Guidance for the New Global Dialogue on AI Governance

Creating a Relevant, Inclusive, and Action-Orientated Process

Center on International Cooperation
New York University

Thibault Camelli

Program Officer, Defending and Promoting Multilateralism

Joris de Mooij

Program Associate, Defending and Promoting Multilateralism

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Executive Summary

This brief proposes an integrated, sequenced, United Nations (UN)-anchored, roadmap for the new **Annual Global Dialogue on AI Governance**.[1] Its purpose is to help identify the key priorities the Global Dialogue needs to address, translate them into actionable design by outlining the contours of a **Global AI Governance Roadmap** (thereafter known as the "Roadmap"), and design the process required to deliver it. In doing so, the brief aims for two goals: (1) structure a multistakeholder process that is practical, transparent, and predictable; and (2) support implementation of the **Pact for the Future** and the **Global Digital Compact**.

The Global Dialogue begins at a moment when artificial intelligence (AI) governance efforts are multiplying nationally, while global and regional coordination remains limited and uneven. Capabilities (compute,[2] data, and talent) are heavily concentrated, while regulatory, technical, and corporate initiatives have multiplied with little coordination. This fragmentation produces **three main challenges**: (1) the risk that AI benefits remain unequally distributed; (2) the political question of who controls the infrastructure on which AI depends; and (3) the emergence of incompatible regulatory models that increase uncertainty and erode trust. The mandate of the Global Dialogue is to convert this landscape into a coherent governance architecture.

A **Global AI Governance Roadmap** provides the most realistic way to achieve this. Rather than adding another declaration of principles, the Roadmap would unify dispersed initiatives into a single, structured framework instrument with annexes that governments can negotiate and implement.

Its substantive architecture rests on three pillars. First, it would **manage AI risks** by establishing shared scientific capacity and a common framework for frontier-model evaluation. Second, it would **distribute AI rewards** by linking governance to equitable access, technical capability, and meaningful participation across regions. Third, it would **align AI rules** by improving interoperability among diverse regulatory systems while preserving national sovereignty.

Across these pillars, the Roadmap would deliver **six outcomes** that respond directly to the priority gaps identified by member states:

1. A Global Frontier AI Evaluation Framework
2. A Declaration on AI and Information Integrity
3. An AI Capacity and Access Framework
4. Responsible Public-Sector AI Guidelines
5. A Regulatory Interoperability Mechanism
6. An Institutional Coherence Options Paper

Delivering these outcomes requires a multi-year process that matches the ambition, spanning across the first two Global Dialogues. Admittedly, the first Global Dialogue will play a crucial role in shaping expectations, confidence, and political momentum. Scheduled back-to-back with the AI for Good Summit in July 2026, the first Global Dialogue will set the tone, scope, and ambition of the overall process. It cannot be reduced to two days of scripted national statements in plenary format. Driven from this context in mind, this brief includes specific recommendations to design the first Global Dialogue—on substance, scope, and format—with the aim of structuring the agenda and testing key assumptions. The period until the second Global Dialogue, scheduled for May 2027, could be used to deepen deliberations, consolidate areas of convergence, and prepare more structured inputs toward the Roadmap.

Participation could be broadened through regional consultations, open written submissions, hybrid formats, and explicit balance targets so that the Global Dialogue reflects not only those who build AI, but also those it governs.

The central message is straightforward: the credibility of the multi-year Global Dialogue process will depend on **getting the first Dialogue right**. A clear path forward means it is institutionally grounded, substantively coherent, and procedurally robust. The Global Dialogue could structure its work with the ambition to deliver a Global AI Governance Roadmap—to move the system from fragmentation to execution, and to embed global AI governance within an inclusive and scientifically informed multilateral framework.

Figure 1: Proposed Structure of the Global AI Governance Roadmap

OUTCOME	ROADMAP DELIVERABLE (Annexes)
Pillar I: Managing AI risks	
Outcome 1: Shared scientific and safety capacity for frontier models.	**Annex I:** Global Frontier AI Evaluation Framework A common testing and evaluation framework co-developed with IISP-AI and regulators; shared risk categories; disclosure thresholds; baseline transparency requirements.
Outcome 2: Ethical and democratic safeguards for information ecosystems.	**Annex II**: Declaration on AI and Information Integrity A negotiated declaration establishing expectations for content authenticity, electoral safeguards, platform obligations, and human oversight in communicative environments.
Pillar II: Distributing AI rewards	
Outcome 3: Equitable access to compute, data, skills, and innovation capacity.	**Annex III**: AI Infrastructure Access Framework A global framework linking regional capacity hubs, shared compute access, multilingual datasets, and a voluntary trust fund or credit mechanism.
Outcome 4: Responsible and accountable AI in public administration.	**Annex IV**: Responsible Public-Sector AI Guidelines A set of minimum operational standards for procurement, transparency, auditability, and human oversight in government AI systems, including for private contractors.
Pillar III: Aligning AI rules	
Outcome 5: Reduced regulatory fragmentation and improved baseline coherence.	**Annex V**: Regulatory Interoperability Mechanism A mechanism defining minimum global documentation and disclosure baselines; templates for mutual recognition; and a UN facilitation platform.
Outcome 6: A coherent global institutional architecture for AI governance.	**Annex VI:** Institutional Coherence Options Paper A mapping of existing bodies and three coordination models (council, inter-agency mechanism, observatory) with functions, reporting lines, and options for long-term architecture.

Introduction

On October 31, 2025, the President of the General Assembly appointed H.E. Ms. Egriselda López, Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations, and H.E. Mr. Rein Tammsaar, Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations, as Co-Chairs of the First Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance.[3] The Inaugural Global Dialogue will be held back-to-back along the margins of the 2026 *Artificial Intelligence for Good Global Summit*[4] organized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Geneva in July 2026.

The **Global Dialogue on AI Governance** is a universal UN initiative established by Resolution A/RES/79/325 to coordinate international AI policy and foster interoperability between governance regimes. Designed as a **non-negotiating format**, it serves as an informal space for governments, industry, civil society, academia, and scientists to exchange best practices and review evidence-based reports from an independent scientific panel rather than drafting binding treaties. This **multistakeholder** platform operates annually for **two days** in the margin of existing summits.

The Global Dialogue on AI Governance comes at a decisive moment: artificial intelligence is reshaping global security, development, and knowledge systems faster than governance arrangements can adapt. As of November 2025, **2,220 AI-governance initiatives**[5] exist world-wide but key questions of oversight, equity, and institutional capacity remain unresolved; in the meantime, **118 countries remain excluded**[6] from existing international AI-governance initiatives, underscoring the scale of the global coordination gap. The absence of national initiatives in many countries, together with the fragmentation of those that exist, risks deepening inequality, eroding trust, and undermining collective legitimacy.[7] The Global Dialogue was established to provide an inclusive space for all stakeholders to discuss these issues.

Notably, **no new regular budget resources** were allocated by the UN to support its function, making the process reliant on voluntary contributions and existing organizational support. In this context, CIC aims to provide thinking that would help inform the Global Dialogue in the early framing of its mandate, and help member states and other stakeholders steer a task that is both **substantive** (developing a Global AI Governance Roadmap) and **procedural** (designing an inclusive, credible method of deliberation). For that reason, this paper:

1. Provides **framing** and highlights why the Global Dialogue offers an opportunity to improve global governance of AI.
2. Proposes a **substantive agenda** to build a Global AI Governance Roadmap around three clusters of shared priorities: managing AI risks, distributing its rewards equitably, and aligning its governance rules.
3. Offers **process recommendations** on participation, sequencing, and design to ensure that each Global Dialogue remains relevant, inclusive, and action orientated.

1. Why the UN Must Lead on Global AI Governance

1.1. Global Challenges of an Emerging Technology

Beyond the technology debates, artificial intelligence is a **multilateral governance stress test**.[8] It concentrates capabilities (compute, data, and talent) in a few states and firms, but diffuses **consequences across borders**. According to the 2025 Annual AI Governance Report of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),[9] "Steering the Future of AI," the United States, China, and the European Union (EU) account for over half of the world's most powerful data centers. American and Chinese companies operate more than 90 percent of the data centers used globally by other organizations for AI work. India has at least five computing hubs and Japan at least four, while more than 150 countries (and Africa and South America as a whole) have none at all.

Governance of AI is about **global power architecture**:[10] who sets the rules, who coordinates, who benefits. Left to club arrangements or market coordination, rules would reflect power dynamics among the narrow pool of AI actors rather than democratic legitimacy. As such, the need for global governance is undeniable, and the role of the United Nations central.

The UN's comparative advantage in this regard is **legitimacy through inclusion and universality**. The OECD, G7, and regional bodies can move faster on technical standards, but only the UN can convene those who regulate AI (the member states) together with those who build and deploy it (the private companies)[11] and those who represent the public interest (civil society, advocacy groups, and most affected communities).[12] With its universal membership, the UN is the only arena where questions of sovereignty, equity, and safety can be addressed in a single forum.

The challenge for the UN is whether it can convene a political conversation that matches AI's transnational reach and unbalanced distribution among membership.[13]

1.2. Existing UN Governance Architecture on AI

The United Nations is building a new multilateral governance architecture for AI that consolidates several reform tracks into a coherent framework. This trajectory was first set out in the Secretary-General's 2021 report *Our Common Agenda*,[14] which called for strengthened global governance of emerging technologies and laid the groundwork for subsequent institutional proposals on AI. Building on that mandate, the Secretary-General convened the *High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence* (HLAB-AI),[15] in 2023 to propose global governance options. Its final 2024 report, *Governing AI for Humanity*,[16] called for two institutional innovations: an independent scientific body and a policy dialogue mechanism to ensure inclusive, evidence-based oversight of AI systems.

These recommendations were subsequently endorsed by member states through the *Global Digital Compact*,[17] adopted at the 2024 *Summit of the Future* as an annex of the *Pact for the Future*. The Global Digital Compact established the normative foundation for digital cooperation,[18] linking AI governance to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),[19] human rights,[20] and global equity. It also explicitly mandated the creation of new UN mechanisms. On January 1, 2025, the Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Technology transitioned to a new UN Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET),[21] established as the central hub for system-wide coordination on digital policy, including AI governance. In August 2025, the General Assembly operationalized these mandates through resolution 79/325,[22] creating the *Global Dialogue on AI Governance*[23] and the *Independent International Scientific Panel on AI* (IISP-AI).[24]

Together, these mechanisms form the institutional backbone[25] of the UN's AI governance architecture.[26] The Global Dialogue provides an annual multistakeholder forum for policy coordination and norm development, informed by impartial, evidence-based advice on AI risks and opportunities presented by the Scientific Panel. Building on the principles of the Global Digital Compact and the analytical groundwork of the HLAB-AI, this new UN structure[27] seeks to close the current global governance gap by embedding AI oversight within an inclusive, science-based, and rights-anchored multilateral framework—with formal space for states, expert communities, civil society and the private sector to contribute.

This endeavor is about stitching together fragmented national, regional, and private-sector efforts into a coherent governance architecture that both states and public opinion can regard as fair.

1.3. Stakes for the Global Dialogue on AI Governance

The Global Dialogue on AI Governance should connect **AI risks, rewards, and rules** into one agenda. That means: treating safety as a shared scientific project rather than a private assurance exercise (risks); linking governance to equitable access so capacity is not an afterthought (rewards); and building interoperability among regulatory models without forcing uniformity (rules).

Because the vast majority of frontier capabilities, data, and compute are controlled by a small number of technology companies, each of these pillars depends on structured engagement with the private sector: technology companies need a seat at the table as active stakeholders, not bystanders offering voluntary disclosure.

The centrality of private actors also reshapes the political context in which the Global Dialogue will operate. As a result, it is not just a normative exercise but also a barometer of shifting global power dynamics.[28]

- On the one hand, for major powers, the Global Dialogue will likely be a battle of soft-institutional dominance over standards and institutions. To maintain a constructive negotiating environment, it must avoid drifting into a **techno-sovereignty debate**[29] that would harden blocs and distract from the shared governance challenges it is meant to address. This risk is amplified by the fact that private companies (often headquartered in major powers) hold disproportionate control over frontier systems, creating an overlap between corporate power and geopolitical leverage.
- On the other hand, for smaller states and non-state actors, the Global Dialogue offers both a chance to shape norms, but also a risk of marginalization if processes entrench existing power dynamics.[30] Without explicit mechanisms to ensure that corporate actors are transparently accountable to the broader membership, smaller states may find themselves negotiating not only with other governments, but with firms whose technical advantages translate into political influence.

The Global Dialogue needs to demonstrate the UN's ability to mediate both technical complexity and geopolitical competition. As a formally mandated multistakeholder platform, it brings together governments, multilateral institutions, civil society, the scientific community, and the private sector.[31] Its

success will therefore depend on the realism of the **mechanisms it embeds**: inclusive participation, balance of power, accountability, transparency.[32]

This policy brief translates that stance into concrete recommendations for the Global Dialogue. Part 2 proposes the three substantive priorities or "pillars" the Global Dialogue could adopt: managing **risks**, distributing **rewards**, and aligning **rules**. Part 3 sets out a participation and process design that can carry those priorities to tangible and practical delivery: sequencing, roles, and outputs that are feasible for member states and legible to the wider public.

1.4. Case for a Global AI Governance Roadmap

The proliferation of AI governance frameworks across states, regions, private actors and technical bodies has produced a fragmented landscape with no common framework for coordination. Fragmented governance arrangements are often ill-equipped to address global problems. Three structural issues stand out for AI governance:

- First, without shared commitments,[33] there is no guarantee that AI's benefits will be distributed equitably across regions rather than reinforcing existing inequalities.
- Second, the concentration of compute, data, and technical capacity in a handful of firms and jurisdictions may lead to a damaging race to the bottom,[34] further marginalizing small actors and creating uncertainty for the private sector. This ultimately may create tension about who controls the infrastructure on which AI depends.
- Third, divergent national and regional regulatory approaches risk hardening into a patchwork[35] that negatively affects both consumers and producers of AI, increases compliance costs, creates loopholes, and erodes public trust.

In the past, complex governance domains such as climate change, migration, and health (pandemic preparedness)[36] advanced only when scattered initiatives were brought together into a single agreement framework with annexes. The Global Dialogue therefore needs to develop a structured instrument that can consolidate dispersed efforts for AI governance: a **Global AI Governance Roadmap** offers a way to set common expectations for inclusion, resources and regulatory baselines, and provides the substantive framework developed in the next section.

2. What Substantive Agenda Could the Global Dialogue Have

The Global Dialogue now needs to determine the substantive content of the Global AI Governance Roadmap. The purpose of this section is to guide the member states in shaping its content. It organizes the substance of global AI governance around **three pillars**: managing *risks* (1), distributing *rewards* (2), and aligning *rules* (3).

This section also details the specific modalities through which those pillars can be made operational.[37] The Global AI Governance Roadmap could be designed to deliver **six concrete outcomes**, responding directly to the priority gaps identified by member states:

1. **Outcome 1** is a shared scientific and safety capacity for frontier AI models, supported through a Global Frontier AI Evaluation Framework (**Annex I**).
2. **Outcome 2** is a set of ethical and democratic safeguards for information ecosystems, through a Declaration on AI and Information Integrity (**Annex II**).
3. **Outcome 3** is equitable access to compute, data, skills, and innovation capacity across regions, by an AI Capacity and Access Framework (**Annex III**).
4. **Outcome 4** is responsible and accountable use of AI in public administration, structured through Responsible Public-Sector AI Guidelines (**Annex IV**).
5. **Outcome 5** is reduced regulatory fragmentation and improved baseline coherence through a Regulatory Interoperability Mechanism (**Annex V**)
6. **Outcome 6** is a coherent global institutional architecture for AI governance, shaped through an Institutional Coherence Options Paper (**Annex VI**).

Taken together, these six outcomes provide a coherent template for consolidating dispersed governance efforts into an integrated, implementable multilateral structure, the backbone of a first-generation global governance framework for artificial intelligence.

2.1. Pillar I: Turning AI Risks into a Collective Governance Framework

2.1.1. Strengthening Safety and Global Scientific Capacity

AI safety has become a collective-action challenge. Frontier models evolve faster than national or intergovernmental oversight systems, while **safety evaluations remain partial and uneven**.[38] Some jurisdictions (notably the European Union)[39] have introduced binding testing requirements for high-risk[40] and general-purpose AI systems. In contrast, the United States[41] relies on executive orders, voluntary corporate disclosures,[42] or nonbinding guidance.[43] Many states have no safety-testing infrastructure at all. In this fragmented environment, there is **no global mechanism** to assess cross-border risks, share scientific evidence, or provide credible public guidance on safety thresholds. Without a shared backbone, cross-border risks cannot be addressed.

The Bletchley Declaration,[44] concluding the **2023 AI Safety Summit**, affirmed that frontier systems require shared scientific evaluation, transparent testing, risk-based categorization, and internationally coordinated research to understand emerging capabilities. It represents an initial but incomplete attempt to build that capacity. The Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence (IISP-AI)[45] provides the foundation to extend this scientific logic into multilateral practice and **close this coordination gap.** As an impartial knowledge body, composed of leading experts in computer science, ethics, and policy from all regions, the Panel **collects and validates safety data**, defines evaluation protocols, and recommends benchmarks for responsible model development and deployment. Its findings could form the scientific basis of the Roadmap. **Private-sector participation** is essential at this stage, as access to model-level information and safety data depends on cooperation from the entities developing frontier systems.

The Roadmap's safety pillar could therefore include **a Global Frontier AI Evaluation Framework (Annex I)**, co-developed with the IISP-AI and relevant national regulators to anchor safety in shared scientific capacity. The Framework will operationalize and consolidate the technical work already undertaken by IISP-AI, ITU, national regulators—building on existing initiatives (e.g., G7 Hiroshima Process on AI Governance)[46] into a shared political and procedural envelope.

2.1.2. Safeguarding Information Integrity

AI systems increasingly mediate public communication (from **elections to civic debates)** under opaque and privately governed algorithms. This *de facto* delegation creates an accountability vacuum: these systems are designed to optimize engagement or virality, but they can amplify falsehoods, marginalize minority voices, and erode confidence in institutions.

Multilateral initiatives have begun to address these challenges, signaling **growing international concern over AI's impact on democratic discourse**. The 2025 *Joint Declaration on AI, Freedom of Expression,*[47] the 2024 UNESCO *Artificial Intelligence and Democracy* report,[48] and related UN and regional processes all highlight the absence of consistent safeguards for transparency, political communication, and algorithmic accountability. However, these efforts remain largely declaratory and fragmented, relying on voluntary commitments and soft guidance that stop short of establishing enforceable obligations for platforms operating as de facto public information infrastructure.

Given that key information ecosystems are privately operated, addressing mis- and disinformation[49] requires a shift from voluntary ethics codes toward codified norms. Safeguards for content authenticity and political communication would protect public information spaces, with clear enforceable **expectations for platform responsibilities**.

Protecting information integrity also requires mechanisms that make rights enforceable, including access to justice[50]. When AI systems distort public debate, manipulate political communication, or harm the information space, individuals and communities need clear pathways to contest decisions and obtain remedies. Justice actors, regulators and human-rights institutions would therefore be part of the Global Dialogue to ensure that safeguards for information integrity can be implemented and enforced at national level.

The Global Dialogue must protect the **integrity of public information ecosystems:** align AI with democratic values,[51] protect users' rights, and salvage their trust in political institutions, and, with it, in democracy itself.[52] The Roadmap could incorporate a **Declaration on AI and Information Integrity (Annex II).**

Annex II translates ethical commitments into actionable multilateral norms and anchors the Roadmap in human rights law.[53] It would consolidate, harmonize, and

codify existing guidance from UNESCO and the Joint Declaration into intergovernmentally negotiated, enforceable expectations for platforms and states. It would also establish enforceable expectations[54] for:

- **Content authenticity and provenance**, establishing common expectations for watermarking and transparency of synthetic media.
- **Political communication and electoral integrity**, defining obligations for platforms and states during election periods.
- **Human oversight and accountability**, affirming that ultimate responsibility for communicative decisions lies with humans, not algorithms.

2.2. Pillar II: Harnessing AI Rewards For Equitable and Accountable Governance

2.2.1. Promoting Inclusion and Equitable Access to AI Infrastructure

AI is deepening existing inequalities[55] and risks widening the digital gap rather than closing it. **AI development** is concentrated primarily in North America,[56] Western Europe, and East Asia, where a handful of private firms control model design, infrastructure, and investment.[57] **Access** to AI capabilities is more diffuse but stratified: while open-source models and cloud-based services widen reach, effective use still depends on broadband connectivity, data literacy, and institutional capacity, which remain uneven across and within regions.[58] **Distribution** of AI's benefits, including productivity gains and social applications, follows the same structural asymmetries.[59]

The Global Dialogue could address this asymmetry as an equity and legitimacy question.[60] Member states, especially in the Global South, consistently emphasize AI infrastructure (compute, connectivity, and cloud access) as a core component of equitable participation. For that reason, resolution 78/311[61] directly mandates international cooperation on AI capacity-building, making it an ideal normative anchor. The 2025 Paris AI Action Summit[62] reinforced this priority, reiterating that equity must be treated as a governance requirement and calling for inclusive and sustainable access to AI infrastructure.

The Roadmap could therefore include an **AI Infrastructure Access Framework (Annex III)**. Annex III would be the implementation mechanism for Global Digital Compact[63] Objectives 1 and 2 (closing digital divides and expanding inclusion[64] in the digital economy) supported by a voluntary trust fund,[65] building on the proposals laid out in the Secretary-General's report 79/966.[66]

In practical terms, this means financing regional AI infrastructure; supporting access to computing infrastructure for research and testing; providing pathways for generative AI use in low-bandwidth environments, for example via SMS or other offline-capable tools;[67] engaging with private providers of compute and cloud infrastructure to ensure that capacity-building measures are practically viable; and creating open, multilingual datasets for public-interest applications. Together, these measures would strengthen scientific and technical sovereignty,[68] and demonstrate that global governance of AI can deliver tangible redistribution.[69]

2.2.2. Ensuring Responsible AI in Public Governance

Public administrations[70] are rapidly adopting AI, from welfare eligibility systems to predictive policing[71] and judicial analytics. Yet, governance is uneven. The OECD's 2025 survey[72] of more than 200 public-sector AI use cases found fragmented oversight, inconsistent accountability, and procurement processes with few ethical or audit conditions. The UN system itself illustrates both the promise and the risks of public-sector AI. On the one hand, AI is increasingly used across agencies for humanitarian targeting, document processing, translation, and early-warning systems.[73] On the other hand, however, there are uneven risk assessment practices, inconsistent safeguards for data protection, and limited oversight standards or institutional audit capacity for AI tools deployed across the UN system.[74]

Although principles already exist (the OECD AI Principles[75] in 2019; UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of AI[76] in 2021; the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on AI[77] in 2024; and the Global Digital Compact[78] in 2024), none provides a universal operational framework for how governments could design, procure, or audit AI systems used in public administration. These gaps expose citizens to risks of bias, particularly in contexts where algorithms shape public decisions.[79]

The Compact could therefore include a set of **Responsible Public-Sector AI Guidelines (Annex IV)**. These guidelines would operationalize Objective 4 of the Global Digital Compact[80] and define minimum requirements for transparency,

accountability, independent audit, and human oversight in government AI systems. This then would align with World Bank guidance and build on global examples collected in the OECD AI Policy Observatory,[81] while establishing a common multilateral baseline.

By starting with the public sector, the UN would signal that governments themselves can model responsible AI use[82] and rebuild **public trust** in how technology shapes public decision-making.[83] For member states, credible safeguards in public administration would strengthen domestic legitimacy and reinforce the UN's own institutional standing at a moment of heightened scrutiny. Because most public-sector AI systems are developed or integrated by private contractors, the guidelines must also cover these partners and clarify minimum accountability and audit requirements. As emerging technologies become more central to global politics, the Global Dialogue offers a rare opportunity for the UN to signal competence early.

2.3. Pillar III: Unifying AI Rules into a Coherent Global Governance Architecture

2.3.1. Developing Interoperability and Global Standards

AI is emerging in a fragmented regulatory landscape: private platforms act as *de facto* global regulators through design choices, safety practices, and market dominance. Meanwhile, formal public regulations (such as the EU AI Act, G7 Hiroshima Process, or the OECD Principles)[84] diverge sharply: each articulates different standards, thresholds, and enforcement tools. This divergence erodes trust, raises compliance costs, and creates uncertainty for states seeking to balance sovereignty with market integration.[85]

The Roadmap could prevent the risk that interoperability becomes a battleground among major powers to influence regulation on baseline standards. Framing **interoperability as a facilitation mechanism** rather than a venue for normative competition could help reduce that risk. Interoperability arrangements will also need structured dialogue with industry, whose compliance architectures shape whether global baselines are implementable.[86]

The Roadmap could therefore include **a Regulatory Interoperability Mechanism (Annex V)** anchored in a UN-led facilitation role drawing on existing technical bodies.[87] The mechanism would not seek to duplicate or replace the work of existing standard-setting bodies (such as ITU, ISO/IEC, or WIPO). Instead, it aims to support regulatory interoperability and facilitate equivalence mapping across national and regional AI governance frameworks. To do so, it would define a minimum global baseline for documentation (risk classification and public disclosure), and provide templates for mutual-recognition arrangements. The UN would ensure inclusivity for all member states while relying on the recognized technical expertise of standard-setting bodies, without creating new standard-setting structures.

This approach preserves domestic regulatory autonomy and state **sovereignty** because interoperability does not require uniformity.[88] In the meantime, it ensures **technical credibility,** reduces friction, and enables coherence.

2.3.2. Ensuring Coordination of the Global AI Landscape

AI governance initiatives are proliferating across UN entities, regional bodies, and specialized agencies, often without a common frame or **coordination**. For many states (especially those with limited capacity) the result is **overlapping standards and inconsistent principles**.[89] Unless addressed, this institutional incoherence will weaken legitimacy, slow implementation,[90] and make it harder for governments to navigate the expanding AI governance landscape. This requires mapping existing bodies and identifying where coordination gaps obstruct effective governance.[91]

Therefore, clarifying **institutional roles** is a core function of the Roadmap. The Global Dialogue cannot and should not replace existing structures like ODET, forums such as the G20, the Global Partnership on AI, specialized agencies like ITU, UNESCO, or technical standard-setting bodies (WIPO, ISO). Instead, it would identify where these institutions are best placed to lead (on standards development, sectoral applications, intellectual property, or capacity-building) and define how a UN-anchored Roadmap can provide a common political frame within which their work remains coherent and mutually reinforcing.

The Roadmap could therefore include an **Institutional Coherence Options Paper (Annex VI)**. The Paper, prepared by the Secretary-General, would map existing mechanisms, identify coordination gaps, and present models for an integrated governance architecture (such as an AI Governance Council, an inter-agency

coordination mechanism, or a global observatory). Over time, this shared mapping may provide a foundation for member states to consider options for streamlining or clarifying institutional roles, should they wish to pursue such discussions. Reviewing the coherence of the overall AI governance architecture provides a roadmap for long-term institutional organization beyond the Roadmap, reducing duplication and strengthening accountability.

Some **resistance** may come from actors invested in existing initiatives (such as the G7 Hiroshima Process and other summit-led initiatives) who may perceive UN coordination as competing with their own platforms; the Roadmap would address this by positioning coherence as complementary rather than substitutive. For instance, tension around the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation[92] and the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework[93] illustrate how parallel processes can trigger concerns over duplication and fragmentation. Coherence mechanisms would also include channels for structured **engagement with private actors** when their systems or standards influence global governance outcomes.

3. How to Structure an Inclusive and Action-Orientated Process

3.1. Architecture of the Multi-year Dialogue Process

3.1.1. Sequencing and Design

Global dialogues often fail when substance and structure diverge, overproducing principles without political buy-in or actionable follow-through. To prevent that risk the Global Dialogue must build a process that mirrors the governance values the Roadmap seeks to promote: **a practical, transparent, predictable process**, while maintaining an inclusive and disciplined pathway from consultation to negotiation.

CIC recommends a three-phase structure over 24 months to create ownership and engagement around a distinct set of responsibilities and outputs:

- **Scoping** (0–6 months): Ensure early framing and that the Global Dialogue reflects global realities rather than pre-set agendas. Outputs could include:
    - Conducting consultations to identify common priorities and gaps.
    - Mapping of existing AI Governance initiative.
    - Endorsing the Roadmap's six annexes.

- **Exploration** (6–18 months): Conduct thematic roundtables based primarily on IISP-AI submissions, in order to build substantive content in a transparent, iterative manner. Outputs could include:
    - Chair's interim report structured around the pillars and six annexes.
    - Technical briefs from the IISP-AI on safety thresholds, evaluation protocols, and compute equity.
    - Written stakeholder submissions feeding into annex drafts.

- **Synthesis** (18–24 months): Consolidate all outputs into a coherent, negotiated **Global AI Governance Roadmap**. Outputs could include a "zero draft," a revised "negotiating text" after regional consultations, and the final Roadmap and its annexes submitted to the General Assembly.

3.1.2. Institutional Structure

Because the Global Dialogue will manage both technical complexity and geopolitical sensitivity, its scoping phase could make explicit the **principles that will shape how the process is run**. These principles could be grounded in the commitments unanimously adopted in the *Global Digital Compact*: inclusion, rights-based governance, transparency, accountability, and adaptability.

Without a clear institutional backbone, inclusive processes tend to diffuse, leading to fatigue, inconsistent participation, and unclear lines of responsibility. To prevent that risk, the Global Dialogue needs a light but credible governance structure that ensures continuity, supports the member states, and maintains alignment with the Roadmap's three pillars. Translating these commitments into operational process principles for the Global Dialogue would set clear expectations for stakeholders and provide a shared reference point as negotiations unfold.

Figure 2: Cross-Cutting Principles



CIC recommends establishing a light support Secretariat, responsible for coordination and documentation. Scientific and technical assessment would rest exclusively with the IISP-AI, with the Secretariat drawing on its work as needed. For process and procedural matters, the Secretariat could be complemented by a small

stakeholder reference group (including governments, private sector, academia, civil society, and technical experts) to ensure transparency and balanced participation. This structure keeps the Global Dialogue organized and connected to the wider UN architecture without duplicating the functions of the Scientific Panel or creating heavy institutional machinery.

3.1.3. Participation Model

Previous UN dialogues have overrepresented those who build technology rather than those governed by it, and have often overlooked communities excluded from its access and participation all together. This skews perspective and undermines perceived legitimacy. To prevent that risk, the Global Dialogue must broaden participation to reflect the diversity of states, capacities, and communities affected by AI, and strive for geographically balanced, socio-economically inclusive, and substantively relevant participation.

Participation modalities would reflect the Global Dialogue's multistakeholder mandate, ensuring structured opportunities for civil society, the private sector, and the scientific community to contribute substantively while preserving intergovernmental decision-making authority.

Some guiding principles in this regard could be:

- **Balanced representation** across regions and stakeholder groups.
- **Open calls** for written submissions from governments, academia, civil society, and industry.
- **Hybrid participation formats** to allow small missions and technical experts to engage substantively.

CIC recommends designing a participation model that combines:

- Virtual consultations accessible to all missions.
- Open written submissions structured around the six annexes of the Roadmap.
- Regional workshops to refine priorities.
- Explicit balance targets for stakeholder composition.

A Global Dialogue that reflects diverse perspectives is better equipped to avoid replicating the concentration of power that characterizes the current AI ecosystem.

Inclusive participation strengthens the political standing of the Global AI Governance Roadmap and facilitates its **long-term implementation**. To preserve legitimacy while ensuring relevance, stakeholder contributions could be formally integrated at each stage (scoping, exploration, synthesis). This channeling mechanism ensures that expertise informs the Global AI Governance Roadmap while retaining full intergovernmental control over negotiated outcomes.

3.2. Recommendations for the First Global Dialogue in 2026

The first Global Dialogue offers an opportunity to combine ambition with pragmatism. With the meeting scheduled in six months, there is little time to waste: the process needs to be purposeful from the outset and focused on deliverables rather than process for its own sake. It could be designed as an inclusive, transparent, and predictable process for shaping a Global AI Governance Roadmap. In this context, **CIC recommends that member states consider the following guidance on substance, scope, and format when shaping the first Global Dialogue.**

3.2.1. Substance: structuring a meaningful discussion

On substance, the first instance of the Global Dialogue would be designed as a genuinely substantive exchange, structured around the three pillars of risks, rewards, and rules. The process would focus this period on convergence around the **Roadmap's structure**: agreeing on the three pillars, confirming the six proposed annexes, and consolidating baseline inputs. This would provide delegations with a shared analytical frame, enabling informed engagement on trade-offs, priorities, and sequencing during the Dialogue itself.

During the Global Dialogue itself, the Co-Chairs can secure political alignment on these elements and identify where further drafting is required. Substantive negotiation of annexes would then take place in the subsequent cycle. This sequencing keeps ambition aligned with constraints and ensures that the Global Dialogue produces a coherent pathway toward a full Roadmap.

A successful Global Dialogue requires ambition calibrated to feasibility. With only six months of preparation and wide variation in delegation capacity, the First Global Dialogue could lay out the **architecture** of the Global AI Governance Roadmap. This draft would set out the Roadmap's scope, principles, and structure, outline the six annexes, and define the institutional roles and next steps for deeper drafting. It provides direction without imposing a negotiation burden that many missions cannot absorb.

3.2.2. Multistakeholder engagement: broadly inclusive while intergovernmentally driven

On inclusivity, the process could enable engagement by every delegation while remaining firmly intergovernmentally driven. The annexes themselves could be developed in phases. During the first cycle, rapporteurs and expert submissions could prepare technical notes that map options and identify areas of convergence, **leaving full drafting to subsequent cycles**.

Multistakeholder engagement—including civil society, academia, and the private sector—could be **structured to provide clear added value, rather than treated as a procedural "tick-the-box" exercise.** These actors can contribute empirical evidence on societal impacts, technical insight into AI system design and deployment, and practical experience with risk mitigation and governance tools. Framed in this way, **multistakeholder inputs strengthen intergovernmental deliberation without diluting member state ownership of outcomes**. This approach preserves inclusivity and ensures that the process reflects the capacity constraints of small missions while generating substantive material.

3.2.3. Format: moving beyond scripted statements

The minimum viable Roadmap emerging from this Global Dialogue could therefore consist of a concise chapeau, commitments across the three pillars, and six annexes presented as frameworks rather than binding obligations, supported by a light successor mechanism to carry the work forward. Achieving this outcome will depend in part on the format of the Global Dialogue itself.

The Dialogue **cannot consist of two days of scripted national statements**, particularly if held back-to-back with the *AI for Good* Summit. Such a format would

otherwise risk reproducing well-established national positions without generating new political clarity or collective learning. This risk is heightened by the timing of the Dialogue: while *AI for Good* is designed to inspire and showcase what is possible, the role of the Global Dialogue is to subject these aspirations to political, institutional, and governance reality.

Instead, the format could be deliberately thought-provoking, shifting from statement-based interventions to interactive and problem-driven exchanges, and explicitly leveraging the fact that nothing is being negotiated to create a setting where exploration, questioning, and political candor are legitimate. In practical terms, this could involve structuring sessions around a small number of governance questions per pillar, with **short, time-bound interventions and moderated exchanges** aimed at identifying areas of convergence, divergence, and follow-up work. This structure would allow member states to engage directly with trade-offs and constraints, in a setting deliberately designed to support exploration over position-taking, and to surface early where convergence may be feasible.

Framing **feasibility explicitly** in this way helps maintain ambition while ensuring that the Global Dialogue delivers a concrete and politically credible foundation for global AI governance. The format of the First Dialogue itself could help translate this ambition into realistic and actionable outcomes, where it:

- Protects small missions.
- Reassures major powers that the process is manageable.
- Creates space for meaningful multistakeholder contribution.
- Provides a realistic path for turning broad political ambition into a structured global instrument grounded in the UN's comparative strengths of inclusion and coherence.

Conclusion

In the months leading to the **first convening of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance**, expectations are high: the current landscape is fragmented, the governance gaps are widening, and member states will look to the Global Dialogue for direction and coherence. While the Global Dialogue is conceived as a multi-year process, the first meeting will carry crucial weight in shaping confidence, political momentum, and expectations about what the process can realistically deliver. This period is therefore an opportunity for the member states and Co-Chairs to shape the agenda early, build convergence around priorities, and establish a credible process that reflects the ambition of the Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact.

This brief provides a **roadmap to support that work**. It sets out the rationale for UN leadership on AI governance; proposes a structured substantive agenda built around three pillars: managing risks, distributing rewards, and aligning rules; and outlines a process and participation design that is inclusive, sequenced, and feasible for governments and stakeholders. In particular, it offers concrete guidance for the design of the first Global Dialogue (substance, scope, and format) while situating that initial convening within a longer-term, phased process. Taken together, these elements offer a coherent path from mandate to implementation.

At the core of this roadmap is the development of a **Global AI Governance Roadmap**. Such a roadmap allows dispersed initiatives to be consolidated into a single, structured instrument with annexes, and offers a structure through which safety, equity, and interoperability can be advanced together over time. If the first Global Dialogue succeeds in articulating a clear Roadmap architecture, it can anchor the multi-year process that follows and give the UN a credible, actionable role in shaping the global governance of AI at a formative moment.

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