

An Integrated Approach to Prevention

The Links between Prevention, the 2030 Agenda, and Sustaining Peace

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About the Authors

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Introduction

The UN Secretary-General has described prevention as *the* priority for the United Nations:

The interconnected nature of today's crises requires us to connect our own efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, not just in words, but in practice.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on sustaining peace demonstrate strong intergovernmental support for an integrated approach.ⁱ

An integrated approach requires clarity on what is meant by prevention, and how the concept of prevention fits with the 2030 Agenda, Sustaining Peace, and other relevant frameworks such as the Agenda for Humanity and Human Rights Up Front.

This briefing:

- Discusses various forms of prevention, including of violence (threats to international peace and security, violent conflict, violent extremism, non-conflict violence, human rights abuses) and of negative consequences from other forms of risk (disasters, humanitarian crises, pandemics, etc.).
- Identifies four reasons for integrated approaches across the various domains of prevention: (i) threats are interconnected; (ii) effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions are key to all forms of prevention; (iii) exclusion is a driver of multiple forms of conflict and violence; and (iv) solutions are multi-sectoral and involve all pillars of the UN.

- Underlines that an integrated approach does not mean removing all distinctions between the different forms of prevention, given that: (i) many root causes and risk factors are similar, others are different; (ii) responsibilities and comparative advantages vary across the international system; and (iii) prevention must be focused to be effective.
- Proposes a new paradigm for prevention that has three levels: (i) universal prevention strategies that aim to build healthy societies that manage conflict productively, provide safety and security, increase resilience, and enhance social, political, and economic inclusion; (ii) “at risk” prevention strategies that target groups, communities, and countries that face elevated risk of conflict, or where violence is highest and resilience lowest; and (iii) prevention strategies that are tailored to situations of ongoing conflict or crisis.
- Argues that the 2030 Agenda and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide frameworks for universal approaches to prevention and also standards for measuring the outcomes of effective prevention, while the sustaining peace resolutions provide a framework for targeted approaches to prevention when the risk of violent conflict is high. Other frameworks (the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the Sendai Framework, the New Agenda for Humanity) cover specific threats and forms of prevention.
- Identifies operational questions that will need to be addressed as the United Nations system responds to the challenge from the Secretary-General that it should act as a platform for integrated and effective prevention.

One | What do we mean by prevention?

Within the UN, prevention is used in several senses in relation to different forms of violence and to other forms of risks.

Prevention of Different Forms of Violence

- **Prevention of threats to international peace and security.** Article 1 of the UN Charter describes the maintenance of international peace and security as one of the purposes of the UN, and as part of this objective, calls for “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.”ⁱⁱ It is this sense of prevention—and its link to the responsibilities of the Security Council—that most often raises sensitivities about externally imposed intervention. The Secretary-General has, however, stressed that his approach to prevention is a sovereignty-supporting one, emphasizing national ownership of preventative action and building national institutional capacities: it is important therefore to consider the many other ways in which prevention has been part of the discourse at the UN.
- **The prevention of violent conflict.** Conflict prevention covers inter-state and civil wars: in the last five years, there has been an increase in both the number of conflicts and in the percentage that are internationalized.ⁱⁱⁱ Most often, a distinction is made between direct or “operational” prevention (short-term) on the one hand, and “structural” prevention (addressing the longer-term causes of conflict) on the other.^{iv} Not only the Secretariat^v but both the Security Council and the General Assembly have repeatedly stressed the operational and structural dimensions of prevention.^{vi} More recently, the sustaining peace resolutions have called for efforts throughout the cycle of conflict, with

particular attention to upstream prevention.^{vii} Operational and structural prevention can clearly be nationally owned (and, indeed, structural prevention is primarily about national institutional capacity).

- **Prevention of violent extremism.** The Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism distinguishes "essential security-based counter-terrorism measures" from "systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism."^{viii} Conflict is identified as both a driver and a result of extremism. The importance of "preventing violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism" was further recognized in a General Assembly resolution in July 2016.^{ix}
- **Violence prevention.** In 1995, the World Summit for Social Development identified the need for "policies and...programs to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence in society."^x The following year, the World Health Assembly declared violence a "leading worldwide public health problem."^{xi} The World Report on Violence and Health (2002) covered self-directed, interpersonal, and collective violence (both conflict and criminal, and by state and non-state actors).^{xii} However, the Global Status Report on Violence Prevention (2014) only covers interpersonal violence, reflecting a growing tendency to distinguish violence prevention from the prevention of violent conflict.^{xiii} By contrast, the SDGs contain broad targets relating to all forms of violence within the development sphere.
- **Prevention of human rights violations.** According to a report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, prevention of human rights violations "requires a proactive, continuing and systemic process of addressing risk factors and causes of human rights violations through a range of measures, including law, policy and practice."^{xiv} The report refers to the prevention of torture, genocide, mass atrocities, incitement to hatred, and discrimination on particular grounds (race, religion, belief, sexual orientation) or against a group (women, persons with disabilities, minorities). Work on non-recurrence of atrocities and human rights abuses has also focused on national institutional capacities.

Prevention of Other Forms of Risk

- **Disaster risk reduction.** The Secretary-General includes the prevention of the "worst effects of natural disasters" in his definition of prevention.^{xv} The Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World (1994) called for the "development of a global culture of prevention as an essential component of an integrated approach to disaster reduction."^{xvi} It was succeeded by the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. The Sendai Framework includes priorities for strengthening governance to manage disaster risk, and for "investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience."
- **Prevention of humanitarian crises.** Humanitarian crises reflect a failure to prevent conflict, disaster, or mass atrocities. Given the scale of the humanitarian burden, the World Humanitarian Summit saw a renewed focus on prevention. It recognized the core responsibility of "political leadership to address the causes of crisis; to own risk and act early to prevent situations from deteriorating."^{xvii} The summit proposed a World Prevention Forum to be held before 2020 and also included a commitment to "develop a comprehensive action plan by 2017 to significantly strengthen the response capacities of the 20 most risk-prone countries by 2020"^{xviii} though, as yet, this does not seem to have been initiated.
- **Systemic prevention.** Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan coined the term "systemic" prevention to describe "measures to address global risks [of conflict] that transcend particular states."^{xix} While

some of these risks are in the security domain (the illicit arms trade, for example), systemic prevention focuses attention on the destabilizing potential of other types of risk, including those that have an economic (illicit financial flows, global macroeconomic instability), health (HIV/AIDS, pandemics), or environmental (climate change and other forms of environmental degradation) dimension.^{xx} The United Nations Convention against Corruption, which entered into force in 2005, also includes a range of preventive measures,^{xxi} with an Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Prevention of Corruption leading efforts to increase and share understanding of how corruption can effectively be prevented.^{xxii}

- **Public health.** Prevention is a fundamental concept in public health, with health defined in the World Health Organization’s constitution as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”^{xxiii} Recent approaches to public health aim to “create, maintain and protect health by supporting healthy lifestyles and creating supportive environments for health.”^{xxiv} Contemporary prevention models were developed in response to the growing burden of chronic diseases (see annex 1), and have been subsequently more widely applied by WHO and the World Health Assembly (injury prevention,^{xxv} traffic injury prevention,^{xxvi} tobacco control,^{xxvii} suicide prevention,^{xxviii} etc.).

Two | Taking prevention out of its silos

Historically, the different domains of prevention have been considered separately. In part, this has strategic roots: distinct problems require distinct solutions. But to a greater extent, it reflects silos between sectoral interests and fragmentation within the international and national systems. It is therefore important to understand both the links and differences between the various forms of prevention.

Common factors

Five common factors can be identified that link different forms of prevention.

1. Threats are interconnected

International insecurity and external stresses are significant drivers of civil conflict.^{xxix} Wars are not isolated from other forms of violence. Conflict, violent extremism, and criminal violence are interlinked and reinforce each other.^{xxx} Human rights abuses increase during conflict, but also create risks of further conflict.^{xxxi} Gender-based violence acts as an early warning signal of conflict, while increasing both during and in the aftermath of conflict. Children exposed to violence early in life are more likely to themselves be violent when they grow older. Within communities, multiple forms of violence tend to be co-located,^{xxxii} with the least safe communities also most vulnerable to disasters and shocks.^{xxxiii}

2. Effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions are key to all forms of prevention

Countries with better institutions than would be expected from their income levels have a 35 to 40 percent lower chance of experiencing a civil war, while human rights abuses and corruption are also a reflection of poor institutional quality. Weak laws, policies, and institutions are a risk factor for violent extremism,^{xxxiv} youth violence,^{xxxv} organized crime,^{xxxvi} and violence against women and children.^{xxxvii} In humanitarian settings, displaced populations face elevated risks of violence, precisely because they have lost the institutional

protections provided by their own governments.^{xxxviii} The breakdown of institutions also helps link different forms of violence. Conflict erodes the rule of law, “Pav[ing] the way for higher tolerance of interpersonal violence, increased weapons and drug trade, and political corruption.”^{xxxix}

3. Exclusion is a driver of multiple forms of conflict and violence

Social, political, and economic exclusion increases the risk of conflict and of violent extremism, especially when leaders emerge to channel the resulting sense of grievance (as discussed in the recent UN-World Bank flagship report on prevention).^{xl} Potential sources of grievance include access to jobs, economic opportunities, land, housing, infrastructure, and services, as well as to political power and influence. Forms of violence that are commonly assumed to have primarily economic motives, such as gang violence, are also strongly rooted in questions of identity and group dominance, “as murders between gangs create an institutionalized network of group conflict.”^{xli} Individuals and communities that experience high levels of violence are likely to be socially isolated, to have low levels of social support and trust, and to face systematic discrimination and exclusions.^{xlii}

4. Solutions are multi-sectoral and involve all pillars of the UN

All the forms of crisis listed above have a mass of practical experience and research showing that effective prevention and response requires action in diverse sectors of economic and social development, in the security sector, and in the judiciary and broader human rights arena—all within an overarching political strategy. Factors that strengthen communities and families are protective against criminal and interpersonal violence, while also increasing resilience to disasters and shocks. The benefits are also shared across different forms of risk: improved security and justice institutions will reduce the risk of multiple forms of conflict and violence, as will measures that lead to meaningful increases in social, political, and economic inclusion.

5. There are a common set of steps to increase “preparedness”

Whether prevention action is taken in the realm of conflict, violence, disaster, or pandemics, an effective response begins with analysis of risks, proceeds to upstream structural and systemic action (things that can be done only well in advance of a potential crisis emerging, such as strengthening institutions or addressing exclusion), and includes using the national and international capacities built through structural and systemic prevention for early warning and action in relation to rising or immediate risks (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Different types of crises, common steps

Points of difference

A more integrated approach does not mean removing all distinctions between the different forms of prevention.

1. While many root causes and risk factors are similar, others are different

Context matters, with threats varying in different settings. Effective prevention is based on analysis of local dynamics and their interaction with external drivers and forces. Risk factors will often vary for different types of threat. For example, “vertical” inequality (between classes) is a risk factor for criminal violence,^{xliii} but not a significant risk for conflict; inequalities between groups (regional, ethnic, religious) matter more.^{xliiv} The presence of natural resources is a risk factor for conflict and for criminal violence, but not for disaster or pandemics.^{xliv} Lack of connectivity increases the risk of conflict,^{xlvi} but the reverse is true for pandemics (which are more likely to strike in crowded urban environments and which spread along transport routes).

2. Responsibilities and comparative advantage vary across the international system

The Security Council holds the responsibility to maintain international peace and security: it does not address criminal violence, localized conflict, pandemics, or disasters unless these rise to the level of international threats; but it does authorize peace operations in complex environments, often characterized by multiple risks. The Human Rights Council leads on addressing human rights violations and manages important instruments in the field of human rights law, as well as the universal periodic review and special procedures which help societies identify risks and responses. The Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) recognized the role of development actors in prevention (“mitigating drivers of conflicts, disaster risks, humanitarian crises and complex emergencies”), but there is a corresponding need to ensure the UN development system remains a “neutral, objective and trusted partner for all countries.”^{xlvii}

3. Prevention must be focused to be effective

When the risks of conflict are high, targeted strategies are needed to build confidence and to break cycles of violence.^{xlviii} Focused approaches must urgently transform institutions in order to reduce polarization and provide a foundation for more sustainable patterns of development. Similarly, for communities experiencing the highest levels of non-conflict violence, the evidence suggests that the greatest impact will result from targeting multiple interventions at “high-risk places, people, and behaviors.”^{xlix} This underlines the importance of being selective and not simply “re-badging” existing activity as prevention. Given the inherent difficulties in achieving impact in high-risk contexts, it also underlines the need for specialist expertise and for partnerships that are not so encompassing that they are incapable of acting with speed and flexibility.

Three | Toward a new paradigm for prevention

The Secretary-General has said that “the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on sustaining peace demonstrate strong intergovernmental support for an integrated approach” to tackling interconnected crises.¹ An integrated approach requires strategic clarity about the objectives and dimensions of prevention, alongside operational models that are sufficiently joined up to be effective, while reflecting mandates and areas of comparative advantage.

Normative/Strategic Level

At a strategic level, a risk-informed model of prevention can be identified, drawing on approaches that have been developed in public health over many decades (see annex 1).

- **Universal prevention strategies.** Effective prevention is integral to any healthy society, through multiple nationally owned processes that manage conflict constructively, provide safety and security, increase resilience, and enhance social, political, and economic inclusion. Universal approaches to prevention are designed to be protective against multiple threats and risks. They have “broad spectrum” benefits for peace, justice, and inclusion, and will usually have other positive social, environmental, or economic benefits. Universal prevention requires addressing patterns of development that are attractive in the short-term, but that may undermine peace and resilience in the longer term. Implementation spans many sectors, including those that traditionally have not been seen as part of the prevention “toolkit.” Prevention at this level is a shared responsibility of many actors, not the domain of a small number of specialists.
- **At risk prevention strategies.** Prevention at this level targets groups, communities, and countries that face elevated risk of conflict; are experiencing heightened levels of violence, discrimination, and exclusion; or have low levels of resilience to disasters and shocks. Risk-informed development is needed to address grievances and increase inclusion, while creating spaces for increased cooperation and resilience. Peacebuilding strategies will need a strong political dimension, as will those that aim to tackle organized crime that challenges the legitimacy of the state. Partnerships remain multi-sectoral, but with a narrower focus of action, given the need to reduce risk to allow for more healthy and inclusive patterns of development.
- **Prevention strategies in crisis.** During a conflict or crisis, political leadership will be needed to prevent a further deterioration and build foundations for recovery. Security, political, and humanitarian actors must come together in a “stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership.”^{li} Highly targeted development interventions engage people and communities in the process of stabilization.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide frameworks for universal approaches to prevention. The 2030 Agenda provides a universal framework for building peaceful, just, and inclusive societies and a crosscutting focus on reaching the furthest behind. Its implementation requires a broad partnership “bringing together Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources.”^{lii}

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights remains one of the simplest and most compelling calls for the role of respect for human rights in preventing other ills. It is grounded in a “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” and in the need to protect these rights “if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.”^{liiii} The declaration recognizes the right to life, liberty, and security of person, and the right to live in “a social and international order” that can fully realize human rights.

Both the 2030 Agenda and the Universal Declaration offer approaches to judging the outcomes from effective prevention:

- The 2030 Agenda commitment to **leave no one behind** cuts across the whole agenda, while many **SDG targets** directly relate to the effectiveness of prevention. SDG16 commits to *significantly reduce all forms of violence everywhere*, as well as to support access to justice and inclusive institutions. Other targets focus on resilience to economic, social, and environmental shocks and disasters (1.5, 10.b, 13.1). In all, 36 targets measure an aspect of peace, justice, and inclusion (from SDG16 and seven other goals). The agenda includes targets for risk and protective factors for conflict and non-conflict violence, as well as for factors that increase resilience to shocks and disasters. All effective prevention will contribute to the achievement of these targets, and to the fulfilment of the agenda as a whole.
- **The Universal Periodic Review** provides a mechanism for reviewing the human rights record of all states, in a way that “promote[s] the universality, interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights.”^{liv} Other human rights instrument and bodies provide a mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of prevention of violence against women^{lv} and children,^{lvi} while there are a range of independent experts and special rapporteurs “with mandates to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective.”^{lvii}

In complement, the sustaining peace resolutions focus particularly on “activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.”

Sustaining peace therefore focuses specifically on conflict, rather than broader forms of crises (such as natural disasters). While peace and conflict can be considered to be universal concepts in that no country is immune to conflict, and subnational communities can suffer conflict even within a flourishing national development context, conflict will not be a significant national-level risk for all countries at all time periods. Hence sustaining peace is a targeted concept helpful to the 2030 Agenda commitment to leave no one behind: it helps focus attention on those societies or subnational communities most likely to be left out of development progress because of conflict.

The Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the Sendai Framework (identified as “the first major agreement of the post-2015 development agenda”), the New Agenda for Humanity, and other frameworks cover some more specialized issues related to specific threats and forms of prevention.

Operational Level

The Secretary-General has made it clear that prevention is not about adding new organizational layers or activities but about reforming the UN’s existing three pillars to do better upstream work on prevention, both within each pillar and in combination. This will raise questions on several levels:

- On joint analysis and strategy, how will the new streamlined “cabinet-style” decision processes introduced by the Secretary-General improve the quality of analysis, and the ability of each of the UN’s pillars to identify risks and plan complementary responses through the right entry points, at the right time and the right scale? How will these build on Human Rights Up Front and other initiatives where progress has been made in joint analysis and strategy?

- In the reforms of the peace and security architecture, how will the proposed changes translate into a continued investment in crisis management and in preventing recurrence in post-conflict countries with peace operations?
- In the response to the QCPR requests for proposals on the development system, how will proposals strengthen the development system's ability to work in increasing societal resilience for effective structural prevention, and to face immediate operational risks? How will this avoid continuing "business as usual," where all existing activities are simply "re-badged" as effective prevention and sustaining peace?
- While each entity maintains a focus on its own mandate and comparative advantage, how will the development and peace and security reform tracks work together to create better links between peace and security, development, human rights, and humanitarian action in the interests of increasing societal resilience?
- How will the UN work with others on prevention? What are the suite of partnerships that are needed to deliver results? What are some of the low-hanging fruit where progress could be demonstrated?

Annex 1 | Prevention models from public health

In 1957, the Commission on Chronic Illnesses was formed to “bring order, cohesion, and direction to the many related but unintegrated efforts to prevent and control chronic illness and to minimize its disabling effects.”^{lviii} It proposed two categories of prevention, with a third subsequently added:

Primary—practiced prior to the biologic origin of disease; secondary—practiced after the disease can be recognized, but before it has caused suffering; and tertiary—practiced after suffering or disability have been recognized, in order to prevent further deterioration.^{lix}

In the 1980s, Gordon introduced the concept of risk, arguing that preventive strategies should be categorized according to whether they delivered benefits that outweighed their costs.^{lx} The two models can be combined as follows:

- **Primary**—universal measures “for which benefits outweigh the costs and risks for everyone.”^{lxi} Examples would include a good diet, exercise, moderate alcohol consumption, not smoking, etc. These measures bring broad benefits and need to be integrated into a healthy lifestyle. They are not controlled by the health sector.
- **Secondary**—selective interventions that target individuals or groups with interventions that can be justified because they face significantly higher risk of future illness. For heart disease, examples would include statins for high cholesterol or intensive support for smoking cessation or weight loss.
- **Tertiary**—highly targeted interventions that respond to risk of an illness progressing. For heart disease, examples would include coronary angioplasty or bypass surgery. Preventive measures are increasingly medicalized and “are not usually totally benign or minimal in cost.”

The three levels of prevention are nested. An individual with heart disease may undergo bypass surgery, but still take a statin and be advised to adopt a good diet, stop smoking, undertake moderate exercise, etc. Prevention is distinct from treatment (the emergency treatment of a cardiac arrest, for example), but, in practice, is closely integrated with tertiary prevention.

Primary prevention measures are low cost and deliver substantial increases in life expectancy. They require fundamental behavioral and social changes. Secondary and tertiary interventions are progressively more expensive and may deliver limited benefits.



Prevention continues to be undervalued. WHO estimates that 3 percent of Europe’s health sector budgets is spent on public health and prevention.^{lxii}

Gawande argues that we have “heroic expectations of how medicine works,” favoring “a definitive intervention at a critical moment in a person’s life” over “prevention and maintenance and incremental progress against difficult problems.”

Rescue work delivers much more certainty. There is a beginning and an end to the effort. And you know what all the money and effort is (and is not) accomplishing. We don’t like to address problems until they are well upon us and unavoidable, and we don’t trust solutions that promise benefits only down the road.

Incrementalists nonetheless want us to take a longer view. They want us to believe that they can recognize problems before they happen, and that, with steady, iterative effort over years, they can reduce, delay, or eliminate them.

Yet incrementalists also want us to accept that they will never be able to fully anticipate or prevent all problems. This makes for a hard sell. The incrementalists’ contribution is more cryptic than the rescuers’, and yet also more ambitious. They are claiming, in essence, to be able to predict and shape the future. They want us to put our money on it.^{lxiii}

Public health approaches to prevention have been applied in areas that require broad behavioral, social, and cultural change on a global scale. MPOWER is an innovative example developed to implement the world’s first public health treaty—the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a “response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic.”^{lxiv} Governments are asked to meet their treaty obligations through six proven policies^{lxv}:

- Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies
- Protect people from tobacco smoke, through legislation on smoke-free environments
- Offer help to quit tobacco use, by treating tobacco dependence
- Warn about the dangers of tobacco, through pack warnings and other measures to change the image of tobacco
- Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship
- Raise taxes on tobacco, with a 70 percent increase in taxes estimated to prevent a quarter of smoking-related deaths

MPOWER blends primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions and is intended to be implemented as a comprehensive package: “Policies are not complex...and are within the reach of governments.”^{lxvi} Implementation costs \$0.11 per capita in low- and middle-income countries.^{lxvii} Progress is tracked by the number of people covered by each MPOWER policy at an acceptable level of implementation. In 2013, 2.3 billion people were covered by at least one policy “at the highest level of achievement” and 530 million people by tobacco taxes at the recommended minimum levels.

Impact is assessed by a statistical model that connects policies to changes in smoking prevalence, and then lives saved.^{lxviii} Based on this methodology, “The highest-level MPOWER policies adopted from 2007 to 2010 will result in 15 million fewer smokers, and 7.4 premature deaths will consequently be averted by 2050.”^{lxix}

Acknowledgments

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Endnotes

ⁱ António Guterres (2017), “Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace,’” available at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-01-10/secretary-generals-remarks-maintenance-international-peace-and>.

ⁱⁱ United Nations (1945), “The UN Charter,” available at <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>.

ⁱⁱⁱ Uppsala University (2015), “Uppsala Conflict Data Program Dataset,” available at <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/>.

^{iv} Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, Final Report. For another helpful overview of the difference between operational and structural prevention, see, Peter Wallensteen, “Reassessing Recent Conflicts: Direct vs. Structural Prevention,” in Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds. (2002), *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*. Boulder, CO.

^v See e.g., *ibid.*; *Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 1625 (2005) on Conflict Prevention, Particularly in Africa* (2008) (calling for a “comprehensive approach” that includes “structural prevention efforts to address the root causes of conflict, operational prevention to ensure the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms, mediation, humanitarian access and response, the protection of civilians and targeted sanctions, and systemic prevention to prevent existing conflicts from spilling over into other states”). See also the Secretary-General’s reports: “Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results” (2011) and “Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution” (2012).

^{vi} As the Security Council affirmed in 2001: “Early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peacebuilding are interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.” Resolution 1366 (2001). See also, *inter alia*, Resolutions 1625 (2005); 1653 (2006); 1809 (2008); 2150 (2014); 2171 (2014). In 2003, the General Assembly adopted a resolution embracing a broad definition of prevention and included provisions on accountability, good governance, human rights, promotion of development, disarmament, education, and gender equality. Resolution 57/337 (2003). See also, *inter alia*, Resolutions 60/1 (2005); 68/303 (2014).

^{vii} For instance, both resolutions call for an approach that “encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict” and that addresses “root causes.” See UNGA Resolution 70/262 (2016); UNSC Resolution 2282 (2016).

^{viii} United Nations General Assembly (2015), “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General,” available at <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/GetFile?OpenAgent&DS=A/70/674&Lang=E&Type=DOC>.

^{ix} United Nations General Assembly (2016), “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 1 July 2016 – 70/291. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review,” available at <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/GetFile?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/70/291&Lang=E&Type=DOC>.

^x United Nations (1995), *Report of the World Summit for Social Development*. New York: United Nations, available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/116/51/IMG/N9511651.pdf?OpenElement>.

^{xi} World Health Organization (1996), “WHA49.25 Prevention of violence: a public health priority,” available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/resources/publications/en/WHA4925_eng.pdf.

^{xii} Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi, and Rafael Lozano (2002), *World report on violence and health*. Geneva: WHO, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42495/1/9241545615_eng.pdf.

^{xiii} World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1.

^{xiv} United Nations General Assembly (2015), “The Role of Prevention in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights—Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,” available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A_HRC_30_20_ENG.docx.

^{xv} António Guterres (2017), “Remarks to the General Assembly High-level Dialogue on ‘Building sustainable peace for all: synergies between the 2030 agenda for sustainable development and sustaining peace,’” available at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-01-24/secretary-generals-building-sustainable-peace-all-remarks>.

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- ^{xvi} United Nations (1994), *Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World—Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation*. New York: United Nations, available at http://www.unisdr.org/files/8241_doc6841contenido1.pdf.
- ^{xvii} United Nations (undated), *Agenda for Humanity—Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit: Advance, Unedited Version*. New York: United Nations, available at <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2282agendaforhumanity.pdf>.
- ^{xviii} Ibid.
- ^{xix} United Nations (2006), “Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,” p. 5, available at <http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga06/conflict.pdf>.
- ^{xx} This tripartite framework is not without its critics. Some scholars warn that it attempts to incorporate too much; that “prevention” has become overly broad—encompassing everything from troop deployment to women’s empowerment to trade. This has been described as the “dilemma of comprehensiveness.” See Edward Luck, “Prevention: Theory and Practice,” in Hampson and Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention*, p. 256. Others have found that “the ever-expanding array of goals expected of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention may also be contributing to an expanded gap between discourse and practice.” Robert Muggah and Natasha White, “Is there a preventive action renaissance? The policy and practice of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, Feb. 2013, p. 1.
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