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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the global development landscape continues to evolve, new and emerging actors – countries transitioning from being aid recipients to aid providers – are becoming increasingly visible on the global scene. Although the approaches, interests and resources of emerging donors are far from uniform, their increasing presence in global development – particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings – could create new ways of thinking about foreign aid and contribute to more horizontal, equitable and efficient practices. The rise of these donors also poses challenges: their compliance with international standards in development assistance, the effectiveness of their aid and the inclusivity of their efforts have often been questioned.

Turkey’s presence in Somalia is an important example of emerging donor engagement in a conflict setting. Its involvement in Somalia intensified in response to the devastating 2010–2012 famine, but has since gone well beyond delivering aid and assistance to famine survivors. It has hosted international and regional conferences, mediated among various parties, engaged in capacity-building efforts, encouraged bilateral trade and delivered development assistance. Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has been remarkably multifaceted; it has included the Turkish government, religious institutions, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and local municipalities. It is too early to accurately assess the impact of Turkey’s involvement on Somali institutions or to understand whether it has attenuated the conflict. Instead, this report draws on dozens of interviews in Turkey and Somalia to examine trends and challenges.

Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has distinguished itself by a readiness to deploy staff in the field despite the security risks, deference to the Somali government and a push for national ownership, as well as its involvement in the security and private sectors. However, its experience has also brought to the fore critical tensions: Will its respect for sovereignty and support to security institutions clash with norms of human rights and the inclusion of other parts of society in peacebuilding? Can this multi-pronged approach to aid be channelled toward a coherent and comprehensive peacebuilding strategy? And will these nascent aid institutions be able to weather domestic pressures in Turkey?
### Abbreviations & Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>ASELSAN</td>
<td>Turkish Military Electronics Industry</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IHH</td>
<td>Human Rights and Freedoms (Insan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri)</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least-Developed Country</td>
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<td>NeST</td>
<td>Network of Southern Think Tanks</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOF</td>
<td>Other Official Flows</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİKA</td>
<td>Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Somali Federal Government</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>South–South Cooperation</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Last month in Somalia, for instance, I witnessed in person how the UN and the international community remained helpless against the pressing problems of today … This is why we have launched a comprehensive aid campaign for Somalia with the strong support of our nation. Along with emergency humanitarian aid, Turkey is also determined to help build the infrastructure facilities that will enable this country to stand on its feet … By reopening our embassy in Mogadishu, we have also showed the world that claims of security challenges cannot be an excuse for delaying assistance. In parallel to this, it is also necessary to urgently bring to an end the civil war and provide the country with a democratic and unified governance in order to succeed in the fight against piracy and terrorism originating from Somalia.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the UN General Assembly, 22 September 2011

In 2011, just one month after becoming the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in two decades, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began his statement to the UN General Assembly with these words. He devoted more than a quarter of his speech to Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in Somalia, which had then been suffering from a devastating famine for months. Erdoğan proudly explained how Turkey’s comprehensive, holistic and long-term vision there differed from previous international efforts, which had failed to address the famine or end the nation’s conflict.

At that time Turkey was a democratic, middle-income country with one of the highest sustained rates of growth in the world. Inflation, interest rates and debt were falling, and the currency had stabilised. The country enjoyed strong political, economic and security ties to the West, as a NATO member and as a candidate for EU accession. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined itself as a ‘new and dynamic player’ and ‘a lead humanitarian donor’ that had substantively increased and diversified its humanitarian and development assistance to make the transition from a former aid-recipient country to an ‘emerging donor’. Later that year, at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon included Turkey in a call for

‘new and emerging donor countries’ to assume more responsibility in conflict-affected areas.\(^4\)

Over the past decade Turkey has indeed increased its engagement in areas outside of its traditional sphere of interest, most notably in least-developed countries (LDCs) and African countries.\(^5\) It delivered aid to 51 sub-Saharan African countries in 2013, although most of these instances involved small amounts.\(^6\) According to the European Commission’s 2015 Report on Turkey, the total amount of official development aid (ODA) granted by Turkey reached EUR\(^2\) 2.8 billion (approximately $3.1 billion), or 0.46% of its gross national income (GNI) in 2014, mostly dedicated to Syria-related action.\(^8\)

Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has been one of the most visible examples of this. In the five years following Erdoğan’s speech, Turkey has gone well beyond delivering emergency aid and assistance to famine survivors in Somalia. It has hosted international and regional conferences, mediated among various parties, established a diplomatic presence in Mogadishu and Hargeisa, provided technical support and personnel for capacity-building efforts, boosted bilateral trade relations and engaged in development assistance. It has done all this via a wide array of actors: government institutions and agencies, religious institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private sector companies, security and military officials, and local municipalities.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Currency code of the EU’s euro.


Beyond its ambitions as an emerging donor, Turkey's discourse on Somalia also reflects its foreign policy aspirations as a regional model and a model for the Islamic world.\(^{10}\) Domestically, engagement in Somalia clearly demonstrates the intention of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to break from Turkey's conventional foreign policies, reinvent the country's image and reach out beyond its geographic confines and traditional Western allies. This 'New Turkey', as the representative of a Turkish NGO said, 'looks beyond its traditional sphere of influence. With its traditional allies, it engages in different ways.'\(^{11}\)

This research report has two purposes. Firstly, as the global development landscape continues to evolve, new actors, financial instruments and ways of working are being defined through high-profile processes such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. It is an opportune moment to take stock of the discussions about emerging donors and what their increasing presence in global development means. This report aims to contribute to discussions about emerging donors, particularly regarding the similarities and divergences between the policies, ambitions and orientations of traditional and new actors, and what global aid policies can learn from emerging actors. Turkey, whose aid policies and practices share similarities with both traditional and emerging donors, provides a particularly interesting case.

Secondly, most aid is political; this is true for both traditional and emerging donors.\(^{12}\) An analysis of emerging donors should aspire to look beyond the technical and operational dynamics of aid and examine the political interests, aspirations and relationships at play. Apart from Turkey's political and economic interests – and even patronage politics – its engagement in Somalia has been defined by a desire to gain a new Turkish identity and define a so-called New Turkey, both internationally and domestically. As Cemalettin Haşimi puts it, 'International aid has been treated as a natural part of the very meaning of Turkey itself . . . It is what defines Turkey as a whole, from domestic politics to its vision of global politics.'\(^{13}\) As such, another purpose of this report will be to reflect on the various political dynamics that may be at play in the engagement of new donors with recipient countries, through the Turkish example.

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11 Interview, NGO representative, Istanbul, April 2016.


CHAPTER 2

TURKEY AS AN EMERGING DONOR:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND STUDY DESIGN

EMERGING DONORS AND SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION:
WHERE DOES TURKEY FIT?

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) categorises Turkey as an 'emerging donor' – a country with a new or recently revived aid programme.\(^\text{14}\) The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs endorses this definition, calling itself a 'new and emerging donor' in development co-operation.\(^\text{15}\)

What defines emerging donors? According to the OECD, the increasing amount of ODA and other official flows (OOF) they provide, as well as their engagement with the OECD-DAC.\(^\text{16}\) The BRICS countries, recent new members of the EU (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, South Korea and Turkey are often categorised as emerging donors.\(^\text{17}\) While politically and economically diverse, they are countries that quickly transformed from being aid recipients to being donor countries; in some cases, as with Turkey, they are recipients and donors simultaneously.\(^\text{18}\) These countries have young populations, good growth rates, an emerging middle class, increasingly diversified economies, reasonably robust financial systems, and growing global visibility and impact.\(^\text{19}\)


Turkey easily falls into this categorisation of emerging donors. It enjoyed relatively steady economic development and growth for over a decade, enabling the expansion of its development co-operation programmes. With a few fluctuations, Turkish gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average of 5% per year since 2002. Since 2004 Turkey has been one of the world’s 20 largest economies. According to the OECD’s projections, Turkish GDP growth should increase from 3% in 2015 to more than 4% in 2017, despite the challenges posed by the protracted crisis at its southern border, the associated influx of refugees and political turmoil.20

Turkey’s ODA, delivered through a range of public agencies co-ordinated by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA),21 has dramatically increased over the past decade (see Figure 1).22 Turkey has also grown in profile as an international humanitarian donor in recent years. When its response to the Syrian crisis is factored in – which constitutes 96% of the humanitarian assistance Turkey reported to the DAC in 2014 – it is the world’s third-largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance.23 Beyond humanitarian and development aid, it has promoted stability in several countries with which it has cultural, religious and historical ties, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia. It has expanded its diplomatic presence beyond its immediate neighbourhood, particularly in Africa, while mediating between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Somalia and Somaliland, and Israel and Hamas.24

Turkey has been an observer at the OECD-DAC since 1991. Having voiced no political desire for membership, it still endorses the basic principles of the DAC and regularly co-ordinates with DAC donors.25 It reports its humanitarian and development assistance in its publicly available reports while voluntarily reporting its top-line figures to the DAC.26

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21 For more data and information on the role and activities of TIKA, see ibid. In 2014 Turkey provided the largest share of its bilateral development co-operation to Syria, Somalia, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. The main sectors of its bilateral development co-operation were humanitarian aid and refugee support, followed by education, governance and civil society.
22 It must be noted here that as a non-DAC country, Turkey does not necessarily abide by the DAC definition and properties of ODA when it identifies its assistance. For instance, Turkey seems to regard its response to the Syrian crisis as ODA, although most of this response is provided on its own territory and continuous assistance to refugees past a year cannot be classified as ODA. See ibid.
23 GHA, op. cit.
24 For more information on Turkey’s mediation efforts in the last decade, see Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Resolution of conflicts and mediation’, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa, accessed 28 October 2016. Details on Turkey’s mediation between Somalia and Somaliland can be found in the article.
26 GHA, op. cit.
FIGURE 1  TURKEY’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (2002–2014, MILLION $)

![Bar chart showing Turkey's official development assistance from 2002 to 2014.]

FIGURE 2  TURKISH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY CATEGORY (2013, MILLION $)

![Bar chart showing Turkish official development assistance by category in 2013.]

Turkey provides 0.42% of its GNI as ODA – well over the DAC average of 0.3%.\(^{27}\) It is also on the DAC list of ODA recipients,\(^{28}\) classified as an ‘upper-middle-income country’.\(^{29}\)

For Turkey, which is a member of several multilateral organisations with mostly Northern membership such as NATO, the OECD and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and which has traditionally preferred to deliver assistance through multilateral channels, a pivot towards bilateralism has been part of a shift in its foreign policy identity. The numbers are striking: multilateral ODA accounted for 2% of Turkey’s total ODA in 2014, as opposed to 60% in 2003 and 44% in 2004.\(^{30}\)

It is important to highlight the differences between emerging donors and providers of South–South cooperation (SSC), which is defined by the OECD-DAC as ‘developing countries, middle-income countries, and emerging economies, which share expertise and financial support with other countries’. The UN Development Programme also distinguishes between ‘non-DAC countries that report to [the] OECD-DAC’ and SSC donors that do not report to the DAC.\(^{31}\) SSC commonly refers to the exchange of resources, personnel, technology and knowledge between developing countries, connected to the idea that developing countries should find their own solutions to development challenges.\(^{32}\) In many ways, SSC is a fraternal exercise of solidarity, as opposed to a product of the moral and historical responsibilities one country might feel toward another.

However, Turkey does not fall neatly into the category of SSC donors. First, while Turkish officials underscore that ‘SSC forms an important aspect of Turkish development cooperation’,\(^{33}\) the country does not see itself as a member of the global South. Rather, it is a NATO member and EU candidate, with close links to the West. In contrast with many countries from the global South, it has never been colonised; in fact, at its height,

\(^{27}\) Hausmann J & E Lundsgaarde, *op. cit.*

\(^{28}\) Turkey is also currently an aid-recipient country. However, most of the ODA directed at Turkey comes from EU institutions and is connected to the accession process to the union. See OECD-DAC, ‘DAC list of ODA recipients’, [http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014%20final.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014%20final.pdf), accessed 28 October 2016, for further information, as well as Hausmann J & E Lundsgaarde, *op. cit.* Turkey also receives international humanitarian assistance for the Syrian crisis, but this assistance corresponds only to 12% of the overall response effort in Turkey (see GHA, *op. cit.*, for further details). These numbers do not include a recent deal between Turkey and the EU in which the EU promised Turkey cash assistance in return for the repatriation of Syrians and other refugees who illegally entered the EU from Turkey.

\(^{29}\) OECD-DAC, *op. cit.*


\(^{33}\) Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Turkey’s development cooperation’, *op. cit.*
the Ottoman Empire, accepted as modern Turkey’s predecessor, controlled territory on three continents – Europe, Asia and Africa, including parts of today’s Somalia.\textsuperscript{34} Turkey, as a candidate country, continues to align itself with most EU positions at the UN, including on human rights and development issues.\textsuperscript{35} Yet it also has its own experiences as an aid recipient and its development policies share commonalities with SSC donors, such as its increasing preference to deliver aid through bilateral rather than multilateral channels, its rejection of aid conditionality, its emphasis on national ownership, and its relative inexperience in strategic analysis and co-ordination.

Instead of viewing Turkey’s involvement in Somalia as an example of SSC, this study attempts to understand how Turkey’s more recent experiences in humanitarian and development assistance – along with its approach to aid, some of which is similar to SSC but should not be classified as such – have fared in Somalia, particularly after 2011.

**OBJECTIVES AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

As previously mentioned, Turkey publishes its ODA and OOF data through its development agency TIKA, and also reports its top-line figures to the OECD-DAC. The first part of the research will rely on this quantifiable data, from both Turkish official sources and the data reported to the OECD, to take a broad snapshot of Turkey’s involvement in Somalia. It will look at the overall scope, principles and modalities of Turkish aid to Somalia, including the operational elements of their co-operation, financial statistics and the evolution of assistance and more recent trends.

As a second step, Turkey’s aid relationship with Somalia and status as an emerging donor will be evaluated from a qualitative angle. As Turkey shares several characteristics with SSC donors, the analytic framework developed by the Network of Southern Think Tanks


\textsuperscript{35} In 2015, for instance, Turkey aligned itself with several EU statements on human rights, economic and social development, and trade issues. The EU Statements on Second Committee Working Methods, Opening of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Formal Drafting Session for the International Conference on Financing for Development, Open Debate of the UN Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, the High-Level Conversation on Religions for Peace, the High Level Debate on the 2016 Special Session on the World Drug Problem, and the Role of Diamonds in Fueling Conflict are examples. See EU Delegation to the UN, ‘EU statements at the UN’, http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statements-at-the-un/, accessed 28 October 2016, for further information.
(NeST) will be used to assess the relationship. Toward that end, the authors gathered primary data via numerous interviews with a variety of government, civil society and private sector actors in Turkey and Somalia, and conducted a survey of the literature on Turkey’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, especially Somalia, since 2011.

As a last step, the report also aims to shed light on the political dynamics of aid. Why is Turkey in Somalia – to achieve its foreign policy goals, project its soft power, or fulfil its economic interests? Are there different domestic and external dynamics at play? How do these interests help or hinder the success of its aid programmes? Relying on the primary and secondary data collected from extensive field research and surveys of academic literature, media reports and official discourse on both sides, this report hopes to provide some answers to these questions, to uncover further factors that may contribute to the effectiveness of aid given by emerging donors.

36 NeST is a group of research institutions from developing countries dedicated to systematising and generating knowledge about SSC. The NeST framework provides a set of 20 indicators, organised in six dimensions, to qualitatively evaluate the process and relationship-oriented nature of SSC partnerships. These dimensions are national ownership, self-reliance and sustainability, inclusive participation, horizontality and equality, accountability and transparency, and development effectiveness. In order to avoid rigid and prescriptive models, the NeST framework provides a flexible guide for empirical research, which can be adapted into different contexts and used across a variety of country and regional case studies. See more about NeST at SAIIA (South African Institute of International Affairs), ‘Welcome to NeST Africa’, http://saiia.org.za/nest, accessed 28 October 2016.
TURKISH AID TO SOMALIA

THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND TURKEY’S ARRIVAL

Somalia has been the scene of a protracted violent conflict since the collapse of the central government in 1991. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's mediation efforts led to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. In 2012, following a long transitional period, the agreement on the Provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia through a broad-based consultation process and the establishment of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) on 20 August 2012 brought renewed optimism to the country. The international community pledged to support Somalia, including through the New Deal Somalia Compact, which intended to ensure greater alignment between international assistance and Somalia’s peacebuilding priorities, backed by pledges of EUR 1.8 billion (approximately $1.98 million). These pledges, however, did not fully materialise. In the meantime, al-Shabaab continued a violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia, targeting the SFG, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), international organisations and aid workers, and occasionally exerting control over large swaths of territory.

The self-proclaimed Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, the self-declared autonomous state of Puntland, enjoyed relative stability. Both entities were, and remain, unrecognised by the SFG and the international community, affecting the international assistance available to them. The status of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as the occasionally violent territorial dispute between Puntland and Somaliland, has been the subject of various mediation efforts centred on finding peaceful solutions for Somalia. The Turkish government has played a role in these talks.

40 The Somalia Compact proved to be more successful in the following years. It has led to a tangible shift in the relationship between the government and the international community. It has also served as an important platform to expedite a shift from humanitarian action to a focus on peacebuilding. Ibid.
From 2010–2012 a severe drought affecting East Africa led to a severe food crisis in Somalia, killing nearly 260,000 people. The situation in Somalia drew Turkey's interest mainly because of the tragic humanitarian consequences of the famine. It also fit into Turkey's broader foreign policy objective of intensifying and diversifying relations with sub-Saharan African countries, as well as its international development policy of channelling Turkish aid to conflict-affected states and sources of instability. This experience then became the entry point for greater involvement in Somalia, as other donors were not able to meet the challenge posed by the famine. In addition, it became obvious to Turkish officials that humanitarian aid would not be able to root out poverty, bring sustainable peace or even meet the basic needs of the more than 3.2 million Somalis in need of humanitarian assistance prior to 2010.

THE BACKGROUND TO TURKEY–SOMALIA RELATIONS

Although Turkey's engagement in Somalia has been particularly publicised since 2011, the relationship between the two countries dates back to the 16th century. Both Turkey and Somalia emphasise these ties in public statements; in 2012 former Somali prime minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali referred in a speech to the profound historical relations between the two countries, while former Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu told the Somalis, 'You are home, Turkey is your motherland.'

Substantial bilateral relations are much more recent. Modern Turkey's visibility in Somalia was low until 1979, when it opened an embassy in Mogadishu and launched a small-scale aid programme. The embassy was shut down as the Somali Civil War began in 1991, but Turkey remained involved in Somalia by participating in the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), and through the appointment of Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir as the force commander of UNOSOM II in 1993. A large Turkish NGO called Human Rights

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42 Achilles K et al., op. cit.


and Freedoms (Insan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri, or IHH) began its operations in Somalia in 1996, implementing drought- and famine-related projects.48

Despite this, Turkish engagement with Somalia and sub-Saharan African countries could at best be considered sporadic until the 2000s. In 1998 Turkey initiated its ‘Opening Up to Africa’ policy, which envisaged the gradual development of political, economic and diplomatic ties with African countries.49 In practice, the policy was only made operational after the AKP government came into power in 2002. The declaration of 2005 as the Year of Africa and Erdoğan’s subsequent visit to Ethiopia and South Africa were the first indicators of change. At the time it was unusual for a Turkish leader to visit sub-Saharan Africa; a leading Turkish newspaper columnist expressed her bewilderment by publishing an article titled ‘Why Ethiopia’? 50 Nevertheless, relations continued to develop. Then president Abdullah Gül hosted the first Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008. Turkey, in the late 2000s, also became heavily involved in the LDC group, hosting the Fourth UN Conference on Least-Developed Countries in Istanbul in 2010. By 2013, when Turkey’s primary focus inevitably turned to the Syrian crisis, the most significant share of the country’s humanitarian and development assistance went to LDCs and Africa.

Turkey’s interest in Somalia spiked after the mid-2000s. Consistent with its commitment to bring political solutions for Somalia back onto the international agenda, it became involved in the 2008 Djibouti peace talks and offered aid at a donor conference in Brussels in 2009.51 That year, the TFG asked Turkey to facilitate its efforts for peace, which culminated in the first Istanbul Conference on Somalia in 2010, organised by Turkey and the UN.52 In 2011 it hosted a meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, where 40 countries pledged $350 million in aid to Somalia.53 It also joined the informal Somalia Contact Group alongside the EU, the US and Ethiopia. In 2012 it organised the

48 Interview, IHH (Insan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri) representative, Istanbul, April 2016.
49 Turkey’s opening up to Africa came as a response to the failure of the EU to grant Turkey candidacy status for full EU membership. When the EU granted Turkey candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, this in turn led to a return to pro-Western policies. For further information, see Ozkan M, ‘Turkey’s opening to Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 48, 4, 2010, pp. 525–546.
52 See Ozkan M & S Orakci, ‘Turkey as a political actor in Africa’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9, 2, 2015, pp. 343–352. According to the authors, the Somalia conference did not lead to any tangible result but did put political solutions for Somalia on the agenda of the international community.
53 Ibid.
second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, which was intended to look beyond the mandate of the TFG, titled ‘Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015’.

Erdogan, in an October 2011 article in Foreign Policy titled ‘The tears of Somalia’, lamented the lack of attention and commitment from the international community to work toward sustainable solutions, and presented his government’s hands-on, comprehensive approach as a model framework for aid to Somalia. His heavily publicised August 2011 visit to the country amid the famine, with a 200-person delegation that included cabinet ministers, businessmen, journalists and his own family members, was a further indication of Somalia’s importance to Turkish foreign policy, and helped draw attention to the conflict.

Mostly replicating a broader template of engagement in sub-Saharan Africa, a Turkish embassy in Mogadishu and a TIKA office were opened, followed by a general consulate in Hargeisa. Turkish Airlines started regular flights, humanitarian and developmental assistance programmes were launched, and commercial activities began alongside mutual high-level bilateral visits and continued mediation efforts, particularly between Somalia and Somaliland.54 Business contacts flourished. In 2012 then Turkish minister of economic affairs Zafer Çaglayan co-ordinated a Turkey–Somalia Trade and Investment Forum. Turkish companies were awarded contracts for the management of the Mogadishu airport and for the reconstruction and maintenance of the Mogadishu seaport.

While initial relations were established with the TFG, after the elections the strong relationship continued with the SFG. Erdogan returned to Mogadishu in 2015, signing several bilateral agreements and inaugurating new projects, including a large hospital. Ahead of his third visit to Somalia on 3 June 2016, when he opened the new embassy building in Mogadishu – Turkey’s largest embassy building in the world – Erdogan published an op-ed in Al Jazeera arguing, ‘Turkey’s development-centred humanitarian aid model helped millions of people, including thousands in drought-struck Somalia, to get back on their feet.’55

OBJECTIVES AND ASPIRATIONS OF TURKISH ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

Turkish aid to Somalia involves many actors and incorporates various objectives and motivations. According to a Turkish foreign ministry official, ‘Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was the first time Turkey was involved, in a comprehensive and holistic manner,
in bringing a vision of durable peace to another country.\textsuperscript{56} From this perspective, its engagement in Somalia is in many ways a litmus test for the kind of actor Turkey is and what kind of potential it holds in Africa and the wider region.

An analysis of official statements by various Turkish ministries and agencies indicates five distinct objectives for engagement:

- meeting emergency needs;
- delivering development assistance,
- strengthening institutions and building capacities;
- supporting political processes; and
- improving bilateral trade.

In addition to these official motivations, strategic, economic, cultural and political motivations also play a role. A representative of the Turkish aid organisation IHH said:\textsuperscript{57}

The political, economic, or geopolitical reasons should not be overemphasised. The main driving force for Turkey is standing up to the challenge of responding to a famine in a Muslim country, especially during Ramadan, which has been leading to a loss of prestige in the Muslim world. The 2011 visit of current president Erdogan served to boost the visibility of Turkey as a humanitarian actor and allowed it to carry the Somalia issue into the United Nations.

While stressing the primacy of humanitarian aspirations, this statement also implies that Turkish ambitions in Somalia go beyond that. Indeed, through its engagement in Somalia Turkey has projected soft power, emerged as a mediator and increased its regional and global visibility and power. Through opening up embassies, consulates and aid offices in Somalia, the Horn of Africa and beyond – and engaging in mediation efforts – Turkey aspires to emerge as a lead actor in conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding on the global stage.\textsuperscript{58} Its engagement in Somalia complemented such aspirations.\textsuperscript{59} It has also shown its desire to be active and visible in multilateral forums by hosting international conferences on Somalia in 2010, 2012 and 2015, and by hosting the High-Level Partnership Forum on Somalia in Istanbul in February 2016.

However, this does not discount the additional reasons for Turkish engagement in Somalia, including political, security and economic interests. Turkish exports to Somalia have increased more than tenfold since 2011 (see Figure 4 page 45), and Turkish businesses managed to secure strategic infrastructure deals, not least the construction and management of the airport and seaport in Mogadishu. Somalia also broadly experienced

\textsuperscript{56} Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2016.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview, IHH, Istanbul, April 2016.
\textsuperscript{58} For instance, at the UN Turkey is a co-chair (along with Finland) of the Group of Friends of Mediation. See UN, Group of Friends of Mediation, http://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation, accessed 28 October 2016.
\textsuperscript{59} More than 80% of Turkey’s ODA goes to states identified as fragile. See Hausmann J & E Lundsgaarde, \textit{op. cit.}
the entry of Turkish civil society along with various domestic businesses, most of which have close ties to the Turkish government.

All these objectives and aspirations are couched in normative language, framed as an act of solidarity with neglected countries. According to several Turkish NGOs and agencies, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia shows genuine compassion and altruism. But it also reflects Turkey’s desire to emerge as a desirable and model partner for countries in Africa, the Muslim world and the global South, and to explore further entry points in its stated goal of ‘opening up to Africa’. This would seem to be working: a Somali businessman interviewed for this study remarked on how ‘the visit of Erdoğan and his family to IDP [internally displaced person] camps in Mogadishu was understood as a historic break with tradition and an act of bravery’. These projected values are influenced by history and culture, which help build trust and affinity between the countries. A Somali academic has further argued that religion and history are two elements that help create and legitimise a relationship of trust between Turkey and Muslim countries in Africa.

Turkish actions in Somalia also cater to a domestic audience, in the sense that they portray the AKP-era Turkey as a different, increasingly ambitious and compassionate country that respects religious and cultural sensitivities, as opposed to the old, traditional, secular approaches. For instance, Turkish pro-government media reported a Turkish counter-terrorism training mission in Somalia as ‘New Turkey spreads to four continents’, in line with the AKP’s domestic slogan ‘For a Greater New Turkey’.

**HOW DOES TURKEY DELIVER IN SOMALIA?**

Turkey engages in Somalia in a holistic manner, with many actors involved in diverse sectors, characterised as a ‘multi-actor and multi-track policy’.

**A MULTIFACETED APPROACH**

From the outset, Turkish engagement in Somalia has involved a multitude of actors, as part of a ‘Turkish Model’ that combines political, developmental, humanitarian and economic support. These actors tackle the Somali crisis from various angles, in a relatively decentralised fashion, under a broad framework put in place during Erdoğan's

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60 Interviews, IHH, Doctors Worldwide and Turkish Red Crescent, Istanbul and Ankara, April–May 2016.
61 Interview, Somali member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.
62 Interview, Somali academic, Mogadishu University, Mogadishu, March 2016.
64 Achilles K et al., op. cit.
Turkey’s involvement in Somalia prior to 2011 was mostly through multilateral channels, and initially focused on famine-relief efforts through the provision of emergency assistance in 2011. However, it quickly evolved into a mostly bilateral exercise and expanded into several areas of development and state building, with particular focus on health, education, infrastructure and capacity building (See Figure 3). NGOs followed suit by expanding their projects to provide services and conduct development projects, particularly in the health and education sectors.

**FIGURE 3**

TURKISH AID TO SOMALIA, 2011–2013


TIKA’s 2014 Development Assistance Report lists over 30 public entities that provide aid to partners and allow TIKA to use the comparative advantage of various sector experts from different institutions. Several Turkish government ministries and agencies engage in development efforts in Somalia under the umbrella of TIKA; Turkish aid agencies treat the humanitarian fallout and run refugee camps; Turkish municipalities build urban policy and other local government capacities; Turkish NGOs implement a variety of aid and development projects. 

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66 Hausmann J & E Lundsgaarde, op. cit.
assistance projects on the ground; Turkish diplomats support different mediation and reconciliation efforts; and Turkish private investors contribute to the Somali economy. The Turkish embassy in Mogadishu plays a loose co-ordinating role among the various institutions and interests. Projects are mostly implemented in partnership with Somalia’s federal government ministries, local authorities, private sector actors and sometimes Somali NGOs.

According to Turkish Ambassador Olgan Bekar, the core mission of the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu is to support humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia, although the embassy engages in reconciliation efforts as well. Turkey, responding to a request from the Somali government, hosted indirect talks between the TFG and Somaliland in a highly confidential process in 2013, and brought the presidents of Somalia and Somaliland together in April 2013. This was the first meeting between Somalia and Somaliland at a presidential level.

Several Turkish line ministries operate in Somalia, including health, development, interior and justice. Humanitarian and development agencies, including TIKA, the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and the Religious Affairs Directorate, are also present. A significant number of Turkish municipalities have also engaged on their own accord with local government counterparts in Somalia. The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has been the most active, delivering emergency assistance by sending support teams to assist famine relief efforts; providing training to Somali local government officials on urban policy matters; engaging in development projects on infrastructure, water and sanitation; and sometimes even carrying out municipal functions. Some smaller municipalities, mostly allied to the ruling AKP government, have also launched aid campaigns and undertaken small-scale projects in Somalia, especially immediately after Erdoğan’s 2011 visit.

67 Interviews, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Red Crescent representatives, Ankara, May 2016.
69 Interviews, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Ankara, May 2016.
71 A Google search has taken the authors to the websites of a large number of municipalities, from all regions of Turkey, that indicate their involvement in providing aid to Somalia. Sancaktepe, Bağcılar, Maltepe, Mamak, Esenler, Arnavutköy, Beykoz, Sakarya, Ordu, Akhisar, Kocaeli, Başakşehir, Umranıye, Ataşehir, Kağıthane, Adıyaman and Fatsa municipalities are examples. Most of them have helped deliver aid via the faith-based Turkish NGO IHH.
The number of Turkish NGOs in Somalia has gradually decreased with the end of the Somali famine and government funding for NGOs moving toward responding to the intensifying crisis in Syria.\footnote{TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), ‘Turkish Development Assistance Report 2012’, http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/TurkishDevelopmentAssistance2012.pdf, accessed 28 October 2016; TİKA, ‘Turkish Development Assistance Report 2013’, http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/KYR_FRAE_2013_uyg9.pdf, accessed 28 October 2016; TİKA, ‘Turkish Development Assistance Report 2014’, www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication, accessed 28 October 2016.} Nearly all Turkish NGOs in Somalia concentrated on emergency assistance in 2011, but after 2013 NGOs also become exponentially more involved in development projects. Many NGOs deliver aid directly, using their own personnel or volunteers from Turkey.\footnote{Interview, Turkish Red Crescent representative, Ankara, May 2016.} A few were on the ground even prior to the 2011 famine: the IHH, for instance, has been active in Somalia since 1997. Some of their personnel collect donations from the Turkish public and engage in small-scale aid distribution projects, while others are involved in bigger projects such as running IDP camps, constructing vital infrastructure, delivering services, and giving scholarships and organising student exchange programmes and work visits for Somali officials and businesspeople. NGOs’ activities have mostly been concentrated in Mogadishu; they tend to partner with Somali NGOs to deliver aid in less-secure areas of the country. According to a Somali NGO staff member based in Nairobi, the Turkish state supports these organisations and sometimes even facilitates their projects,\footnote{Interview, NGO staff, Nairobi, March 2016.} with the recent exception
of the withdrawal of support to NGOs allied to Fethullah Gülen. Gülen is a controversial US-based cleric who leads a global network of educational and humanitarian institutions. He was recently accused by the Turkish government of leading the terrorist organisation behind an attempted military coup in July 2016.75

The Turkish private sector has shown increasing interest in the relatively underexploited and potentially profitable Somali market, and its ability to capitalise on this interest has been made possible by Turkey's continued engagement in the country.76 According to Turkish government officials, the promotion of Turkish investment and business interests complements Turkey's political, developmental and humanitarian programmes. Turkish companies have mostly been involved in the construction, infrastructure, energy and transportation sectors, most visibly through the renovation and management of the Mogadishu airport and the Erdoğan Hospital (also known as Digfer Hospital), and the management of the Mogadishu seaport. During the Private Sector Investment Conference, co-chaired by Erdoğan and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Istanbul in February 2016, Turkish investors declared their interest in investing in Somali energy, infrastructure, ports, information and communications technologies, agriculture, livestock and fisheries. While most Turkish companies have focused primarily on Mogadishu, the Turkish ambassador, during his visit to Garowe, Puntland in April 2016, has signalled the interest of some companies to expand their operations to the self-declared independent Somaliland and the federal states of Puntland and Jubaland. Many Turkish companies also partner with Somali businesspeople, particularly in the construction sector.77

Turkish official aid has been mostly concentrated on Mogadishu; little of the funding provided to the Somali government was transferred to regions beyond its administrative control.78 However, the opening of the Turkish general consulate and TIKA office in Hargeisa, along with increased interest from TIKA and other agencies in Garowe, has started changing this.

Turkish ODA, as well as NGO assistance, is largely provided through bilateral channels. The funding and financing of projects in Somalia has gone beyond the provision of grants to include technical assistance, market-based loans, export credits and public–private sector partnerships. In addition, according to interviews with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, Turkey allocated $4.5 million of direct budget support each month between June and December 2013 for the funding of salary shortfalls in the office of the president, the office of the prime minister and various government ministries.

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76 Keyman F & O Sazak, op. cit.

77 Interview, Somali businessman, Mogadishu, April 2016.

78 Achilles K et al., op. cit.
Strategic Analysis, Assessments and Plans

The current Turkish humanitarian and development assistance framework in Somalia was almost exclusively established during Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2011 visit to Mogadishu. First, a high-level meeting was held with the Transitional Federal Government, where they deliberated on priority needs for the government. This was followed by a series of separate meetings between Turkish officials and their respective counterparts to record specific needs. Decisions on the rehabilitation of key infrastructure and the reconstruction of the Mogadishu airport and seaport were also taken during these meetings.79

Somali academic at Mogadishu University, April 2016

As the above quote indicates, the overall framework of Turkish engagement in Somalia broadly reflects the joint analysis agreed upon during Erdoğan’s 2011 visit. Turkish foreign ministry officials underscore that the diplomatic missions in Somalia are responsible for monitoring political, economic and security developments on the ground, and for adjusting general-needs assessments and areas of co-operation accordingly. But the extent to which other public institutions and agencies rely on this advice is unclear. Instead of having a basis with common strategic and political analysis of institutions, the future vision and direction of Turkish assistance continues to be determined during high-level visits among governments. While different platforms for co-ordination and information sharing among Turkish actors exist, these efforts remain ad hoc and have not yielded structured planning.

Joint analysis and assessment among Turkish diplomatic, humanitarian and development actors from both government and civil society sectors does not seem to be the norm. Assessments commonly emphasise direct consultations and co-ordination with Somali state and non-state actors in order to identify and plan projects, but the lack of openness during these consultations has been criticised by some Somalis. They argue that the requests made by Somali officials do not always reflect communities’ needs and interests or lead to inclusive and balanced planning and delivery.80 Turkish government and civil society actors do not regularly participate in UN-led humanitarian co-ordination efforts or other aid co-ordination frameworks.

Turkish government agencies and NGOs generally assess requests and proposals from the Somali government, mostly to verify that they are needs based and feasible.81 Agencies such as TIKA and the Red Crescent identify their projects in various ways, including by consulting directly with the Somali government, conducting scoping missions, and evaluating input from multilateral forums such as the Istanbul Somalia conferences.82 Some NGOs use representatives on the ground to identify needs, while others act on requests from their Somali partners or their own political connections back

79 Interview, Somali academic, Mogadishu University, Mogadishu, April 2016.
80 Interviews, Somali officials, Mogadishu, April 2016.
81 Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2016.
82 Interviews, senior officials in the Somali Ministry of Finance, Mogadishu, April 2016.
The often ad hoc nature of this approach also has its advantages: several Somali government officials have indicated that the absence of detailed and structured assessments facilitates the prompt delivery of aid and services, and allows for more responsiveness to Somali requests.

Several Turkish government and civil society representatives have also recognised the need for better strategic and political analysis of conditions on the ground. Save for the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance, engagement has, especially in the early days, followed a well-known template employed in several other countries in Africa – broadly characterised as the opening of diplomatic missions, frequent high-level delegations, the establishment of a TİKA office, the launching of new Turkish Airlines routes, the delivery of scholarships and the entry of construction firms – rather than being tailored to Somalia’s political and security dynamics. Although the opening of diplomatic missions in Mogadishu and Hargeisa has helped to increase political understanding and strategic awareness, especially in the earlier days of engagement in 2011, unfamiliarity with local and national dynamics has been apparent. On the other hand, Turkey’s presence on the ground has in some contexts enabled it to understand and analyse local dynamics better than international actors that either manage their operations from Nairobi or have little freedom of movement inside Somalia.

### Table 1: Turkish Assistance to Somalia – Actors, Areas and Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key actors</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Examples of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Turkish government  | Humanitarian aid | • Food distribution during Ramadan  
|                     |             | • Provision of food and shelter to IDPs  
|                     |             | • Emergency medical services  
|                     |             | • Construction of logistics and supply centres                                       |
|                     | Health      | • Training of medical specialists  
|                     |             | • Provision of equipment to hospitals, including field hospitals  
|                     |             | • Construction, rehabilitation, renovation and management of hospitals and health clinics |
|                     | Education   | • Provision of scholarships  
|                     |             | • Construction and management of schools and orphanages  
|                     |             | • Technical support and hardware provision to universities                           |

83 Interviews, representatives of Turkish NGOs, Istanbul, April 2016.
84 Achilles K et al., op. cit.
85 Interview, representatives of IHH, Istanbul, April 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key actors</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Examples of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Turkish Armed Forces</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>• Direct budget support to Somali government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support to tax-regulation authorities (planning phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turkish agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Training of Somali diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turkish Red Crescent</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
<td>• Restructuring of Somali army and police force</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Turkish Religious Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Training of Somalia’s police and military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yardimeli (Helping Hand)</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>• Donation of patrol boats</td>
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<tr>
<td>• IHH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Doctors Worldwide</td>
<td>Urban policy</td>
<td>• Training and capacity-building programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kimse Yok Mu</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishment of Somalia Agricultural School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cansuyu (Life Water)</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>• Supporting efforts toward a Mogadishu city plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aziz Mahmut Hidayi</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Low-income housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deniz Feneri</td>
<td>Religion/culture</td>
<td>• Rehabilitation of the Galkayo Prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ASELSAN(^a)</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>• Building capacities for fisheries and maritime trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Albayrak</td>
<td></td>
<td>• As a founding member of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, a Turkish naval frigate was deployed in the region in 2009(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turkish Religious Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Yardimeli (Helping Hand)</td>
<td>Infrastructure, water and sanitation</td>
<td>• Drilling of water wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IHH</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Construction and rehabilitation of urban roads and street lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Doctors Worldwide</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Renovation of Mogadishu airport and seaport</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Kimse Yok Mu</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rehabilitation of Mogadishu’s sewage and drainage system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cansuyu (Life Water)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Waste collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aziz Mahmut Hidayi</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Training on transportation infrastructure (including enhancing civil aviation capacity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deniz Feneri</td>
<td>Trade and commerce</td>
<td>• Bilateral visits of high-level trade and commerce delegations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Turkish Religious Foundation</td>
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\(^a\) ASELSAN (Turkish Military Electronics Industry) is associated with the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, established to cover Turkey’s military defence needs nationally, through product and system development. See ASELSAN, ‘Who we are?’, http://www.aselsan.com.tr/en-us/about-us/Pages/Default.aspx, accessed 28 October 2016.


TAKING STOCK OF TURKEY’S ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA:
NEST INDICATORS

Although the forms, modalities, principles, skills, interests, experiences and resources of emerging donors are far from uniform, the increasing presence and visibility of middle-income countries in global development can be understood to create opportunities that make global development more horizontal, equitable and efficient.86 As previously discussed, although Turkey does not fall within the category of the global South and has a deeper historical and institutional relationship with traditional players compared with emerging donors such as Brazil, China, South Africa or Indonesia, its policies and principles on humanitarian and development assistance share many characteristics with SSC actors.

The purpose of this section is twofold. First, the Turkey–Somalia study provides an interesting opportunity to test the assumptions and applicability of the NeST framework, designed to measure SSC, which will form the basis of this analysis. The section also benefits from the more quantitative analysis, as the purpose here is to point out concrete convergences and differences between Turkish and traditional donor engagement in Somalia, with the expectation of contributing to global discussions about traditional versus emerging donors. Second, the report attempts to capture the differences between Turkish aid and other emerging donors, and to explore whether the NeST framework is useful for this type of analysis as well.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>NEST INDICATORS OF SOUTH–SOUTH CO-OPERATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National ownership</td>
<td>Horizontality, solidarity and equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alignment with national priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demand-driven co-operation</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Non-conditionality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-reliance and sustainability</td>
<td>Accountability and transparency</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Knowledge and technology transfer</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Untying of aid</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Use of local systems and resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusive participation</td>
<td>Development effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Multi-stakeholder dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Active engagement in programme cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Protection of people and environment</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Perhaps the most obvious features of Turkish involvement in Somalia are respect for recipient country ownership, alignment with national priorities and plans, and empowerment of the national and local leadership. This approach often aligns with internationally supported programmes that emphasise national leadership and ownership, such as the New Deal programme of the Somalia Compact, the SFG's Six Pillar Policy, which highlights stability, economic recovery, peacebuilding, service delivery, international relations and national unity, and the Somalia National Development Plan for 2017–2019. The inclination of Turkish actors to work closely with government and other agencies of Somalia on the ground – and to consult with Somali authorities in the assessment, planning and programming phases of projects – was highlighted in several interviews. Beyond Turkish officials, NGOs also make an effort to work through or alongside the Somali authorities in project design and implementation. These preferences have sometimes been criticised for their potential to empower the Mogadishu government at the expense of other actors.

Several, if not all, of Turkey's projects in Somalia have been driven by demand. New projects are often announced after mutual and bilateral high-level visits; as previously mentioned, the general framework of the Turkish assistance has been drawn based on requests made by the Somali government during Erdoğan's 2011 visit to Mogadishu. The demand-driven nature of Turkish involvement in Somalia extends beyond aid and assistance: officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have emphasised in interviews that Turkey's role in the talks between Somalia and Somaliland, which was initially one of facilitation, has been upgraded to one of mediation, based on strong demand from Somali parties.

87 For more information on the Somalia Compact, see Hearn S & T Zimmerman, op. cit.
90 Interviews, Turkish and Somali officials and NGO representatives, Istanbul, Ankara and Mogadishu, March–May 2016.
91 Achilles K et al., op. cit.
92 Interviews, Somali civil society organisations, Mogadishu, April 2016.
93 Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Ankara, May 2016.
There is no evidence to suggest that these demands have been based on a broad, inclusive analysis of the country's needs rather than the requests of certain high-level Somali officials. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Somalis are always in the driver's seat; some Somali interviewees claimed that Turkish actors have been given carte blanche by the Somali government to implement projects without having to link to national plans.

Turkey strongly adheres to the principle of non-conditionality. In an interview given to Afronline in 2012, TIKA Director Serdar Çam makes this clear:\textsuperscript{94}

\begin{quote}
If we articulate this issue [conditionality] when dealing with any aid recipient, we would run the risk of punishing the people of that country in need of urgent help. Therefore, as an aid agency, our principle is not to interfere with the domestic policies of certain aid recipients.
\end{quote}

Several Somali and Turkish respondents have emphasised that Turkey, unlike traditional donors, does not impose conditionality.\textsuperscript{95} A Turkish NGO representative argued that while that organisation refrains from distributing aid in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, beyond that it provides aid to anyone in need, whether armed or not.\textsuperscript{96} If one reason for adherence to the principle of non-conditionality is refraining from imposing conditions on already precarious governments, the other one is to distinguish Turkish aid as 'different',\textsuperscript{97} able to win hearts and minds while delivering assistance efficiently. Some Turkish officials have also criticised Gulf countries’ tendency to condition assistance to adherence to their own religious principles, while Turkey – even as it undertakes religious programmes – does not impose such conditionality.\textsuperscript{98}

\textbf{HORIZONTALITY, EQUALITY AND SOLIDARITY}

Both Turkish and Somali official discourse use a language of ‘equal partnership’ to frame bilateral relations. This language promotes the value of national ownership and leadership by emphasising the role of Somali authorities in managing aid flows, by building horizontal relations with the Somali government, and by implementing projects only after they receive the approval of Somali authorities.\textsuperscript{99}


\textsuperscript{95} Interviews, Mogadishu, Ankara, Istanbul and Nairobi, March–May 2016.

\textsuperscript{96} Interview, representative of a Turkish humanitarian NGO, Istanbul, April 2016.


\textsuperscript{98} Interview, Turkish official, Ankara, April 2016.

\textsuperscript{99} Achilles K \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}
In a January 2015 article for the Turkish newspaper *Daily Sabah*, Mohamud stated:  

> From the outset, Turkey has treated Somalia as an equal partner, respected our requests, and insisted on our input. Turkey's perception of Somalia as a future trading partner enabled us to approach our relationship from an equal footing, leading to mutual respect and enthusiastic cooperation.

Both the Turkish government, businesspeople and NGOs, and the Somali government and Somali aid recipients, seem to have benefited from this partnership – but have they done so in a balanced measure? This is mostly a matter of perception. Many Somalis argue that the relationship with Turkey has been greatly beneficial for them. An idea that was often relayed in the interviews was that Somalia has gained a partner in Turkey with a long-term and comprehensive vision of peace, development and self-sufficiency, which provides direct benefits to Somalia and works directly on the ground toward that end. Mohamud, in an interview for TİKA's 2016 Somali report, states:

> It was the first time in 22 years that Mogadishu has seen foreigners moving in the streets of Mogadishu, collecting garbage from the city, cleaning the city, rehabilitating roads, rehabilitating old buildings, rehabilitating the lighting system of the city. This was a real milestone for Mogadishu … So impact is very clear on the ground.

The renovated airport and seaport projects are said to generate nearly 80% of the Somali government's overall revenue, whereas in the past the government was not able to tax the private companies running these facilities. While some emerging donors, such as China, have been criticised for prioritising their own economic interests in their engagements in Africa and elsewhere, there is not much visible criticism of Turkey's engagement in Somalia disproportionately benefiting Turkey.

Turkey, through its involvement in Somalia, has become more visible on the global scene, has boosted its international standing and gained an entry point into Africa. Turkey has also found a space for its businesses and civil society to expand their operations, and has presented itself as a model emerging donor. Its direct investments in Somalia, according to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Lütfi Elvan, reached $100 million in 2015 from nearly nothing in 2010. Elvan also noted that the bilateral trade volume was 2572 million

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101 Ibid.


103 Wasuge M & M Harper, *op. cit.*

104 The Mogadishu Airport now operates 40–60 flights daily to four different countries. See *ibid*.

105 Hausmann J & E Lundsgaarde, *op. cit.*
in 2015; however, a vast trade imbalance of $71 million continues to exist in Turkey’s favour.\(^{106}\)

Projects are mostly implemented in partnership with national or local Somali authorities; many Somalis have held critical decision-making roles in major infrastructure and transportation projects implemented or funded by Turkey.\(^{107}\) This signals a willingness on the Turkish side to share decisions and resources. On the other hand, while Turkish reports indicate that needs assessments are jointly undertaken, differences in capacity and experience create an imbalance between parties.\(^{108}\) As a Somali businessman said, ‘The Somali side often does not have the capacity to examine the long-term impact of agreements, particularly those related to trade.’\(^{109}\) This sometimes leads to suspicions regarding the intentions of Turkish actors; the contracts for both the Mogadishu seaport and the original airport have been criticised for containing ‘troubling clauses’ and not being tendered competitively.\(^{110}\)

The principle of solidarity, one of the defining elements of SSC, is visible in Turkey’s engagement in Somalia.\(^{111}\) Turkish actors – both governmental and non-governmental – are often present on the ground, engaged in direct aid delivery instead of working through local implementing partners. According to a Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Turkish government institutions and NGOs perceive fewer security threats in Somalia and therefore impose fewer security restrictions on their personnel operating in the country than traditional donors. Comparative cultural and religious proximity also facilitates Turks’ access in Mogadishu and beyond. This eases their presence, access and visibility and allows them to raise their flag.\(^{112}\) This presence is often taken as a sign of solidarity and mutual trust by Somalis, who hail Turkish aid workers for living among

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106 Information on foreign direct investment numbers is available at Sabah, ‘Basbakan Yardimcisi Elvan: Turkiye’nin Somali’deki yardimlari 100 milyon dolara ulasti’, 23 February 2016, http://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2016/02/23/basbakan-yardimcisi-elvan-turkiyenin-somaliye-yatirim-100-milyon-dolara-ulasti#, accessed 28 October 2016. For information on Turkey’s trade volume with Somalia, see https://www.deik.org.tr/6521/SOMAL%C4%B0_%C4%B0LE_%C4%B0L%C4%B0%5EK%C4%B0LERDE_YEN%C4%B0_ADIMDE%C4%B0K_TEN_GELD%C4%B0.html, accessed 28 October 2016.

107 Interview, Somali member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.

108 Interview, professor, Mogadishu University, Mogadishu, April 2016.

109 Interview, Somali businessman, Mogadishu, April 2016.

110 Wasuge M & M Harper, op. cit. Despite criticisms about the way the government contracted the airport, many have acknowledged that the companies produced excellent results. The Somali Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, for instance, stresses that the ‘new, sleek terminal [of the Mogadishu Airport] … would shame many African airports’.


112 Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2016.
them instead of seeking shelter behind the walls of high-security compounds.\textsuperscript{113} The long-term perspective on the situation, particularly visible through the construction of the new Turkish embassy in Mogadishu, could be read as a message that Turkey is there to stay.\textsuperscript{114} In this sense, Turkish aid to Somalia is similar to SSC, while using aid as a mechanism of an assertive foreign policy to gain visibility and influence, reflecting a vision of solidarity, complementarity and equality.\textsuperscript{115}

**SELF-RELIANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY**

One of the most important purposes of SSC is to reduce external dependency through a steady increase in local capacity rather than relying on in-kind and monetary aid. Capacity building is a critical aspect of Turkey’s engagement in Somalia.\textsuperscript{116} Capacity building has both short and long-term goals.\textsuperscript{117} In the short run, organisations such as the Turkish Red Crescent recruit and train local personnel so they can work jointly with Turkish organisations.\textsuperscript{118} Following the setting up of projects and programmes, Turkish organisations use Somali personnel and decision-makers and aim to fully transfer management to locals once they are ready.\textsuperscript{119} The transfer of several IDP camps established by the Red Crescent to the Somali Ministry of Health has already taken place.\textsuperscript{120} Private companies also regularly train and employ Somali personnel to build capacity, and ‘occasionally organise tours for Somali businessmen to see Turkish manufacturing plants to convince them to start similar businesses in Somalia’.\textsuperscript{121} Capacity building and knowledge transfer are also aspects of a long-term development strategy that is exemplified by both governmental and non-governmental actors providing scholarships, education programmes and training in various sectors such as security services, science, engineering, health, agriculture and urban policy.\textsuperscript{122}

As previously mentioned, Turkey has made a conscious effort since 2011 to reframe its engagement in Somalia in the peacebuilding and development realms, beyond humanitarian assistance. Its approach to peacebuilding is similar to that of other emerging donors such as South Korea and Qatar in the sense that, while they do not oppose traditional peacebuilding practices, this does not mean they adhere to a particular

\textsuperscript{113} Interview, Somali businessman, Mogadishu, April 2016; interviews, Turkish Red Crescent representative, Ankara, May 2016; interviews, Doctors Worldwide and IHH, Istanbul, April 2016.

\textsuperscript{114} Several Somali officials and civil society members made this point during interviews held in Mogadishu, March–April 2016.


\textsuperscript{116} Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2016.

\textsuperscript{117} Interview, professor at Mogadishu University, Mogadishu, April 2016.

\textsuperscript{118} Interview, Turkish Red Crescent official, Ankara, May 2016.

\textsuperscript{119} *Ibid*.

\textsuperscript{120} Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2016.

\textsuperscript{121} Interview, Somali businessman, Mogadishu, April 2016.

\textsuperscript{122} Interview, Abdirahman Bayidow, Mogadishu University, Mogadishu, March 2016.
peacebuilding model or framework.\textsuperscript{123} It should be broadly understood as a broader, longer-term commitment to security, stability and prosperity in the country.\textsuperscript{124} Many of the bilateral agreements and related projects include long-term visions, sometimes spanning as many as 20 years.\textsuperscript{125} An eventual transition from a relationship built on aid and assistance to a more equal diplomatic and economic partnership seems to be the goal, although there are no immediate plans for Turkish agencies to withdraw from Somalia, and the circumstances on the ground will determine the conditions of departure. A Turkish foreign ministry official explained:\textsuperscript{126}

Yes, we plan exit strategies. For instance, we are constructing a military training centre. The purpose here is that it will remain functioning even after the Turks leave. Of course, conditions on the ground will eventually determine the continuation of projects, but long-term results that lead to self-sustainability is our ultimate goal.

**MONITORING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY**

As mentioned above, Turkey is among the 20 non-DAC countries that choose to report their ODA volumes to the OECD annually, although this reporting is not always broken down geographically and by sector in line with the Creditor Reporting System.\textsuperscript{127} Turkey sporadically reports aid data to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Financial Tracking Services. TİKA publishes detailed annual reports of Turkey's governmental and nongovernmental development activities on its website (the last report was released in 2014). Several Turkish NGOs and companies report on the nature, scope, personnel and budget of their projects to TİKA and the Ministry of Interior's Department of Associations, and often publish project data on their websites.\textsuperscript{128} Moreover, a tender process is compulsory and regulated, per Turkish legislation, for all kinds of procurement and construction work to be carried out by governmental authorities.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Richmond O & I Tellidis, ‘Emerging actors in international peacebuilding and statebuilding: Status quo or critical states?’, *Global Governance*, 20, 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Interview, Somali member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} For more information, see OECD, ‘Aid-for-trade statistical queries’, http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/aid-for-trade-statisticalqueries.htm, accessed 28 October 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Interviews, Doctors Worldwide and IHH, Istanbul, April 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Specifically, by the State Tender Law and Public Tender Law, and their implementing regulations.
\end{itemize}
But beyond publishing information on numbers and figures, Turkish aid to Somalia has been criticised for lacking transparency and accountability, and for mixing government, development and business interests.\textsuperscript{130} Governmental and non-governmental actors often conduct independent project evaluations on an ad hoc basis, but a reliable and standardised monitoring and evaluation model is lacking,\textsuperscript{131} sometimes leading to criticisms about transparency and allegations of corruption. For instance, due to corruption allegations regarding the direct budgetary support extended to the Somali government through a ‘cash through courier’ system, the programme had to be suspended in 2013.\textsuperscript{132} A member of the Somali Parliament recalled that several members of Parliament also criticised bilateral agreements with Turkey for being passed without proper legislative scrutiny and oversight.\textsuperscript{133}

Joint reviews and evaluations of projects are not the norm; the Somalis mostly seem to leave it to the Turkish side to do project reviewing, monitoring and evaluation, and to define the conditions for exit planning and handover of ownership. Proper oversight of public–private partnerships also seems insufficient. For instance, while Turkish managers must hand over 55% of revenue from the Mogadishu seaport project to the Somali government, they admit to not following up on how this money is later used.\textsuperscript{134}

**INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION**

In development processes the participation of all relevant stakeholders is key for ensuring that solutions do not exclude the people they are intended to serve. Emerging donors, however, often prefer co-operating primarily with government authorities; Turkey is no exception to this.\textsuperscript{135} As previously stated, the overall vision and framework of Turkish assistance was mutually designed by governmental officials during Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia in 2011 and tweaked during subsequent high-level visits. Most of the assessment and planning processes predominantly involve national and local government authorities, on which Turks depend to understand community priorities.\textsuperscript{136} In the field, Turkish agencies, companies and businesses try to engage the leaders of dominant groups, village elders, religious leaders and Somali civil society to gain the support of the community for their projects against possible al-Shabaab influence.\textsuperscript{137}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{130}{Wasuge M & M Harper, \textit{op. cit.}}
\footnotetext{131}{Achilles K \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}}
\footnotetext{132}{Because Somalia had no operating banking system, direct cash support to the Somali government was delivered directly by couriers from Turkey under the ‘cash through courier’ system. See, for instance, TIKA, 2013, \textit{op. cit.} See also NAME OF WEBSITE, NAME OF ARTICLE/SUBHEADING, DATE, IN ENGLISH & TURKISH http://www.mynet.com/haber/dunya/turk-buyukelciliginden-kutu-kutu-para-alirdik-1050264-1, accessed 28 October 2016.}
\footnotetext{133}{Interview, Somali member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.}
\footnotetext{134}{Wasuge M & M Harper, \textit{op. cit.}}
\footnotetext{135}{Mawdsley E, \textit{op. cit.}}
\footnotetext{136}{Interviews, Somali civil society representatives, Mogadishu, April 2016.}
\footnotetext{137}{\textit{Ibid.}}
\end{footnotes}
The implementation phase of projects appears to be more inclusive. Turkish projects are mostly implemented in partnership with Somalia’s federal government ministries, local authorities, private sector companies and local NGOs.\(^\text{138}\) A representative of Doctors Worldwide commented that Turkish NGOs tend to work on the ground with partners that are well received by the national and local government and by the community, and which have professional expertise and area knowledge, as all these improve access, especially in areas with no previous Turkish presence. There have been efforts on the Turkish side to promote the participation of women and youth in development projects, but there is not a structured system to consistently enable inclusive community engagement.\(^\text{139}\)

Beyond the assessment and implementation of projects, there seems to be a much more obvious effort to address community needs in an inclusive way. Turkish projects, both governmental and non-governmental, are visibly community-oriented. Projects dealing with health, sanitation, urban areas and displacement have a clear protection focus. For instance, the Turkish Red Crescent and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality jointly conducted a waste-removal project in Mogadishu in 2015, actively supporting the participation of the Somali population through a ‘wage for work’ programme.\(^\text{140}\)

One consistent criticism is the concentration of Turkish assistance in and around Mogadishu. The opening of a general consulate and a TIKA office in Hargeisa, and the visits of the Turkish ambassador to Puntland and Somaliland might change this in the future. According to TIKA’s 2016 Somalia report, a number of projects in the health, education and infrastructure sectors are currently under way in Somaliland and Puntland.\(^\text{141}\)

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138 Achilles K \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}

139 According to interviews with Somali officials, a joint project with the Somali Banadir municipality on sanitation made a special effort to hire women and youth in the implementation phase. But this is more an exception than the rule. Interviews, Mogadishu, April 2016.


141 According to TIKA’s 2016 Somalia report, it currently carries out the following projects in Puntland and Somaliland:

- rehabilitation of the Galkayo Hospital Emergency Ward;
- construction and furnishing of the Galkayo Vocational Training and Youth Sports Centre;
- furnishing the Galkayo Orphanage;
- construction of water wells and opening of religious schools in the Tevekkul Camp;
- furnishing the computer laboratories of Universal Islamic Cultural Trust;
- equipment support to the Galkayo Regional Health Administration;
- construction of the Hargeisa Regional Training Administration;
- renovation of the Barbera Hospital and Barbera Training Centre;
- donation of ambulances in Somaliland;
- donation of fire trucks to Hargeisa Airport; and
- furnishing of the computer lab of Hargeisa Middle School.
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

As previously mentioned (See Table 2), NeST indicators measure development effectiveness by looking at how the donor state performs in four categories: flexibility and adaptation to local context; time and cost efficiency; co-ordination and complementarity; and policy coherence for development. This section will examine the effectiveness of Turkish aid and assistance in this context, while the overall effectiveness and impact of Turkey’s engagement in Somalia – in terms of both delivery on the ground and effect on conflict transformation – will be tackled later in this study.

The flexible and rapid nature of Turkish activities in Somalia has been often praised. The presence of Turkish actors on the ground, ‘side by side with their Somali counterparts’ and local communities, has allowed these actors to be more adaptable to local conditions, needs and wishes.142 As previously mentioned, the absence of unified and structured systems in assessments, planning and monitoring has been criticised for leading to inefficiency and ineffectiveness, but acknowledged for facilitating flexible and rapid delivery.

TIKA is the ‘mother company’ that co-ordinates Turkish governmental and non-governmental assistance.143 In Somalia, this task falls to the Turkish embassy as well. However, the representative of a Turkish NGO active in Somalia explained that there is not much co-ordination to prevent overlapping or duplication of efforts on the ground, or to achieve a balance of responsibilities among different institutions.144 He suggested that this problem is not unique to Somalia but mirrors a larger shortcoming of Turkish aid in general. Another NGO representative remarked that TIKA provides security assistance and general co-ordination to aid efforts, but there is no structural co-operation mechanism.145 While the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu holds sporadic co-ordination meetings, the goal is to foster information sharing rather than co-ordinating aid operations or directing NGO spending of public funds.146 The consistency and efficiency of co-ordination also seems to be driven by personality; some deputy prime ministers with the TIKA portfolio have been keener on fostering co-ordination than others.147

Co-ordination with regional and international efforts in Somalia also seems weak and sporadic. A Turkish Red Crescent representative stated that they take part in UN-led co-ordination efforts, but this is more of an institutional preference rather than an overall strategy.148 AMISOM officials have complained that Turkey’s training of the Somali police force is a duplication of its efforts.149 No Turkish NGOs participate in the Somalia
NGO Consortium, a voluntary mechanism with several participants designed to foster co-operation among NGOs operating in Somalia.  

Ironically, one factor hampering Turkey's co-ordination with other international actors has been its presence on the ground in Somalia, as many of the other international and regional organisations involved in assistance work conduct their operations from Nairobi.

**THE TURKISH APPROACH IN SOMALIA: PRINCIPLES, MODALITIES AND SHORTCOMINGS**

The NeST framework and methodology provide a useful lens through which to analyse Turkish engagement in Somalia. While previous sections have shed light on the Turkish methods of working on the ground, from assessments and programming to delivery and financing, the NeST indicators are beneficial in understanding what kind of actor Turkey is, both as an emerging donor and as a different kind of actor, situated between East and West, North and South, traditional and new. The study also helps demonstrate how the NeST framework can be practically adapted to different country contexts, even to those that do not fall strictly in the realm of SSC.

The NeST framework indicates that the Turkish venture in Somalia is a good example of emerging-donor engagement and lessons learned in conflict-affected countries. Turkey has translated several of the principles of SSC into practice, particularly national ownership, solidarity, trust, non-conditionality, improved access, protection of people, shared analysis and implementation, flexibility, horizontality and adaptation to local contexts. It also emerges as a different development partner due to its decades-long assistance programmes, past engagements in multilateral efforts and traditional relationship with the West. 

This has led to its improved performance in publishing data and access to information, policy coherence and accountability. On the list of priorities for Turkish organisations in Somalia should be improving co-ordination (internally and with Somali and international counterparts); enhancing inclusiveness in assessment; improving planning and delivery; and developing more structured monitoring and evaluation systems.

The NeST indicators are also useful in underlining convergences with and differences between the Turkish approach and more traditional Western approaches (see Table 3). Emerging donors vary vastly in their principles, ways of working and closeness to traditional approaches; beyond highlighting the quality of SSC, the NeST framework could also be used to determine where different actors fall in the spectrum between the traditional and the new. For better results, the framework could be expanded to include additional principles that define traditional or Western assistance: adherence

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to humanitarian principles in emergency action, commitment to multilateralism, and reporting requirements. This exercise could also benefit the dialogue between traditional and non-Western donors to help prevent potential normative clashes, foster partnerships and determine how to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness on both sides.

### Table 3: Comparison between Turkish and Traditional Donor Approaches and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional approaches in Somalia</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Turkish approach</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mostly Nairobi-based and delivery through partners</td>
<td>Relative success in reaching beneficiaries, fewer security risks, potential for better co-ordination with local agencies</td>
<td>Direct aid delivery through presence on the ground</td>
<td>Efficient, cost-effective, rapid, direct contact with local populations, needs-based, more visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Security restrictions on aid personnel</td>
<td>Minimised security risks, particularly from al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Few security restrictions on aid personnel&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Higher accessibility, direct contact with populations, winning over local populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Assessment and implementation through donor/UN agencies in consultation with national government</td>
<td>Less duplication, better accountability</td>
<td>More joint assessment and planning with Somali counterparts</td>
<td>Increased ownership and leadership of national government, more demand-driven aid, more rapid response, greater cost-effectiveness by avoiding vigilant need and risk assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Political and economic conditionalities to development assistance</td>
<td>Improved accountability, allows pushing of normative principles and values, especially on human rights, inclusivity and people-centred delivery</td>
<td>No direct or indirect conditionalities</td>
<td>Empowering the national government, stronger relations with national and local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Short-term vision: more concentration on aid delivery</td>
<td>Solutions that are more temporary (at the expense of solid and sustainable outcomes in which development projects are limited in scope and not capital-intensive)</td>
<td>Longer-term development and peacebuilding projects</td>
<td>Sustainable focus, attention, and peacebuilding and development angle, responsive to day-to-day needs on the ground, multi-track and multi-actor presence, operations based on comparative advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Limited visits from donor countries to Somalia</td>
<td>More concentration on day-to-day projects and programmes instead of investing in visibility</td>
<td>Frequent mutual visits from national/local Turkish officials</td>
<td>Increased visibility of Turkey, attention drawn to Somalia, various Turkish stakeholders given the opportunity to study the Somali market and aid dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Better co-ordination at national, regional and NGO levels</td>
<td>Better co-ordination and less duplication of efforts with various actors</td>
<td>Limited co-ordination, mainly among Turkish stakeholders</td>
<td>Difficulty in adhering to a broader conflict transformation strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional approaches in Somalia</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Turkish approach</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Grant-based financing</td>
<td>Better advances donor objectives</td>
<td>Innovative financing, including public–private partnerships, direct budget support, loans and technical assistance</td>
<td>Aid mobilised from a variety of public and private sources, increased potential for sustained financing, facilitated entry of Turkish private sector into Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Multilateralism</td>
<td>Better co-ordination, prevention of duplication of efforts, support to a broader international strategy</td>
<td>Bilateralism</td>
<td>Better promotion of Turkish visibility and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Structured monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems</td>
<td>Better analysis and evaluation of the impact of donor aid and progress</td>
<td>Absence of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, ad hoc reporting</td>
<td>Broader and more qualitative evaluations of the success of the general Turkish engagement, but increased difficulties in evaluating the impact of specific projects and programmes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a Interviews with Turkish NGOs operating on the ground have revealed that while Turkish agencies and NGO staff were initially less concerned about the security situation, the recent targeting of some Turkish government buildings and public/NGO officials (primarily by al-Shabaab) has led to higher restrictions, especially for permanent diplomatic and development/humanitarian staff.

Source: Compiled by the authors
BEYOND THE NEST FRAMEWORK: TURKEY, SOMALIA AND THE POLITICS OF ENGAGEMENT

While NeST is a useful framework to understand the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of Turkey’s engagement in Somalia, a more complete analysis should include the broader political dynamics at play. Just as with traditional donors, domestic politics and geopolitical interests play a role in shaping aid policies and their outcomes. Emerging donors are different not just because of their cultural practices and their past but also because of their particular interests. These may include a tradition of providing patronage to communities with which they share historical and cultural links, the need to expand their visibility and power as regional and sometimes global actors, the quest to open markets for their growing economies, or their support for ways of working beyond the traditional rules and dynamics of donor and recipient countries. To this end, this section looks at three additional dynamics that have helped to define Turkish–Somali relations, particularly since 2001: identity politics, patronage politics and the sustainability of assistance.

HOW EFFECTIVE IS TURKISH AID TO SOMALIA?

While the NeST indicators present a solid technical model to measure the effectiveness and quality of Turkish aid, it is helpful to remember that the relative impact of aid is difficult to measure. Firstly, the NeST indicators do not provide measurable benchmarks when determining the aid effectiveness of SSC, making it difficult to ascertain how effective Turkey’s assistance has been. Turkish aid is applied somewhat randomly, and there is no neat control group of similar, traditionally funded projects with which the Turkish projects may be compared. In addition, apart from seeing whether the specific projects were completed, it is difficult to ascertain the much more diffuse impact they have had on the broader economy and political stability.

Secondly, apart from targets and indicators, perceptions of success and the sustainability of development assistance efforts often depend on the fulfilment of the expectations and interests of the two sides, rather than the effectiveness of the aid. From a Somali perspective, Turkish aid has improved the day-to-day lives of Somalis, especially around Mogadishu; provided them with better opportunities in education, health and business; significantly increased international attention on Somalia; and helped strengthen state and municipal institutions. While the visibility and sustainability of the Turkish project in Somalia will inevitably shift with security, political and economic developments on both the Turkish and Somali sides, as well as regional and global dynamics and the entry of new actors into the Somali aid scene, the impact of the first five years of Turkish assistance has been positive. The Somali experience has allowed Turkey to increase its presence

and visibility in the global aid scene, assert itself as a new and relevant actor with rapid,
cost-effective and efficient ways of working, and emerge as a new actor in Africa and on
the global assistance scene.

Whether this positive dynamic will translate into longer-term peacebuilding gains is yet
to be seen. The security issues and instability on the ground, the continued willingness
of the Somali government to engage with Turkey on peacebuilding issues, and the ability
to expand peace processes to be more geographically inclusive and people-centred will
influence the outcome. Turkey’s ability to connect its aid and assistance programmes with
deeper political knowledge and analysis, and to co-ordinate different parts of its efforts
around a more unified vision of peace will be key to sustainable results. These are areas
in which Turkey seems to be lagging behind. Furthermore, a successful contribution to
conflict transformation will require a certain stability and balance in Turkey’s foreign and
development policy amid the political turmoil the country is going through.

Of course, one must add the caveat that Somalia is a unique case for Turkey and does not
necessarily define the general effectiveness of Turkish aid. While Turkey has undertaken
a holistic and multi-track involvement in Somalia, in other theatres it has mostly been
criticised for the ad-hoc and short-term nature of its efforts. In Somalia, Turkey was at
the right place at the right time, with not many actors with which to compete. In order
to duplicate its success in Somalia in other countries and regions, particularly in the field
of conflict transformation, it will probably need a longer-term, more structured strategy.

IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE NEW TURKEY

Since the AKP came to power in Turkey in 2002, there have been debates over whether
Turkey would continue its secular, Western-oriented policies as a NATO ally and aspiring
member of the EU or move in a new direction by embracing different principles and
perhaps more conservative values with different ways of working. The second alternative
could lead to Turkey’s acting more autonomously from the West, engaging more with
partners whose histories have more in common with its own, and seeking new alliances. The
increasingly strong rhetoric of Turkish political leaders to redesign and re-establish an
identity for a so-called ‘New Turkey’ indicates a preference for the second option, in terms
not only of its foreign policy and economic interests but also of its constitution, internal
system of governance and identity.

153 For instance, the sustainability of Turkey’s efforts to accommodate Syrians has often been
questioned; see IRIN, ‘Is Turkey’s approach to Syrian refugees sustainable?’, 15 April 2013,
http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2013/04/15/turkeys-approach-syrian-refugees-sustainable,
accessed 28 October 2016. For further analysis on this issue, see Hausmann J & E
Lundsgaarde, op. cit.; Achilles K et al., op. cit.

154 See, for instance, Akgun M, ‘Turkey: What axis shift?’, Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2010,

Turkey’s engagement in Somalia in many ways relates to that debate. A recent Chatham House study on Turkey’s engagement in sub-Saharan Africa examines the extent to which the AKP’s foreign policy is about ‘restoring the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire’, and highlights official statements and writings that ‘include fanciful assertions about Ottoman influence in Somalia’.\textsuperscript{156} Indeed, many Turkish officials and civil society organisations cite historical ties between the two countries that date back to Ottoman times,\textsuperscript{157} but recognise that these are not necessarily the driving factors behind Turkish engagement. On the Somali side, the Ottoman aspect appears to be even less of an influence on bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{158} Regardless of the actual nature and scope of the historical Ottoman presence in Somalia, the frequent references to Turkey’s Ottoman history are mostly used by Turkish political leaders to lay out the country’s foreign policy in Somalia and beyond, more than to look backward at the relationship as an example of deep historical ties. The vision they mean to evoke, in referring to historical and cultural connections (whether real or not), is of an emerging regional powerhouse engaging with new partners (particularly in Muslim countries) in new ways, beyond Turkey’s traditional foreign policy focus. This new engagement has a moralistic and normative focus, which aims to differentiate Turkey’s policies from those of its traditional allies and highlight its potential as a leading actor in the region. Many Somalis think that Turkey, as a new humanitarian donor ‘who talks to Somalis and stands beside them’, wants to foster an identity and image different from other donors, which are viewed with scepticism.\textsuperscript{159} Similarly, as a representative of IHH says:\textsuperscript{160}

\begin{quote}
In Somalia, Turkey has fulfilled its moral responsibility in a large-scale humanitarian crisis. Even if there were no historical ties, Turkey would still respond to the famine. The main motivation is humanitarian. What happened in Somalia was a great loss of prestige for Muslim countries, which are increasingly equated with poverty and terrorism. In Somalia, when the world was looking away, Turkey as a Muslim country was able to react to such a disaster with a different way of working than Western countries.
\end{quote}

From this angle, the ramping up of Turkish aid to Somalia after 2010 intends to cater to a domestic audience. It is part of the AKP’s broader rhetoric of an independent New Turkey, which, through its strong economy and principled foreign policy, is capable of protecting the interests of Turkish citizens, boosting the image of the country, and assuming and asserting leadership in its region, among Muslim countries and throughout the world. This Turkey is portrayed as a strong state, able to reach out to and protect all people that need its help, whether these are Turkish citizens living in poverty or the people of Somalia, Afghanistan or Palestine suffering from the effects of conflict. For instance, speaking at an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[157] Interview, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, May 2015; interview, IHH official, Istanbul, April 2015.
\item[158] Interview, Somali academic, Mogadishu, March–April 2016.
\item[159] \textit{Ibid.}
\item[160] Interviews, representatives of IHH and Doctors Worldwide, Istanbul, April 2016.
\end{footnotes}
AKP election rally in 2015, Erdoğan used the Turkish experience in Somalia to define the tenets of a new and changed Turkey:

Despite all threats, we went to Somalia without any fear. We opened a modern hospital, a nursing school, and a mosque … Turkey embraced Somalia, who everyone had left alone. Today, there is a Turkey that determines the global agenda. We will reach out to wherever we can reach out. We will reach out to the oppressed. We will do whatever a great state has to do.

Some Somali interviewees in Mogadishu concurred with this analysis, arguing that Turkish engagement in Somalia is partially aimed at furthering a model of governance that is consistent with political Islam.161 Others suggested that Turkey is not too concerned with the political and religious leanings of the Somali government, and does not want to appear selective in the type of government with which it engages.162 However, as a Muslim state, Turkey is seen as an ally, rather than an external power to be feared.163

PATRONAGE POLITICS: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ALLIANCES, TIES AND INTERESTS

FIGURE 4 TURKISH EXPORTS TO SOMALIA, 2009–2015


161 Interviews, Somali analysts and academics, Mogadishu and Nairobi, April 2016.
162 Ibid.
Despite criticisms that Turkey has been following a neo-Ottoman or Islamic agenda both domestically and internationally, several studies that look at the politics of Turkish aid to Somalia concur that from a domestic angle the engagement caters to the objectives of the AKP rather than pursuing religious or revisionist goals. It has provided the ruling party with an opportunity to consolidate political and economic alliances, appealed to the expectations and sensitivities of mostly conservative voters, injected new energy and dynamism into a country whose ego has been bruised by decades of endless negotiations with the EU, and boosted the leadership profile of both the party and its leader, Erdoğan.

On the economic side, beyond helping to redefine its foreign policy identity, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has also opened up space for its businesses and civil society organisations to operate. Erdoğan’s 2011 visit helped to pave the way for closer co-operation, trade and investments; afterward, Turkish exports to Somalia skyrocketed.

According to some sources, most Turkish companies that gained access to the Somali market are known to be close to the governing AKP. This includes the biggest contracts, notably for constructing and managing the strategically important Mogadishu airport and seaport, which were awarded to three companies: Favori, Kozuva and Albayrak. A Somali civil society representative claimed that the contracting process was not based on competitive bidding through a proper legal framework. Some Somali members of Parliament also claim that the agreements were not adequately negotiated in favour of Somalis and that contracts were signed without proper parliamentary procedure being followed. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that few foreign companies were interested in doing business in Somalia and the projects have brought significant revenues to the Somali government. According to a former official at the Mogadishu seaport, Turkey’s investments in the seaport and airport turned the facilities around and earned much-needed revenue for the government. ‘Before the Turks came, the TFG received 20% of the revenue, while the rest went to cartels. The Turkish introduction has increased the government’s ratio to 55%,’ the former official said.

Most Turkish civil society organisations that entered Somalia after 2011 have been close to the Turkish government. Among those who accompanied Erdoğan on his initial trip were several NGOs linked to the Gülen movement, known throughout sub-Saharan Africa for

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164 Akyol M, op. cit.
165 Interview, member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.
167 Interview, Somali representative of civil society, Nairobi, March 2016.
168 Interview, Somali member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.
its schools and scholarship programmes. After a fallout between Erdoğan and Gülen in 2013, schools and organisations linked to Gülen in sub-Saharan Africa, including Somalia, found that their operations came under increased pressure from the AKP government, had their bank accounts frozen, and were investigated as forming part of a terrorist network.\textsuperscript{169} At the Second Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit, Erdoğan asked African countries to be aware of the hidden agendas of Gülenists. A Somali civil society representative said:\textsuperscript{170}

\begin{quote}
At the beginning, it seemed like all the Turks on the ground, both on the civil society and business side, shared similar backgrounds and a common vision in supporting the Somali government. However, since the fallout with Gülen, the cooperation between the Turkish government and some civil society organisations has visibly dropped. On occasion, Turkish authorities have allegedly asked the Somali government to clamp down on Gülenist schools and NGOs by restricting their operation and movement in the country.
\end{quote}

This trend can be expected to continue, especially after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016, which was linked to the Gülenist movement. Having received Erdoğan in Mogadishu only a couple of weeks previously, Mohamud was one of the first world leaders to condemn the coup attempt. In an extraordinary session of the cabinet the same day, the Somali government ordered all Gülenist organisations in Somalia to shut down and leave the country in seven days, in response to a request by the Turkish government.\textsuperscript{171} The Somali government also organised a rally against the coup attempt in Mogadishu, with hundreds of protestors taking to the streets.

Turkey’s assistance to Somalia has helped to restore confidence in the Somali government, and the projects that it has introduced have helped to catalyse economic growth and investments. However, as stated previously, some studies do suggest that Turkish–Somali relations have directly benefited companies and individuals close to the Somali government.\textsuperscript{172} Some Somali interviewees also pointed to a close association between the Turkish government and the SFG, arguing that many Turkish development projects seem to have been designed around government priorities as articulated by Mohamud’s Vision

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{169} Shinn D, \textit{op. cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Interviews, teacher at Mogadishu Polytechnic Institute and Somali analyst, Mogadishu, April 2016. Other interviews have indicated that, although the Somali government was initially hesitant to expel all agencies connected to Gülen, after the failed coup attempt Somalia closed all Gülenist organisations in the country and expelled their personnel. The Turkish embassy in Mogadishu has since taken over the ownership of the operations of former Gülenist organisations.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Wasuge M & M Harper, \textit{op. cit.}
\end{itemize}
They also said that the majority of contractors and employees working at the seaport, the airport and health facilities have been recruited through recommendations and referrals from influential politicians, ministers and state officials in the former TFG and the current government. A Saferworld study also suggests that Turkish officials have sought to develop personal relationships with key government figures, who have played a role in shaping Turkey’s official aid. The geographic concentration of Turkish aid in Mogadishu is often cited as an indicator of Turkish support to the Somali government; however, the opening of the general consulate in Hargeisa promises to expand aid coverage, which could help to counter these claims.

The political motivations and implications of aid are important for several reasons. Firstly, understanding the politics is important for the sustainability and predictability of aid. If aid is largely dictated by domestic politics, it will also be vulnerable to events and developments that have little to do with Somalia, such as the Syrian refugee crisis or shifting imperatives for the government in Ankara.

Secondly, the political economy of aid has an impact on the broader success of forging peace in Somalia. For example, the Turkish intervention has strengthened the revenue-generating capacity of the federal government, at the expense of cartels. This is generally a positive development, although it could provoke a violent backlash from those excluded from lucrative rents. The allegations of favouritism and patronage at the seaport and airport highlight the risks involved. If development projects lack transparency and accountability they may undermine the nascent political settlement being forged, as well as the rule of law more generally. Somalia has long been a case study in the unintended consequences of aid; these dynamics lie outside of the scope of this report, and more research and study is needed to better understand the shifts in political economy provoked by various donor interventions.

173 On 2 September 2013 the Somali president hosted a five-day national conference (‘Vision 2016’) in Mogadishu with 200 delegates in attendance. ‘Vision 2016’ is intended as a national dialogue expected to focus on key issues in Somalia’s future, such as developing federal systems and democracy, arranging the constitution and setting up a policy for the country to have free and fair elections in 2016. See Garowe Online, ‘Somalia: 2016 election: Optimism, misgivings, and leadership analysis’, 23 August 2014, http://www.garoweonline.com/en/opinions/somalia-2016-election-optimism-misgivings-and-leadership-analysis, accessed 28 October 2016, for further details; interview, senior Somali analyst, Mogadishu, April 2016

174 Interview, Somali businessman, Mogadishu, April 2016.
THE WAY AHEAD: THE SUSTAINABILITY OF TURKISH AID TO SOMALIA

Turkey's arrival in Somalia in 2011 helped to bring international attention and hope to a country that had suffered years of destruction and attendant humanitarian tragedies. The AKP government, emboldened by Turkey's increasing internal political stability, economic growth and improved international standing, saw an opportunity in Somalia to alleviate the suffering of a country in need and introduce durable solutions, while further improving its own domestic and international standing, promoting its model of governance and making new allies.

Turkey's engagement in Somalia has benefited both sides. Somalia has received attention, as well as much-needed infrastructure and development. Turkey has boosted its image, soft power and visibility while presenting itself as a ‘different’ actor capable of delivering change. It has also become a player in Africa and discovered a venue where its private sector and civil society can expand. While several studies have underscored the need to improve Turkish policies in Somalia by enhancing co-ordination, expanding assistance programmes beyond Mogadishu, engaging better with the international system and investing more in strategic analysis and assessments, the overall sentiment in both Turkey and Somalia is that Turkish aid should be considered a success.

Yet increasing instability inside and just outside Turkey's borders – notably the internal turmoil with the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the prolonged conflict in Syria – raises questions about the sustainability of Turkish efforts in Somalia. A Turkish Red Crescent official has acknowledged that public donations for Somalia have dropped significantly due to the war in Syria and the related displacement crisis, which heavily affects Turkey. However, as previously mentioned, Turkish ODA to Somalia has nevertheless remained relatively constant – $93.39 million in 2011 versus $95 million in 2014 – and Somalia remains the third-largest recipient of ODA from Turkey. Will that funding decrease over time? Will Somalia remain among Turkey's top foreign policy priorities? Or will other humanitarian crises and security issues divert attention from Somalia? These questions have yet to be answered.

Similarly, the mandate of the Somali government is set to expire in 2016; the Somali government announced a timetable for the electoral process in August 2016. The stability in Somalia after the elections will also affect the future of the Turkey–Somalia relationship. There are several risks: the new constitution has not yet been passed, corruption and patronage remains widespread in government structures, and the continued strength of clan militias challenges the creation of centralised military and police forces.

Another factor that will determine the sustainability of Turkish aid to Somalia over the long term is Turkey's relationships with its traditional allies. Its relations with such

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175 Interview, Turkish Red Crescent official, Ankara, May 2016.
old partners as Egypt, Russia and Iraq are increasingly tumultuous, and it may have to channel more of its energy back to protecting its regional interests. On the other hand, as a Chatham House report suggests,176 Turkey's increasingly strained relations with its traditional partners in the Middle East may motivate it to continue expanding its African policy in search of stable partnerships.

The security situation on the ground will also help to determine how Turkish involvement plays out. Al-Shabaab has allegedly issued a fatwa against Turkey due to its status as a NATO member and its support for the Somali government, which al-Shabaab considers to be an apostate administration.177 Turkish officials have experienced continuous attacks by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu since 2012. The threat has prompted Turkish officials to adopt a raft of protective measures, including tightening security detail around the Turkish embassy, using bulletproof cars and limiting movement in the city and beyond.178

Turkey's domestic politics is the final determining factor for the future of Turkish–Somali relations. Davutoğlu, who was responsible over the course of his more than 13 years of involvement in Turkish foreign engagements for defining a new direction for Turkish foreign policy through terms such as ‘humanitarian diplomacy’, ‘zero problems with neighbours’ and ‘strategic depth’, stepped down in May 2016. The 15 July coup attempt will also lead to significant changes in the Turkish state structures and institutions, with the dismissal of several state officials and military personnel and planned shifts in state institutions.179 These developments may indicate a changed strategic direction and new foreign policy priorities for the country. The effect on Turkish–Somali relations is yet to be seen.

176 Shinn D, op. cit.
177 Interview, ICG Horn of Africa analyst, Nairobi, April 2016.
178 Turkish diplomats and businesspeople have been restricted from moving around Mogadishu, particularly Bakara Market and Dayniile, Suuqa Xoolaha and Gubta neighbourhoods.
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