
What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do to Support National Prevention Strategies?

Center on International Cooperation
New York University

Céline Monnier
Senior Program Officer

Sophie Rutenbar
Visiting Scholar

Betty N. Wainaina
Program Director

Marta Bautista Forcada
Program Officer

Natalie Briggs
Program Officer

**Center on
International
Cooperation**

 NYU | ARTS & SCIENCE

November 2024

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 4

**1. Increasing Interest in National Prevention Strategies:
What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do? 8**

**2. Unpacking Different Opportunities for the Commission
to Support National Prevention Strategies 11**

2.1 Fostering buy-in for prevention 11

**2.2 Exchanging good practices and lessons learned on
national prevention strategies 15**

2.3 Coordinated and coherent support to NPS 24

2.4 Making the case for financing NPS 36

**3. Transversal Challenges and Opportunities to Strengthen
the Commission's Support to NPS 50**

3.1 Transversal challenges 50

3.2 Transversal opportunities 53

Endnotes 58

Acknowledgments

This paper was funded thanks to the generous support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authors also thank the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office colleagues, Habib Mayar, Deputy General Secretary at the G7+ Secretariat, and Margaret Williams, Associate Director, SGDI6+, Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, for reviewing this paper. Editorial support was provided by Symphony Chau and Thibault Chareton.

About the Center on International Cooperation (CIC)

The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at [New York University](#) (NYU) is a research center and think tank that, for over two decades, has been a leader in applied policy, connecting politics, security, justice, development, and humanitarian issues. Our mission is to inform and strengthen collaborative approaches and/or collaboration among national governments, international organizations, and the wider policy community to build trust, prevent and respond to crises—and advance peace, justice, and inclusion at all levels. Learn more on [our website](#) and @nyuCIC on social media.

© New York University Center on International Cooperation, All Rights Reserved, 2024.

Executive Summary

Over the past few years, **national prevention strategies (NPS) have risen on the United Nations (UN) political agenda**. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres advocated for their universal adoption in his *New Agenda for Peace*, while member states, through the *Pact for the Future*, pledged to develop them. In parallel, member states have shown an **increased interest in using the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC, or “Commission”) to discuss NPS**.

This report explores how the PBC can provide effective support to member states on NPS in four areas: fostering buy-in for prevention, exchanging good practices, coordinating support, and financing.

I. Fostering buy-in for prevention

Developing and implementing an NPS demands broad and sustained political and societal commitment at the country level, as addressing the multifaceted and deeply rooted causes of violence requires the active involvement of diverse national and local stakeholders. However, countries are rarely homogenous in their understanding of and willingness to invest time and efforts in prevention. **National actors can leverage the PBC to foster buy-in for prevention domestically** by publicizing PBC meetings and organizing country visits to raise awareness about the importance of investing time and efforts in prevention. Additionally, by showcasing the universal relevance of prevention approaches, the PBC can be used to **normalize prevention** globally and address member states' concerns by showing that prevention is both of universal relevance and sovereignty-enhancing. The opportunity for member states to receive support for their efforts through the PBC can also **create incentives** for national actors to develop NPS.

II. Exchanging good practices and lessons learned on NPS

Developing an effective NPS is complex and context-specific, but some lessons might be more broadly applicable. The PBC can serve as a platform for member states to share good practices. Given that the PBC is first and foremost a political body and the current lack of shared understanding of what a successful NPS entails—the so-called good practices discussed at the PBC run the risk of not being evidence-based. This may create the risk of legitimizing strategies that are not effective and ultimately undermine trust in prevention. To ensure a more evidence-

based approach, the PBC could explore opportunities to strengthen conditions for **informed engagement by member states** by providing enough time, substantive guidance, and strategic opportunities for diplomats in New York to consult ahead of and during PBC meetings with their experts in capital as well as external experts on prevention (e.g., research institutions, practitioners). The PBC could also support the exchange of good practices outside New York, including by organizing cross-regional field visits. Additionally, the **UN can provide more support** for evidence-based discussions on NPS. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)—including the Peacebuilding Impact Hub—could accompany and provide expertise to countries interested in developing an evidence-based NPS, including by developing evidence-based products. In particular, the PBC could serve as a repository for a toolbox to support NPS, building on the broader expertise in prevention within and outside of the UN system.

Finally, the PBC membership could **develop a shared understanding of how a NPS can be successful in preventing violence**. Effective NPS have to respond to the following conundrum: how to ensure national ownership and an evidence-based approach simultaneously. The PBC is an ideal body to meet the first condition. But there are currently no limits on what member states can call an NPS, which—as mentioned above—can erode trust in prevention as a credible and impactful approach. To address this concern, some member states interviewed suggested identifying some minimum criteria or parameters for effective and evidence-based NPS while maintaining a focus on national ownership and flexibility. The report also explores the pros and cons of having a voluntary, nationally owned reporting system on NPS at the PBC, drawing inspiration from the 2030 Agenda Voluntary National Reviews (VNR). Alternatively, member states could report on their NPS in their VNRs to explore how the NPS supports the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG16.1.

III. Coordinated and coherent support to national prevention strategies

The PBC can play a significant role in strengthening the coherence of multilateral actors' support for NPS. Among other options, the PBC **could complement the work of the Security Council** by providing quality and timely advice on how peace operations can support NPS to prevent violence in areas of host countries that have not yet experienced conflict or how effective transitions can establish the foundations for sustaining peace. A member state seeking support for its NPS

could also submit a **request for assistance through the PBC to the General Assembly**, recommending the secretary-general to develop options for a tailored package of support. Additionally, the PBC could provide advice to subsidiary committees of the General Assembly, for example to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, about the contributions of peacekeeping operations to NPS. The PBC can also leverage development efforts to support NPS by **drawing on the expertise of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)**'s expert-led subsidiary bodies and/or by encouraging the boards of the various UN agencies, funds and programmes (AFPs)—through the ECOSOC—to mandate their organizations to support NPS. Beyond the main UN organs, the PBC can also **improve coordination with regional and sub-regional organizations**, particularly to vertically link national, regional, and global prevention strategies under the leadership of national authorities. Finally, the PBC can provide a space for member states to discuss opportunities to address exogenous shocks and exogenous root causes of violence that might undermine the effectiveness of their NPS.

IV. Making the case for financing national prevention strategies

The PBC could play a role in making the case to various donors for NPS financing, including from national funding, bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, and other international financial institutions (IFIs). However, various factors may limit the PBC's role as a forum for mobilizing financing for NPS, including the fact that participants in PBC meetings are usually not financing decision-makers and do not have the technical expertise to analyze and assess NPS. NPS are also often part of broader national development strategies, which makes it difficult to isolate financing for specific strategic objectives. Despite those challenges, the PBC could strengthen collaboration between the UN, IFIs and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), bilateral donors, and foundations by providing a space to:

- (a) Allow member states to showcase their national interest in prevention so that IFIs and MDBs can make the case to their board for upstream support;
- (b) Build a common understanding of what prevention is and how to measure it;
- (c) Highlight opportunities for complementarity of efforts; and
- (d) Sound the alarm when a country faces structural challenges that undermine its stability (such as debt distress or massive currency devaluation).

The PBF and the PBC are also well-placed to act in a complementary manner to support NPS. For instance, the PBF could support the development of NPS, which

the PBC could highlight to mobilize additional funding from the World Bank's Prevention and Resilience Allocation Facility (PRA), which requires the existence of a national prevention strategy as one criterion for funding. The links between the PBC and PBF could also be strengthened, including by allowing countries that present their NPS to the PBC to receive special consideration for PBF funding and organizing an annual meeting on PBF financing for NPS.

Preconditions to strengthen PBC support to NPS

For the PBC to effectively support NPS, two key preconditions must be met, applicable across the four areas outlined above. First, member states need to **establish a shared, evidence-based understanding of the factors essential for the success of NPS** and ensure that the PBC provides targeted support to help meet these conditions. Second, member states should **enhance the PBC's capacity** to support NPS by increasing the financial and human resources of the PBSO's PBC Support Branch. Additionally, the format of PBC meetings should be improved to facilitate evidence-based discussions, ensure greater engagement, schedule meetings further in advance, and enable holistic support and sustained follow-up. To demonstrate its potential, the PBC could pilot a proof of concept by working closely with a few selected countries, measuring its impact in supporting NPS.

1. Increasing Interest in National Prevention Strategies: What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do?

Over the past several years, **national prevention strategies have risen on the United Nations political agenda.** In his New Agenda for Peace, the UN secretary-general encouraged all member states to develop such strategies, and most recently, in the Pact for the Future adopted in September 2024, member states agreed to strengthen and implement existing NPS and to consider developing them where they do not exist. These changes represent a shift towards a more universal approach, recognizing that no country is immune from violence and that prevention is relevant for all. The Pact further specifies that to support this effort, the UN system will provide assistance to member states, upon their request, to build national capacity to promote, develop, and implement national prevention efforts. Notably, member states agreed to make greater use of the Peacebuilding Commission to support nationally-owned prevention efforts.

In parallel, there has been an **increase in interest in using the PBC to discuss NPS** among member states, and—given that the PBC is anchored in national ownership—very little pushback. The Commission has been traditionally focused on post-conflict contexts, whereas NPS open opportunities to discuss ***more upstream contexts***. For the purposes of this paper, we will consider NPS as dealing with contexts where no conflict has occurred in the recent past, as well as violence more broadly, including, for instance, the prevention of violent extremism in high-income countries. Prevention strategies can also be implemented in conflict-affected countries but ***in areas of the countries that have remained peaceful***, as well as to ***prevent relapse into conflict***.

The PBC's mandate is to bring sustained international attention to sustaining peace, provide political accompaniment upon request to specific countries, promote integrated approaches, bridge the role of different UN organs, and convene all relevant actors within and outside the UN to increase coordination, exchange good practices, and ensure predictable financing.¹ **The PBC is thus an easy first step to ask for multilateral support for NPS.**

Member states have already started **discussing NPS at the PBC**. In March 2024, the PBC organized a meeting on “National Efforts for Prevention and Peacebuilding,” which covered the prevention of different forms of violence,² and during the same month, Mauritania presented its own prevention efforts.³ Before that, the Commission reported, as a new initiative in 2023, considering support for the preparation of national strategies for conflict prevention and their implementation⁴. Additionally, the recent open debates on Conflict Prevention at the UN Security Council, organized under the presidency of Japan in March 2024 and under the presidency of Sierra Leone in August 2024, foreshadow that member states will continue to use the PBC to discuss their NPS. **This report thus explores what the PBC can offer that is of added value for member states to strengthen their NPS.**

The first step in **identifying opportunities for the PBC to support NPS effectively** is to understand what makes NPS effective. Some key elements that such strategies should be are anchored in strong political and social commitment, evidence-based, holistic, and adequately resourced to ensure their implementation and sustainability. This report addresses four ways the PBC can support NPS, drawing on these elements. The first section discusses how **the PBC can strengthen buy-in for prevention**. Developing an NPS is not solely a technical exercise, and the strategy’s success will rely on the willingness of national actors to implement it and, in some cases, of international partners to support it. Second, the report delves into opportunities for **the PBC to be used to exchange good practices** on NPS. Preventing violence is complex and multifaceted. While each context is different, and therefore, NPS cannot follow a templated approach, some common conditions for effective strategies may apply across contexts. This section unpacks opportunities and challenges for the PBC to create a space for member states to discuss conditions for successful NPS. Third, NPS are a system of efforts that address multiple root causes of violence¹ and seek to strengthen resilience. To do

¹ The terms ‘root causes’ are often used in policy discussions but there is no shared definition. CIC prefers the terms risk factors and protective factors. Prevention is not only about addressing risk factors but also about strengthening protective factors. A risk factor is a variable that precedes armed violence and **increases** the likelihood of its occurrence. A protective factor is a variable that precedes armed violence and **decreases** the likelihood of its occurrence. More in “Understanding Risk and Protective Factors,” in David P. Farrington and Brandon C. Welsh, “Saving Children from a Life of Crime: Early Risk Factors and Interventions,” *Studies in Crime Policy* (May 24, 2012): 17–36, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304091.003.0012>. In this report, while we are using the term ‘root causes’ because it is used more in policy discussions, we are also assigning it the same meaning as risk and protective factors. For more information, see: Joanne Richards, “Connecting Evidence and Policy for the Prevention of Armed Violence: New Tools for Practitioners and Policymakers,” *Center on*

so, **coordinated support** is paramount. This third section discusses how the PBC can draw support from different branches and partners of the UN, in particular, the General Assembly (GA), ECOSOC and the Security Council. The last section discusses if and how **the PBC can mobilize funding for NPS**. For each section, this report presents several options that can be considered to strengthen the PBC's role in supporting and helping finance NPS.

After considering these four avenues for supporting NPS through the PBC, the report then considers transversal challenges. The first one is **the impact of universality**. While both the secretary-general's New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future highlight the importance of preventing all forms of violence and the universality of prevention, the question that arises is whether the PBC has the capacity to support NPS through a universal approach. The second transversal challenge is the issue of **continuity**, as developing an NPS is a complex and long-term endeavor that may require sustained support. Thus, ensuring continuity of engagement and support for NPS at the PBC is critical. The report concludes by stressing some additional transversal recommendations that can be considered during the upcoming Peacebuilding Architecture Review in 2025.

This report is based on close to sixty interviews with members of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), PBSO, the World Bank, Regional Development Banks, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), UN Development Coordination Office (DCO), UN Development Programme (UNDP), and civil society organizations.

International Cooperation at New York University, November 4, 2024, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/connecting-evidence-and-policy-for-the-prevention-of-armed-violence-new-tools-for-practitioners-and-policymakers/>.

2. Unpacking Different Opportunities for the Commission to Support National Prevention Strategies

2.1 Fostering buy-in for prevention

Developing a national prevention strategy is not a mere technical exercise. **Ownership from political actors and the wider society is the cornerstone on which the success of an NPS depends.** Indeed, given that violence is multicausal and that the root causes of violence are diverse (e.g., negative childhood experiences,⁵ access to land and land property rights,⁶ police legitimacy⁷), a wide variety of actors need to be involved in addressing the root causes of violence. In addition, the commitment to addressing root causes needs to be sustained over time, as many of these factors can take decades to subside (e.g., decreasing inequality between groups). Thus, NPS are an instrument to engage a broad array of stakeholders—from government ministries to the individual level—to address the drivers of violence over a long period of time.⁸

However, countries are rarely homogenous in their understanding of and willingness to invest time and efforts in prevention. Additionally, election cycles can bring in new governments who may choose to discontinue support for NPS. Without political will and commitment from a broad array of actors, prevention strategies will not be implemented. It is thus critical to explore opportunities to strengthen and sustain political and social commitment, and the PBC could be a tool for some member states to strengthen domestic buy-in.

Political buy-in for prevention at the international level, particularly at the UN, is also key to **ensuring the development and implementation of NPS.** While each context is specific, preventing violence from happening is a challenge that all countries have to face. Intergovernmental fora are thus a key platform for encouraging all countries to adopt NPS. Additionally, through negotiations, member states can issue a clear mandate to the UN system to support NPS effectively when a government requests it. However, until recently, discussing

prevention at the UN was thorny. While most member states would likely agree with the saying that an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure, member states have expressed concerns that the UN prevention agenda could be used to meddle in their internal affairs or that prevention efforts could be stigmatizing, as some observers might take them to signal that a country is at risk of falling into conflict.⁹

To address these concerns, the secretary-general, in his New Agenda for Peace, has pushed for a more universal approach to prevention and insisted that these efforts be nationally led. In particular, the secretary-general emphasized that “instability, violence and the potential for conflict are not restricted to only a few States, as growing risks, while differentiated, exist in developed, middle income and developing States alike.”¹⁰ Member states have subsequently emphasized the importance of a universal approach to prevention through their statements at Security Council open debates.¹¹ In the Pact for the Future, they also broadened the focus of NPS from conflict to violence, in line with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 target to reduce all forms of violence. In the context of these efforts, the PBC can also play an important role and contribute to normalizing and destigmatizing prevention, which in turn would allow for more incentives to develop NPS and access to better support when relevant. The following sections discuss options for the PBC to be a forum to foster buy-in for prevention, both at the national and international levels.

2.1.1 Options for the PBC to foster buy-in for prevention

a) Using the PBC to strengthen, broaden, and sustain domestic commitment to NPS

Some member states are using the PBC as part of their efforts to strengthen political and social support domestically, as well as to hold themselves accountable to international and regional actors—particularly ahead of a political transition. The mere fact that a member state decides to present their NPS in front of the PBC can have an impact by encouraging the government to take a position and discuss prevention issues in-country. Additionally, once a meeting takes place, it can be publicized at home. Timor-Leste, for instance, broadly communicated about their 2022 meeting at the PBC¹² on local media outlets¹³ as well as social media¹⁴ in national and local languages, showcasing the importance of their prevention efforts to a

domestic audience. Similarly, a PBC country visit can also foster commitment at the national level, for instance, by encouraging collaboration across ministries or raising local communities' awareness about the importance of investing time and effort in peacebuilding and prevention.

Conversations at the PBC, even when they are not focused on a delegate's own country, may also be an opportunity to **raise awareness about prevention at the capital level**. When delegates in New York ask for inputs from their counterparts in capitals, the request may encourage all parties to think strategically about their national prevention efforts, potentially triggering domestic interest and engagement. Member states and PBSO could, therefore, build on these efforts by discussing best practices for using the PBC to strengthen national ownership at the country level, particularly through effective communication strategies.

b) Using the PBC to normalize, address concerns, and create incentives for NPS internationally

The PBC can also play an important role in strengthening global political buy-in for prevention. First, the Commission can be used as a forum to **normalize NPS**. The PBC can engage governments at a high level through the organization of ministerial meetings to raise awareness about the importance of prevention, the need to adopt evidence-based approaches, including through peer learning, and the need to facilitate a connection between countries to partner on these issues. During these meetings, the PBC can also allow member states to showcase that many of them have already acknowledged domestically the need to prevent violence and develop prevention strategies in different shapes and forms.

Second, the PBC can be used to **address** member states' concerns, particularly to destigmatize the prevention agenda by showcasing that no country is immune to violence and that prevention is universally relevant. Presentations from countries such as Norway—where violence levels are low and unlikely to fall into conflict in the near term—contribute to establishing a new narrative, where prevention efforts are not a sign of vulnerability but rather a routine activity relevant for any country. Member states reported that the March 22, 2024 meeting on “National Efforts for Prevention and

Peacebuilding”¹⁵ emphasized the universality of prevention and was an important step in destigmatizing prevention.

Presenting NPS in front of the PBC is an opportunity to address another central concern about the prevention agenda: the fear that prevention will be used to meddle in internal affairs. By using the PBC, member states can present their national priorities to steer multilateral and bilateral aid and support their vision for prevention. In turn, the PBC, through its advisory role, can encourage the Security Council to better reflect host countries’ national approaches in its discussions and peace operations mandates.

Third, the PBC can contribute to **creating incentives** for member states to develop and strengthen their strategies. In particular, many member states perceive that presenting their efforts to the Commission will increase the likelihood of receiving concrete support. Furthermore, interviews reveal that presenting NPS in front of the PBC can convey a sense of prestige, given that the public appearance represents an opportunity to influence peers by showcasing success and positioning countries as thematic leaders. The opportunity to present their NPS to the PBC can become a powerful incentive for member states to develop and evaluate their NPS.

An option to use the PBC to strengthen political buy-in for prevention is thus to continue organizing meetings on NPS at the PBC. This way, member states can use the Commission to communicate among themselves and **develop a norm whereby prevention is a routine activity that all countries undertake in some shape or form**, no matter their income level, perceived stability, or other descriptive factors. These meetings can be used strategically to address member states’ concerns about the prevention agenda and to create incentives for prevention. This, in turn, may increase member states’ willingness to develop their NPS, discuss prevention at the UN, and receive support for prevention when relevant, without fear of being stigmatized or concern that their national priorities will be disregarded.

2.2 Exchanging good practices and lessons learned on national prevention strategies

Countries frequently import good practices, norms, and standards from others. Exchanging good practices on peacebuilding is part of the core mandate¹⁶ of the PBC. The Commission could serve the same function for NPS; it could act as a marketplace where member states showcase their success and benefit from hearing inspiring practices from others. Member states could also discuss shared challenges and exchange lessons learned. This approach could allow them to strengthen their NPS by learning from their peers. The PBC is arguably the best intergovernmental forum to hold such discussions. Since the Commission is anchored in national ownership, member states do not have the same fear of intervention that they may have with the Security Council. While exchanging good practices in front of the General Assembly could facilitate broader participation of the membership, the Commission allows member states to exchange good practices when they want to, rather than being mandated to report in front of the General Assembly. Thus, the PBC has the added value of being voluntary and anchored in political will to have those discussions, which, when appearing before the General Assembly, could become a tick-the-box exercise.¹⁷

The format of Commission meetings to exchange good practices and lessons learned could vary. Member states could decide to hold thematic conversations or present their own country's context. When it has been difficult for member states to agree on holding thematic conversations at the PBC in recent years, member states have shared their experiences among smaller groups of countries instead. For instance, in June 2023, during the PBC meeting on Indigenous Peoples, Peace and Reconciliation, Canada, Colombia, and Norway shared good practices and challenges in addressing Indigenous issues to reduce violence and ensure inclusive peacebuilding.¹⁸ When a small group presents their NPS, member states in the audience can also share their own good practices and lessons learned. For instance, when Kenya, Norway, and Timor-Leste presented their strategies, Denmark and Nepal also shared their experience from the floor.

However, exchanging good practices at the PBC also comes with challenges. **The PBC is, first and foremost, a political body** that might not have the technical expertise to discuss effective practices to prevent violence. Member states may be unclear about what an NPS entails, given that the concept is relatively new to the

UN,¹⁹ and there is no shared understanding of what such strategies may look like in practice. Additionally, while national ownership is a *sine qua non* condition for prevention strategies to be effective, it is not a sufficient condition. Such strategies also need to be anchored in evidence of what works to effectively prevent violence.

In addition, given the political nature of the Commission, as well as the current lack of a shared understanding of what a successful NPS entails, **the so-called good practices discussed at the PBC run the risk of not being evidence-based.** The PBC could potentially be instrumentalized for self-promotion or even “whitewashing” or could be used to rebrand business as usual as prevention (e.g., a sole focus on development activities, human rights, or security without any clear theory of change of how these specific efforts will contribute to preventing violence).²⁰ Some member states fear that the PBC might be used to push for various member state agendas, such as increasing financing for development, or thematic priorities—such as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS); Youth, Peace and Security (YPS); and climate security—rather than adopting a holistic approach to prevention. Finally, PBC members may also lack sufficient trust in their counterparts to share genuine lessons learned. The different implications of the PBC being a political body enumerated above may create the **risk of legitimizing strategies that are not effective and ultimately undermining trust in prevention.**

The current lack of clarity about what NPS entails may also lead to a **lack of comparability** between the different NPS presented. In the March 22, 2024 PBC meeting, Timor-Leste presented a series of prevention and sustaining peace efforts; Norway, its strategy on countering violent extremism; and Kenya, its comprehensive review of its peacebuilding architecture. These efforts might appear miscellaneous and could limit opportunities for member states to learn from each other. On the other hand, the lack of a definition for NPS has the benefit of leaving room for member states to define what NPS mean in their context. Nevertheless, interviews reveal that some member states adopt a very **literal understanding of a national prevention strategy**, which disincentivizes them from presenting any efforts not labeled as such. For instance, a country with a national prevention strategy that does not seek to prevent all forms of violence might feel that they are not qualified to present in front of the PBC when, in fact, they could share sectoral prevention strategies (e.g., preventing violent extremism [PVE] national action plans or social cohesion strategies) or local strategies (e.g., violence prevention in cities). Further unpacking what NPS might entail could help member states move away from the perception that NPS have to follow a template.²¹

Without unpacking the options for NPS, member states unfortunately might discard systems of efforts that address root causes of violence under different labeling.

Member states also report that **the level of discussion at the PBC is usually too general to be useful**. In particular, delegates—often not experts on NPS—may only be able to read pre-made statements rather than react to the presentations or participate in an active discussion. The focus on pre-prepared statements begs the question of intention: are member states really trying to exchange good practices or just engaging in inspiring storytelling? The PBC may remain a challenging place to exchange good practices on NPS. However, if member states decide to use the PBC this way, the section below elaborates on potential options to ensure a stronger and more evidence-based approach to exchanging lessons learned on NPS.

2.2.1 Options for the PBC to allow for the exchange of good practices on NPS

a) Strengthening conditions for evidence-based engagement among member states

Member states have the opportunity to cultivate an evidence-based approach when discussing good practices on NPS at the PBC. In addition to presenting examples anchored in evidence, member states can also react to other member states who do not. Such reactions will probably disincentivize the most extreme forms of whitewashing,²² but they may not be enough to encourage evidence-based discussions. Expertise on NPS is not usually held by diplomats in New York—who answer to their country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs—but by their colleagues in capitals. To participate constructively in PBC meetings on good practices, diplomats in New York need to seek technical input from their capitals. However, acquiring this information might take time, particularly since NPS often involve multiple ministries. Unfortunately, PBC meetings are often scheduled too late to allow for extensive national consultations. To allow member states to play a greater role in ensuring evidence-based discussions on NPS, the PBC could:

- **Provide better opportunities for member states to engage with their experts in capital.** The PBC meetings should be scheduled further in

advance to provide enough time for member states to consult with their capitals. PBSO—potentially by relying on the Peacebuilding Impact Hub²³—could also provide more evidence-based guidance to help member states identify what constitutes good practices in their context so they can share their own lessons learned from the floor. This would help member states better understand what to request from capitals, ensure more comparability during the discussion, and thus facilitate more opportunities to find relevant practices across contexts. In turn, this would likely lead to more specific conversations and more specific reporting.

- **See the PBC as a starting point for a conversation, rather than the conversation itself.** Even if very general, the presentations at the PBC could be an opportunity for member states in the audience to identify potential topics of interest. After the initial meeting, through the right representatives and bilateral meetings, they could organize additional and more in-depth conversations.
- **Draw from non-member state expertise.** Member states could also draw expertise on NPS from non-governmental sources such as academic institutions and think tanks. Given its convening role, the Commission could organize a series of meetings on NPS, inviting think tanks, academics, and other experts to discuss both country-specific contexts and/or good practices. In particular, the PBC Organization Committee could develop good practices and lessons learned under the responsibility of one of the vice-chairs. Experts and think tanks should be consulted cross-regionally when relevant to reflect a diversity of views. In country-specific contexts, the PBC could convene experts—scholars and practitioners—to offer tailored technical expertise on prevention to countries that wish to develop their NPS. Member states could then use the PBC to ask for support in implementing experts' recommendations. Alternatively, or additionally, the PBC could establish a network of prevention experts or even establish a permanent panel of experts²⁴ to draft recommendations on NPS, which would operate upon request from the country engaged.^{25, 26}
- **Encourage exchanges of good practices outside New York.** Given the abovementioned constraints, PBC meetings in New York might not be ideal for exchanging good practices. Instead, the PBC could organize cross-regional field visits to ensure more in-depth learning. This would

require an increase of the PBC's budget and PBSO's capacity to support these missions, to be approved by the General Assembly.

b) Strengthening UN support for evidence-based discussions on NPS

The UN could also provide support to member states to engage in more evidence-based discussions on NPS. Some of the opportunities are:

- **Accompanying specific countries.** The newly created Peacebuilding Impact Hub could accompany and provide expertise to countries interested in developing an evidence-based NPS approach through the PBC. However, the Impact Hub is funded through voluntary contributions, so a substantial increase in the volume or depth of support provided by the Hub will require a corresponding increase in resourcing.
- **PBSO could develop evidence-based products.** PBSO could provide reinforced secretariat services to the PBC, including by translating PBC meeting discussions into relevant best practices products. Unfortunately, the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch does not have a knowledge management unit and has limited human resources. Thus, PBSO and the PBC Chair currently only have sufficient capacity to provide a summary of meetings but not a deeper analysis. Therefore, there is currently no space to capture, analyze, and develop the good practices collected during the meetings. Member states could either consider reinforcing PBSO's knowledge management capacity and increasing staff to support the PBC or supporting a think tank or a network of think tanks to produce this analysis.
- **The PBC could be a repository for a toolbox to support NPS.** The secretary-general's *New Agenda for Peace* recommends that member states "seeking to establish or strengthen national infrastructures for peace should be able to access a tailor-made package of support and expertise." Given that infrastructure for peace can be a form of NPS, the PBC could ask PBSO to develop such a toolbox—potentially involving the Peacebuilding Impact Hub, other parts of the UN system whose expertise is relevant for prevention, and external experts on prevention—which member states could use on a voluntary basis to design and support the implementation of NPS.

c) Developing a shared understanding on conditions for success

Effective NPS have to respond to the following conundrum: how to ensure national ownership and an evidence-based approach simultaneously. Both of these conditions are essential for success. National ownership allows context-specificity and ensures buy-in for implementation. Additionally, NPS should be evidence-based to effectively prevent violence. A national prevention strategy label is insufficient for the strategy to be effective; the strategy must concretely help national and local actors address the root causes of violence.²⁷

There are currently no limits on what member states can call a national prevention strategy. However, presenting so-called “good practices” that are not evidence-based in front of the PBC can actually do a disservice to the whole prevention agenda by eroding trust in what prevention efforts can achieve. To address this concern, some member states interviewed suggested **identifying some minimum criteria or parameters for effective and evidence-based NPS** while maintaining a focus on national ownership and flexibility.

While NPS will look different in different countries, some principles for violence prevention are universal. The PBC has highlighted in the past that, while there is no one-size-fits-all, some common principles are applicable across contexts.²⁸ Shared principles for effective prevention strategies could include, for instance, the fact that **violence is multicausal and requires an integrated approach**. Root causes are often tenacious and require **sustained efforts over extended periods of time**. Progress is non-linear, and all NPS will encounter periods of setbacks. The root causes of violence may also change, and NPS need to **be adaptive and iterative**. Minimum parameters could encourage countries developing and strengthening their NPS to ask themselves questions such as how is the country:

- Identifying and addressing the root causes of violence?
- Ensuring the sustainability of the approach?
- Coordinating among stakeholders?
- Adapting to external shocks?

These questions are universal, but their responses are context-specific. Focusing on these and similar questions would allow member states to

exchange good practices more effectively on universal challenges.²⁹ Any parameters established for NPS should be flexible **to allow for context-specificity** and respect national ownership, and **they should be anchored in evidence** of what works for effective NPS. The PBC is not a think tank but a political body, and it should, therefore, draw upon outside expertise to develop preliminary proposals for presentation to PBC member states. Interviewees highlighted different opportunities to define these parameters, including relying on an external cross-regional group of violence prevention experts, drawing from UN knowledge, requesting a secretary-general report, and involving capitals. Some also suggested letting member states use the PBC to present what they understand as their NPS and, once a critical mass of information has been created, to use that information inductively to identify shared parameters. Member states could agree on the need to adopt such parameters through an intergovernmental process, such as the Peacebuilding Architecture Review. Member states could also request the secretary-general to develop evidence-based parameters in a report inspired by the UN secretary-general's proposed guidelines for Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs)³⁰ (see Box 1 below).

Box 1: Reflections on a voluntary, nationally owned reporting system for the PBC

Ambassador Ivan Šimonović, Permanent Representative of Croatia to the UN, and former Chair of the Commission, has suggested that member states could use the Commission to present their NPS, using a model akin to the VNR or the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).³¹

Building on this idea, interviews with member states reveal that a **voluntary, nationally owned reporting system for NPS** has some appeal. Through this reporting system, member states could present their NPS, and report on progress, challenges and lessons learned at the PBC.

What it would look like: taking inspiration from the VNRs

A reporting system for NPS would be **distinct from the UPR** in several ways. First, the UPR is a mechanism of the Human Rights Council, where member states follow a mandatory reporting cycle in which they report on international treaty obligations and undergo a peer review of their human rights record.³² Also, the UPR process has a follow-up and recommendations system for the implementation of recommendations. In contrast, the reporting system for NPS would be voluntary and might not benefit from a mechanism to monitor implementation.

The reporting system could **draw more inspiration from the VNR** process, which takes place once a year at the High-level Political Forum (HLPF), under the auspices of the ECOSOC, where member states report on progress on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Member states could undertake a similar reporting but on their NPS at the PBC.

To report on the VNRs, member states follow guidelines, which were developed in a secretary-general report³³ and by UN DESA in the form of a handbook,³⁴ both of which are updated periodically. Similarly, member states could request the secretary-general or PBSO, to prepare a report proposing **guidelines for reporting on NPS**. In the VNR process, member states organize in-country consultations. The same approach could be used for the reporting on NPS, with the goal of encouraging all key stakeholders to discuss and evaluate their NPS to develop the report. Finally, the **UN system could provide support** to member states upon request to report on their NPS in a similar way that they do for VNRs. For VNRs, the UN provides support at the national (through UN Country Teams), regional (e.g., through UN Regional Commissions), and global (e.g., through UN DESA, UNDP, among others) levels. For NPS, support could be provided at the global (e.g., PBSO, DCO, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions [OROLSI]) and the national (e.g., UN Country Teams, including Peace and Development Advisors [PDAs] when deployed) levels.

Potential benefits of a reporting system

Such a reporting system could **strengthen political and social commitment** and galvanize in-country efforts for effective prevention. Member states would be encouraged to organize national consultations among key stakeholders to review their national prevention strategy. In the case that countries do not have a formalized strategy, this process could allow diverse stakeholders to identify potential components of a prevention strategy within a country (i.e.,

policies that address root causes of violence, but are not labeled as prevention (e.g., efforts to reduce marginalization of certain groups). This, in turn, could allow for the establishment of a coherent vision of a system of efforts to address diverse root causes and prevent violence. Member states could also use the guidance to assess their strategy's capacity to address the root causes of violence in the country and **strengthen their strategy when relevant.**³⁵ This assessment could also allow member states to use the PBC to request concrete support for their NPS. Following up on the presentations in New York could also contribute to the continuity of efforts to strengthen and implement NPS. At the international level, it would help **maintain interest in NPS, support the normalization and destigmatization of prevention, and showcase its universality.** It could also allow for a more effective exchange of good practices.

Potential drawbacks and challenges

This process does not come without drawbacks and challenges. First, reporting could be burdensome and expensive for countries. Member states may suffer from reporting fatigue or even fear of being monitored by the UN and may not have enough resources to engage in yet another reporting process. Second, given the voluntary nature of the guidelines, a reporting system could be used by some member states as a whitewashing exercise. Finally, the proposed reporting system could be duplicative of the existing VNR system, through which countries are reporting on SDG16 on Peaceful and Just Institutions and its 16.1 target on reducing all forms of violence.

Options

- **A voluntary reporting system for NPS** could take place in the PBC, with reporting scheduled throughout the year, which would give more flexibility to member states on when to report. Not all member states would need to report, but when member states request support for their prevention strategy, undergoing this process might allow them to better identify their needs. Alternatively, the reporting could take place during a specific time of the year, once or twice a year. Concentrating the reporting process in a week or a day could help focus the attention on NPS, as the HLPF does with sustainable development. This would also allow the Commission to focus on countries seeking specific support during the rest of the year.
- **Reporting on NPS in VNRs.** Member states could use their VNRs to showcase their NPS and explore how such strategies also support the implementation of the SDGs, such as SDG16.1. For example, Sierra Leone's 2024 VNR notes the establishment of the Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion as a key infrastructure for the implementation of SDG16,³⁶ which is a form of NPS. When reporting on SDG16 through the ECOSOC, countries could explore the links of prevention, peacebuilding, and development. This option, however, comes with some obstacles. Given the various issues that countries report on as there are 17 SDGs, the showcasing of NPS may not get mentioned in the report or oral presentation during HLPF and not get much attention. Also, not many countries may believe that NPS falls under the sustainable development framework and thus may not report on them. Finally, the 2030 "deadline" of the SDGs is fast approaching, but for now, the VNR process could be used in the medium term.

Alternatively, such guidelines could be developed through an internal Secretariat process.

The parameters could then be reflected in a document such as a General Assembly or ECOSOC resolution, a PBC dedicated document focused on those parameters, a PBC annual report, or a PBC roadmap for engagement on NPS. **To respect national ownership, the parameters should be used on a voluntary basis.** Given the evolving knowledge on NPS, such parameters **should also be updated periodically.** In turn, these parameters could guide reporting on NPS at the PBC, ensure comparability on good practices and lessons learned, and/or develop a UN toolkit to support NPS, drawing from the whole UN system.

2.3 Coordinated and coherent support to NPS

Coordination is a critical element of NPS and effective UN support for such strategies. Violence is multicausal: the root causes that an NPS seeks to address can be political (e.g., the exclusion of certain groups), economic (e.g., the unequal development of certain regions), security-related (e.g., government forces are weak and disorganized), interpersonal (e.g., violence against children that leads to other types of violence), or psychosocial (e.g., traumas that increase aggressive behavior), among others. These factors are cumulative and interconnected: isolated prevention efforts may have limited impact. Addressing multiple root causes of violence requires the engagement of multiple stakeholders at multiple levels, including local, national, regional, and international levels. Thus, NPS require a holistic approach to violence, and similarly, the UN system needs to be able to provide support across its different pillars in a coordinated way. In particular, the PBC must be able to work together with ECOSOC, the Security Council, and the General Assembly to provide coherent and complementary support.

The PBC's cross-cutting composition and bridging function make it a natural fit to holistically and coherently support NPS by working across intergovernmental and institutional mandates and domains under the leadership and guidance of national authorities. Indeed, the composition of the PBC represents an innovative coming together of the major member state organs enshrined in the UN Charter. The Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC each nominate seven of the PBC's 31 members, theoretically imbuing the PBC with connections to the

mandates of each Charter body. Informal coordinators nominated by each Charter body also serve to liaise between each Charter body and the PBC. As such, the PBC has the ability to serve as an entry point for advice and engagement spanning across the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the wider UN system, including UN country teams,³⁷ in addition to regional and sub-regional organizations, while still honoring the mandates of each respective body.

Thus, the PBC is particularly well-positioned to convene a range of actors to discuss relevant prevention issues, including tackling root causes of violence like rule of law or land reform, to strengthen specific NPS. The PBC is also well-positioned to **engage on the interlinkages between peace and development**, connecting the peace and security threats governed by the Security Council with the development issues handled by ECOSOC to ensure that both bodies fully consider the prevention issues that arise at this intersection.

Aside from PBSO, the PBC itself does not have any technical prevention capacity, but it could have a role in **helping member states find the support they need**. This includes actors with capabilities for helping design prevention strategies, addressing different forms of violence, helping build data collection and analysis systems, and supporting member states in addressing different root causes of violence.

The PBC is also well-placed to vertically **link national, regional, and international strategies**. For example, for a particular country on the PBC agenda, national leaders could share national strategies, relevant regional organizations could present on regional mechanisms to support the development of NPS, while briefers from international entities, like Security Council penholders, ECOSOC ad hoc advisory groups, or representatives of international financial institutions, could share information on their approaches, allowing the various levels of engagement to exchange and seek alignment. The link between NPS and regional strategies is particularly useful. While NPS should address root causes of violence, some of the root causes are exogenous, for example, the potential for conflict linked to regional transhumance and needs collaboration from the broader region. Regional prevention strategies can thus enhance the effectiveness of NPS.

In practice, however, this coordination does not come without challenges. Members do not necessarily see themselves as having a particular role simply

because a particular Charter entity nominated them. Additionally, the PBC's role as an advisory body means that PBC experts, not to mention PBC informal coordinators, are not full-time on PBC matters, limiting the PBC's capacity to ensure coherence across the work of the different UN organs. The lack of a shared understanding of what represents a root cause of violence and what an effective national prevention strategy entails also hinders coordination. Finally, at the moment, the PBC operates under the requirement of an extraordinarily high level of consensus, making it difficult to gain agreement regarding the provision of advice.

Nevertheless, the PBC's cross-cutting engagement and advisory role has the potential to play a critical role in strengthening the coherence and effectiveness of the UN system to support NPS. The sections below unpack a few options to make progress.

2.3.1 Options for the PBC to effectively engage UN Charter bodies to support NPS

a) Cross-cutting options for ensuring coherent and coordinated PBC support

Two improvements to the working methods of the PBC could help enhance PBC coordination and engagement with UN entities across the UN system. First, the PBC could adopt working methods that require a lower level of consensus or a more tailored level of consensus for different products. For example, the PBC could provide more dynamic, timely, and innovative written advice to bodies, including the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC, by adjusting the level or type of consensus required for these products, making them faster and easier to negotiate and better able to respond to developing dynamics. To respond to these changes in consensus requirements, certain products could reflect the full range of opinions in the PBC by sharing minority or supplementary opinions.

Similarly, enhanced use of the informal coordinator system could strengthen internal PBC coordination as well as coordination between the PBC and its parent bodies. In particular, making the informal coordinator system a full, regular, and formal part of internal PBC coordination efforts could help create a stronger sense of investment in the PBC by the Charter bodies, in

addition to improving communication with PBC members. Establishing an enhanced internal PBC coordination system could also help improve the retention of knowledge of past practices by improving handovers between PBC membership classes.

The PBC should also consider ways to draw on the expertise of the Peacebuilding Contact Group. In particular, to support the PBC's coordination efforts, PBSO could work with the Peacebuilding Contact Group to carry out a mapping of UN system actors with relevant expertise in prevention. This would help ensure the PBC can point member states in the right direction and lay a foundation for the “toolbox” of support to NPS.

b) Ensure complementarity between the PBC and the Security Council

In the area of NPS, the **PBC and the Security Council have the potential to complement each other** in a number of ways, including through the PBC's provision of advice to the Security Council.

The Security Council should particularly make use of the fact that some countries, especially post-conflict countries, view the PBC as a forum more rooted in national ownership. The PBC does not possess coercive tools like sanctions or peacekeeping operations, but instead is a setting where countries can seek support for challenges that fall short of a threat to international peace and security. The PBC shares suggestions rather than commands, and through its advisory role, it promotes interactive, broad-based dialogue that has the potential to contribute to more inclusive analysis. As such, discussions at the PBC benefit from countries' greater willingness to engage with the PBC, meaning that the PBC has the potential to provide the Security Council with well-coordinated technical insights that bring in historically underrepresented viewpoints, as well as sharing with the Security Council the collective aspirations of conflict-affected and developing countries. This includes, in particular, the viewpoint of national actors, as well as their capacity to address root causes of violence, which is critical to strengthening the role of peace operations in peacebuilding.

Advising the Security Council regarding peace operations represents a central opening for the PBC regarding coordination on NPS. The Security Council, as mandated in the UN Charter, maintains primacy regarding issues on its agenda. However, the PBC is intended to look at the longer-term

sustainment of peace, including how to sustain peace after the departure of peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeepers and political offices have important roles to play in preventing conflict in the areas of host countries that have not yet experienced conflict, in addition to helping prevent the recurrence of conflict. The PBC is well-placed to ask the right questions of peacekeeping and special political missions to identify ways that they can more effectively contribute to NPS and prevention more broadly and to advise the Security Council accordingly.

The PBC is also well placed to **advise the Security Council on UN transitions**, which are a particularly critical time for prevention efforts. NPS should consider how to sustain the gains made by peacekeeping operations and special political missions after their departure, both by addressing the remaining root causes of violence while mitigating any potential disruption that might emerge from a transition. Moreover, both NPS and mission transitions involve a wide range of overlapping actors and stakeholders. If well calibrated, broad-based PBC engagement could contribute both to effective transitions as well as the development and implementation of NPS. For example, the PBC could engage with UN peace operations ahead of a transition to understand what root causes will remain after the operation's departure, in addition to what shocks might be created by the mission leaving and how NPS and transition plans can contribute to addressing them to sustain peace.

However, the PBC and the Security Council have not historically managed to make the most of these opportunities. **The Security Council should increase its formal and informal engagement with the PBC** and its formal and informal requests for advice on how to best contribute to NPS. Making use of regular informal interactive dialogues at the expert level and planning meetings further in advance can also increase the utility of exchanges on prevention and other topics.

In recent years, the Security Council has increasingly invited the PBC to provide advice in the form of written statements on specific country topics, including in relation to prevention.³⁸ To respond to this opportunity, the **PBC should ensure that its advice to the Security Council is of high quality**, timely, and anchored in national ownership. Yet the PBC is not a repository of technical knowledge but a political body. As such, it should convene

experts to engage on specific topics, develop political and technical advice about how the Security Council can increase coherence with other areas of responsibility in the UN system, and ensure that the system contributes to prevention and peacebuilding. The PBC also has a role to play by channeling and consolidating advice shared during PBC discussions, including from participants not part of the Security Council's meetings—including local and national actors, regional organizations, and IFIs.

c) Making the most of PBC and General Assembly comparative advantages

The General Assembly has a number of tools at its disposal that can complement the work of the PBC. For example, Article 11 of the Charter mandates the GA to discuss and issue recommendations on any international peace and security issue, including prevention. In fact, the General Assembly has a standing agenda item on “prevention of armed conflict,” which has been used on occasion to highlight relevant issues of concern,³⁹ such as the role of diamonds in fueling conflict, and which could be used to help develop additional tools to address root causes of violence that affect several contexts which member states could include in their NPS. Moreover, the General Assembly has the ability (although rarely used) to dispatch envoys of its own, or in rare cases, for peace operations.

Given the size and function of the GA, the opportunities for the PBC to coordinate GA technical assistance are somewhat more limited. For instance, a General Assembly meeting on a topic, given that the GA is composed of 193 member states, may not produce the same level of engagement, buy-in, or support as a meeting in a smaller forum. On the other hand, organizing a country-specific PBC meeting requires a country to request the meeting or to join the PBC's agenda, indicating some level of national ownership.

The PBC and the General Assembly could make better use of existing mechanisms to work together when the Security Council faces difficulty reaching an agreement.

For example, a Member State seeking support for its NPS could **submit a request for assistance through the PBC**, which would consider the request in a meeting on the topic. Subsequently: “... Following deliberations in the Peacebuilding Commission, the Chair would send a letter to the President of

the General Assembly conveying the request from the Member State and recommending the dispatch of a fact-finding mission by the Secretary-General to develop options for a tailored package of support. The endorsement of such a request by the General Assembly would trigger a strategic assessment to generate options for the UN configuration, which could include UNCT+ and light footprint models that build on the existing capacity of the UN in-country. These options would then be considered, along with their associated resource requirements, by the General Assembly."⁴⁰

Envoys and, in some instances, peace operations could be effective tools for addressing certain aspects of prevention, such as root causes like border disputes or regional issues like transhumance rights. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) is one example of a peace operation that has made slow progress over the years in addressing border disagreements and helping resolve a potential source of conflict.⁴¹ While NPS should consider national efforts to respond to exogenous root causes, regional prevention efforts can supplement NPS by creating region-wide response frameworks.

Additionally, a high-level General Assembly meeting could be organized to discuss the effective use of NPS to support prevention. The PBC could also provide advice to subsidiary committees of the General Assembly. For example, the PBC could provide an annual briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, better known as the C34, about the actual and potential contributions of peacekeeping operations to NPS, drawing on country briefings during the previous year about the development and implementation of NPS.

d) Ensuring coordinated PBC-ECOSOC approaches to support NPS and address the root causes of violence

A potential major comparative advantage of the PBC is its ability to engage with the ECOSOC. The two entities share fertile ground for collaboration: as a forum to discuss economic and social issues, the ECOSOC provides an opportunity to ensure support for the efforts of national actors to address root causes of violence through development efforts. In turn, peace is an important promoter of development. Projects addressing root causes such

as inequality can also contribute to both development and prevention objectives.

Despite these important links between the prevention and development agendas, **the connections between the bodies remain limited.** The ECOSOC and the PBC officially hold one joint meeting together a year on a different topic each year⁴² to increase coordination between the two bodies. The two bodies engage formally in other ways, including a briefing to the ECOSOC by the PBC Chair last year on “Experience in South Sudan: Promoting resilience and sustainable solutions in a complex and protracted crisis.”⁴³ The two bodies also engage informally, including last year an ambassadorial workshop on the linkages between development and peacebuilding, which was organized to foster a common understanding of language on peace and development across the PBC membership ahead of the annual joint ECOSOC-PBC meeting.

There are several opportunities for the PBC to expand on this collaboration and use the ECOSOC to support NPS. The relationship between the PBC and ECOSOC is shaped each year by a discussion between the PBC chair and the ECOSOC president, advised by the informal coordinator of the ECOSOC-appointed PBC member states. As such, there is a measure of flexibility to define and deepen the relationship to the extent that both bodies find it useful. The ECOSOC and the PBC could cooperate more frequently on issues at the intersection of peace and development, where many activities covered by NPS often land. First, thematically, the two entities could expand their areas of collaboration. For instance, one of the future annual meetings could focus on NPS.

Second, unlike the PBC, the ECOSOC has a number of expert-led subsidiary bodies. **The PBC can thus draw on the expertise of some of the ECOSOC’s expert-led subsidiary bodies**, like the Committee for Development Policy, which sets the criteria for Least Developed Country status, or the Permanent Forum on Indigenous People, to advise the political leadership engaged at the PBC about the interlinkages between peace and development. Additionally, the ECOSOC could **create a committee of experts in prevention strategies** to advise member states on good practices or provide specific support. Given that development in itself cannot be equated to prevention,⁴⁴ through this committee, the ECOSOC

could also explore more granularly what development efforts contribute to prevention. Additionally, given that understanding the root causes of violence is key for national actors to develop and strengthen NPS, the **ECOSOC could also explore opportunities to support member states through its Statistical Commission**. The Commission, which is responsible for setting statistical standards and the development of concepts and methods, including their implementation at the national level, could support national actors in developing systems to monitor the root causes of violence linked to development.⁴⁵

Third, both the PBC and ECOSOC are able to engage with UN AFPs. The AFPs are particularly critical in the context of NPS because, within their mandate, they have the capacity to support national actors in addressing specific root causes of violence. Thus, the ECOSOC could **integrate prevention and peacebuilding in their “operational activities of the UN for international development cooperation”**⁴⁶ segment or even hold a dedicated meeting during this segment on the linkages between development and prevention, or specifically NPS. Attention to these issues during the operational activities segment could help strengthen AFPs’ mandates in supporting NPS and addressing the root causes of violence. Going even further, the **ECOSOC could encourage the boards of the various AFPs to consider supporting NPS** and contributing prevention efforts in their country-level implementation.

Fourth, the PBC could also encourage the ECOSOC to **adopt an evidence-based resolution** describing elements for setting up effective NPS to support member states in their efforts on a voluntary basis. This was done in the past for crime prevention.⁴⁷ Additionally, to ensure broader buy-in past the 54 ECOSOC members, the Council could suggest to the General Assembly's Second or Third Committees that the resolution be considered for GA adoption as a way of developing and promulgating a coordinated and more effective approach to supporting NPS across the UN system.

e) Improving cooperation between the UN peacebuilding architecture and regional and sub-regional organizations

Partnerships between the PBC and regional and sub-regional organizations are also a potential area for ensuring complementarity and alignment while

enhancing each organization's comparative advantages in support of NPS. The PBC and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council recognized the importance of cooperation on prevention during their October 2024 joint annual meeting, where they "reaffirmed the need for increased support to the peacebuilding and national prevention plans of countries and regional organizations and for further strengthening of the strategic partnership between the two bodies to achieve durable peace."⁴⁸ Engagement with regional partners like the AU and with sub-regional organizations can bolster mutual accountability by aligning platforms for review of NPS and development of and action on NPS.

However, engagement with regional and sub-regional organizations is an area where the PBC continues to develop its efforts. In line with the PBC's convening and bridging roles, these partnerships can be further institutionalized by regularizing formal meetings and informal interactive dialogues between bodies, building on current mechanisms. In particular, the PBC partnership with the AU could be strengthened in relation to prevention issues pertaining to Africa, including through more regular annual consultations and joint visits between the PBC and the AU Peace and Security Council.

PBC engagement on African peace and security issues should also include regional economic and social commissions (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) in addition to the AU. As previously mentioned, regional prevention frameworks can supplement and support NPS by creating a coordinated, regional response to exogenous factors and regional dynamics. In addition, coordinated international assistance from the national and regional levels to the international levels is critical for supporting national authorities in articulating and implementing NPS. Engagement with RECs, RMs, and other sub-regional organizations can be arranged on a case-by-case basis as countries approach the PBC for support but could also be regularized when a country requests deeper or longer-lasting engagement by the PBC on prevention.

f) Support for exogenous shocks

Root causes of violence are both endogenous and exogenous. The knock-on effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the conflict in the Middle East are recent examples of external shocks that have affected countries around the world. For instance, the war in Ukraine led to an increase in international food prices, with prices for wheat increasing by 58 percent and grains by 34 percent between March 2021 and 2022;⁴⁹ and sharp price increases are a root cause of violence.⁵⁰ Exogenous root causes affect many member states, some of which might be ill-equipped to respond given the international nature of the shock. Discussions in the PBC might offer a good opportunity to **draw attention to root causes that specific AFPs can address**. In the case of the above-mentioned shock on food prices, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) played an important role in decreasing those prices. The UN Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance (GCRG), which UNCTAD coordinates, was instrumental in achieving the signing of two agreements focused on combating the rise of global food insecurity.⁵¹ While UNCTAD might not consider itself a prevention actor, its action contributed to preventing violence. Other examples of exogenous root causes may include environmental degradation, trade, influxes of refugees, or other types of spillover effects from countries in the region.

Given the potential impact of exogenous shocks, member states and the UN may want to discuss how to make sure their **responses to shocks are conflict-sensitive**.⁵² The PBC has helped facilitate these conversations on multiple occasions. In 2020, for instance, the PBC convened an ambassadorial-level meeting on the impact of COVID-19 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Member states emphasized the importance of “utilizing the convening, bridging and advisory role of the PBC, including to the Security Council, to help bring Member States together with the UN system and other partners, including International Financial Institutions, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society, to mobilize resources, share lessons learned and advocate for coherent, coordinated responses to the pandemic.”⁵³ The PBC also facilitated country-specific conversations on shocks, for instance, about the impact of COVID-19 on ongoing activities related to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Burkina Faso.⁵⁴ The occurrence of extreme shocks that hit as a result of devastating

climate disasters or other natural disasters can cause a big burden to a country. Member states could also use the PBC to report back on financing that they have received, how they have been able to address the root causes of violence and conflict, and where there are still gaps. This reporting could serve as an opportunity to make a case for additional funding where funding is insufficient.

One of the challenges of using the PBC to discuss exogenous root causes and conflict-sensitive responses to external shocks is that this is not part of the PBC's current mandate, and the PBC might not have the necessary capacity or funding to engage. Additionally, some topics have been notoriously difficult to discuss among member states, including the impact of climate change on violence. Some member states have also expressed concern about bringing controversial topics into the PBC—such as the impact of the war in Ukraine on food prices—which they fear could risk politicizing the Commission. While thematic conversations have been difficult to agree on, the national ownership of the PBC still allows member states to share the impact of the external shocks affecting them. The conversation can then expand if other member states in the room express similar concerns in their statements.

In summary, the PBC can raise the alarms to member states about the knock-on effects of external shocks on prevention efforts. Member states can also use the PBC to raise attention when their NPS are being undermined by exogenous root causes of violence and to request tailored support to address such root causes. This support could focus only on one member state or on a group of member states facing the same exogenous root causes. To avoid politicization of the PBC, member states could choose to raise more political issues (e.g., the impact of the war in Ukraine on food prices) at the Security Council and focus on issues that are less sensitive (e.g., COVID-19, the impact of artificial intelligence) at the PBC.

2.4 Making the case for financing NPS

Developing and implementing NPS can be both resource and effort-intensive. Member states have used the PBC platform as a way of advocating for financing for their prevention efforts. The rationale is that by presenting its NPS in the PBC, the country is sending a signal to donors that it has taken time to identify the issues that are contributing to conflict and violence and has the political will and the vision to prevent them. The NPS represents an effort to clearly communicate the issues and the priorities so that potential partners could identify where there are synergies. Funding for NPS could subsequently come from various sources, including the UN agencies and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), MDBs, bilateral donors, private and public foundations and philanthropies. The strategy and approach for each will vary, so there is no one size fits all for engagement.

However, it is unclear whether reality matches expectations. Currently, no monitoring system exists that can demonstrate that presenting a country's NPS at the PBC has resulted in funding.

Moreover, various factors might limit the PBC's role as a forum for mobilizing financing for NPS. The following discusses some of the general ones, although the subsequent sections discuss some specific reasons in detail.

- The PBC membership consists of diplomats who represent their Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the UN and who are **neither usually financing decision-makers** from the donor side nor interlocutors with recipient countries. As such, no financing decisions can be confirmed at the PBC. Therefore, the PBC serves more as a platform for registering requests for support. However, this role alone may be useful, and we discuss ways in which it could be further leveraged.
- The members of the PBC **do not have the technical expertise** to analyze NPS and determine their veracity and fundability.
- As previously discussed, there is **no standardized approach to developing NPS**. Some countries have their NPS as part of a broader national prevention strategy, and others have sectoral strategies. For those whose NPS is part of a broader national development strategy, it may be difficult to isolate financing for specific strategy objectives that could be achieved within well-designed development programs.

2.4.1. Financing partners for NPS

Despite these challenges, the PBC could play a role in making the case for financing for NPS from a number of different categories of funding sources, including national funding, bilateral donors and IFIs and MDBs. The PBF will be discussed subsequently in a separate section ([2.4.3](#)).

National funding

In the true spirit of nationally owned and nationally led prevention, the first source of financing for NPS is a country's own national resource allocation. The PBC can be a useful platform for showcasing countries that have included prevention objectives and programs within their national budgets, funded by their own domestic resources. This can be undertaken as part of the efforts to share best practices and exchange knowledge, where member states can learn from their peers.

Bilateral donors

Another source of funding for NPS is bilateral donors. Bilateral donors sit on the PBC not in their capacity as donors but in their capacity as members of the PBC. Representatives of bilateral donors participating in PBC meetings may send recommendations to their capitals based on the PBC meetings they have attended. However, these recommendations may or may not lead to eventual funding discussions. The first reason is that **diplomats sitting in the PBC do not make funding decisions** on behalf of their governments, and they also may not have the framework for systematic follow-up on actions taken at the capital level, particularly given the fact that aid agencies are often independent of the Foreign Ministry. Discussions on funding allocations are likely to be taken up at the individual country level on a case-by-case basis as part of the respective country's program of support. Secondly, PBC delegates **do not necessarily have the tools and capacity to make a value judgment on the veracity of a strategy and its fundability**. As such, the nature of their engagement cannot directly lead to funding. Third, PBC discussions lack continuity; recommendations made during the meeting and resources potentially mobilized are **not systematically tracked**.

The greatest value of the PBC, therefore, would be to provide a global platform for a country to present its NPS and for donors to be able to

subsequently take the strategy up at the country level through bilateral negotiations. PBC members would share NPS with their colleagues in capital for further action. Bilateral donors could then report back on actions taken and also provide updates from the capital on decisions taken.

Secondly, the PBC could become a platform for donors to share their experiences financing prevention and peacebuilding initiatives and their achievements. This would include reporting on the amounts and impacts of financing.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) and other International Financial Institutions⁵⁵

Strengthening the linkages between the UN and the MDBs in prevention and peacebuilding has been a long-standing objective for the UN, one that was elaborated quite strongly in the joint World Bank-UN report *Pathways for Peace*⁵⁶ and in several subsequent secretary-general reports. The MDBs, too, have recognized the value of partnering with the UN due to their subject matter expertise, which is tied to their mandate of supporting political and social processes, their deep field footprint, and their ability to remain engaged in crisis situations.

Strengthening collaboration between the UN and IFIs has been a central objective of the Commission since its inception.⁵⁷ The World Bank Group (WBG, or the “Bank”) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) management are invited to all PBC meetings.⁵⁸ However, while the World Bank strives to attend high-level PBC meetings twice a year, inviting the IFIs to all meetings has not yielded significant results.

There have been some overlaps between countries that have briefed the PBC and those that have received additional funding through the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA) and the Turn Around Allocation (TAA) as part of the fragility, conflict and violence window of the International Development Assistance (IDA) instrument of the World Bank.⁵⁹ The PRA is a top-up financing instrument added to an existing program of support that an IDA country receives to assist them in addressing drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence. The PRA is provided where a country is considered at risk of escalating into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence.⁶⁰ Countries are expected to satisfy eligibility criteria that include, among other

indicators, having a prevention strategy or plan⁶¹ with clear milestones. The table below highlights that less than half of the countries that have received PRA assistance as part of their IDA Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) envelope have also presented their prevention approach before the PBC. Countries that have presented before the PBC have also accessed other MDB-specific instruments to support peacebuilding efforts, such as the African Development Bank Transition States Facility.

Table 1: 2020-2024 PRA and TAA recipients and PBC engagement⁶²

Country ⁶³	PRA	TAA	PBC Engagement
Benin	Yes	-	No
Burkina Faso	Yes	-	Yes
Burundi	Yes	-	Yes
Cameroon	Yes	-	No
Chad	Yes	-	Yes
Democratic Republic of Congo	Yes	-	No
Mali	Yes	-	No
Mozambique	Yes	-	Yes
Niger	Yes	-	No
Togo	Yes	-	No
Central African Republic	-	Yes	Yes
The Gambia	-	Yes	Yes
Somalia	-	Yes	Yes
Sudan	-	Yes	No

PBC members have undertaken visits to the IFIs in Washington, D.C., on various occasions to discuss specific country contexts, including the Central African Republic (CAR)⁶⁴ and Liberia⁶⁵ in 2020, and Sierra Leone⁶⁶ and CAR⁶⁷ in 2018. While none of these meetings have focused specifically on prevention, this model could be used for it.⁶⁸

Constraints on the PBC's engagement with IFIs

Engagement between the PBC and IFIs has remained modest, and some reasons have been advanced to explain this. First, **there is a need to reassess how the PBC engages with IFIs.** PBC meetings are meetings of member states, they are not technical meetings. In the past, when the PBC has invited IFIs and MDBs to meetings, they have extended the invite to the management of these institutions. The executive directors of IFIs and MDBs represent member states as shareholders within a constituency model. Though the IFI member state representation does not entirely mirror the UN/PBC member state representation, it would be more appropriate for the PBC to engage executive directors rather than management in the spirit of acknowledging the governance structures of the IFIs and MDBs. Management of the IFIs would then be able to follow up on the discussions through the respective boards.

Second, **PBC meetings are not structured as policy dialogue sessions.** They are structured as forums where member states read their pre-written statements. This does not allow for engagement; it allows for the recording of positions only. This, coupled with the lack of a follow-up mechanism to track decisions made, diminishes the value of participation by external actors. The transaction costs of participation do not match the benefits derived from the process. This has been one of the main hindrances for IFIs and MDBs, who have to allocate limited time from other competing demands.

Third, **meeting invitations are usually provided on short notice,** so the IFIs do not have time to prepare and ensure that the right people attend the meeting or that those who attend are well briefed.

Fourth, even where IFIs have participated in PBC discussions, this would not necessarily lead to financing decisions being made. The reason for this is that **financing by the IFIs is within a negotiated country strategy or framework.**

Using the example of the WBG, a country partnership framework is a document negotiated between the country and the Bank. Both sides agree on the priorities, and then the document is approved for funding by the Board. The principal interlocutors for this discussion are the Ministry of Finance on the government side and the country director on the Bank's side, while all specific sectoral projects are provided for within this strategic framework. Accordingly, a PBC discussion would not be able to translate to a funding decision if an NPS is not accommodated within the country partnership framework. What a PBC discussion does provide is a political signal about the extent to which the government is committed to its NPS.

Despite these constraints, the PBC still represents a very useful forum, and funding actors, including bilateral donors, IFIs, private and public foundations, and philanthropists, can draw value from it. It provides some opportunity to create greater political buy-in, build common understanding, and discuss the threshold for action. The PBC could strengthen collaboration between the UN, IFIs and MDBs, bilateral donors, and foundations by providing a space to: (a) provide the political reference that could support technical analysis for support; (b) build a common understanding of what prevention is and how to measure it; (c) highlight opportunities for complementarity of efforts; (d) sound the alarm when a country faces devastating shocks (e.g., climate-related disasters) or is facing structural challenges that undermine its stability (such as debt distress or massive currency devaluation).

2.4.2 Options to strengthen the PBC as a useful forum for funding actors

a) Providing the political reference that could support technical analysis for support

The PBC could be used by national governments to showcase their national interest in prevention, particularly NPS. Some prevention issues are, in fact, political issues and are therefore outside of the mandate of the IFIs and MDBs to engage. When a country presents these issues at the PBC, they signal an openness to dialogue on these issues. This is usually a very important signal to the IFIs and MDBs and could be a reference point in discussing the relevant policy reform agenda.

A PBC discussion would also help IFIs and MDBs make the case for support for a country to the institutions' boards when the technical threshold for support has not been met. This is particularly useful because there is an increasing realization that support provided further upstream may be more critical in preventing crisis. The PBC is one arena whereby member states could engage with the Bank about re-thinking its eligibility threshold, perhaps to establish a differentiated system that might permit engaging in more upstream prevention, where the root causes are identified as being higher, even if threshold indicators have not been met. Lowering the quantitative threshold and/or creating a qualitative pathway would help lend balance/nuance to the decision-making process, potentially enabling more responsive and flexible funding decisions. In some country cases, the World Bank has successfully utilized discussions at the PBC to make the case to its board for exceptional access to a PRA.⁶⁹

For a more systematic follow-up of these country cases, the PBC could consider having a quarterly report that highlights all the country cases that have been discussed and providing views on recommendations. This could then be shared with the IFIs and MDBs.

b) Build a common understanding of what prevention is and how to measure it

Issues of fragility, conflict, and violence have taken on a more prominent role in IFIs and MDBs in shaping their activities in recent years due to their prevalence among member countries. The FCV terminology at IFIs and MDBs has been evolving, influenced by the institutions' respective mandates. The World Bank, for example, has employed a modular approach focused on mitigating risks to stability and development in a designated set of FCV countries, although there is now a greater appreciation that upstream efforts may be more useful before crisis sets in.⁷⁰ The African Development Bank, on the other hand, has a more robust approach, where it views fragility as a spectrum rather than a binary classification, enabling a more flexible and nuanced approach that considers the varying degrees of fragility across different contexts. Given these differences, **there is a real opportunity to contribute a common normative understanding of the root causes⁷¹ of violence and conflict, what prevention is and how to measure it, and what is a national prevention strategy and plan.** If this thinking can be

consolidated, it would build on and complement what the MDBs are already doing through their own analysis and would contribute to a common understanding that can help in developing appropriate metrics.

Identifying ways to measure prevention would be one of the biggest contributions that the PBC could make to the peacebuilding financing landscape. Measuring prevention is inherently challenging because it is often perceived as involving proving a counterfactual. Unlike more straightforward metrics, prevention metrics require assessing what could have happened but did not happen and imputing success. To tackle this challenge, MDBs and the funding community have been asking how to measure prevention for some time now. Suggestions have been made to develop frameworks similar to those used for climate change or gender equality, where progress can be tracked through indirect indicators, such as changes in risk levels, the capacity of local institutions, or the resilience of communities to potential shocks. By improving these metrics, **organizations could better demonstrate the impact of their preventive actions, guide future strategies, and secure ongoing support for upstream interventions that avert crises before they escalate.** This will also contribute to unlocking the financing question because donors want to put money where it is clear what results can be achieved.

All these would be best undertaken within the framework of the PBC, with technical support from the PBSO and other relevant technical agencies of the UN, supported by external experts, including experts from the IFIs, think tanks, academia, and civil society. The PBC could be particularly useful in this regard because it is a member state-led platform, and prevention is not just a technical issue but has deep political and social nuances that require political buy-in.

There is a strategic opportunity for doing this. The Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) coincides with the expiration of the World Bank FCV strategy and the process of developing a new one. To this end, therefore, the PBC could consider commissioning a study, as part of the PBAR, on what prevention is and how it can be measured and could undertake structured engagement with the IFIs and MDBs, think-tanks and academia, civil society, and relevant UN agencies, funds and programs to build this common

understanding and create a reference document that could become a guide for all actors on these issues.

c) Highlight opportunities for complementarity of efforts

The Pact for the Future highlighted that establishing a more systematic and strategic partnership between the Commission and IFIs would help to “mobilize financing for sustaining peace and to help align national development, peacebuilding, and prevention approaches.” The question remains: what would this mean in practical terms?

First, as was noted in earlier sections of this report, the PBC is a forum where member states come to share their NPS. The PBC could, for instance, be used to showcase existing IFI support—including in collaboration with the UN—in the hope of **making a case for additional bilateral funding**. This was the case for Burkina Faso, where the government, with the support of the World Bank and the UN, undertook a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA). Burkina Faso then used the PBC to showcase its Matrix of Priority Actions to seek additional funding.

Box 2: The Burkina Faso case—proof of concept

Burkina Faso is often mentioned as proof of concept on how the PBC can support national prevention efforts. The UN, World Bank, and the European Union (EU) supported the government in undertaking a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) in early 2020. It was then used by the government to develop a Matrix of Priority Actions⁷² as part of the “Programme d’Urgence pour le Sahel 2020-2021.”⁷³ Burkina Faso then presented the RPBA and the matrix of priority actions at the PBC in early 2020⁷⁴ to mobilize funding. In that meeting, the World Bank representative noted that the institution was studying the country’s eligibility for the PRA. The joint RPBA assessment led Burkina Faso to be the first country to receive funding under the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA) window—700 million USD—⁷⁵ in December 2020,⁷⁶ on top of the IDA19 core support of USD 1 billion. After a PBC press release encouraging partners to support the implementation of the Matrix of Priority Actions⁷⁷ following a PBC meeting in March 2020, the PBC Chair at the time, Canada, asked PBC members to report on their existing or forthcoming commitments to support Burkina Faso’s Matrix of Priority Actions in a letter dated May 5, 2020.⁷⁸ In November 2020, the PBC Chair reported that he received information of support for USD 400 million.⁷⁹

While this was an interesting process, the role that the PBC played in mobilizing funding is unclear. The Burkina Faso case was a good practice in terms of having both the World Bank and the UN system as well as other key actors such as the EU and the African Development Bank, move in parallel to PBC meetings. But unfortunately, it was not a good practice in preventing violence in Burkina Faso, which has only increased in the past few years. Since 2021, attacks by non-state armed groups against civilians have increased as well as clashes between the Burkinabe army and armed groups.⁸⁰ This leads to the question of how we can better understand what makes NPS effective and support them more strategically.

The PBC could also become a platform where donors announce new funding pots that countries can apply to. These would include bilateral donors, MDBs, and foundations.

Further, a suggestion made previously also deserves mention here. To facilitate monitoring and provide greater meaning to information sharing, bilateral donors could also use the PBC to report how they support NPS in different countries. This is not only useful for tracking financing but also for providing a platform that could serve as a tool for coordination, as donors could use this to identify points of synergy and complementarity in the countries where they may have programs. For this to be operationalized, the PBC will need to develop a more structured calendar so that donors can know well in advance and prepare adequately. This could be structured as an annual donors' report.

d) Sound the alarm when a country is facing structural challenges that undermine its stability (such as debt distress or massive currency devaluation)

In July 2024, Colombia expressed concern to the PBC about its inability to finance the implementation of its 2016 peace agreement due to the impact of debt.⁸¹ Countries sometimes find themselves in difficult waters that constrain their fiscal position and render them incapable of meeting obligations under their social or political contracts. In some situations, this could be the difference between stability and the eruption of civil conflict or even an unconstitutional takeover of government.

Debt distress is an issue affecting many countries today. Some countries are forced to default, thereby compromising their ability to borrow in the short and medium term, while others are forced to make difficult fiscal consolidation decisions, compromising social sector investment and, therefore, undermining service delivery. Around the world, 3.3 billion people live in countries that spend more on debt servicing than on health and education.⁸² Countries outside this category opt instead for more aggressive domestic revenue-raising measures, which may trigger cost-of-living crises domestically. No matter what measures they take, all these countries face discontent and social tensions among their populations due to these difficult choices.

Countries need a platform where they can cry out rather than choke to death. The PBC could play that role: PBC deliberations could be used by the IMF as one source of evidence to determine what debt treatment approach to advise different countries to undertake. However, even more broadly, the current debt servicing crisis requires the multilateral system to bell the cat and call for a multilateral solution for debt relief that is appropriate for this context. Having heard many presentations by different countries on this, the PBC should be able to make a pronouncement that could serve as one of the pieces of evidence needed to trigger action.

2.4.3 Partners to catalyze funding for NPS

The Peacebuilding Fund

The PBC and the PBF are two entities among many in the broader peacebuilding ecosystem, but they are well placed to act in a complementary manner when it comes to supporting NPS. Their mutual thematic focus on peacebuilding, their ability to support nationally led efforts, including in prevention, and their backstopping through the Peacebuilding Support Office mean that the PBC and PBF have the potential for important synergies regarding NPS, even if they have no direct formal institutional or administrative link. Albeit through informal engagement and coordination, the intersection of the PBC's convening power and political accompaniment role and the PBF's financing role could increase the visibility of and provide important support for NPS.

The PBF is a fund of the secretary-general, and decisions about the allocation of PBF funding are demand-driven, made in response to a country's request through a process centered on consultation between government authorities and UN representation in a given country context. According to the terms of reference of the PBF, **the PBC can advise the secretary-general to consider providing funding to a country on the PBC agenda** but cannot directly influence the allocation of PBF funding. Conversely, although they may choose to, PBF recipient countries do not need to go to the PBC or join the PBC agenda. The reasons why a country receiving PBF funding might go to the PBC include being able to access the Commission's coordination of UN entities involved in providing advisory services, technical support, and assistance, the possibility of mobilizing additional funding, and interest in

accessing the convening services offered by the PBC to countries on its agenda.

The PBC and the PBF may share a backstopping office in the form of the Peacebuilding Support Office, but since the PBC is a member state organization, and the PBF is under the leadership of the secretary-general, navigating the relationship between the two bodies has required effort. The PBC and the PBF have gradually built up a set of interlinkages, including regular PBF briefings to the PBC, but more could be done to strengthen the relationship.

Strengthening this relationship is especially important because, while the PBC and PBF possess synergies, they also share similar challenges. Both bodies and the broader peacebuilding infrastructure at the UN suffer from resource constraints in terms of both funding and personnel. Recent UN-wide liquidity issues,⁸³ and the spillover effects of falling development aid funding have limited the funding capabilities of the PBF. Better coordination between the PBC and PBF regarding NPS could help **ensure that limited resources are allocated effectively to support national plans**. Moreover, Peacebuilding Fund projects are intended to be catalytic, providing an entry point for and encouraging the mobilization of substantial additional resources from other donors. As a result, it is even more critical that the PBF and the PBC seek to leverage and align all available funding sources.

Given the connectedness of prevention activity across the peace continuum and the fact that the goals of prevention and development often overlap, it is critical to connect projects across this spectrum, especially between different actors working in related areas in a particular country setting. The PBC's ability to convene a wide range of actors in a given country setting could facilitate efforts to ensure coordination and coherence among funding streams, contributing to an effective response given current resource limitations.

2.4.4 Options to increase synergies between the PBF and the PBC

While the PBC and PBF may not be directly linked, they possess potential synergies that should be fully exploited, as recognized by the 2016 Peacebuilding Architecture Review.⁸⁴ The bottom-up and top-down approaches of the two entities are well-placed to **complement each other**. The PBF relies on what country actors come up with at the country level to inform funding strategies and activities, so good advice from the ground is critical. In contrast, the PBC brings together country representatives and member states at the highest levels to support a strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding. However, national leadership is central to both entities and processes.

- The PBF plays a catalytic role in financing prevention and peacebuilding. However, one of its limitations is that it does not have forward linkages with other, bigger pots of money, such as from the MDBs or bilateral donors. The PBC could become a forum for presenting PBF projects at inception, providing information on the projects and any opportunities they might open that require scaling up. Holding these discussions would be a very useful way to **help donors identify project pipelines** they could support.
- In addition, direct links between the PBF and IFIs could be strengthened using the PBC. For example, at a government's request, PBF funding could be used to support the development of NPS. The **PBC could then help highlight the country's NPS to mobilize additional funding from the World Bank's PRA Facility**, which, as mentioned previously, requires the existence of a national prevention strategy or plan as one criterion for funding.
- While no NPS-specific funding window currently exists at the PBF, **countries that share their NPS with the PBC are often well-placed to approach the PBF** for NPS-related funding under one of the PBF's existing windows, given that approaching the PBC requires national ownership and buy-in at the highest levels. However, creating a PBF NPS-specific funding window could facilitate and streamline the country's efforts to obtain funding for NPS activities.
- The PBC has implemented measures to improve synergies with the PBF in recent years, including convening an annual meeting on the work of the PBF, receiving presentations from PBF recipient countries, inviting representatives

of the PBF Advisory Group to PBC meetings, and remaining updated on PBF activities. These synergies could be enhanced and tailored to support NPS. For example, the PBC could convene a dedicated annual meeting on financing for NPS, **where PBF projects and best practices supporting NPS are highlighted**. With the PBF, the PBC could also convene ad hoc discussions featuring briefings from PBF recipient countries on their NPS. This groundwork could lay the foundation for greater coordination of efforts in support of financing for NPS and more systematic efforts to identify and pursue NPS funding opportunities through the PBF. The Peacebuilding Impact Hub could also play a role in evaluating the approaches.

- The links between the PBC and PBF could be strengthened using the **PBC’s advisory role to the secretary-general**, and countries that present their NPS to the PBC could receive special consideration for PBF funding. The PBC could make recommendations to the secretary-general based on the national priorities mentioned during the briefing. Then, the secretary-general could make recommendations to resident coordinators and the PBF regarding financing options. These measures could help increase alignment between the priorities addressed in the PBC and the projects financed by the PBF to enhance consistency between political aims and actions on the ground.
- Another potential tool is using the secretary-general’s peacebuilding funding dashboard to strengthen the “coherent, predictable and traceable use of resources” for peacebuilding activities. The dashboard⁸⁵ could be amended to **track NPS-related activities**, making it easy to ensure visibility of NPS progress and efforts.

3. Transversal Challenges and Opportunities to Strengthen the Commission's Support to NPS

3.1 Transversal challenges

3.1.1 The impact of universality

The secretary-general's *New Agenda for Peace* proposed a paradigm shift that acknowledges the universality of prevention and recommends the development of NPS to address drivers and enablers of violence and conflict⁸⁶ for all countries. On this basis, the PBC's 2024 forward-looking agenda notes that the body is expected to expand its geographical scope of countries and regions to support and underline universality.⁸⁷ Efforts in this direction are already taking place, such as the above-mentioned March 2024 meeting, where a diverse group of countries—Kenya, Norway, and Timor-Leste—presented their prevention efforts and strategies.⁸⁸

Nonetheless, a central question is whether the PBC has the capacity to serve as a universal platform for discussing such strategies. The PBC is not representative of the full UN membership: only 31 member states participate in its meetings. Additionally, supporting universality means that the number of countries that present before the PBC may increase from current levels, while the PBC's ability to assist those member states that need the most support (technical or financial assistance or political accompaniment) might decrease.

Limited membership

The Commission's membership comprises only 31 member states,⁸⁹ representing a small portion of the UN membership of 193 countries. Despite this, **the PBC can still offer a universal approach** because any member state can request to present **their NPS**. Furthermore, strategic partners for NPS that are not PBC members (e.g., non-PBC members, regional partners, etc.) can be invited to participate in the meeting with the consent of the country presenting and the membership.⁹⁰

Finally, the information discussed during PBC meetings is available to non-members of the Commission. Most meetings are broadcast, and the Commission is mandated to publicly share an outcome document of its discussions and recommendations.⁹¹

Limited capacity

Acknowledging the universality of prevention means that 193 member states could potentially request to present their NPS to the Commission. This could strain the Commission's already limited capacity to assist countries that need more substantial support, including keeping international attention, mobilizing resources, and coordinating support for NPS. Member states, therefore, wonder whether the Commission could accommodate all requests, how it should prioritize them, and how PBSO could support the increased workload.

Options

- ***Pursue two forms of engagement with the PBC: one that seeks to provide support and another one that solely seeks to convene.*** To ensure that member states receive the requested and needed support from the Commission, two types of meetings could be organized. One could focus on member states that request support from the Commission. This would allow the Commission to develop a proof of concept by showing that it can mobilize funding, maintain international attention, provide political accompaniment, and convene relevant stakeholders for enhanced coordination to support NPS. A second type of meeting could be organized twice a year to present strategies by member states that have no expectation of receiving support. These meetings would have the goal of sharing lessons learned, showcasing success, and normalizing and destigmatizing prevention.

3.1.2 The need for continuity

Interviews reveal that the benefits of presenting at the PBC are perceived as limited because after a meeting is over, there is no action plan, no holistic support package, and thus no continuity. Unless the PBC provides better follow-up, member states who request support for their NPS might not see much added value.

The meaning of continuity is twofold. First, it can mean ensuring **continued engagement between the country and the PBC to discuss its strategy over time**. Developing a national prevention strategy is a complex and long-term endeavor that may require sustained support. A series of meetings would allow the PBC to **convene diverse, relevant actors** who could support an NPS in different ways—e.g., financing, good practices, coordination—and ensure **that attention to the NPS is sustained** to address the root causes of violence over time. Furthermore, because the root causes of violence are constantly evolving and countries are sensitive to external shocks (e.g., COVID-19 or the knock-on effects from other conflicts), NPS should also evolve over time to adapt to change, and so should external support when relevant.

Second, continuity is meant to ensure that conversations at the PBC lead to progress in terms of concrete support to NPS. Follow-up meetings can serve as a **means for accountability** by offering a space to report on actions taken following the Commission’s meetings, such as mobilization by the UN system, marshaling of financial resources, or effective coordination within the UN system between the national and regional levels.

The latest Commission working methods reflect that continuity is an important issue for the Commission. The 2024 document encourages “exploring possibilities for follow-up to meetings with the membership and various briefers, respecting national ownership,” as well as “periodic follow-up meetings in the country- and region-specific contexts to inform the Commission of outcomes of its engagements.”⁹² The PBC has also acknowledged the need for continuity during its meetings. For instance, the PBC membership emphasized the need for “strategic follow-up to the implementation of the recommendations” during the 2023 meeting on South Sudan.⁹³

However, despite the PBC’s stated intention to follow up, currently, there is rarely any monitoring of or subsequent updating on recommendations made during PBC meetings. This can undermine the PBC’s influence, including its synergies with the PBF. For example, when Somalia presented in front of the PBC in December 2020, a recommendation was made for the PBF to encourage “partners to consider providing additional resources to ensure the sustainability of collective and inclusive peacebuilding efforts while also increasing support to civil society actors.”⁹⁴ However, no action has been taken to follow up on the recommendation, and Somalia has not subsequently returned to the PBC.

Various challenges affect continuity at the PBC. First, the Commission is moving away from country configurations to a model where countries engage with the Commission by request. A risk of this approach is that it could sacrifice follow-ups. For example, through its country configuration, Liberia has continuously engaged with the PBC since 2010 through meetings and country visits⁹⁵. There are also no regular sessions on specific countries that could provide predictability and follow-up, unlike at the Security Council, where a rigid schedule of reporting and mandate renewals ensures that the next meeting on a country's situation is always on the horizon. Second, no one—in PBSO or within the PBC membership—is mandated to follow up **to track and ensure the implementation of recommendations**. Furthermore, given the limited knowledge management capacity of PBSO, **knowledge in the PBC tends to fade away**. Specifically, knowledge stays with member states and, particularly, the PBC Chair, albeit for a short period of time. However, with the rotation of Chairs (each year) and diplomats (every few years, sometimes less), such knowledge vanishes. This can consequently have a negative impact on the sustained support needed for NPS.

Options

- **Designate a Vice Chair to support continuity.** PBC members could request a Vice Chair to be in charge of follow-up⁹⁶. That Vice Chair would track the implementation of recommendations, encourage follow-up, and advise the Chair as needed. This Vice Chair role and its particular terms of reference could be agreed upon and reflected as a recommendation in the working methods. A handover exercise could be led by outgoing Vice Chairs to keep the incoming Vice Chair apprised of the task and continue key efforts. To ensure that follow-up is carried out effectively, appropriate resources should be provided to the Vice Chair and PBSO.

3.2 Transversal opportunities

Conflict and violence are wreaking havoc, in many cases with what seems to be no end in sight. Member states are painfully aware that violence is the biggest root cause of future violence, and thus when conflicts start, they are hard to stop. In this context, **the UN prevention agenda—and particularly NPS—is benefiting from political momentum**: the secretary-general's *New Agenda for Peace* encouraged all member states to develop or strengthen their NPS and for the UN to provide

them with support upon request. Member states have raised the importance of the issue in Security Council Open Debates and at PBC meetings⁹⁷ and they recently committed in the Pact for the Future to strengthening and implementing existing NPS and considering developing them where they do not exist. The Pact also highlights that member states should receive UN support for their prevention efforts, including through the PBC.

For member states to discuss prevention at the PBC, **the mandate of the Commission does not need to be modified.** Given that the Commission's work is anchored in national ownership, member states can bring their prevention strategies in front of the PBC if they wish. As highlighted above, member states have already started this practice. This, in turn, has contributed to destigmatizing and normalizing discussions on NPS, particularly through the participation of high-income countries, such as Norway, and peaceful countries, such as Mauritania, and by highlighting the diversity of national prevention approaches. By continuing with this practice, member states can address the concerns of some of their peers by showing that presenting NPS does not lead to stigma or to interventions.

At the moment, if member states want to use the PBC to discuss NPS, they can. Currently, however, “we do not mind that NPS are discussed at the Peacebuilding Commission, but we are not optimistic about what the PBC can do,” as one member state mentioned during an interview. Being able to address this concern is central. As member states show interest in using the PBC to discuss their NPS, the Commission should meet their demand. The upcoming Peacebuilding Architecture Review is an important opportunity to take stock of what the Commission can do and how to strengthen it.

The focus of the upcoming PBAR on the impact of peacebuilding and prevention efforts allows for a reflection on what makes these efforts—particularly, in this case, NPS—effective. This paper has discussed options in terms of using the PBC to increase political buy-in, exchange good practices, enhance coordination, and expand financing. Member states could discuss the options highlighted in this report—and others—in the context of the PBAR to strengthen the PBC. Additionally, member states could consider the following transversal recommendations:

- 1) **Ensure that the work of the Commission is evidence-based.** For the Commission to have a positive impact on prevention, it needs to support

national actors in developing and implementing evidence-based strategies. An evidence-based approach is key because, without it, a strategy might not be effective, eroding trust in prevention. The first step in supporting evidence-based efforts is to clarify the parameters for effective national violence prevention strategies (see section 2.2.1c, [Developing a shared understanding on conditions for success](#)). In this, it is essential to develop a more thorough understanding of the root causes of violence.⁹⁸ In policy fora, root causes are often identified based on assumptions and ideologies.⁹⁹ Consequently, the policies and programs implemented may not address actual root causes and, therefore, might not reduce violence or, even worse, might do harm.

2) **Strengthen the PBC's efforts on NPS, which entails ensuring that the Commission's work is aligned with the conditions of success for NPS.**

Without a shared understanding of how violence happens and how it can be prevented, the UN cannot be fully effective in supporting NPS. Establishing parameters for effective violence prevention strategies could help guide all aspects of PBC work. They could guide how to use the Commission to strengthen political and social commitment, to how the Commission can coordinate its efforts with the ECOSOC, the Security Council, and the General Assembly to help countries support different parts of their strategies and address different root causes. Understanding the conditions for success will also help attract funding by increasing trust in prevention and helping establish benchmarks for assessing progress and impact. The PBC is also uniquely placed to engage IFIs and develop a shared strategic vision to support effective prevention strategies. Violence is multicausal, and the root causes of violence are interlinked and cumulative. Prevention, therefore, needs to be established as a system of efforts to address these causes. Prevention strategies represent the framework for that system of efforts and can be a game changer in terms of impact. However, poorly designed and implemented prevention strategies will not fulfill this objective. The PBAR is an opportunity to commit to the development of an evidence-based approach to prevention—one that should be updated as knowledge emerges—to guide the UN system in providing effective support for national actors.

3) **Develop metrics: what would success look like for the PBC?** The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review is intended to focus on impact. Measuring impact is key not only to ensuring that efforts in prevention are

effective but also to being able to make the case for member states to use and invest in the PBC. Currently, however, efforts to measure impact are limited: there is no clear understanding of the impact of the PBC's political accompaniment, quality of advice, or success in mobilizing funding. Developing a better understanding of the conditions for effective prevention strategies highlighted above will also help the PBC measure its impact in two ways. First, by better understanding what the root causes of violence are, we can measure how they increase or decrease, thereby measuring the effects of prevention efforts.¹⁰⁰ Second, by clarifying the parameters of what makes national prevention effective, these parameters can be used as the basis of an evaluation framework to assess how the PBC is able to effectively support national actors in developing a strategy in line with these parameters.

- 4) **Increase the capacity of the PBSO's PBC Support Branch.** PBSO's PBC Support Branch, which functions as the secretariat for the PBC, has limited human and financial resources. This, in turn, undermines the PBC's ability to support NPS in all the ways discussed in this report, from knowledge management to ensuring continuity of efforts. More resources in the unit would enable the PBC to step up its efforts, including by providing support to the membership in developing a strategic vision to support NPS, strengthening the Commission's convening role, and increasing the impact of its efforts, including by engaging in more effective follow-up. In particular, the PBC Support Branch could develop a knowledge management system to better support member states in their prevention analysis. To strengthen the PBC's role in supporting NPS, its secretariat needs to be adequately resourced.
- 5) **Improve the format of PBC meetings.** Member states and IFIs interviewed have often relayed that the format of the meeting is not fit for purpose. The participants in the meetings might not be the right people to make decisions: diplomats' expertise may not be suited to the context or topic under discussion, and they might not be able to participate substantively in the conversation. Budget decision-makers—whether from the IFIs or bilateral donors—are often not present in the room. Interviewees also reported that the format of the discussion is limited to pre-made statements, is not very dynamic, and does not allow for policy development. The unproductive discussion format may partly be due to the audience, who lack the expertise for a substantive discussion, the high number of briefers, or the

length of different interventions.¹⁰¹ The format is also very anchored in traditional UN mindset and ways of working. Member states and PBSO could explore other formats to allow for more engaging conversations. For instance, the PBC could consider convening more expert-level meetings, enabling more virtual participation to allow colleagues from capitals or IFI country directors to join, or holding more open meetings to invite external experts. Finally, opportunities should be explored to schedule the meetings further in advance.

- 6) **Develop a proof of concept and measure the PBC's impact.** While the PBC has the potential to support NPS, it still needs to prove the impact of its engagement. The PBC could, upon request, decide to focus on accompanying one or a handful of countries in developing their NPS, and the Chair or one of the Vice-Chairs could dedicate efforts to monitoring how the Commission supports the country, again upon its request, in specific ways—in particular strengthening political and social buy-in, enhancing its evidence-based approach, coordinating assistance efforts, and facilitating financial support—in addition to monitoring the impact of that support.
- 7) **Ensure continuity.** One of the main frustrations that came through the interviews is the lack of follow-up after a PBC meeting. Many member states never return for subsequent discussions, and there is no clear understanding of how discussions at the PBC transform into action. The PBC could increase the frequency of its meetings on the same country or topics.¹⁰² The PBC can also be part of a broader UN strategy to support national prevention efforts, including by making sure that the Commission helps support UNCTs and that, in turn, UNCTs are able to consider PBC discussions when relevant.

The PBC has the potential to play an important role in supporting the development and implementation of NPS. The challenge is now to move away from potential to practice. This paper highlights a few ideas that member states may wish to discuss, explore, workshop, test, and further develop to help the Commission reach its potential in supporting prevention.

Endnotes

-
- ¹ “Mandate,” United Nations Peacebuilding, accessed October 25, 2024, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/mandate>.
- ² Marta Bautista Forcada and Céline Monnier, “As Prevention Gains Momentum With Member States: What’s Next?” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, April 22, 2024, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/as-prevention-gains-momentum-with-un-member-states-whats-next/>.
- ³ UN Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Chair’s Summary,” March 20, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chair_summary_-_pbc_ambassadorial-level_meeting_on_mauritania_20032024_-_final.pdf.
- ⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its seventeenth session, A/78/765-S/2024/153,” February 9, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a_78_765-s_2024_153.pdf.
- ⁵ See for example, Lasse Lindekilde, Stefan Malthaner and Francis O’Connor, “Peripheral and embedded: relational patterns of lone-actor terrorist radicalization,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 12, no. 1 (2019): 20–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2018.1551557>; and Stephen G. White, “Case study: The Isla Vista campus community mass murder,” *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* 4, no. 1, (2017): 20–47. <https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000078>.
- ⁶ Camelia Minoiu and Olga Shemyakina, “Armed conflict, household victimization, and child health in Côte d’Ivoire,” *Journal of Development Economics* 108, no. C (2014): 237–55, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387814000339>.
- ⁷ Lieven Pauwels, & Maarten S. O. De Waele, “Youth involvement in politically motivated violence: Why do social integration, perceived legitimacy, and perceived discrimination matter?” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 8 (2014): 134-153, <https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/4442212>.
- ⁸ Céline Monnier and Joanne Richards, “Strengthening Violence Prevention at the UN: 11 Overlooked Facts,” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, May 28, 2024, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/strengthening-violence-prevention-at-the-un/>.
- ⁹ Paige Arthur and Céline Monnier, “Unpacking Prevention: Member State Perspectives,” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, April 16, 2019, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/unpacking-prevention-member-state-perspectives/> and Paige Arthur and Céline Monnier, “The Prevention Agenda: Mapping Out Member States’ Concerns,” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, July 2, 2019, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/the-prevention-agenda-mapping-out-member-states-concerns>.
- ¹⁰ United Nations. “Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace (A/77/CRP.1/Add.8),” July 3, 2023. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4015374?ln=en&v=pdf>.
- ¹¹ United Nations Security Council, “9574th meeting Wednesday, 13 March 2024, 10 a.m, New York (S/PV.9574),” New York, March 13, 2024, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n24/068/30/pdf/n2406830.pdf>; United Nations Security Council, “9574th meeting Wednesday, 13 March 2024, 3 p.m, New York, S/PV.9574 (Resumption 1),” New York, March 13, 2024, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n24/066/14/pdf/n2406614.pdf>. See also verbatim notes from the UNSC open debate on 21 August 2024 under Sierra Leone’s presidency: United Nations Security Council, “9710th meeting Wednesday, 21 August 2024, 10 a.m. New York, S/PV.9710,” New York, August 21, 2024, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n24/245/51/pdf/n2424551.pdf>, and United Nations Security

Council, “9710th meeting Wednesday, 21 August 2024, 3 p.m. New York, S/PV.9710 (Resumption 1),” New York, August 21, 2024, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n24/245/64/pdf/n2424564.pdf>.

¹² UN Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on Timor-Leste Sharing Experiences, Good Practices and Lessons Learned in the Context of South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Chair’s Summary,” *United Nations*, September 26, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/psc_timor-leste_chairs_summary_final.pdf.

¹³ For example, the local media *Tatoli* made a piece about the meeting in Portuguese and Tétum. See: “Comissão de Construção da Paz realiza sessão especial dedicada a Timor-Leste,” *Tatoli*, September 28, 2022, <https://pt.tatoli.tl/2022/09/28/comissao-de-construcao-da-paz-realiza-sessao-especial-dedicada-a-timor-leste/>; and “Komisaun Konstrusaun ba Pás ONU realiza sesaun espesial dedika ba Timor-Leste,” *Tatoli*, September 27, 2022, <https://tatoli.tl/2022/09/27/komisaun-konstrusaun-ba-pas-onu-realiza-sesaun-espesial-dedika-ba-timor-leste/>.

¹⁴ For example, the President of Timor Leste, made a post on Facebook in English, Portuguese and Tétum: José Ramos-Horta, “Peacebuilding Commission Organizes Especial Session Dedicated to Timor-Leste,” *Facebook*, September 28, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/g6NwoN4mXGgRdwqA/>. A media page for Timor Leste news also made a post about the meeting: Notícias em Português sobre Timor-Leste, “Timor-Leste partilha experiências de consolidação da paz na ONU,” *Facebook*, September 28, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/NoticiasEmPortuguesDeTimor/posts/pfbid026P77dEQvZVVuT753CnYiCGzqVuitcMvc78DUWWkYo1JQH7rxvZ42hWdiN4J51s8Cl?rdid=8qryT1bPfnPz7u>.

¹⁵ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on national efforts for prevention and peacebuilding – lessons learnt from Kenya, Norway and Timor-Leste. Chair’s Summary,” *United Nations*, March 22, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_-_psc_ambassadorial-level_meeting_on_national_efforts_for_prevention_and_peacebuilding_in_kenya_norway_and_timor-leste_-_final.pdf.

¹⁶ United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 70/262 (2016), May 12, 2016, <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F70%2F262&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>; and United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2282 (2016). April 27, 2016, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2282\(2016\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2282(2016)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

¹⁷ The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, and the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, “National Prevention Strategies: How Can the UN Peacebuilding Commission Provide Support? Summary Note,” July 25, 2024, <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/20240826-osp-rt-national-prevention-strategies-how-can-the-un-peacebuilding-commission-provide-support-summary-note.pdf>.

¹⁸ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Press Statement on Indigenous Peoples, Peace and Reconciliation in Canada, Colombia and Norway,” *United Nations*, June 19, 2023, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230619_press_statement_indigenous_peoples_peace_and_reconciliation_-_approved.pdf.

¹⁹ The concept of “national prevention strategies” was introduced in the secretary-general’s *New Agenda for Peace* in 2023. See: United Nations. “A New Agenda for Peace,” *UNDPPA*, 2023, <https://dppa.un.org/en/a-new-agenda-for-peace>.

²⁰ Paige Arthur and Céline Monnier, “Development and Prevention: National Examples of Linkages,” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, August 31, 2019,

<https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/development-and-prevention-national-examples-of-linkages/>.

²¹ Céline Monnier and Vincenza Scherrer, "Building on What Exists: Demystifying National Prevention Strategies," *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, October 17, 2024,

<https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/building-on-what-exists-demystifying-national-prevention-strategies/>.

²² Here, "whitewashing" refers to calling prevention, efforts that actually do not contribute to preventing violence.

²³ The Peacebuilding Hub was launched in December 2023 with the goal to provide evidence on what works on peacebuilding and prevention so that interventions are informed by evidence. For more information about the Hub, check their website: "Peacebuilding Impact Hub," UN Peacebuilding, accessed October 29, 2024, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/impact-hub>.

²⁴ During our interviews, one delegate mentioned the Panels of Experts advising the various Security Council Sanctions Committees.

²⁵ The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) has made more specific suggestions in this regard: "[...] the PBSO, with direction from the Peacebuilding Commission, can establish a global research advisory panel [...]" "To ensure that the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Architecture has a network of experts available that it can call on for information and analysis as needed, the PBSO can establish a peacebuilding research and knowledge network and database as part of its Impact Hub.." (p. 15). See: Cedric de Coning, Ingvild Brox Brodtkorb, Thor Olav Iversen and Jenny Lorentzen, "Improving the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and enhancing the synergy of the Peacebuilding Architecture. Input Paper for the 2025 (Twenty-year) Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, (2024), <https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/improving-the-impact-of-the-un-peacebuilding-commission-and-enhancing-the-synergy-of-the-peacebuilding-architecture-input-paper-for-the-2025>.

²⁶ An additional recommendation from NUPI is for the PBC to organize "[...] an annual peacebuilding research and knowledge conference with the global peacebuilding research community and other knowledge holders. The aim should be to take stock of the available research on peacebuilding." (p. 15) See: de Coning, Brodtkorb, Iversen and Lorentzen, "Improving the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Commission."

²⁷ Monnier and Scherrer, "Building on What Exist."

²⁸ Common principles for effective peacebuilding are: Adopting a holistic and strategic approach, promoting national ownership, strengthening national capacities, providing sustained engagement, achieving effective coordination, fostering mutual accountability, ensuring prioritization and sequencing, integrating a gender perspective, and encouraging a regional approach. See United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned, "Key Insights, Principles, Good Practices and Emerging Lessons in Peacebuilding," *United Nations*, June 12, 2008, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/synthesis_report_12_june08_conclusions.pdf.

²⁹ For example: 1) political and social commitment 2) evidence-based approach to addressing root causes of violence 3) differentiated approach to address different local and group realities 4) integrated and coordinated approaches 5) flexible approaches to adapt to change 6) sustainability to address structural root causes and 7) flexibility to adapt to change. From: Céline Monnier, "Seven Questions to Consider in Designing, Implementing and Supporting Nationally-Led Violence Prevention Strategies," *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, September 14, 2023, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/seven-questions-to-consider-in-designing-implementing-and-supporting-effective-nationally-led-violence-prevention-strategies/>.

³⁰ United Nations. "Critical milestones towards coherent, efficient and inclusive follow-up and review at the global level: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/684)," January 15, 2016, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n16/009/39/pdf/n1600939.pdf>.

³¹ Ambassador Ivan Šimonović, Permanent Representative of Croatia to the UN at the High-Level Opening Plenary on the theme “Building Trust for a New Agenda For Peace,” *International Peace Institute and Geneva Peacebuilding Platform*, November 28, 2023, <https://youtu.be/3yJlej06uml>.

³² Other differences include the use of reports and information from independent experts and non-governmental actors to complement member state reports; and a multi-tiered reporting processes that includes an interactive discussion based on all the reports submitted for one member state, the development of an ‘outcome report’ adopted by the Human Rights Council membership, and a follow up on the implementation of the conclusions and recommendations contained within outcome documents. For more details on the UPR process: United Nations Human Rights Council, “Basic Facts about the UPR,” *OHCHR*, last accessed October 28, 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/basic-facts>.

³³ United Nations, “Critical milestones.”

³⁴ United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, “Handbook for the Preparation of VNRs, 2024 Edition,” *United Nations*, 2024, <https://hlpf.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/VNR%20Handbook%202024%20EN.pdf>.

³⁵ Monnier and Scherrer, “Building on What Exists.”

³⁶ Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, “Sierra Leone 2024 Voluntary National Review Report. Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in Sierra Leone,” *United Nations*, 2024, <https://hlpf.un.org/sites/default/files/vnrs/2024/VNR%202024%20Sierra%20Leone%20Report.pdf>.

³⁷ “... representatives of United Nations country teams accounted for 5 percent of all United Nations briefers at the Commission’s meetings in 2023.” See: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Peacebuilding Commission.”

³⁸ For example, on the role of women and young people in peacebuilding (See: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Peacebuilding Commission written advice to the Security Council on the role of women and young people in peacebuilding,” *United Nations*, May 24, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/psc-unscc_advice_wps_yps_asadopted.pdf); and on peacebuilding and sustaining peace through comprehensive approaches (See: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Peacebuilding Commission Submission to UN Security Council Arria Formula Meeting Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace through Comprehensive Approaches. Investment in People, including Empowerment of Women,” *United Nations*, January 22, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/january_2024_arria_formula_-_psc_written_submission_approved.pdf).

³⁹ Erica Gaston and Adam Day, *Assembly for Peace: A Digital Handbook on the UN General Assembly’s Past Practice on Peace and Security* (New York, Office of the UN President of the General Assembly, 2024), https://unu.edu/sites/default/files/2024-08/Assembly%20for%20Peace_GA%20Digital%20Handbook%20on%20Peace%20and%20Security.pdf.

⁴⁰ Eugene Chen, “A new vision for UN peace operations (or how I learned to stop worrying and love Christmas tree mandates),” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, October 3, 2024, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/a-new-vision-for-peace-operations/>.

⁴¹ United Nations, “The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission: A success in the resolution of boundary dispute,” *United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel*, July 9, 2019, <https://unowas.unmissions.org/cameroon-nigeria-mixed-commission-success-resolution-boundary-dispute>.

⁴² In 2024, the meeting was on forced migration. See summary here: United Nations Meetings Coverage Economic and Social Council, “With 120 Million People Forcibly Displaced Worldwide, UN’s Peacebuilding, Development Organs Explore Durable Solutions That ‘Go Beyond Humanitarian Aid. Joint Meeting (PM). ECOSOC/7173-PBC/147,” July 1, 2024, <https://press.un.org/en/2024/ecosoc7173.doc.htm>.

-
- ⁴³ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “2023 ECOSOC Meeting on the Transition from Relief to Development. Experience in South Sudan: Promoting resilience and sustainable solutions in a complex and protracted crisis. PBC Chair’s Remarks,” June 20, 2023, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/200623_ecosoc_meeting_on_transition_from_relief_to_development_pbc_chairs_remarks_-_approved.pdf.
- ⁴⁴ Arthur and Monnier, “Development and Prevention.”
- ⁴⁵ “United Nations Statistical Commission,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics, accessed October 29, 2024, <https://unstats.un.org/UNSDWebsite/statcom/>.
- ⁴⁶ United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Provisional Agenda, E/2024/1 (2023),” July 21, 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/resolution_2002-13.pdf.
- ⁴⁷ United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Action to Promote Effective Crime Prevention, Resolution 2002/13 (2002),” July 24, 2002, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/resolution_2002-13.pdf.
- ⁴⁸ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Joint Statement: 7th Annual Consultative Meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),” October 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/joint_statement_au_psc_and_un_pbc.pdf.
- ⁴⁹ “How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has further aggravated the global food crisis,” *Council of the EU and the European Council*, last reviewed January 27, 2024, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/how-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-has-further-aggravated-the-global-food-crisis/#0>.
- ⁵⁰ See for example: Olga Shemyakina, “War, conflict, and food insecurity,” *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 14, no. 1 (2022): 313–332, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-021918>.
- ⁵¹ The Group was established by the Secretary-General in March 2022 to respond to the unprecedented, interconnected food, energy and finance crises in the world resulting from the war in Ukraine. More information can be found in the UNCTAD website: “UN Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance,” *United Nations Trade and Development*, last accessed October 28, 2024, <https://unctad.org/global-crisis>.
- ⁵² Céline Monnier, “Adopting a Sustaining Peace Lens to the COVID-19 Response,” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, July 1, 2020, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/adopting-a-sustaining-peace-lens-to-the-covid-19-response/>.
- ⁵³ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on the impact of COVID-19 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Chair’s Summary,” *United Nations*, April 8, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_covid-19_8_april_2020_-_final.pdf.
- ⁵⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on Burkina Faso. Chair’s Summary,” October 8, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_burkina_faso_8_october_2020_draft.pdf.
- ⁵⁵ Multilateral Development Banks and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) differ in that the former are member states owned banks that support development in countries and the latter are not banks in the traditional sense (e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, etc.).
- ⁵⁶ United Nations; World Bank. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, 2018, <https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org/>.
- ⁵⁷ The UN Secretary-General and the World Bank Group President have signed the 2017 Partnership Framework for Crisis-affected situations, to strengthen coordination for prevention, and PBSO

launched in 2019 the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership (HDPP) Facility to provide small grants for joint activities. The World Bank Group and the UN already partner in almost 50 countries. See: “United Nations-World Bank Partnership in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations,” *United Nations Peacebuilding*, accessed October 25, 2024, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/policy-issues-and-partnerships/partnerships/un-worldbank-partnership>.

“... representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements...” See: United Nations. Resolution 60/180 (2005). <https://undocs.org/en/a/res/60/180>.

⁵⁸ “9. Decides that representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements.” From: United Nations, Resolution 1645 (2005), [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1645\(2005\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1645(2005)).

⁵⁹ The Fragility, Conflict and Stability (FCV) Envelope of the International Development Association is comprised of three FCV-related country allocations: the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA), the Remaining Engaged during Conflict Allocation (RECA), and the Turn Around Allocation (TAA). The PRA and the TAA are the ones that can support prevention contexts.

⁶⁰ For example, the DRC. According to the World Bank, “DRC meets PRA eligibility criteria for support to countries at risk of escalation into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence. DRC meets the qualitative (adoption of the National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Community Resilience Building) and quantitative (the close to 5,800 conflict related 2020 deaths translate into 6.63 fatalities per 100,000 people¹¹⁶, which is within the 2–10 conflict related deaths per 100,000 people) requirements for eligibility to the PRA.” From: The World Bank Group, “Country Partnership Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo for the Period FY 22-26. Report No. 168084-ZR,” January 24, 2022, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/214221646062568502/pdf/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-Country-Partnership-Framework-for-the-Period-FY22-26.pdf>.

⁶¹ PRA eligibility is based on two criteria: “(i) a quantified indicator that identifies countries that are at risk of escalating into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence; and (ii) the Government has in place a strategy or plan acceptable to IDA that describes the concrete steps that the country will take to reduce the risks of conflict or violence, and the corresponding milestones the Government commits to implement with support from the PRA.” Also, “These eligibility criteria are designed to provide a basis for IDA programming that is genuinely country-led and focused on reducing conflict and violence.” From: The World Bank, “Annex 3. Implementation Arrangements: Fragility, Conflict and Violence Envelope,” <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/2efc3db020f54cc6b5a3ddb09330e5b7-0410012020/original/ida-replenishment-final-report-annex3.pdf>.

⁶² PBC engagement is defined here as PBC meetings and (if any) country visits since 2020.

⁶³ Sources: Development Finance, Corporate IDA & IBRD, “IDA19: Implementation and Delivery,” *Government of Austria*, October 6, 2022, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/III/855/imfname_1503495.pdf; *Government of Austria*, “IDA20 Mid-Term Review,” *Development Finance, Corporate IDA & IBRD*, November 28, 2023, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/III/1124/imfname_1613386.pdf; *Government of Austria*, “IDA21 Replenishment,” May 31, 2024, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099070124191517803/pdf/BOSIB10a7116710a31a633130ef4ff439c.pdf>; Press Release, “A New Chapter in the Partnership between the World Bank Group and Togo,” *World Bank Group*, May 23, 2024, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/05/23/new-chapter-partnership-between-world-bank-group-and-togo>; “PBSO’s Partnership Facility – Update,” *United Nations Peacebuilding*, August 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbso_partnershi

[p_facility_aug2024.pdf](#); “Peacebuilding Commission Documents,” *UN Peacebuilding*, n.d., <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/documents>.

⁶⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Chair of the Central African Republic (CAR) configuration to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,” February 13, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/5_feb_20_car_pb_c_trip_report_to_wb_and_imf.pdf.

⁶⁵ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Chair of the Liberia Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission’s virtual visit to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,” May 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/psc_liberia_configuration_chairs_virtual_discussions_with_the_world_bank_and_imf_-_may_2020.pdf.

⁶⁶ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Working-Level Visit of the Peacebuilding Commission Sierra Leone Configuration to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund,” June 27, 2018, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/final_-_working_level_visit_of_the_sierra_leone_configuration_to_wbg.pdf.

⁶⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Chair of the Central African Republic (CAR) configuration to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,” February 13, 2020, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/49637842.pdf>.

⁶⁸ For instance, in the context of recent presidential, parliamentary and local council elections, the PBC engaged with the WBG as it was working on the next country configuration workplan and considered it important to hear the WBG’s perspectives in the workplan while supporting the UN-WBG relationship in Sierra Leone. For Liberia, the Chair engaged in consultations with the World Bank Group and the IMF in March 2023. Discussions revolved around the IFIs “support to Liberia’s peacebuilding priorities, to discuss the upcoming elections, reconciliation, and women’s and youth empowerment, as well as opportunities for joint UN-IFI engagement in support of peacebuilding, in follow up to virtual consultations held with IFIs on May 2021 and June 2022.” From: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission Liberia Configuration’s consultations with International Financial Institutions (IFIs),” March 2023, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/report_of_the_chair_of_the_liberia_configuration_of_the_pbc_consultations_with_ifis_march_2023.final_.pdf.

⁶⁹ See for example, for Mauritania: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on the Islamic Republic of Mauritania”, March 20, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chair_summary_-_pbc_ambassadorial-level_meeting_on_mauritania_20032024_-_final.pdf; and see also São Tomé and Príncipe: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on peace consolidation in São Tomé and Príncipe. Chair’s Summary,” January 15, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chairs_summary_pbc_meeting_on_sao_tome_and_principe.pdf.

⁷⁰ The evolution of the World Bank approach began with recognizing that fragility, conflict and violence issues manifest within a spectrum, and that, as such, understanding the drivers of FCV very early on is critical to prevent countries from sliding into crisis. This approach evolved into the modular approach mentioned, where FCV issues were limited to a set of FCS countries. The focus of this approach was centered on mitigating risks to stability and development in fragile and conflict-affected states through targeted interventions, which were mainly influenced by the matrix determining funding allocations. However, with the surge of coup d’états following the pandemic, this thinking has again been challenged, and there is now a greater appreciation that upstream efforts may be more useful before crisis sets in, or even where the drivers of fragility, conflict and violence are silently simmering below the surface unnoticed.

⁷¹ Arthur and Monnier, “Development and Prevention.”

-
- ⁷² Government of Burkina Faso, “Programme D’urgence Pour Le Sahel. Burkina Faso Matrice d’actions prioritaires du PUS-BF 2020-2021,” February 2020, https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-05/11_Burkina%20Faso%202020%20Post-Disaster%20Needs%20Assessment.pdf.
- ⁷³ Government of Burkina Faso, “Programme D’urgence Pour Le Sahel.”
- ⁷⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in Burkina Faso,” March 5, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_-_pbc_on_burkina_faso_5_march_2020_canada.pdf.
- ⁷⁵ Press Release, “The World Bank Boosts Support to the Sahel for a Resilient Recovery from the Security and Economic Crisis,” *World Bank*, December 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/15/the-world-bank-boosts-support-to-the-sahel-for-a-resilient-recovery-from-the-security-and-economic-crisis>.
- ⁷⁶ World Bank Group, “2020 UN-WB Partnership Monitoring Report. United Nations – World Bank Partnership in Crisis-Affected Situations,” July 2019 – June 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2020_un-wb_partnership_report_final.pdf.
- ⁷⁷ UN Peacebuilding Commission, “Press Release. Partnership for Prevention and Peacebuilding in Burkina Faso,” March 6, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/burkina_faso_press_release_march_2020.pdf.
- ⁷⁸ United Nations, “Letter to All members of the Peacebuilding Commission and partners of Burkina Faso,” *United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*, May 5, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc-bf-follow_up_letter_chair-may_2020.pdf.
- ⁷⁹ United Nations, “Letter to H.E. Mr. Lassané Kaboré, Minister of Economy, Finance and Development of Burkina Faso,” *United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*, November 6, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chairs_follow-up_letter_on_burkina_faso.pdf.
- ⁸⁰ ACAPS. “Burkina Faso. Conflict-induced displacement. Briefing Note,” April 6, 2023, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230406_acaps_briefing_note_burkina_faso_conflict_induced_displacement.pdf.
- ⁸¹ United Nations, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on Peacebuilding in Colombia,” *United Nations Peacebuilding in Colombia*, July 11, 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chair_summary_colombia_july_2024.final_.pdf.
- ⁸² United Nations, “World of debt: Global debt landscape and prospects for a new agenda. Report 2024,” *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, <https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt>.
- ⁸³ Eugene Chen, “The Liquidity Crisis at the United Nations: How We Got Here and Possible Ways Out,” *Center on International Cooperation at the New York University*, August 19, 2024, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/the-liquidity-crisis-at-the-united-nations-how-we-got-here-and-possible-ways-out/>.
- ⁸⁴ United Nations, Resolution 70/262 (2016). <https://undocs.org/en/res/70/262>.
- ⁸⁵ “Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Funding Dashboard,” *United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*, accessed October 28, 2024, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/secretary-generals-peacebuilding-funding-dashboard>.
- ⁸⁶ United Nations. “A New Agenda for Peace.”
- ⁸⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Peacebuilding Commission.”
- ⁸⁸ United Nations, “Ambassadorial-level meeting on national efforts for prevention and peacebuilding – lessons learnt from Kenya, Norway and Timor-Leste.”

⁸⁹ The founding resolutions of the PBC mandates that the membership comprises members of the General Assembly (7), Security Council (7, including all five permanent members), ECOSOC (7), and the top financial contributors (5) and the top military and police personnel providers (5). The membership renews every two years. Check the mandate for more details: United Nations Peacebuilding, “Mandate.”

⁹⁰ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Peacebuilding Commission.”

⁹¹ United Nations. Resolution 60/180 (2005). <https://undocs.org/en/a/res/60/180>.

⁹² United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Report of the Peacebuilding Commission.”

⁹³ United Nations, “Peacebuilding Commission Ambassadorial-level meeting on South-Sudan Building Peace in Communities through Local Governance and Community Reconciliation in South Sudan. Chair’s Summary,” *United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*, January 31, 2023 https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230131_pbc_meeting_on_south_sudan_chairs_summary_final.pdf.

⁹⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Ambassadorial-Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on Somalia. Chair’s Summary,” December 2, 2020, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ambassadorial-level_meeting_of_the_peacebuilding_commission_on_somalia.pdf.

⁹⁵ See all outcome documents from the PBC’s engagement with Liberia on the PBC website: “UN Peacebuilding Commission Documents: Liberia,” United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, accessed 30 October 2024, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/documents?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_documents_type_tid=All&field_documents_topic_tid=All&field_location_tid=772.

⁹⁶ NUPI includes a similar recommendation in their publication, but instead of designing one Vice Chair for continuity, it suggests that “Vice-Chair(s) or other members should take responsibility for following up with specific countries or regions.” They also recommend that “Member States with previous experience of transitioning out of conflict can volunteer to accompany fellow Member States as mentors that can provide advice on how best to leverage the Peacebuilding Architecture, wider UN system and global peacebuilding and development support.” (p. 12) See: de Coning, Brodtkorb, Iversen and Lorentzen, “Improving the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.”

⁹⁷ At the UNSC, for example, Japan organized an [open debate on conflict prevention](#) during their Presidency on 13 March 2024, and Sierra Leone organized a [UNSC Open Debate focused on conflict prevention](#) in August of the same year. At the Peacebuilding Commission member states have presented their national prevention efforts. For instance, [Mauritania](#) in March 2024, and [Kenya, Norway and Timor-Leste](#) on March 22, 2024.

⁹⁸ Monnier and Richards, “Strengthening Violence Prevention.”

⁹⁹ Richards, “Connecting Evidence and Policy;” Céline Monnier, “Pact for the Future: How to Turn Pledges on Addressing Root Causes of Violence Into Action,” *Center on International Cooperation at New York University*, November 4, 2024, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/pact-for-the-future-how-to-turn-pledges-on-addressing-root-causes-of-violence-into-action/>.

¹⁰⁰ Monnier and Richards, “Strengthening Violence Prevention.”

¹⁰¹ Made better by the, (e.g., 3 minutes has helped with the clock).

¹⁰² “Regularly convene briefings on specific countries, regions and thematic areas. The overall purpose of these meetings should be—in keeping with the strategic focus of the Peacebuilding Commission—to identify trends and developments that relate to the underlying drivers and causes of the conflict. This would include taking stock of the work that is being done by the UN system and the larger peacebuilding and development ecosystem to address the drivers and causes of the conflict in a specific context.” (p. 13) See: de Coning, Brodtkorb, Iversen and Lorentzen, “Improving the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.”