowing for backstopping positions to be added to the mission budgets.
83. The broader issue at hand, however, is not backstopping or startup issues, but rather the funding of the missions themselves. The G77 has strongly supported the Secretary-General’s proposal – later endorsed by the ACABQ – for the creation of a separate account for SPMs out of the regular budget. However, this proposal has proved very divisive, and has impeded progress on the other aspects of the discussion. Most Member States indeed acknowledge the dysfunction of the current arrangement, but the General Assembly has not acted on the report, being largely blocked by the P5.

84. First, the financing countries are charged a higher rate in the peacekeeping support account than the regular budget. The G77 have argued that SPMs should be financed from the peacekeeping support account, at that scale of assessment; as a compromise measure, a new (third) scale of assessment has sometimes been proposed, somewhere between the scales for the regular budget and for peacekeeping. Today, ten countries are paying about 80 per cent of peacekeeping operations. That situation is as unsustainable as the situation on the ground where the first ten troop contributors from developing countries are taking 82 per cent of the peacekeeping burden. As Graphs 3-5 overleaf show, neither the funding nor the physical participation in peacekeeping is equitably shared by Member States.

85. The actual impact on the budget of the P5 is still however fairly modest. The overall effect of moving the current seven large field-based missions (Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Libya, and Somalia, which total about $550 million) off the regular budget would be $68 million in total for the P5 in additional costs caused by the move between the two different sets of assessment.
Graph 3: Burden-sharing in Peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Assessed contributions, % of total UN Peacekeeping budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 4: Evolution of the financial contributions to the UN Peacekeeping budget

Graph 5: Evolution of the troop and police contributions to the UN Peacekeeping budget
86. Since the amounts involved are relatively small in the context of the UN's overall financing (see also Box 6), the different scale of assessments in the support account however appears insufficient to be the only underlying reason holding up action to remove SPMs from the regular budget. To the extent that this is a real problem, a compromise could be to bring all peace operations, including SPMs, into the support account for the purposes of budget cycle and flexibility in planning and backstopping, but not immediately in terms of financial burden sharing. The regular budget scale of assessment could be grandfathered for a set period for SPMs (3-5-7 years) so that the major financing countries do not pay immediately at a higher rate; or an intermediate scale set.

87. It may be the barrier to removing SPMs from the regular budget also comes from a second concern: those who pay a higher share of the UN's regular budget fear the G77 would fill the hole through other Secretariat expenditures that they do not support, such as increased expenditure in DESA or the regional commissions. If the regular budget stayed flat, and was combined with a higher support account budget, the bill for the main financing countries would go up considerably. It is difficult to see a resolution to this conundrum without a strategic discussion of the UN's budget, which sets some principles on what can be expected in aggregate, and compares expenditure across the pillars with the mandates and strategic direction given by Member States as well as the new Secretary-General's vision.
88. Such a strategic discussion could include presenting some new analysis to Member States. For example, it could compare the operational and non-operational expenditures in the three pillars. Sometimes analysts compare the budget of peacekeeping operations and SPMs – $8-10 billion in recent years – with the much smaller expenditures in the regular budget on development. Yet this is not comparing “apples with apples,” since the economic and social entities on the regular budget are non-operational (primarily DESA and the regional commissions, some small agency costs). Box 8 lays out an analysis based on non-operational costs alone. The terminology “non-operational” should not undercut the importance of these core mandated functions. Good analysis is what informs good policy: advisory services and capacity-building are, if successful, the greatest contribution that can be made to sustainable results on the ground.

89. It may also be of benefit to Member States to consider analysis of peacebuilding as an issue that cuts across the three pillars, and focus on the contributions made to it by development and human rights, as well as the peace and security pillar. This would enable a more open discussion of how the economic and social actors may contribute to peacebuilding, moving away from a “competition” between development, peace and security, and toward identifying their complementarities.81

Box 8: Comparing non-operational costs across the UN pillars

The 2016-2017 regular budget of DESA and the regional commissions is around $325 million annually for what are deemed non-operational activities (statistical and analytical, policy, country advisory services, capacity-building, global and regional dialogue, Member State committees and conferences). An additional $150 million per annum is extra-budgetary. “Operational” development activities in the field are delivered through the wider UN development system, with voluntary funding. If the equivalent of these operational field activities – peacekeeping missions and large SPMs – are removed from DPA and DPKO budgets (including their backstopping through DFS and the support account, and XB operations such as the mine action trust fund), the amount remaining is around $120 million p.a. in the regular budget and $ 50 million p.a. in extra-budgetary support. This must cover all analytical work, dialogue, capacity-building and advisory services in non-mission settings and Member State processes.

Hence the economic and social pillar receives almost three times more than the peace and security pillar for activities that increase global knowledge and dialogue and country capacities. The human rights pillar receives less annual funding than either of the other two.

90. The second budget and fiduciary problem relates to delays and lack of responsiveness to field requests. Less work is available on options in this area, and this paper cannot go into detailed analysis. It is however worth noting two options that may be worth considering. These are based on lessons from previous processes that have tried to address managerial effectiveness, such as former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s change management initiative.82 These initiatives have generally shown that dividing change into many small improvements has faced constraints with Member States: discussions have fallen into a debate on what is and what is not in the authority of the Secretary-General, and very peripheral changes have taken up much time in the ACABQ and Fifth Committee.
91. It may therefore be desirable to consider three options for larger and more comprehensive proposals to fix these problems, and invest the necessary time in gaining Member States’ approval. Three options here include:

• **Design a full set of fiduciary procedures for field missions, and propose entrusting DFS with their implementation.** Field operations are intrinsically different in the degree of speed required from headquarters functions. A separate set of Secretariat procedures could be proposed to Member States to reflect this, drawn from best practice in other parts of the UN system and other multilateral institutions. The question would be how these might relate to the UN controller: would/could the controller delegate approvals to the USG DFS, or would a second controller for field operations be required? This option could reduce cost savings from the peacekeeping support account, of which DM is the largest recipient, as well as speed and effectiveness gains.

• **Contract out to a reliable entity such as UNOPS the processing of some human resource and fiduciary processes (but not their approval), and require 24/7 backstopping according to specified turnaround times as part of a performance contract.** This option would not resolve all questions about whether the current procedures are appropriate to field operations in crisis situations, but it could speed up turnaround.

• **Create a direct reporting line from the controller to EOSG rather than to the USG DM, to ensure their accountability is at a level above the interests of above any one department.**

• **Create clearer senior management accountability for both strategic performance and fiduciary risk.** The UN Secretariat is unusual amongst multilateral institutions in separating accountability for strategic performance so clearly and completely from accountability for fiduciary risks. This means that one set of officials has every incentive to minimize administrative and fiduciary risk, but limited incentives to improve strategic performance and mandate delivery; another set of officials has every incentive to push for improved performance without taking account of acceptable levels of fiduciary risks. Through access to financial resources, current structures create an imbalance towards managing administrative and fiduciary risk at the expense of strategic performance and mandate implementation which is arguably significantly more difficult to measure. In many organizations this responsibility would be brought together, forcing senior managers to find strategies that deliver strategically while still managing fiduciary risks within acceptable levels. If this were done at the level of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, for example, it would place additional responsibilities upon them and require a different decision-making process within missions, but it would also be the basis for greater delegation to the field.
Box 9: The Specialized Agency Model

Going beyond the options presented above, some consider that a specialized agency (on the model of UNOPS) could be established as a mandated service provider for peace operations, transforming DFS into a liaison office ensuring the link between the DPKO and that agency. As with the first option overleaf, such an agency would also have a separate set of fiduciary and human resource procedures adapted to field operations. The UN Secretariat would concentrate on the political aspects of those operations. In this model, support and logistics would be entirely subcontracted to a new implementing agency.

Such an agency could in principle be more efficient. However, it could create confusion between the decisions of the UN secretariat and the way the specialized agency supports operations, as well as a greater distance to needs on the ground. The idea would likely face steep resistance from Member States that could feel a loss of control over peacekeeping budgets.

THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RESOURCES

92. The UN human resources system is, as many interlocutors put it, “broken”, in general and certainly when it comes to the peace and security pillar. It is one of the main flaws of the United Nations and the source of numerous complaints at all levels, from headquarters to the field; some interlocutors have even suggested that the whole system needs to be reset entirely. There is a need, as ICM underlined, to “rebuild an independent, professional, international civil service” ... “A clear career structure should be made available to professional staff, as in any nation’s foreign service, development agencies, and wider civil services.” There is also a need to rely better on expertise; to establish a real rotation system; to reward personnel serving in hardship missions; and for people to stop spending their office hours applying for another position, because of the short-term nature of their contracts. Job insecurity creates unhealthy behaviors that undermine the ability of the UN system to deliver as a whole.

93. The HIPPO report indeed pointed out that “staff members are discouraged and frustrated by administrative red tape and a lack of mobility and career development.” The Secretariat should also be able to hire people with specific knowledge and expertise as required in situations. Insufficient attention is also given to careers, staff development, training and recruitment due to a lack of resources, with less than one per cent of staff costs spent on learning and development. The current archaic recruitment processes takes on average 273 days from the issuance of an advertisement to staff selection. There is insufficient managerial latitude, with little scope to reward high-performing staff or remove “dead wood.” A dysfunctional internal justice system reinforces widespread aversion among managers to providing honest feedback to poorly performing staff, as doing so results too often in years of internal litigation. The new Secretary-General will have to find ways to deal with those deficiencies, with the help of Member States, if he wishes to improve the implementation of mandates given by the Security Council.

94. Options to resolve this include those listed in the fiduciary section above, in terms of special human resource procedures for field operations and contracting back office functions under tight performance contracts. In addition, a complementary independent review of the jurisprudence used in recent cases should be added to the 2016 review of the internal administration of justice system, such that both could be considered by Member States. This will be crucial to enable truly effective performance management in the Secretariat, in field operations as in headquarters.
VII. PRACTICAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

95. The present report has noted that structural change is not the only answer to the challenges facing the peace and security pillar: equally if not more important is visionary leadership and a new mindset of collaboration, underpinned by a shift toward “cabinet-style” management. Secretary-General António Guterres has already moved to put these in place with his initial instructions on the colocation of DPA and DPKO and the creation of an Executive Committee.

96. In these circumstances, is structural change still important? Should there be a new reform of the Secretariat’s structures almost 25 years after the creation of Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ten years after the creation of the Department for Field Support? Yes, we believe so. The duplication and incentives for competition caused by current structures will make collaborative leadership and strategic coordination difficult to achieve, despite strong direction from the top. Conversely, some structural change could help to foster stronger strategy, coordination, responsibility and accountability.

97. The overall objective is to enhance the ability of the United Nations’ peace and security pillar to deliver better results on the ground in a spectrum of conflicts and preventative situations. The main challenge is to create manageable structures that link operations and support to the “primacy of politics”, where silos are reduced to their minimum and where the planning is done in consideration of the needs of the country in crisis rather than pre-set models of operations pulled from bureaucratic shelves. A second challenge is to establish clear lines of authority, where structures depend less on personalities and more on agreed policies, well-defined procedures and guidelines. A third is to rebalance the relationship between the Secretariat, the Security Council and other relevant governance organs so that it has the capacity to tell its Member States what they need to know, not only what they want to hear.

98. No organigram is perfect. The models we present in this report all combine some structures and delineate others, and all therefore have pros and cons. Practical policy-making dictates that, in considering whether one or other option should be followed, the costs of achieving the change should be weighed against the benefits. Here we look at some of the issues involved.

99. *Form should follow function.* Which form best fits the organization should be driven by which functions need to be strengthened. For example, a strong focus on global preventative diplomacy might argue against strengthening geographical departments that could become silos of their own, preventing effective diplomatic outreach to actors in different regions. A strong focus on the cross-cutting nature of peacebuilding might argue against placing key peacebuilding support units directly under the peace and security pillar. If it is important to ensure space for the primacy of politics and preventative diplomacy, this may argue against merging these functions with the day-to-day running of large field missions.

100. *Span of control matters.* Merging a greater number of functions always increases the possibility for synergy, and decreases the likelihood of competition by bringing more units within one unified management structure. However, this also increases the span of control that any one manager is required to cover – requiring for instance one USG to remain on top of many different functions, with a larger human resource and budget responsibility. This is a primary drawback
to ideas about the merger of DPA and DPKO and DPKO and DFS. The sense that these functions had simply become too large for one department to manage was part of the reason for their formation, and in the intervening years the demands have not decreased.

101. *The larger the change, the greater the efficiency cost.* Changes in responsibilities, reporting lines, accountabilities and physical location all require effort from management and staff, and a necessary time period to settle into new roles. Some of the models described here – for instance the regional model or political services model – would merge or abolish whole departments and establish new ones: they would change the job description and reporting lines of quite a large number of staff. Such a reorganization takes time, consume a great deal of bureaucratic energy, and likely provoke strong resistance which would threaten the success of the reform. There are however also opportunity costs in avoiding fundamental change when it is needed, and good change management can mitigate the disruption to activities.

102. *Political feasibility and political consequences matter.* Change at the UN always involves politics, both the large “P” of Member State governance processes and the small “p” of bureaucratic politics. Some of the models described might bring incidental but important political pressures: threatening the position of a USG role that has for some time been held by a powerful Member State or Member State grouping, as in the fusion models, or spurring pressure to appoint USGs from particular regions in the geographical model. The more major changes in relation to current structures are also perhaps more likely to create divisions among Member States in the relevant governance committees. If there is doubt about the surrounding Member State dynamics in 2017, following an option where change is minimal in relation to current structures may make sense, although this may also entail an opportunity cost in relation to the depth of reform really needed.

103. *Budget and fiduciary issues are linked to the effectiveness of restructuring.* Most of the models discussed in this paper (with the exception of the second DSG) would not necessarily require additional resources. But it would be difficult to realize the best results from organizational change unless budget processes shifted to reflect new functions. Under almost all of these models, a unified budget cycle for all types of peace operations in the field would be needed for them to fully realize the desired results. The politics of gaining consensus on budget issues and the broader budget picture would also therefore need to be considered.

104. *Any restructuring has second round effects.* PBSO’s creation was not accompanied by much analysis of the adjustment needed to DPA or DPKO’s activities or the processes followed by country teams; DFS’s creation did not lead to adequate changes in DM’s role to realize the desired result. Not all of these effects can be identified upfront, but it is useful to identify the more major implications and set in place a follow up process to work these through.

105. It is important to note that these are models with elements that can be combined in practice. The models analyzed above present contrasting organizing ideas. In practice, ideas from more than one may be combined. For example, a strong political/operational/support delineation of functions could be combined with a stronger center of excellence in institutional support services, focused on serving all departments and linked with the UN development system (see Figure 2 overleaf). The difference with the political services model is simply that institutional support services remains an ASG-level division rather than a department, serving separate political and operational departments rather than a
merged department. Equally, the two models on peacebuilding could be combined, placing some functions of the PBSO (including the ASG peacebuilding and the policy function) closer to EOSG, while placing the PBC secretariat close to the Security Council secretariat in DPA.

**Figure 2: Combining elements: an example**

106. While this report does not aim to lay out one option alone, something along the lines of the model above seems from our analysis to come closest to a proposal that would meet the criteria laid out:

- It adheres to the key principle that form follows function: the key underlying functional objectives are to create a more field-focused HQ, by strengthening political strategy and preventative diplomacy in DPA; operational responsiveness in DPKO (the political-operational model) and linking the two through the colocation of regional staff already instructed by the Secretary-General.
• It also fulfills two subsidiary functional objectives: strengthening the institution-building functions most related to prevention and sustaining the peace (the political-services model), albeit not elevating these to USG level; and strengthening peacebuilding by bringing it closer to EOSG. Again, the purpose of this would be to better serve field presences (and ultimately host societies) in those areas.

• Provided the fiduciary and human resource issues described below are addressed, the model would also simplify the link between operations and support by removing the need for DFS to juggle its service between DPKO and DPA (as all peace operations would be in DP(K)O).

• It could be managed within a flat budget, although as we note in the budget section the activities of the peace and security pillar and the PBSO are actually underfunded in relation to the development pillar of the United Nations.

107. Given the political factors described above, the approach to the budget and fiduciary questions merits further words on practical policy considerations. As described in section 4, in an ideal world the UN’s Member States might review its budget process and allocations between functions at a very fundamental level, to realign them with the new demands and agendas for development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, peace and security and peacebuilding. On the procedural side, Member States might consider that the difference between conference services and other headquarters functions and peace operations in the field requires an entirely separate specialized agency to manage field missions.

108. But these changes would have to be negotiated, and there may be some good grounds to fear that opening up such large questions could create divisions between Member States and result in an even more negative outcome than the current system. Some more modest options therefore exist: 1) to unify the budget cycle, rules and sourcing for SPMs and PKOs while grandfathering the scale of assessments for SPMs; 2) to agree that moving SPMs out of the regular budget cycle will not result in new proposals to fill this gap; and 3) to improve 24/7 backstopping of fiduciary and human resource processes or propose a more comprehensive set of procedures. Not all of this change needs to be done at once. While the budget changes are intimately linked to the restructuring options, the question of more appropriate human resource and fiduciary procedures could be addressed down the line.

109. Ultimately, the efficiency of the Secretariat’s structures dealing with peace and security will also depend on the level of consensus that exists among Member States regarding prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping in the field. There is a great deal of Member State appetite for greater UN action on peacebuilding and prevention. At times these are seen as different things, but in fact they are complementary. Resolution 2282 clearly defines “sustaining the peace,” as shown in Box 10, to encompass a broad range of activities across the three pillars of the UN, aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. Provided UN leadership continues to stress shared responsibilities of Governments and all national stakeholders outlined in this definition, there is no reason why prevention and peacebuilding should not be thought of as mutually reinforcing concepts which merit being brought together.

110. The second conceptual element that we highlighted under current challenges is a diminishing degree of consensus on the purpose of peacekeeping, or peace operations more broadly. Ten years after the Capstone doctrine process and in the aftermath of the HIPPO, it is perhaps high time to renew the UN’s doctrine covering the spectrum of peace operations, linking also to Member States and the new leadership’s emphasis on a culture of prevention and sustaining the peace.
111. Better performance of peace operations will need to be underpinned by a stronger triangular cooperation between peacekeeping stakeholders (Secretariat, Security Council and troop and police contributors), taking into account the ownership needed by host nations if a lasting peace is to be achieved. An updated doctrine could assist in renewing the consensus on the meaning of the three main principles of peacekeeping (consent of the host nation, impartiality, use of force in self defense and in the defense of the mandate) and their implication on the ground. This would help regain crisis management flexibility, where solutions are driven by the primacy of politics and designed to “right fit” conditions in the field. New work on doctrine should also update understanding of the primacy of politics, and the fit of peace operations within broader approaches to prevention/sustaining the peace. This should be done in a context that acknowledges the added value of the UN in providing political solutions to crises and conflicts at minimal cost to the international community.

112. In conclusion, there are trade-offs involved. The Secretary-General, UN leadership and Member States will need to consider which functions are most important to strengthen given the urgent and evolving shape of today’s crises, prevention and peacebuilding challenges. They will need to decide how much change, once bitten off, can be chewed. They will need to manage the speed and sequencing of change. Finally, they will need to finely judge the relationship with organizational priorities in other areas, including the development/humanitarian and human rights pillars. Yet the opportunity is there, and it is a shared one: the Secretary-General’s leadership and managerial judgment is indispensable, but change will only work with active Member State engagement and support.
ENDNOTES


4See CIC’s [website](#) for further details on these work streams.


7HIPPO Report, op. cit.


10“UN70: A New Agenda” (Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, and Norway).


14Conclusions of the co-chairpersons (Germany, Bangladesh, Canada, France, Senegal).


18Preparatory Commission, op.cit., p. 84-85.


20He has since kept the title of “Military Adviser of the Secretary-General.” See paper on the role of the *Military Adviser*

21That operation was indeed initiated after the Secretary-General had for the first time use his prerogatives under Article 99, and “ONUC was the first peacekeeping operation in which the use of force beyond self-defense was authorised by the Council.” See Chapter on MONUC written by Jane Boulden in Joachim A. Koops/Norrie MacQueen/Thierry Tardy/Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015, Oxford University Press, pp.160-170. That operation further led to the creation of the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.


23Thant Myint-U/Amy Scott, op.cit., p. 84.

24Group named after the Australian permanent representative to the United Nations. Report mentioned by Thant Myint-U/Amy Scott, op.cit., p. 86. Another prominent and influential report written at that time was the one from Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers on “A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations” (1990). They advocated for the creation of three deputies of the Secretary-General: one for peace and security including peacekeeping; one for economic and social matters, including environment and the coordination of the system; and one for administration and management.

25Ibid., p. 85.

26Thorsten Benner/Stephan Mergenthaler/Philipp Rotmann, op.cit., p. 11.


The UNOC is a center that provides integrated situational awareness to UN senior leadership on peace and security, human rights and development issues with a view to enabling informed, coordinated and timely decision-making and strategic engagement on operational and crisis-related issues. It also supports funds, programs and agencies with the exception of UNICEF. See Olga Abliva/Alexandra Novosseloff, “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine,” New York: International Peace Institute, July 2016, 25 pages.

A reform strategy officially presented in a financial report to the General Assembly (A/60/696), 24 February 2006.

Although, as noted in the section on budget, it is important to compare similar functions: DPKO’s budget for analysis and research, advisory services and capacity-building is far lower than the corresponding budget for the development pillar.


PRST/2001/5 (20 February 2001).


The Peacebuilding Commission was established by parallel General Assembly (A/60/180) and Security Council (1645 (2005)) resolutions.

For the Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, PBSO was meant “to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations”. A/59/2005, para.266. See PRST/2001/5 that acknowledges that peacebuilding encompasses the entire conflict cycle from outbreak to recurrence.


The PBF was launched in 2006 to support activities, actions, programs and organizations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict. The Fund addresses immediate needs in countries emerging from conflict at a time when sufficient resources are not available from other funding mechanisms. It will also support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process and contribute toward addressing critical gaps in that process.

Non-paper: Strengthening UN Peace and Security Operations: The Case for Restructuring, January 2007. The other reason has been a wish from some Member States to reduce the increasing influence of DPKO within the UN Secretariat.

N, “Report of the Secretary-General, Comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peace operations”, A/61/858, 13 April 2007, paragraph 111. Ban’s non-paper talks about a “Department of Peace Operations” which is no longer the case in his report to the General Assembly.

In parallel, Ban also recommended the creation of a High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. The Department for Disarmament Affairs therefore became the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.


“Having two department heads that are equal in terms of UN hierarchy while one has to report to the other may turn out as a recipe for bureaucratic infighting at the expense of operational efficiency in peacekeeping.” Timo Pelzl/Volker Lehmann, “The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Reforming DPKO”, Dialogue on Globalization, Fact sheet, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2007.

According to their terms of reference, IOTs are integrated structures consisting of political, military, police and support officers. They prepare recommendations for senior management on the planning and implementation of political strategy, the comprehensive UN approach, and integrated operational objectives; they review and approve integrated operational resource requirements and prepare strategic guidance on political, integrated operational and management issues to the field; and they monitor the overall implementation of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation.


Recent reports have however recommended that such capacity should be taken out of DPA as counter-terrorism strategy is a cross-pillar one that concerns the entire UN system. See reports of the Global Center on Cooperative Security by Alistair Millar and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Taking UN Counterterrorism Efforts in The Next Decade From Plans to Action”, September 2016, and by James Cockayne, Alistair Millar, David Cortright and Peter Romanuik, “Blue-sky thinking for global Counterterrorism Cooperation 10 Years after 9/11”, 2012. See also Arthur Boutellis and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2016.

The creation of the Cluster II category of bodies as SPMs was driven by the Budget Office/Controller since no obvious alternate home was available. It is not clear that these should be considered to be special political missions, although they are certainly an important peace and security instrument for the UN, and one which...
creates a crucial link with the financing of conflict.

81Number of field-missions as described in the fact sheet of the Department of Political Affairs.

82See A/68/223 (29 July 2013): Report of the Secretary-General on “Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions”.


85Steps have been taken to enhance preventive capabilities – DPA’s Standby Team of Mediation experts and the mediation roster, the UNDP-DPA Joint Program on Building National Capacities, the use of regional offices for conflict prevention to support preventive capacities in the field have been hailed as important tools to translate rhetorical commitments to prevention to preventive action. However, the effectiveness and reach of these efforts are hampered by human and financial resource constraints, often preserved for “more pressing operational needs”.

86The AGE report is particularly important in policy terms. See also New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, G7+ 2011; World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development, World Bank 2011.

87Including at times resistance from within the agencies and from Member States.

88According to Ian Martin: “Continuity of political strategy, flexible reconfiguration of the operational presence and long-term peacebuilding are not well served by current arrangements [...] Initial mediation is the responsibility of [DPA]. Once a country situation requires a UN peacekeeping presence, responsibility transitions to [DPKO]. This implies a discontinuity in political oversight, and can result in marginalizing the political expertise hitherto built up within the Secretariat. It also carries the risk that the demands of managing large operations, often in crisis situations, result in an insufficient focus on political strategy, as well as disconnect from the UN’s wider diplomatic engagements in the region and beyond.” In “All Peace Operations Are Political: a case for Designer Missions and the Next UN Reform”, Review of Political Missions, 2010.

89OROLSI staff in the police, justice and corrections area are co-located with UNDP staff.


91An alternate view is that the strategy was unrealistic in operational terms given the UN operating model and the fact that had been no precedent in setting up major operational hubs in the harsh climate of northern Mali.

92HIPPO Report, paragraph 316, 317. See also Ian Johnstone, “Between Bureaucracy and Adhocracy”, op. cit., p. 2.

93For Ian Johnstone, “the term peace operations as used in the reports encompasses peacekeeping, political missions and other instruments the UN deploys to maintain peace and security. As such, it enables a more substantive discussion of the spectrum without getting distracted by the traditional dichotomy UN intergovernmental bodies, draw between peacekeeping and political missions for budgetary reasons.” In “Between Bureaucracy and Adhocracy”, op. cit.

94The objective of the Capstone Doctrine was to try to articulate the principles and guidelines for designing and delivering multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions.

95“Prevention” is sometimes viewed as a more intrusive term, whereas in fact, like peacebuilding, it can be framed as primarily focused on developing societies’ own capacities in an inclusive manner to resist conflict. This understanding is more in line with the focus on “inclusive national ownership” as a core tenet of sustaining peace, recommended by the AGE Report and endorsed by the resolutions on sustaining peace.

96This USG-level post coordinates the agenda of the Secretary-General, has a say in high-level appointments, and has in the past played a political role and undertaken diplomatic missions.

97These reflect several other recommendations: for example, from the HIPPO, and the Independent Commission on Multilateralism.

98This report does not address in detail authority, command and control between UN headquarters and Missions headquarters, as this would require a stand-alone study.

99The HIPPO viewed the DSG as complementary to a restructuring of the departments below. In this paper we consider the two options separately, recognizing that one can be done without the other.

100PBSO’s resourcing is already presented within the budget of DPA.


102There is a precedent in the Human Security Trust Fund.


107UN 2030: Rebuilding Order in a Fragmenting World”, op. cit., p. 62.

108HIPPO Report, paragraph 315.


109ibid.


112See Alexandra Novosseloff, “Triangulation Cooperation - Key to All”, 10 November 2015.
APPENDIX A

THE SECRETARIAT AND THE REST OF THE UN SYSTEM: CONNECTORS ACROSS UN SILOS

# APPENDIX B

## CHRONOLOGY – HISTORY OF UN STRUCTURES IN PEACE AND SECURITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Creation of a “Department of Security Council Affairs” having four divisions: the “General Political Division,” the “Administrative and General Division,” the “Enforcement Measures Division” (linking with the Military Staff Committee), and the “Atomic Energy Commission Group.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>Failure to establish the structures of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council (Article 47 of the Charter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Replacement of the “Department of Security Council Affairs” by a “Department of Political and Security Council Affairs,” and establishment of an “Office of the Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs” within the “offices of the Secretary-General.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Creation of the position of “Military Adviser of the Secretary-General” within the Executive office of the Secretary-General. The position is replaced in 1969 by one of a “Military Liaison Officer,” before being recreated in 1979 within the Department of Special Political Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Creation of the Department of Peacekeeping operations and of the Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Creation of a Civilian Police Unit with the position of Police Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Creation of the position of Deputy Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>“Peace Operations 2010” reform strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Split of DPKO and creation of the Department for Field Support</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX C - DETAILED RESTRUCTURING MODELS

Additional Deputy Secretary-General for Peace & Security
The “DPA-DPKO Fusion Model”
The “Political and Operational Model”
The “Political and Services Model”
The "Regional and Integrated Model"
Restructuring the UN Secretariat

Integrating peacebuilding with political affairs
Integrating peacebuilding more closely with EOSG