Why Member State Engagement Needs to Be at the Heart of UN80 to Unlock Its Success

From Mistrust to Breakthrough

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Executive Summary

Six months after its launch, the Secretary-General's "UN80" reform initiative is still widely seen as lacking meaningful and systematic member state engagement. This perception has created distrust among delegations, weakened political traction, and hampered momentum as the Secretary-General's term is drawing to a close. As the world leaders gathered in New York for the "General Debate" at the end of September to launch the 80th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, very few actually mentioned reform. More striking even, the few who did lamented a process they essentially regarded as technocratic, administrative, and internal to the Secretariat. Without a clear role for delegations, permanent representatives, and capitals, the process risks lacking legitimacy and member states' ownership.

The main challenge is the absence of deliberate design. The fragmented UN governance—across mandates, committees, boards, and subsidiary bodies—results in an already arcane system, not unusual for UN Reform, but challenging for delegations to navigate. However, it is not inevitable. Entry points exist to anchor reform legitimacy, align processes, and mobilize capitals. Experience from previous cycles, from the 2005 World Summit follow-up to the 2017 repositioning of the UN development system, shows that reforms only gained traction when member states were explicitly engaged through regular political dialogues, articulated with a strong political leadership from the Secretariat.

Strategic adjustments are both urgent and feasible. This paper proposes a member state engagement toolkit across four dimensions: substance, scope, modalities, and dynamics. Recommendations include appointing permanent representatives as focal points, creating light coordination mechanisms, convening regular cross-regional dialogues and feedback loops, and empowering decision-shapers through targeted support and structured briefings. Such measures would not only enhance ownership but also reduce political risk for the Secretary-General by spreading accountability across the membership.

The window for recalibration is narrow but real. In the immediate aftermath of High-Level Week launching the 80th session of the General Assembly, there is still time to build shared ownership of the UN80 reform. Credible engagement is not

just a procedural improvement but a political necessity. Without it, the initiative risks being seen as Secretariat-driven, reinforcing doubts about whether the UN can apply to itself the same principles it promotes to others.

To address these risks, this paper sets out a practical toolkit of 10 recommendations for strengthening member state engagement in UN80. The recommendations are structured across four dimensions (substance, scope, modalities, and dynamics). A distinction was also made between measures that require Secretariat action and those that depend on the authority of the President of the General Assembly and member states. Taken together, they outline both immediate adjustments for the UN80 cycle and longer-term reforms to embed engagement more systematically. Table 1 below summarizes these recommendations.

To operationalize these 10 recommendations beyond the four dimensions that helped identify them, we reframed them into three overarching priorities that capture the essential conditions for reform to succeed:

1. Ensure transparent information flows: information is the foundation, as predictable updates and clear pathways allow delegations and capitals to prepare and engage.
2. Mobilize political leadership: leadership is the driver, as permanent representatives and capitals must convert information into political traction and coherence.
3. Sustain effective oversight: oversight is the guarantor, as decision-shapers require tools to monitor implementation and maintain accountability.

Read together, these three priorities provide a coherent logic to ensure effective member states engagement, and a simple structure for assessing whether UN80 is on track.

Table 1: 10 Strategic Recommendations to Enhance Member State Engagement

Dimension	Short term (UN80 cycle)	Long-term (systemic reform)
Substance	**(1). PGA**: Convene early structured briefings for PRs before major milestones, to connect New York deliberations with capitals and ensure ministries receive consistent information **(2). SG**: Draft a typology annex clarifying normative, structural, and budgetary reforms, with timelines and engagement pathways.	**(3). SG**: Develop a Secretariat-wide engagement protocol with MS and technical guidance codifying how reform types are processed.
Scope	**(4). PGA**: Appoint informal PR focal points per UN80 reform workstream to ensure continuity, visibility, and distributed leadership.	**(5). SG**: Provide consolidated, transparent updates on reform initiatives, timelines, and decision points, issued jointly with the PGA, to improve coherence and prevent overlap.
Modalities	**(6). PGA**: Convene regular reform dialogues (e.g., bimonthly) to clarify expectations and socialize proposals. **(7). PGA**: Establish a structured feedback loop with public synthesis of MS inputs.	**(8). PGA**: Institutionalize a GA-mandated Strategic Dialogue on System Coherence and Reform, meeting annually and co-chaired by the PGA, to track progress across cycles.
Dynamics	(9). SG/PGA: Support decision-shapers through closed SG-PR briefings, modeled on Security Council "horizon scanning," giving trusted intermediaries early access to analysis and drafts.	**(10). MS/SG**: Establish peer review panels, co-led by MS and the Secretariat, to assess follow-through and create a culture of structured political pre-briefing.

Note: The following acronyms are used in this table and in a subsequent table for brevity—GA (General Assembly), PGA (President of the General Assembly), PR (Permanent Representative), SG (Secretary-General), MS (Member States).

1. Problem Assessment: Why UN80 Lacks Political Traction

On September 16, 2025, Ambassadors Wallace of Jamaica and Schwalger of New Zealand co-chaired the **inaugural meeting** of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation, established under **General Assembly decision 79/571**. In their opening remarks, they pledged to steer the exercise in a manner that is open, transparent, and inclusive, emphasizing that it would be member state-driven, without preconceived outcomes, and anchored in political direction from permanent representatives. Backed by the President of the General Assembly, their framing conveyed a sense of institutional weight and collective ambition rarely seen in the UN80 track so far.

This commitment stands in stark contrast to the broader **UN80 process**.[1] Despite its initial ambition,[2] the reform initiative has proceeded with minimal structured governmental input.[3] Briefings have been sparse, feedback loops weak, and procedural avenues for input largely absent. Some of the most relevant Secretary-General proposals and decisions have been leaked on social media before even being presented or discussed with delegations. UN80 is proceeding with minimal member state engagement, creating a reform process that risks lacking political traction, which has heightened concerns among member states.

The resulting vacuum exposes the Secretary-General to political risk, undermines reform viability, and threatens the Secretariat's credibility. Without structured avenues for member state engagement, the reform will continue to be perceived as Secretariat-driven, regardless of the Secretary-General's intent. This perception fuels skepticism in capitals, where the process is viewed as lacking intergovernmental legitimacy, and the Secretariat as overreaching or overstepping political boundaries. When reforms appear detached from member state ownership, their political viability is weakened; governments are less inclined to defend proposals they did not shape, and are more likely to resist them in intergovernmental bodies. Each stalled or rejected initiative reinforces the narrative that UN reform is an insular exercise that fails to deliver.

This also represents a missed opportunity: the lack of regular engagement with delegations leaves permanent representatives idle. Permanent representatives are uniquely placed to connect New York deliberations with national ministries that ultimately shape political positions.

In practice, the absence of significant member state ownership is not simply a procedural flaw but a political dead end. Without transparent formats, procedural safeguards, or clear uptake mechanisms, delegations remain uncertain about the reform's trajectory and ownership. The "trust" gap transforms technical initiatives into contested terrain, leaving the Secretary-General exposed to pushback that could have been preempted through earlier buy-in.[4] The risks are significant: in committees where consensus prevails, reforms lacking structured engagement of permanent representatives and their capitals invariably encounter resistance. Institutionally, initiatives stall or trigger defensive reactions when proposals crystallize. Strategically, disengagement erodes trust and undermines the Secretariat's credibility. Unless UN80 corrects course by embedding regular and credible channels for engagement, it risks becoming yet another reform cycle remembered more for rhetoric than delivery.[5]

The first formal endorsement of UN80 by the membership only came in July 2025, with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 79/318.[6] The resolution marked a late and limited, but important, step in transforming the initiative from a Secretariat-led proposal into an intergovernmental process. Its passage was preceded by heated debate, reflecting deep divisions on both substance and process. Some delegations saw, with concern, the Russian Federation's submission of the draft proposal as an opportunistic move to assert member states' authority over the Secretariat. However, the fact that it was ultimately adopted by consensus provided a necessary baseline of legitimacy to the process. While resolution 79/318 gave UN80 its first real political anchor, the delay in securing this endorsement underscores the uncertainty of member states' alignment and the importance of building more sustained engagement going forward.

2. Political Analysis: Where Member State Engagement Can Be Activated

2.1 Structural Complexity: Fragmentation is Real, But Coherence is Possible

UN reform unfolds across a fragmented institutional landscape.[7] Mandates, governance tiers, and oversight boards create dispersion, limiting horizontal coordination and fostering opacity. Yet fragmentation is not fatal; coherence can still be forged through deliberate, well-designed anchoring.

The General Assembly remains the critical anchor. As the only universal forum, it holds the normative authority to confer legitimacy and accountability to reform processes. A recent example is the adoption by consensus of the "veto initiative" in 2022, which requires the Assembly to meet automatically whenever a veto is cast in the Security Council.[8] This illustrates how the Assembly continues to respond to the call for institutional rebalancing. It also showed that member states are willing to empower the Assembly when reform initiatives are properly framed and presented as benefiting the full membership.

By leveraging its convening power, the Assembly can define shared frameworks, issue coherence mandates, and set procedural expectations across subsidiary bodies. Reform anchored in General Assembly authority will have stronger legitimacy and resilience.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation Review embodies this anchoring role. Its creation was proposed by the President of the General Assembly for the 79th session, Philemon Yang, following informal discussions with delegations, the Secretariat, and the incoming President for the 80th session, Annalena Baerbock. This initiative of the President of the General Assembly, which was endorsed by all delegations when formally considered by the Plenary of the General Assembly, roots the reform process in the authority of the General

Assembly while remaining firmly member-state–driven. It also demonstrates how reform initiatives can secure political legitimacy,[9] and procedural credibility with creative and inclusive leadership.[10]

The President of the General Assembly's intention to provide an open platform for Member States to discuss the review of mandates was emphasized by the co-chairs to avoid some of the pitfalls of past efforts that collapsed under mistrust and overreach. Their effort to frame the process as member states-driven with technical and constructive support from the Secretariat, and a pace that protects smaller delegations, has already helped rebuild confidence.

The challenge will be to sustain this balance as negotiations deepen and expand similar approaches to other tracks of the current reform process. If maintained, this approach could turn a history of mistrust into an opportunity for meaningful progress under UN80.

2.2 Reform Scope: Not All Reforms are Equal

UN reforms differ vastly in type, scope, and political pathway.[11] What matters most for engagement, however, is not only the legal basis on which the membership endorsement is reflected—whether a reform is binding or not—but also how it moves through the system. Three categories can be distinguished:

- **Normative reforms**: include resolutions, declarations, pledges, or compacts. They often provide political direction and can even carry legal effect (such as General Assembly resolutions or reforms to the rules of procedure) within the UN system. In practice, normative reforms are usually channeled through processes led by the President of the General Assembly, relying on political momentum rather than administrative follow-through.

- **Operational reforms**: cover structural changes with immediate programmatic or budgetary impact, such as budgetary decisions, human resources reforms, or mandate alignment. They trigger the UN budgeting machinery,[12] passing through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and ultimately the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, where consensus traditions make even minor technical adjustments politically sensitive.
- Strategic or hybrid reforms: some initiatives combine normative and operational elements. The Global Digital Compact is a recent example: it

articulates non-binding principles on technology governance while also establishing mechanisms such as the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET) and an Independent Scientific Panel on artificial intelligence (AI), which have institutional and budgetary implications. Such reforms usually require hybrid formats, combining deliberations led by the President of the General Assembly for political framing with scrutiny by the Fifth Committee to address institutional consequences.

Clarity of categorization is crucial for effective engagement. Without a clear typology, member states cannot anticipate which instruments to mobilize or when to intervene. During the "Delivering as One"[13] initiative, for example, political declarations were bundled with programmatic reforms, leaving capitals uncertain about what required national endorsement and what was merely administrative streamlining.

Mapping reforms to their procedural pathways clarifies when and how capitals should be mobilized. It would enable delegations to engage with the right structures at the right moment, and at the right level. Normative reforms depend on political momentum and can often be handled in New York through negotiations led by permanent representatives, whereas structural reforms almost always require the involvement of senior ministry or political officials in capitals.[14] A clear typology provides delegations with a political map of when to escalate issues beyond the mission and when to maintain engagement at the level of permanent representatives.[15] It reduces not only confusion but also resistance, while preventing capitals from being blindsided—a situation that often fuels mistrust and defensive reactions.

2.3 Modalities of Engagement: Spaces Exist but Lack Sequencing

Engagement spaces exist but remain disconnected. Formal avenues[16] include plenary meetings of the General Assembly, the General Committee, and the various Main Committees of the General Assembly, as well as other subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly. Informal spaces range from regional group meetings and technical briefings to informal meetings of those same organs previously mentioned. Yet, the use of these options is often redundant, poorly sequenced, or driven by tactics rather than strategy.

The General Committee is a dormant asset.[17] Legally mandated yet politically underutilized, it could serve as a light coordination platform for reform monitoring, timeline consolidation, and focal point convening. Its activation would add rhythm and predictability to reform deliberations without creating new structures.

The President of the General Assembly's convening power is a second entry point.[18] Like the General Committee, the President of the General Assembly's good offices are an untapped resource few member states know how to leverage. Regular, regionally balanced dialogues convened by the President, in the form of the traditional morning dialogues or as informal meetings of the plenary, could facilitate frequent engagement with delegations and build trust, providing a platform for honest exchanges of views regarding priorities, options, and the feasibility of moving the organization into a specific direction. Complementary mechanisms, such as an independent external panel reporting jointly to the Secretary-General and President, could add depoliticized analysis and long-term strategic input without encroaching on statutory bodies.

2.4 Decision Dynamics: Influence Flows Through More Than Just Formal Votes

Reform outcomes are influenced by **decision-shapers**, not only **decision-makers**. Co-facilitators, regional chairs, experienced permanent representatives, and senior Secretariat officials frame debates and filter options long before final votes occur. Yet these actors' actions remain structurally under-supported and uncoordinated, reducing their capacity to steer reform constructively. In practice, small groups of delegates often set the tone of Assembly debates: the co-facilitators of The Summit of the Future (Germany and Namibia) were pivotal in defining acceptable options before wider membership even debated them.

Supporting decision-shapers is key to success. Tailored technical briefings for delegates, synthesis notes, and informal networks among permanent representatives could clarify expectations, de-escalate contentious issues, and foster goodwill. Onboarding member states and other key actors early would not only ease negotiations but also counterbalance the perception that UN80 is managed exclusively by Secretariat officials. Providing decision-shapers, including civil society representatives, heads of UN agencies, and other stakeholders, with evidence, comparative examples, and draft proposals can depoliticize sensitive questions and facilitate the formation of broader coalitions around shared framing.

3. Strategic Recommendations: A Toolkit for Member States

3.1 Substance: Adapt Engagement Strategies

(1). The President of the General Assembly can play a catalytic role **by convening early, structured briefings** for permanent representatives on the different reform tracks. Such sessions, timed before major reform milestones, would help delegations connect deliberations in New York with capitals, ensuring that ministries receive consistent political and technical information. By institutionalizing this convening role, the President of the General Assembly would reduce information asymmetries and build trust in the reform process.

(2). Member states need reform pathways that match the type of initiative. Immediate steps should include a reform typology annex that clarifies normative, structural, and budgetary reforms, with corresponding follow-up mechanisms, indicative timelines, and engagement pathways. Such an annex should be incorporated directly into the draft and circulated to delegations early, enabling Permanent Representatives to brief capitals and prepare them for differentiated involvement.

(3). Secretariat guidance may be required to inform decisions. Such guidance would provide technical, fact- and evidence-based data on how reform types are presented and processed: normative reforms through dialogues led by the President of the General Assembly, operational reforms through the Fifth Committee, and strategic reforms through hybrid approaches. Codifying this practice would guard against reform fatigue.

3.2 Scope: Clarify Roles Across the Reform Ecosystem

(4). Distributed permanent representative leadership can provide continuity and political traction. Permanent representatives should be appointed as focal points for each reform workstream (as was done with the two co-chairs of the Ad Hoc

Working Group on Mandate Implementation) to serve as liaisons in New York between the full membership and other actors, including the Secretariat. These focal points could operate like co-facilitators, but with lighter mandates: their role would be to socialize reform content within member states' groupings, ensure that governments receive consistent information, and prevent duplication and dispersion of advocacy efforts.

(5). Light coordination mechanisms can prevent fragmentation. Rather than creating new structures, member states could request that the existing reform-coherence function in the Secretariat (under the Deputy Secretary-General or the Under-Secretary-General for Policy) be made more transparent and accessible to delegations. This could take the form of regular consolidated updates on reform initiatives, timelines, and decision points, issued jointly with the President of the General Assembly. Such reporting would give permanent representatives and capitals a clear overview of the reform ecosystem, while keeping responsibility anchored in the Secretariat's established mandate.

3.3 Modalities: Align and Activate Engagement Channels

(6). Engagement must become regular and predictable, with a clear feedback loop. Immediate steps should include bimonthly informal dialogues with all delegations and a written feedback loop in which the Secretariat synthesizes the inputs of member states. Such a feedback mechanism would mirror the practice of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the revitalization of the General Assembly,[19] which compiles member states' positions. It would also signal that contributions are not only heard but systematically recorded and factored into decision-making.

(7). A second step is to establish a structured feedback loop under the authority of the President of the General Assembly, complementing Secretariat updates. After each round of informal or regional dialogues, the President of the General Assembly could issue a short synthesis of member state inputs, circulated transparently to all delegations. This practice, modeled on revitalization exercises, would show that contributions are captured and considered, while keeping the process firmly anchored in member state ownership.

(8). Institutionalized dialogue led by the President of the General Assembly is needed to ensure continuity. Longer-term reforms could further include a triennial General Assembly-mandated Strategic Dialogue[20] on system coherence, co-chaired by permanent representatives and the President of the General Assembly. This dialogue could serve as a standing review mechanism, enabling successive presidencies of the General Assembly to track progress across multiple reform cycles with continuity and consistency, and giving member states a rhythm for reassessing priorities.

3.4 Dynamics: Empower Decision-Shapers to Inform and Structure the Process

(9). Decision-shapers need support and structured access. Immediate steps should include activating the General Committee as a convenor and piloting closed Secretary-General-Permanent Representatives briefings tied to reform cycles. Such briefings could be modeled on the informal "DPPA Briefing" sessions held in the Security Council,[21] where content is shared in advance and deliberation occurs in a non-negotiating format.

(10). Peer accountability can sustain reform follow-through. Longer-term reforms could include member state–Secretariat peer review panels to assess implementation, as well as creating a culture of structured political pre-briefing. These panels would not replace statutory oversight bodies but complement them by providing a member states–driven review of whether reforms deliver on political expectations, thereby reinforcing collective ownership.

3.5 Synthesis: An Action Plan for Engagement

The logic of engagement is straightforward: reforms only gain traction when information flows are transparent, political leadership is mobilized, and oversight mechanisms sustain follow-through. In practice, this means three things.

1. Predictable channels of **information** are essential for enabling delegations and capitals to track proposals and prepare responses in real time.

2. **Leadership** must be exercised collectively by permanent representatives and capitals, converting information into political direction and coherence across reform tracks.

3. **Oversight** must be organized in a way that empowers all stakeholders, including decision-shapers, to structure negotiations and implementation.

Read in this light, the ten recommendations outlined above can be re-clustered into these three functional categories: information, leadership, and oversight. This framing clarifies how they align operationally and mutually reinforce one another throughout the UN80 cycle. They also define a clear Action Plan for Engagement (See table 2: Action Plan for Engagement, below).

Going further, stakeholders beyond the General Assembly should come together to monitor its work more closely. A dedicated "General Assembly Observatory" could track and report on the processes, mandates, and informal dialogues under the authority of the President of the General Assembly. By documenting both procedure (who led, what modalities were used) and substance (which ideas gained or lost traction), such an Observatory—modeled on practices used for the Security Council—would improve transparency, accountability, and member state ownership. It would also clarify how debates shape outcomes and ultimately strengthen the role of the General Assembly.

Table 2: Action Plan for Engagement

Cluster 1: Information Building transparency and coherence
(1) PGA: Convene early structured briefings for PRs before major milestones. **(2)** SG: Draft a typology annex clarifying reform categories and pathways. **(5)** SG/PGA: Provide regular consolidated updates on reform initiatives & decision points. **(6)** PGA: Convene informal dialogues with delegations & circulate syntheses of positions. **(7)** PGA: Establish structured feedback loops after dialogues, issuing summaries of MS inputs, and a "GA Observatory."
Cluster 2: Leadership Empowering permanent representatives and capitals
(3) SG: Develop Secretariat-wide technical guidance to codify reform modalities. **(4)** PGA/MS: Appoint informal PR focal points per reform workstream to ensure continuity and distributed leadership. **(8)** PGA: Institutionalize a GA-mandated Strategic Dialogue on system coherence.
Cluster 3: Oversight Supporting decision-shapers & ensuring follow-through
(9) SG/PGA: Support decision-shapers through SG–PR briefings tied to reform cycles. **(10)** MS/SG: Establish peer review panels, co-led by MS and the Secretariat, to assess follow-through and reinforce accountability.

4. Conclusion: Anchoring Reform in Shared Ownership

The central lesson of UN reform is that design matters less than ownership. Even the most technically sound proposals falter when they are perceived as Secretariat-driven or lacking legitimacy. UN80 risks repeating this cycle unless it is anchored in deliberate political investment by member states.

The current window is both narrow and decisive. With UNGA 80 underway, and in the immediate aftermath of the General Debate, attention is unusually concentrated, and delegations are seeking signals that the initiative can be genuinely member-state driven. Resolution 79/318 has provided a late but valuable anchor, yet the fragile consensus behind its adoption underscores the volatility of the political landscape. Building on this base now requires consistent opportunities for engagement and transparent follow-up.

Anchoring reform requires a structured approach across substance, scope, modalities, and dynamics. Substantively, reforms must be clearly categorized so delegations know when and how to engage. In terms of scope, distributed leadership through focal points can sustain continuity and mobilize capitals. On modalities, predictable dialogues and feedback loops can normalize participation and reduce suspicion. Finally, on decision dynamics, empowering those who frame debates—co-facilitators, committee chairs, and influential permanent representatives—ensures that ownership is real rather than rhetorical.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation has provided an initial indication of what this balance looks like in practice. By combining openness, inclusivity, and member state ownership with constructive support from the Secretariat, it has shown that trust can be rebuilt around process design. Replicating this approach across other UN80 workstreams would not only protect the Secretary-General from political exposure but also signal that the UN is capable of embodying the principles it promotes globally. If this model is sustained, UN80 could be remembered not as another cycle of performative change and procedural stasis, but as a moment when political will and institutional renewal converged.

Endnotes

1. UN80 Initiative. “UN80 Initiative.” *United Nations*. Accessed October 1, 2025. https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/en.

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16. *The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly* embody amendments and additions adopted by the General Assembly up to and including its 76th session. They contain 163 rules, an introduction, an explanatory note, and eleven annexes. See United Nations General Assembly, *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly,* A/520/Rev.20 (2021), accessed October 1, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/520/Rev.20.

17. For more details, see United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations, *GA Handbook: A Practical Guide to the United Nations, 2017,* which includes a section on the General Committee: its composition, remit over agenda, recommendations, etc, accessed October 1, 2025, https://unitar.org/sites/default/files/media/publication/doc/un_pga_new_handbook_0.pdf.

18. Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, "The President of the General Assembly of the United Nations," *International Organization* 18, no. 2 (1964): 231-240, accessed October 1, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300011802. See also M. J. Peterson, "General Assembly," in *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations,* 2nd ed., ed. Thomas G. Weiss, and Sam Daws (eds), 2nd ed., ed, 2nd edn, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic), accessed October 1, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803164.013.6.

19. In recent years, the General Assembly has consistently strived to make its work more substantive and relevant. In its resolution 59/313, it significantly strengthened the role and powers of its president, and in 2019, it established an ad hoc working group dedicated to its own revitalization; see United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 59/313 (2005), *A Strengthened and Revitalized General Assembly*, accessed October 1, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/59/313; United Nations, "Functions and powers of the General Assembly," accessed October 1, 2025, https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml; and United Nations, "Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly," accessed October 1, 2025, https://www.un.org/en/ga/revitalization/index.shtml.

20. A "General Assembly strategic dialogue" refers to various interactive discussions held by the General Assembly or in conjunction with it to address key global issues and formulate policy. Examples include informal interactive dialogues with the Peacebuilding Commission on architecture reviews; see Security Council Report, "Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Informal Interactive Dialogue of the General Assembly and Security Council with the Peacebuilding Commission," May 2025, accessed October 1, 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/05/peacebuilding-architecture-review-informal-interactive-dialogue-of-the-general-assembly-and-security-council-with-the-peacebuilding-commission.php; and United Nations, "Global Digital Compact

An open, safe and secure digital future for all - AI Panel and Dialogue," accessed October 1, 2025, https://www.un.org/global-digital-compact/en/ai.

21. The practice was initiated in 2010 with "Security Council horizon scanning" briefing sessions to inform the Security Council on potential or emerging threats to international peace and security, aligning with the Council's role in conflict prevention under Article 99 of the UN Charter. These proactive briefings, led by the then Department of Political Affairs (now DPPA), aimed to provide a forward-looking assessment of potential crises, enabling the Council to prepare for and potentially prevent conflicts rather than just managing them; see United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), "Security Council Briefings," accessed October 1, 2025, https://dppa.un.org/en/briefings/all.