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

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UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD BANK COLLABORATION IN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTORS: LINKAGES TO DEVELOPMENT

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Glossary

2030 Agenda	The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, introduced in 2015.
Common Country Analysis (CCA)	The UN CCA is the UN system's independent, impartial and collective assessment (i.e., a description of a country situation) and analysis (i.e., a description of causes and their implications) of a country situation for its internal use in developing the Cooperation Framework. It examines progress, gaps, opportunities and bottlenecks vis-à-vis a country's commitment to achieving the 2030 Agenda, UN norms and standards, and the principles of the UN Charter, including as reflected in the Cooperation Framework Guiding Principles.
Community-Driven Development (CDD)	CDD is an approach to local development that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups (including local governments). It is a powerful, effective instrument for empowering communities and delivering services to otherwise underserved populations.
Community Violence Reduction (CVR)	CVR is a DDR-related tool that directly responds to the presence of active and/or former members of armed groups and is designed to promote security and stability in both mission and non-mission contexts. CVR shall not be used to provide material and financial assistance to active members of armed groups.
Country Partnership Framework (CPF)	The World Bank Group's CPF is a systematic, evidence-based, selective, and focused approach to make the WB's country-driven model more effective. It lays out the development objectives that WBG interventions expect to help the country achieve and associated program of WBG interventions.
Development Policy Operations (DPOs)	DPOs encompass all World Bank operations that provide rapidly disbursing policy-based financing to support a country program of policy and institutional actions. Specifically, DPOs help borrowers achieve sustainable poverty reduction by strengthening public financial management, improving the investment climate, addressing service delivery bottlenecks, and diversifying the economy.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)	A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures, and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. • Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population. It also includes the development of responsible arms management programs. • Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of "reinsertion" which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants. • Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.
Front Line Services	Front lines services are provided directly to the public. They include services such as education, health, social care, emergency response, dispute resolution, etc. They are run by the government or other organization/service providers.
Governance	Governance refers to the structures and processes whereby a social organization—from a family to corporate business to international institution—steers itself, ranging from centralized control to self-regulation.
Humanitarian Development Peacebuilding Partnership Facility	In 2019, the Peacebuilding Support Office launched the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership (HDPP) Facility, a UN instrument which provides small grant financing for UN-World Bank partnership activities in the areas of joint data analysis, as well as joint frameworks/priorities and seed funding for joint implementation.
IDA19	The resources of the World Bank Group's International Development Association (IDA) are replenished every three years. The 19th replenishment (IDA19) covered the period from July 1, 2020, to June 30, 2023. Among the priorities areas under this replenishment were strengthening of the rule of law, an increased attention to crisis preparedness and resilience building, and a concerted focus on fragility, conflict and violence with a dedicated financing toolkit for the latter—Fragility, Conflict & Violence (FCV) envelope with three FCV-related country allocations: prevention and resilience allocation, remaining engaged in conflict allocation, and turn around allocation.
Institutional Hardware	Institutional hardware refers to the laws, policies, organizational structures and processes required for an institution to function.

Investment Lending	Investment lending (IL) represents the traditional mode of World Bank lending for individual project. It is the primary lending instrument of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's middle- and low-income arms respectively.
Isomorphic Mimicry	Isomorphic mimicry is the tendency of governments to mimic other governments' successes, replicating processes and systems, and even products of the "best practice" examples. This mimicry tends to conflate form and function leading to a situation where governments look like they have capacity when they do not.
Justice Sector/ Justice System	The justice system includes justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and tribunals); implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems; human rights Commissions, and ombudsperson; etc.
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEFs)	MTEFs constitute an approach to budgeting and public financial management that addresses well-known shortcomings of annual budgeting, including shortsightedness, conservatism, and parochialism. MTEFs translate macro fiscal objectives and constraints into broad budget aggregates and detailed expenditure plans, guided by strategic expenditure priorities. They also help curtail shortcomings of annual budgeting by (1) achieving budget realism, (2) ensuring spending is driven by medium-term sector strategies, (3) giving spending agencies a voice, (4) inserting multi-year spending allocations in budgets, (5) linking funding more closely to results, and (6) creating greater fiscal transparency and accountability.
People-Centered Approaches	People-centered security sector governance and reform offers a re-conceptualized model for programming which better articulates the link between the community and the state and aims to directly influence community-state trust building, community representation and positive participation, as well as service provision effectiveness, equity, transparency, and legitimacy.
Public Expenditure Review (PER)	A PER is a diagnostic tool used to assess and analyze government spending in a country. These reviews evaluate the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and sustainability of expenditures in a given sector (education, health, infrastructure, justice, or security). By examining spending trends and fiscal policies, PERs provide insights into how public funds are allocated. They help identify opportunities for improving resource allocation and ensuring better outcomes for citizens.
Public Goods	**Public goods** are those that are available to all ("nonexcludable") and that can be enjoyed repeatedly by anyone without diminishing the benefits they deliver to others ("nonrival"). The scope of public goods can be local, national, or global. National defense is a national public good, as its benefits are enjoyed by citizens of the state. **Global public goods** are those whose benefits affect all citizens of the world. They encompass many aspects of our lives: from our natural environment, our histories and cultures, and technological progress down to everyday devices such as the metric system.

Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA)	The RPBA is a joint approach of the UN, the World Bank, and the European Union to identify and address immediate and medium-term recovery and peacebuilding requirements while laying the foundations for the elaboration of a longer-term recovery and peacebuilding strategy in a country facing conflict or transitioning out of a conflict-related crisis.
Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs)	The World Bank's RRAs are used to identify and analyze key drivers and risks of FCV, as well as sources of resilience in affected countries. These assessments inform country engagements and provide evidence for Systematic Country Diagnostics and Country Partnership Frameworks.
Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (SDCF)	The SDCF is "the most important instrument for planning and implementation of the UN development activities at country level in support of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda)." The Cooperation Framework guides the entire program cycle, driving planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of collective UN support for achieving the 2030 Agenda. The Cooperation Framework determines and reflects the UN development system's contributions in the country and shapes the configuration of UN assets required inside and outside the country.
Security	The system responsible for protecting the basic right to life and personal integrity.
Security Sector	Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.
Security Sector Reform (SSR)	Security sector reform (SSR) describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Security and Justice Sector Reform and Governance (SJSR/G)	This is "the political and technical process of improving state and human security by applying the principles of good governance to the security sector." It means "... making security provision, oversight and management more effective and more accountable, within a framework of democratic civilian control, the rule of law and respect for human rights." SJSR/G is viewed as both a preventive measure and a long-term development goal intended as a response to increasing challenges related to conflict, peace, and development. SJSR/G programming has been shaped from the outset by an approach to security and justice centered on people that combines "top-down state-based approaches and bottom-up people driven solutions."
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)	SGBV refers to harmful acts perpetrated against a person based on gender norms and unequal power relationships. It encompasses various forms, including sexual violence such as rape and sexual abuse, domestic violence, trafficking, forced or early marriage, and harmful traditional practices.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	The SDGs are a United Nations project aimed at achieving a better and more sustainable future for all. They address global challenges such as poverty, inequality, climate, environmental degradation, peace, and justice. SDG16 aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; provide access to justice for all; and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. It focuses ensuring safety, reducing violence, and establishing fair and transparent governance systems. SDG17 aims to strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD)	The SDC is a diagnostic exercise to identify key challenges and opportunities for a country to accelerate progress towards development objectives that are consistent with the twin goals of ending absolute poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner.
UN-World Bank Partnership for Crisis Affected Situations	The United Nations and the World Bank Group partner in almost 50 countries affected by FCV to address root causes and drivers of instability, changing the way both institutions do business in challenging settings.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations marked with * can also be found in the Glossary with an explanation.

AfDB	African Development Bank
ASM	Artisanal and Small-scale Miners
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CCA*	Common Country Analysis
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CDD*	Community Driven Development
CPF*	Country Partnership Framework
CSOs	Community Service Organizations
CVR*	Community Violence Reduction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR*	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRS	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Section
DPO (WBG context)*	Development Policy Operation
DPO (UN context)	Department of Peace Operations
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC/DC	Executive Committee and Deputies Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
FCV	Fragility, Conflict and Violence
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFP	Global Focal Point (for the Rule of Law)
HDPP*	Humanitarian Development Peacebuilding Partnership

HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IATF SSR	Inter-Agency Task Force on SSR
IDA	International Development Association / IDA19 (see Glossary)
IDDRS	Integrated DDR Standards
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IL	Investment Lending
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LICs	Low Income Countries
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MTEF*	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTR	Medium-term Review
NYU	New York University
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PER*	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	Public Financial Management
PRA*	Prevention and Resilience Allocation
RC	Resident Coordinator
RPBA*	Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment
RRAs*	Risk and Resilience Assessments
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
SDCF*	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
SDGs*	Sustainable Development Goals
SGBV*	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SJPER	Public Expenditure Review of the Security and Justice Sectors
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR*	Security Sector Reform
SJSR/G*	Security and Justice Sector Reform and Governance

SSRU	Security Sector Reform Unit
SSRuGe	SSR Standing Capacity
TAA*	Turn Around Allocation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPPA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations Agency for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Misson in Somalia
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WDR	World Development Report
WHO	World Health Organization

Authors

Sarah F. Cliffe is a Distinguished Fellow at New York University's Center on International Cooperation (CIC), where she served as the Executive Director from 2015 to 2024. Prior to joining CIC, she was the Special Representative for the World Bank's World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development and the Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities to the UN. Ms. Cliffe worked for twenty years in countries emerging from conflict and political transition, including Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, South Sudan, South Africa, Somalia, and Timor-Leste. At the World Bank, her work covered post-conflict reconstruction, community-driven development, and civil service reform. She was the chief of mission for the Bank's program in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2002; led the Bank's Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group from 2002-2007; and was the Director of Strategy and Operations for the East Asia and Pacific Region from 2007-2009.

Betty N. Wainaina Betty N. Wainaina is an Associate Director, Multilateral Reform at the New York University's Center on International Cooperation, working on promoting and defending multilateralism, rethinking multilateral policy approaches in fragile, conflict and violence contexts and strengthening collaboration between the UN and IFIs. She is a social development specialist, with diverse experience in the development sector, having worked in several developing country contexts. Previously Betty has worked with the World Bank as an economist in different country programs and in the Global Center for Conflict, Security and Development.

Natacha Meden spent over twenty years working on and in countries emerging from conflict, supporting the implementation of peace agreements, and the reform of security sector institutions. She supported early reconstruction efforts as a member of the World Bank team in Timor-Leste during its transition to full independence. While serving on the Secretariat of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, she was involved in the design, implementation, and monitoring of DDR programs. As a United Nations SSR Officer, she advised on security sector governance in Burundi and Timor-Leste. She also contributed to policy dialogue on donor assistance to SSR in countries emerging from conflict. The experience she derived from her fieldwork, combined with strategic level assessments and program evaluations she conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa for the International Security Sector Advisory Team of the Geneva Center for Security Governance allowed her to contribute to knowledge sharing within the SSR community of practice.

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Executive Summary

The links between security and development cannot be said enough. Effective and accountable security and justice institutions are essential to anchor peace and accelerate development but only if these institutions are people-centered, inclusive, accountable and based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. Over 600 million people are living in countries that are considered politically estranged today. Many of these countries have faced and continue to face security challenges that have been significant drivers of grievance and contestation. Addressing governance challenges in the security and justice sectors in such circumstances is critical at a moment when all the remaining UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations have been requested to initiate or intensify transition planning. These transitions are taking place in countries and regions where the nature of violence and conflict is changing—becoming more protracted, involving transnational non-state armed actors, amid geo-political contestations and proxy wars. The points below argue further for greater investment in people-centered security and justice service delivery as a stronger path towards sustainable development.

Why renewed attention needs to be given to security and justice sectors in development

1. The 2030 Agenda recognizes justice and security from a people-centered perspective as development targets in their own right, and also as enablers for all the other development goals. Good security and justice outcomes foster higher rates of growth and development progress.
2. Access to justice and security is declining and unequal.
3. Security and justice sectors are analogous to health and education in development terms: they provide public goods and, when governed well, are a service to society.
4. Problems in security sector governance and with access to justice can cause sudden and immediate disruption to access to development and risk losing hard earned investments.
5. Justice and security—both services and public goods—are expensive. They often take up a large part of government expenditure and personnel, but the financial and societal costs of poorly resourced and governed justice and security systems are greater.
6. Security forces often play a significant role in the economy, through the control of contracts, concessions, and state-owned enterprises.
7. Demand from governments for international assistance is growing. Many governments are now assigning high priority to security, stability, violence prevention, and public safety.

Lessons Learned

Because of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues in the security and justice sectors, the governance and reform process is political, and dialogue needs direct involvement of field leadership. Sensitivity of the issues requires careful, time-intensive, and gradual dialogue, which is why senior advisory capacity should be included to support field leadership. In addition, successful reform cannot only be about the government: it requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders including regional partners, civil society, and community groups. As such, no one institution can manage to engage the whole spectrum of actors alone. **Multistakeholder engagement demands collaboration across and within organizations—not just the UN and the World Bank, but other actors as well.** This will ensure that reform is not just focused on institutional hardware (laws, policies, organizational structures, and processes), but anchored on outcomes for people.

This study highlights that despite the long history of UN and World Bank engagement in the security and justice sectors, there has not been much strategic collaboration. Indeed, while there have been a few very compelling examples of joint work such as public expenditure reviews in the security and justice sectors in Liberia or Somalia, joint diagnostics and knowledge products as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) operations in a few countries, or strategically sequenced mutually reinforcing interventions for example in the case of The Gambia, these instances are the exception rather than the norm.

Recommendations

The study finds that there is a lot more that can be done to promote a more systematic and strategic partnership between the UN and the World Bank in security and justice sector engagements. This could range from information sharing, joint analysis where necessary, reinforcing each other's messaging, and the coordination and harmonization of efforts to leverage respective convening platforms and relationships. Strengthening this work is a challenge that would require engagement from the most senior UN and World Bank leadership as it would involve a cultural transformation and fresh understanding of organizational and staff incentives. The following joint and individual recommendations therefore range from the cultural or strategic, to the more technical.

Joint Recommendations

1. Adopt joint messaging on security and justice as a service and public good.
2. Agree on a joint framework, realistic for both organizations. A possible UN-World Bank partnership framework can be built on the following comparative key lessons:
    a. Security sector and justice governance cannot be placed outside the "development" areas —these are public services and public goods, and no matter how unaccustomed, they have to be seen as central to development.
    b. An understanding of the comparative advantage of both organizations.

c. Mission-driven partnership anchored in data and knowledge sharing, and built on mutual understanding and complementarity, and focused on optimizing impact on governance and institutions not on funding flows. In this area:

    I. The two organizations could agree to create a common impact hub on security and justice reform as a one-stop shop for the UN system and WB.

    II. The two organizations could jointly assist countries in carrying needs assessments and diagnostics such as political economy analysis.

    III. The UN and the WB could agree to start with a joint publication.

    IV. Beyond joint efforts, another way of facilitating collaboration is allowing the respective organization to provide feedback and inputs into analytical products, strategies, and diagnostics.

d. As with all areas that can be sensitive, messaging from top leadership is important.

3. Pursuing shared understanding. This would include developing a common understanding of how security and justice sectors impact other development sectors, along with parameters for engagement that define the boundaries of each organization's respective mandates.

Individual Recommendations

4. The top leadership within both institutions needs to communicate the importance of the strong linkages that exist between justice, security, and sustainable development—and ensuring that international assistance yields people-centered outcomes, not just institutional reform.

5. Based on the realization that security and justice are fundamental and universal factors affecting the development prospects of countries, there is a need to integrate security and justice consistently in country analytical work, diagnostics, and other strategic assessments. There is also a need to develop gender-responsive and intersectional indicators to measure the effectiveness of security and justice interventions.

6. Where lacking or needing specific clarification, both organizations should issue relevant operational guidance for staff on the scope and mandates for engagement.

7. Successful reform is almost always multistakeholder, often involving regional partners as well as civil society and community groups. Supporting the framework for this multistakeholder engagement serves to build broad-based ownership and civilian accountability in these sectors.

8. It is evident that both the UN and the WB bring complementary yet distinct capacities into justice and security sector engagement. To build on this and support meaningful collaboration, both organizations need to define a limited number of security and justice engagements as core operational offerings to clients. Communicating these offerings within the two organizations and with national actors would foster a sense of coordination and manage expectations.

Multistakeholder engagement demands collaboration across and within organizations– not just the UN and the World Bank, but other actors as well.

"World Bank President, Jim Yong Kim with Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon during an event, Honoring UN Partnership at the World Bank in Washington DC, on April 15, 2016. ©Dominic Chavez/ World Bank.

Chapter 1:

Introduction and Methodology

This paper was commissioned as a flagship deliverable of Advancing Policy Tools for Sustainable Security Sector Reform (SSR), a program funded by the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership (HDPP) Facility, under the United Nations (UN)-World Bank (WB) Strategic Partnership Framework for the 2030 Agenda and the UN-World Bank Partnership for Crisis-Affected Situations. The HDPP supports UN and World Bank country leadership in establishing a common understanding of risks, needs, gaps, and existing capacities through the sharing of analysis and pooling of relevant data, as well as joint assessments and planning.

The objective of the paper is not to add to the considerable academic work on these issues, but rather to provide a high-level policy report that could inform both United Nations and World Bank leadership on future options for their work on Justice and Security Sector Reform and Governance (SJSR/G), both within each organization and in partnership with one another.

The methodology of this paper includes:

- Expert consultations were undertaken with thirty-three leaders, managers, and practitioners from within the United Nations and World Bank Group, including those who have experience in both government and the multilateral system, and encompassing senior country and regional as well as global leadership.
- A data and literature review, including relevant trends in security and justice sector reform and governance; United Nations and World Bank policies; the nine policy briefs commissioned as part of an earlier phase of this project; and internal and independent reviews and evaluations of security and justice sector program interventions.

1.1: What do we mean by security and justice sectors reform and governance?

For the purposes of this paper, the following are definitions of the key terms and basic concepts used.

1) **Security Sector:** The joint UN-WB report Pathways for Peace: Inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict[1] (hereafter, Pathways for Peace) defines security as

the "system responsible for protecting the basic right to life and personal integrity." This is the definition adopted for this report. The UN defines the security sector as "... the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country," to include "defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies" as well as the "actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors [...] considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services."[2]

2) **Justice Sector:** Similarly, the justice sector is traditionally understood to comprise the judicial system and associated personnel and agencies, as well as the executive authorities responsible for justice sector administration and management (justice ministry or department), institutions responsible for justice sector oversight, agencies responsible for law enforcement, and agencies responsible for carrying out sentencing and rehabilitation. However, informal and customary justice actors and systems are also viewed increasingly as an integral part of the justice ecosystem, with many formal systems playing an oversight or appellate role over such actors.[3] The police are generally considered to be part of both the security and justice sectors. This report recognizes that both criminal and civil justice are critical when applying a preventive lens and, as such, critical for human security.

3) **Security and Justice Sector Reform and Governance:** This is "the political and technical process of improving state and human security by applying the principles of good governance to the security sector." It means "... making security provision, oversight and management more effective and more accountable, within a framework of democratic civilian control, the rule of law and respect for human rights."[4] SJSR/G is viewed as both a preventive measure and a long-term development goal[5] intended as a response to increasing challenges related to conflict, peace, and development. SJSR/G programming has been shaped from the outset by an approach to security and justice centered on people[6] that combines "top-down state-based approaches and bottom-up people driven solutions."[7]

1.2: Why is reform and governance of the security and justice sectors important for development?

The United Nations Charter aims to "protect future generations from the scourge of war." Its founders always understood that this aim involved links between social and economic welfare, human rights, and peace and security. While the World Bank is much less associated with peace and security, its founders always understood the links between these issues and social economic development, as the name they selected for the first of the five organizations making up the World Bank Group, or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, indicates.

Awareness of these links was strong immediately after World War II, dropped off during the Cold War, and increased once again in the period of complex emergencies in and after the 1990s, when the need for integrated approaches became evident. In the most recent period, other types of international challenges—e.g., rising geopolitical tensions, pandemics, and visible signs of climate change in extreme weather events—have tended to push attention to national links between security and economic development off the agenda, along with support to national security and justice sector governance.

The consultations undertaken and documents examined for this study underlined the need to renew our understanding of these linkages. We therefore start by briefly summarizing the linkages, with some illustrations of how these have emerged at country level and of how they affect global public goods, particularly climate and peace and security.

First, **the 2030 Agenda recognizes justice and security from a people-centered perspective, as development targets in their own right, and also as enablers for all the other development goals.** In a recent global poll,[8] respondents ranked political instability and security as significant concerns for their countries and their own daily lives, above food insecurity and hunger. Figure 1 below shows that more than twenty targets (out of 169) of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), directly relate to security and justice outcomes. The New Agenda for Peace documents the ways in which conflict and violence affect all seventeen goals of the SDGs, including poverty, hunger, access to health and education, biodiversity, and green transitions (see Appendix 2). Security and justice services are not only essential for defense and people-centered protection and justice; they can be key to protecting people in natural disasters, as evidenced in 2023 following the earthquake in Morocco by the role that security institutions played. **Good security and justice outcomes foster higher rates of growth and development progress.**

Additionally, **a security sector that promotes inclusivity and gender equality is crucial for long-term sustainable development**. This may require reforms that remove legal and institutional barriers to women's full, equal, and meaningful participation within the security sector. In countries emerging from conflict, building effective security institutions that are representative of the country's population allow the sector to better address the security needs of the different segments of society and to hold greater public legitimacy.

Figure 1: Sustainable Development Goals security & justice indicators



Second, **access to justice and security is declining and unequal.** Fatalities from conflict have risen to their highest level since 1945, with more than one billion people living in countries affected by conflict.[9] Such situations have increasingly been characterized by:

- Fewer meaningful political settlements and fewer conflicts resolved.
- An increase in violence by non-state actors and an increase in conflicts at local and regional levels.
- The designation of armed groups as terrorist organizations.
- The continued fragmentation and multiplication of armed groups.
- The regionalization of conflict and insecurity, including through the impacts of climate change.
- Epidemics and pandemics in conflict settings.

All issues that require innovative approaches, including for violence reduction in communities and the demobilization and reintegration of combatants.

Despite the prevalence of violence in conflict-affected contexts, an estimated 80–90 percent of lethal violence takes place outside of conflict zones, the most observed form being intentional homicide.[10] This is unevenly distributed. The highest regional homicide rate per capita is found in the Americas, with 15 per 100,000 population in 2021, or 154,000 people, two point five times that of Asia, Europe and Oceania. Africa had the highest absolute number of homicides at 176,000, or 12.7 per 100,000 population and available data suggests that the homicide rate is not falling, even as decreases have been registered in other regions.[11] Data indicates that global homicide rates are projected to decrease to 4.7 in 2030, as evidenced by long-term trends and while this falls short of the SDG target of significantly reducing all forms of violence, it is still a promising trend. We should not however think of security deficits as limited to only particular regions: assaults and fear of attack constraining movement occur at equal levels in all regions. At 6.1 percent, these security and justice outcomes affect 1,300 times the number of people than homicides. In addition, we see that women worldwide suffer disproportionately from assault in both the global north and global south alike, while homicides by contrast disproportionately affect young men. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2023 Global Homicide report highlights those men accounted for 81 percent of homicide victims and 90 percent of suspects, but women are more likely to be killed by family members or intimate partners.[12]

The world has witnessed a significant increase in the number of people incarcerated over the past two decades, reaching a 11.2 million by the end of 2021. With nearly a third (3.5 million) of all prisoners being detained without a sentence. In addition, only a fraction of victims of crimes, such as robbery, physical assault, and sexual assault report these incidents to authorities, and the support and assistance provided to those who do report are often less than adequate.[13] The 2019 United Nations Global Study on Children Deprived of Liberty[14] estimates that over 7 million children are deprived of liberty worldwide each year.[15] This includes between 1.3 and 1.5 million children who are detained in remand centers and prisons, or being held in police custody.[16] However, this figure is

likely to be an underestimate, as not all countries[17] provide data on children in the criminal justice system.[18]

These sobering facts underscore the urgent need for global efforts to address access to justice and security for all.

Third, **security and justice sectors are analogous to health and education in development terms:** they provide public goods and, when governed well, are a service to society. They are services because they are part of the frontline delivery that citizens expect of states in return for their loyalty. As such, they are key in the definition of state citizen relations. Frontline/community-based services, which help people prevent and resolve their disputes, grievances, and problems, are a critical and indispensable element of the social contract and the creation of trust between people and governments. This compact between state and society helps ensure a match between people's expectations of what the state and other actors will deliver (on health, education, as well as safety, rule of law, legal identity, access to information, and opportunities for participation) and the institutional capacity available within the state and other actors to meet those expectations.[19] Security services are public goods by nature because, for the most part, they are non-excludable: when you provide security for one person in a given area, you provide it for all in that area. The people-centered approach, as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "does not deny the critical role of the state but elevates people to the place of an equal stakeholder in the pursuit of security, peace and development."[20] Because of this, SJSR/G has been identified as an area of strong connection between politics, security, and development, where challenges in the security sector have knock-on effects throughout society.

Fourth, **problems in security sector governance and with access to justice can cause sudden and immediate disruption to access to development and risk losing hard earned investments**. Figure 2 shows the growth in "politically estranged" countries, those living under coups d'état and other unconstitutional circumstances. These situations have increased significantly in recent years and now affect at least 500 million people, or half the population of the most fragile states.[21] The gain in prominence of the private sector in state defense and security in some of these countries threatens their state/society relations even further.

Figure 2: Population living in politically estranged situations



While the drivers of crises in these countries are each different, they all share challenges in security and justice sector governance, without which coup d'état may have been avoided, and grievances would have been expressed through other means. Preventing more such situations, and resolving those that have already occurred, requires attention to SJSR/G and engagement with security actors. SJSR/G, with its focus on governance, seeks to address these issues and to promote a system of checks and balances that

supports the security sector, and linked functions in the justice sector. Through this approach, SJSR/G can become a facilitator of resilience, prevention, and peacebuilding, rather than a root cause of fragility or a driver of conflict. When justice systems are weak, ineffective, or inaccessible, it creates a lack of accountability, thus eroding trust in the rule of law. As a result, the absence of a functional justice system can lead to increased tensions, grievances, and potential conflicts, creating obstacles to sustainable development, and in instances where ex-combatants are present, an impediment to their successful reintegration. A comprehensive approach that integrates security, justice, and development efforts is essential to break the cycle of conflict, promote stability, and pave the way for long-term socioeconomic progress in post-conflict societies.

In addition, there is now growing evidence that links security and environmental issues like climate change (see Box 1 below). While these issues do not in and of themselves trigger conflicts, evidence from around the world shows that climate impacts are affecting communities in a way that can spur conflict—for example between herders and pastoralists. Furthermore, green transition policies that are well-intentioned and have aggregate benefits—addressing, for example, closure of fossil fuel facilities and mining regulation—can place unfair burdens on vulnerable and indigenous communities. If developed without proper consultation with those affected, these policies can indeed have long-term security repercussions.[22] Environmental crime is an international security issue characterized by transnational trafficking, a criminal supply chain with links to other serious crimes. It includes crimes which facilitate or accompany environmental crimes such as fraud, human trafficking, money laundering and corruption. Organized crime poses a major threat to our environment, with organized criminal groups around the world engaging in wildlife trafficking, crimes in the fisheries sector, waste trafficking and illegal mining, among other illicit activities. This exploitation has a serious impact on our ecosystems, national security, and the lives of millions of people who depend on these natural resources for their livelihoods, as emphasized by UNODC Executive Director, Ghada Waly, at the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 2021. Environmental degradation, including the destruction and illegal exploitation of terrestrial and marine flora and fauna, can be fueled by corruption. It threatens effective regulation of legitimate markets, hampers crime prevention, and undercuts the efforts of the criminal justice system to investigate and prosecute those crimes. It further enables criminals to commit, conceal and avoid conviction for their crimes. It also deprives governments of revenue streams, and communities of their natural resources and livelihoods that are essential for sustainable wellbeing.[23]

Box 1: Linkage between conflict, security, and environmental management

Conflict can significantly degrade the environment both directly (e.g., deforestation, contamination of water and soil) as well as indirectly (weakened institutions are less able to manage and protect the environment). Recent research shows that, conflict and insecurity affect countries and people's ability "to cope with climate shocks, precisely because their ability to adapt is weakened." Further large-scale displacement places strain on resources. There is also evidence that suggests that natural resources can be exploited to sustain war economies.

Illegal and criminal activities that affect the environment—such as illegal deforestation, marine pollution, wildlife trafficking, and crimes in the fisheries, waste, and mining sectors— are contributing to rapid ecosystem degradation and loss of livelihoods. A recent analysis paper[24] published by UNODC, encourages scaling up initiatives to combat crimes that affect the environment and integrating the justice system's response to these crimes into biodiversity, climate, and circular economy agendas.

The scarcity of natural resources such as water and pastureland that is brought about by prolonged drought conditions, also contributes to insecurity and conflict amongst communities competing for their access, particularly in the Sahel and Horn of Africa. Other impacts are more complicated and felt through pathways such as food insecurity, poverty, and increased inequality.

Yet, natural resources management can potentially contribute significant peace dividends. For instance, in 2023, the UN Department of Peace Operations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a feasibility study on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and community violence reduction (CVR) opportunities in the small scale and artisanal mining sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The study identified synergies between DDR programs implemented in conflict-affected and high-risk areas with existing supply chain due diligence initiatives fostering the integration of artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM) in global supply chains in these areas. Further, it highlighted how OECD-led initiatives supporting ASM formalization in conflict zones can bolster DDR programs.[25]

Fifth, justice and security—both services and public goods—are expensive. They often take up a large part of government expenditure and personnel, but the financial and societal costs of poorly resourced and governed justice and security systems are greater. As such understanding what is happening in these sectors is critical to public financial management.

On average, the world's countries spent 6.9 percent of total government expenditures on the military in 2023.[26] Police and local judicial personnel constitute a large part of most government workforces.[27] The UN estimates a target ratio of 1:450[28] for police to population [low-income countries (LICS) are currently over 1:100), similar to the 1:445 ratio estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a minimum threshold for physicians, nurses, and midwives.[29] Pensions and benefits for the security services can also exceed those received by civilians and the private sector, creating fiscal pressure. On the other hand, the cost of violence is also very high. In 2021, the global economic impact of violence was USD 16.5 trillion, equivalent to 10.9 percent of global gross domestic product

(GDP), or USD 2,117 per person.[30] Similarly, in 2019, the average economic cost of violence in the ten countries most affected was equivalent to 35 percent of GDP, compared to a mere 3.3 percent in the countries least affected by violence.[31]

Sixth, security forces often play a significant role in the economy, through the control of contracts, concessions, and state-owned enterprises.[32] This can distort incentives needed to spur economic growth and private sector development. Since transparency and accountability in these sectors is often the focus of internationally supported reform efforts, security sector influence can create potent opposition to changes that would benefit the majority of people. This was evidenced quite starkly in the situation in Sudan (see Box 2).

As a result of this role in the economy, elite capture, corruption, and rent seeking in the security and justice sectors has remained a big issue. This undermines trust in institutions and places a considerable cost burden on the economy. Further, while the police and the criminal justice system can play a key role in combatting corruption, these sectors are also particularly vulnerable to bribery and capture; for example, at the grand corruption end through procurement, and at the petty corruption end through the frequency of police transactions with the population (e.g., traffic police) and circumventing of justice in the courts.[33]

Box 2: Sudan's transition and the unintentional overload of political and economic expectations

In April 2019, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a military coup. The African Union (AU) suspended Sudan's participation, and both the AU and the UN engaged with de facto authorities through their respective designated envoys. A civilian-led transitional government was installed following protests by citizen-led groups, with the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement later that year.

Donors engaged with the new regime to support both the Juba Peace Agreement and a roadmap back to constitutionality, as well as the recovery of an economy near collapse. This involved discussions on the roadmap to elections, and accountability for past military human rights abuses. Relatively little progress, however, was made on the integration, modernization, and oversight of the security forces.

At the same time, the interests of the Sudanese army and the main paramilitary forces were also threatened by developments on the economic front. In June 2021, the executive boards of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) determined that Sudan had taken the necessary steps to qualify for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The reform plan included measures to increase domestic revenue mobilization, reduce energy subsidies, and introduce transparency measures in state-owned enterprises.

These reforms affected the cost of living for the population and limited the autonomy that the military had previously enjoyed in the energy sector. In October 2021, the military staged a coup against the transitional government, sending the country into another cycle of crisis. In 2023, fighting between rival security forces threw the country back into civil war.[34]

Lastly, demand from governments for international assistance is growing. Many partner governments assign high priority to security, stability, violence prevention, and public safety. For instance, the government that assumed power in The Gambia in January 2017 identified SSR/G as an immediate priority to "stabilize the economy, restore public confidence and strengthen democratic institutions," and the need to engage multiple national stakeholders and enlist the support of international partners as critical to reach these goals while addressing the legacies of over 20 years of authoritarian rule.[35] Nevertheless, The Gambia remains a country of concern, in a region of concern, where many of its neighbors have been taken over by military regimes.

More recently, ahead of the March 2023 UN Security Council meeting on SSR, Mozambique noted that SSR/G priorities "may not receive sufficient funding even when prioritized in national prevention, recovery and development plans." Ecuador and Gabon—now tragically itself embroiled in a coup d'état—echoed this concern, calling on "the international and regional financial institutions to provide support to countries in need," in line with SDG17. Gabon further pointed to the need for support to the development of the institutional capacity of fragile states to "responsibly plan, mobilize, budget, allocate and spend national resources for defense and security."[36] Countries such as Sierra Leone have also included security and justice sector reform in their national development plans and are developing a comprehensive sector specific strategy (See Box 3 below). The World Bank's past programs and those of other multilateral development banks (MDBs), as covered below, demonstrate that such demand is quite widespread: it extends from low-income, fragile- and conflict-affected states to many middle- and high-income countries facing significant interpersonal violence challenges, as well as hotspots in particular cities or rural areas.

Box 3: Sierra Leone's justice sector reform strategy and investment plan

The Sierra Leone Justice Sector Strategic Plan (2024–2028) builds upon their Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan IV (JSRSIP 2018–2023). This plan seeks to support the country's aspiration of increasing access to justice and safeguarding the rule of law. The Strategic Plan is intended to establish a planning and implementation framework that is aligned with the country's national development plan and other commitments made in the New Direction Manifesto of 2023–2028 that seeks to consolidate gains made in improving access to justice in the last five years of the current government and accelerating transformation.

The overarching goal of the Justice Sector Reform Strategy is to have a Sierra Leone with an effective Justice Sector enabling increased access to justice, expedition of justice, protection of human rights and opportunities for economic development. In order to meet this objective, the government has identified the following five strategic objectives:

- Increased equal access to justice for all.
- Improved case management infrastructure and expedited justice systems.
- Enhanced adherence to human rights and rule of law.
- Strengthened capacity for improved service delivery of sector institutions.
- Enhanced safety and security of citizens and property.[37]

Source: Materials shared by the Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Justice, Sierra Leone

In conclusion, security and justice sector institutions and actors are crucial not only for peace and security outcomes, but also for broader economic and social development. They have a direct influence on the economy. When these sectors work effectively, they underpin the social compact between citizens and the state. Their failure can result in societies losing both basic security and years of development investments.



Chapter 2:

Lessons Learned

Starting from the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) which underscored close linkages between security, justice, and development, to the 2017 WDR on Governance and the Law that recognized security as a first-order characteristic of development, and subsequently to the Pathways for Peace report that called for inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict. There is consensus between the UN and WB on the intrinsic links and interdependency between peace, security, justice, and development.

This rich and growing body of research has been useful in informing thinking within both organizations on their respective engagement with SJSR/G. Nevertheless, research has not always translated into the full integration of security and justice sectors in development logic. Guidance on how to engage with these sectors remains inconclusive in both the WB and with the UN. The UN has yet to develop an engagement framework and a business model for SSR assistance in non-mission settings and also in exceptional circumstances. A clearer agreed logic shared between the boards of international financial institutions' (IFIs), UN member states, and their respective management and staff is necessary to understand why and when engagement in these sectors is a development imperative—motivated by ongoing analyses that builds evidence on how to engage. Such an approach could, for instance, have informed country teams in countries recently affected by coup d'état before these situations actually deteriorated to their current state, and assisted them in resp0nding after the fact.

Engagement in security and justice reform and governance should be evidence-based. There has been useful research, but there is no central multilateral initiative drawing together relevant data and analysis. This, in part, is why so many of the indicators for SDG16 lack data.[38] The Crisis Risk Dashboard launched by UNDP seeks to address this need. This aggregation tool gathers a "broad range of datasets to strengthen evidence-based assessments," and "support contextual risk analysis."[39]

Governance and reform of the security and justice sectors is essentially political, and dialogue needs direct involvement of field leadership. Sensitivity of the issues requires careful, time-intensive, and gradual dialogue, which is why senior advisory capacity should be included to support field leadership. In addition, successful reform cannot only be about the government: it requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders including regional partners, civil society, and community groups. As such, no one institution can manage to engage the whole spectrum of actors alone. Multistakeholder engagement demands collaboration across and within organizations—not just the UN and the World Bank, but other actors as well. This will ensure that reform is not just focused on institutional hardware (laws, policies, organizational structures, and processes), but anchored on outcomes for people. The former has tended to be less successful; the result has been coined in some literature as "isomorphic mimicry,"[40]

where institutions mimic what is considered best practice without examining what can bring about a shift in institutional culture and imperatives to deliver improved quality and access of services for people.

2.1: Lessons from United Nations engagement

Direct UN support to national security sector and justice reform processes started just before the end of the Cold War and expanded over the subsequent 30 years. Support is provided both by the Secretariat, particularly through its peace operations with relevant mandates, and by UN country teams, including through institutional support from UNDP and specialized support on gender, crime prevention, organized crime and children associated with armed forces and armed group and victims from UN Women, UNODC, and UNICEF.

Programs with a stronger people-centered focus have tended to give more directly attributable results than those that have focused on the institutional hardware only. In Somalia, the UN has devised a series of joint programs to strengthen the capacity and accountability of state institutions to recover territory; stabilize and provide basic safety and security (police component); ensure the alignment of laws (including on the reorganization of the judiciary) with the Constitution and international standards; and ensure that more Somalis have access to fair and affordable justice. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and UNDP have also supported increased civilian oversight of the SSR process and facilitated civil society engagement. There has also been collaboration with the World Bank on public financial management of the security and justice sectors through a joint public expenditure review in both sectors (see Box 4).[41] However, despite these efforts, sustained access to security and justice has remained low in Somalia.

In El Salvador, UNDP has focused more on citizen security, supporting institutional reform and structural changes in the relationship between the state and communities. This has been achieved through technical support and methodological guidance for institutions, as well as facilitating political dialogue and the engagement of civil society on issues.[42] This work has benefitted from InfoSegura,[43] a regional initiative grounded in a multidimensional approach to strengthening "state capacity for evidence-based and people-centered public policy making on citizen security" with a focus on gender and human rights. Independent evaluations[44] point to some improvement in performance and accountability of the security and justice sectors over time from a very low baseline.

Further, in Brazil, UNODC, in partnership with the National Justice Council and UNDP, implemented a project to Strengthen Pre-Trial Detention Control Hearings (2019–2023) based on the ideas of proportionality, rationality, and effectiveness of the criminal justice system. By promoting access to legal aid and social protection, this project contributed to the reduction of prison overcrowding.

Strong demand and a clear vision from political leadership has enabled more comprehensive engagement by the UN, informed by evidence through analysis and better coordination between different actors. As such, it is critical to help

political leadership understand how strong, accountable, responsive security, and justice institutions will enhance governance, strengthen the social contract, generate better conditions for sustainable development—thus bolstering their sovereignty. The example of The Gambia in Box 4 below illustrates this.

Box 4: Nationally-led SSR efforts in The Gambia

In The Gambia, through the Global Focal Point for the Rule of Law (GFP) and the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on SSR, as well as funding through the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF),[45] the UN supported the conduct of a government-led[46] inclusive SSR assessment that informed the development of the country's first security sector policies and strategies,[47] as well as follow-on SSR/G. UN assistance to The Gambia has aimed to connect and sequence implementation of SSR reforms with transitional justice, access to justice, human rights and conflict prevention efforts. Capacity strengthening was provided by support to the Office of National Security,[48] which also worked closely with the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance in undertaking a review of public expenditure in the sector.

Upon taking office in January 2017, President Barrow and his government understood that the realization of their goal to "deliver good governance and accountability, social cohesion, and national reconciliation and a revitalized and transformed economy for the wellbeing of all Gambians" would require prioritizing of reforms in the security and justice sectors, as well as transitional justice.

Barrow said, "My government, with the assistance of the UN, European Union (EU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other partners has [...] embarked upon a robust security sector reform process, aimed at bringing the security services fully under civilian democratic control, ensuring that the force's structures and manpower are appropriate for our national security needs, and that the men and women in our armed and uniformed services can play a meaningful and positive role in national development."

UN support to the process consisted in project aid disbursed through the PBF, along with the deployment of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA), UNDP, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) experts to support a comprehensive assessment that sought to: identify threats and challenges facing the state and people of The Gambia; analyze the overall security architecture then in place; survey public perceptions; provide the basis for the development of a reform strategy and inform the design of a program to support its implementation; contribute to the development of the country's first national security policy and strategy; and guide international support to the process.

The PBF also assisted in the establishment of a National Security Advisor (NSA) position in 2017—funding it for a year along with an international senior SSR advisor—and of the NSA-headed office, the Office of National Security (ONS). NSA, ONS, and the International Advisory Group also worked closely with the World Bank on a Public Expenditure Review. The PBF also funded support to the government on transitional justice.

The Gambia has maintained a fragile stability after this support, despite extreme instability in its neighbors.

Positive signaling by the UN's highest leadership, coupled with clear direction, has been instrumental in guiding staff on how to engage in the security and justice sectors. This engagement was previously ad hoc, but there has been ongoing effort to formally incorporate it in both mission and non-mission settings. These systematizing efforts can be tracked to the establishment of the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on SSR[49] in 2007. Drawing on knowledge gained from the five integrated missions that had SSR mandates, their work informed the 2008 report of the UN secretary-general on securing peace and development.[50] The resulting SSR Integrated Guidance Notes, published in 2012, constitute "an important part of the United Nations efforts to provide a holistic and coherent approach to SSR."[51] In addition, two thematic UN Security Council resolutions offer high-level guidance on SSR,[52] and the UN General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has issued recommendations on the implementation of SSR mandates over time.[53]

More recently, there has been recognition of the limitations to a solely state-centric, normative approach. There is a need to focus on the primacy of politics (see Box 5) and the complementary roles of state and civil society, as well as the role of "private, informal and traditional security actors, including elders, religious leaders, and armed groups"[54] in the provision of justice and security services, especially where the reach of state institutions is limited.[55] These issues have been covered in the second (2013) and third (2022) reports of the secretary-general on SSR. They note that in practice engagements tend to remain "technical in nature," and highlight the critical importance of governance and of establishing inclusive national ownership in such reforms.

Box 5: The primacy of politics

"Changes in the way that the security sector is governed and organized will inevitably bring about changes in the distribution of power and resources, not only among national institutions but also in society, including changes to dynamics between men and women. It is therefore important that reforms be implemented through national dialogue and agreements while striving for a more equitable distribution of power and resources, including through the negotiated changes in the composition and architecture of security institutions at all levels. While capacity-building is important, including by providing entry points for reforms, it is vital to understand the political and economic role of institutions from the perspective of different actors and communities."[56]

The UN experience in Timor-Leste reflects this evolution with an initial state-centric and normative focus (1999-2012) that did not sufficiently address the complex historical or political dynamics at play and achieved limited results on SJSR/G. The subsequent shift to include civil society organizations and community consultations on security oversight and governance, aligning more closely with national priorities,[57] yielded much better results. While Timor-Leste is not free of risks, it has remained free of conflict for over fifteen years.

An independent review of UN support to SSR in peace operations conducted in 2021 found that although "SSR typically seeks to re-orient security priorities, security institutions and security forces' behaviors away from the interests and influence of specific members of a country's ruling elite and towards the public interest," and therefore such process is bound to "touch directly on the interests of powerful

people," SSR work in UN missions too often lacks the level of "understanding of the political economy of the security sector landscape" that would support such sensitive processes. This leads the independent review to stress that "conflict-centered political economy analysis is essential to design and implement a mission SSR strategy that is achievable." It also highlights the need to prioritize support to the management of security sector public finances, and to ensure that reform strategies are not "premised on unrealistic and unsustainable models." While noting that the conduct of security sector public expenditure reviews does begin to "address this gap" (see Boxes 6 and 9), the independent review suggests the inclusion of public financial management as a "focus area" in SSR support in mission mandates.[58]

Additionally, the UN has identified that the **building of policy and operational guidance needs to be complemented by relevant strategic and technical capacity.** However, more effort has been placed on the latter than the former. The Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU) was established in 2007 as part of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and now the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), to support field missions.[59] The SSRU serves as secretariat to the IATF on SSR, manages a roster of experts set up in 2010 and oversees the SSR Standing Capacity (SSuRGe) that has been operating out of Brindisi since 2020. Additional capacities include the Standing Police Capacity and the Justice and Correction Standing Capacity, which are also based in Brindisi, as well as peace and development advisers deployed in over eighty countries through the UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme. UNDP, OHCHR, and UNODC have programs on the security and justice sector, along with smaller programs in agencies such as UN Women and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Since these capacities are dispersed, the Global Focal Point for the Rule of Law (GFP),[60] co-chaired by DPO and UNDP, was established in 2012[61] to provide some coordination in planning and implementation of programs,[62] including the provision of seed funding.[63] In integrated mission settings, this coordination function generally resides in small teams in the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), and in non-mission settings, in the office of the UN Resident Coordinator (RC).[64]

The policy on integrated assessment and planning also provides a framework for this coordination between missions and country teams.[65] This integrative function also applies to justice reform. In mission settings, the justice components of peace operation may be mandated to help deliver basic justice services or assist nationally-led investigations and prosecutions of atrocities, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[66] Other examples have included where OHCHR has supported UN missions in providing tailored and risk-informed human rights capacity-building activities to security forces;[67] including the support provided from 2018–2023 to the Group of 5 (G5) Sahel Joint Force[68] that directly contributed to the professionalization and operational posture of the Force—with human rights compliance having paid protection, operational, and political dividends.

In non-mission settings, UNDP's people-centered approach to justice and UNODC's people-centered work on organized crime and criminal justice reform (work informed by a rule of law framework that includes a gender perspective and pays particular attention to groups facing structural impediments, as well as institutional reform[69]) both acknowledge the need to factor in the full array of state and non-state justice service providers.[70]

This is also captured in the UN secretary-general's new vision for the rule of law, which emphasizes people-centered justice.

Despite these positive developments, there are still significant challenges in both the operationalization of existing guidance and the deployment of adequate field capacity. This was highlighted in the 2023 Executive Committee and Deputies Committee (EC/DC) discussion and staff interviews.

- Senior leadership stressed how ensuring that SSR/G and linked justice reform processes are nationally led requires time-consuming and ongoing engagement. Specifically, they noted that it generally takes someone of a political senior-level profile several intensive months to develop trust, adding that while SRSGs can open opportunities, they cannot follow through with this level of time commitment due to their other political engagements.
- While appreciative of support from the GFP, OROLSI, UNDP, and other funds and programs, senior field leaders required more senior personnel with a clear understanding of the "primacy of politics" in SJSR/G field positions[71] to advise SRSGs/DSRSGs and RCs on seizing and generating opportunities for SSR and justice reform. Current support structures provide good technical knowledge, but without more senior mentorship, this knowledge is often seen as too boilerplate for the field, insufficiently geared to national sensitivities, and needing trust-building, pacing, and sequencing.
- Field leadership noted a general awareness of the useful technical resources at their disposal through the GFP, but knowledge of their existence was not sufficiently disseminated.

2.2: Lessons from World Bank Engagement

While the World Bank's founding and name—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—refers to its role in relation to conflict, aside from loans to France and other countries devastated by World War II, the scale of World Bank investment in conflict, fragility, and violence only really started to increase in the 1990s. The World Bank has since had quite significant engagement with the security and justice sectors, with investment operations, development policy loans, and knowledge products covering public expenditure analysis and reform; social analysis; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; police reform, prisons and rehabilitation; municipal and local violence prevention; transport safety; anti-money laundering; and anti-trafficking measures.

Lending commitments are, however, still relatively small, at USD 2–3 billion total between 1990 and 2020.[72] This is equivalent to around USD 86 million annually. While this is minor in relation to the World Bank's overall lending; this amount is around 10 percent of official development assistance (ODA) to the security and justice sectors. The investment by OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in both sectors is also low, only around 2 percent of ODA to fragile- and conflict-affected states.[73] Despite these

small volumes, the WB's investments in this area, like those of the UN, have produced significant advances in operational effectiveness and results.

The World Bank's evolution in thinking about how to engage with the security and justice sectors has involved analytical and knowledge building, even if it has not involved specific internal institutional adjustments. On the analytical and policy front, the World Development Report 2011, the Legal and Guidance Notes on World Bank Support for Criminal Justice Activities 2012, the World Bank Strategy for Fragile and Conflict Affected States, and the updated Bank Policy: Development Cooperation and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) 2021 have all been instrumental in determining how the WB is engaging in the sectors.

Though the World Bank is not an expert in core security matters, it has built analytical strength in some of the specialized issues that overlap with development, such as **public expenditure, governance of economic enterprises, violence prevention, SGBV, DDR, and anti-money laundering.** In fragile- and conflict-affected countries, the common challenges of public sector governance and capacity constraints ring particularly true for security and justice sector institutions. These include issues such as public financial management, human resource management, results-based management and reporting, public service delivery and accountability, etc. These are areas where the World Bank is considered a leader.

Diagnostics is one of the ways in which the World Bank has increased its understanding and sensitivity to the drivers of fragility violence and conflict. The mid-term review (MTR) of its FCV strategy, reiterates the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) report that finds "the existence of Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs) has encouraged "leaning into conflict" through formal identification and analysis of conflict drivers, making subsequent investment projects in particular countries more likely to include adaptive and conflict-sensitive design and implementation mechanisms."[74] Depending on the context, RRAs have been able to bring forward issues linked to security, justice, and the rule of law such as poor governance leading to inadequate, unequal public service delivery; security challenges and lack of security and justice provision; and marginalization and inequality. The RRAs in turn inform the Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs), which subsequently inform country strategies.

Some examples of these RRAs include the one undertaken on Chad in 2021, which identified "security sector dysfunction and weak rule of law that prevents the effective implementation of justice and mitigation of conflicts" as a structural driver of conflict. The subsequent SCD undertaken in 2022 identified poor security sector governance and weak rule of law as binding constraints that increasingly undermine progress toward poverty reduction. In the DRC, the RRA undertaken in 2021 identified dysfunctional security and justice systems as a conflict driver. The SCD that was undertaken prior in 2018, had also identified the imperative of developing a robust, disciplined, and professional security force together with an accessible and fair judicial system as key to safeguarding economic and social progress. The World Bank's upcoming portfolio review of security and development[75] notes that SCDs in South Africa, Timor-Leste, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Afghanistan, The Gambia, and Nigeria all reflect on critical security and justice issues. Despite the identification of these issues in the diagnostics, some of the country partnership frameworks for these countries, however, have not

included actions in these sectors. For example, the Country Partnership Framework 2022–2026 for the DRC acknowledges the government's National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Community Resilience Building that commits to addressing drivers of conflict and violence, including governance, justice, security and stabilization, and socioeconomic inclusion. Yet, it does not have any program addressing these issues.[76]

The MTR also notes that the main point of the RRAs is to identify follow-up opportunities for dialogue or operational engagement. In this regard, there have been missed opportunities in advancing dialogue and action in these sectors as critical drivers of fragility in some of the country contexts where they have played a key role in the overall events and developments trends, such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, or the Sahel.

Where there is client demand, the World Bank has been able to respond positively to increasing calls for support in conducting Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) and public finance management assistance, both areas in which it holds a clear comparative advantage. The World Bank has conducted more than twenty security and justice sector PERs in low- and middle-income countries affected by conflict or interpersonal violence such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Niger, Mali, El Salvador, and Mexico. It has clearly built substantive expertise in undertaking these PERs. Depending on the objectives of these PERs, the results have been useful in informing both the government and the WB. Somalia provides an example of the impact of well-timed public expenditure work (see Box 6).

PER work is by no means confined to least developed countries or fragile states. It has also proven useful in middle-income countries. These reviews have enabled governments to make critical decisions on reform measures. For example, in 2015, the Mexico multisector PER enabled the government to see how a newly proposed "Single Police Command" would mean transferring around 500,000 police officers from the municipal to state authority, and the cost implications of this action. The PER informed the Mexican government's decision not to go ahead with the plan.

Box 6: World Bank contribution to security and justice PER in Somalia

In late 2013, the Ministry of Finance of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) requested that the World Bank and UNSOM jointly conduct a public expenditure review of the security and justice sectors (SJPER).

The main objectives of the SJPER were to "assist policy and operational-decision-making" at a complex juncture in the country's history ahead of a political and security transition; and to help the Somali authorities meet their goal to build "able, affordable, accountable, and acceptable Somali security forces and institutions, that support enhanced community led peacebuilding efforts." The process unfolded in an iterative manner over several years, allowing it to remain relevant in a dynamic context. For example, it informed discussions shaping the National Security Architecture (including between the FGS, federal member states, and donors). The SJPER was updated once a consensus was reached on the matter.

The forthcoming portfolio review indicates that this update generated "strong demand in a World Bank follow-on program of work" that would shed further light on "fiscal trade-offs and options for system strengthening" from the national authorities and their international partners. The review notes that World Bank Public Financial Management (PFM) specialists were also keen to pursue such work, particularly on issues relating to affordability, fiscal transfers, and revenue sharing.

This led the World Bank to play a "leading advisory role in PFM reform" through more generic and security sector-specific engagements and operations led by the Governance Global Practice.

Analytical reports found that "high-level ownership of the reforms throughout government provided a robust foundation for discussing and supporting [PFM] reforms in Somalia."

Despite a number of remaining challenges, the country's SSR program "incorporates mechanisms for improved governance and PFM; almost all salaries and some ration payments are now paid directly to soldiers' bank or mobile money accounts; clear processes are in place for authorizing payments within the system; and biometric registration allows for verification that payments are going to the right person." The establishment of "central purchasing contracts for major supplies to the Somalia National Army" has yielded some savings. Discretionary and unsupervised spending and corruption are expected to be further reduced by 'the FGS' plans to improve internal controls to cover logistics procedures." These positive developments have generated momentum for further reform and have contributed to "restoring public confidence in the security sector and reducing the cost of providing the existing level of security services."[77]

The World Bank also has a substantive portfolio of operations both development policy operations (DPO) and investment lending operations (IL) covering security and justice sectors. In the early 1990s–early 200s there are examples of the institution providing support to countries emerging out of conflict providing concessional loans linked to reform of the security sector.

Where security and justice issues are identified as being critical to achieving the objectives of a development policy operation, interventions have in some instances been

proposed as part of the DPO. As such, there are several examples where a number of policy operations have contained security institutional reform or violence prevention prior actions. Some examples have included in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Ecuador, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. Brazil is a particularly interesting case due to the sequence of development operations, which generated significant results over time (see Box 7).

Box 7. Security and justice sector development policy and investment lending operations in Brazil

In Brazil, the World Bank has undertaken various development policy operations, working with a variety of state administrations focusing on violence prevention and institutional support to the security sector. The total value of disbursement under these operations reaches USD 1.78 billion. Some of these examples include:

- In the state of Bahia, the government has promoted multidimensional approaches through social prevention initiatives that deal with crime and violence.
- In Pernambuco, crime was reduced by 8 percent in areas where the project was implemented, rehabilitating crack users and addressing violence against women.
- In Sergipe State, the government was able to implement decentralized protection and support programs for women in the four municipalities with the highest concentration of gender-based violence (GBV). This increased reporting of GBV by 36 percent.
- In Alagoas, the government was able to revamp the state social security system, including a funding mechanism for military personnel through the enactment of the social security law.
- In Amazonas, the government was able to integrate management of its civil and military police units, as well as establishing a performance evaluation system to monitor and measure their joint activities. The government also regulated public disclosure of expenditure and the costs of its civil and military police units.

In Bahia, the government received budget support linked to the establishment of a multisectoral group within Secretaria da Seguranca Publica to assess, design, and train for services needed by selected vulnerable groups. Police were trained on prevention of violence against vulnerable groups. This included changes to case registration systems at specialized police stations.[78]

The WB has built a substantive portfolio of work on DDR, focusing on some of the aspects of demobilization and more on reintegration. Many of these have been implemented following peace agreements seeking to integrate ex-combatants into society through activities such as psychosocial support, skills development and vocational training, pension programs for veterans and the military, etc.

Other areas of work have included road safety aspects of road transport projects, and to a lesser extent, security related operations in airport and seaports as well as demining operations.

At a policy level, the WB's Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence 2020-2025[79] offers the necessary framework to guide the organization's work in this field, as two of the six priority areas of the strategy relate to SJSR/G: "(v) engaging on justice and the rule of law; and (vi) developing approaches to dealing with the security sector."[80] The World Bank's updated policy on Development Cooperation in Fragility, Conflict and Violence further acknowledges the relationship between security and prevention of violence and sustainable development. The policy highlights the role that the World Bank can play where it has a comparative advantage and the technical competence, and where activities—underpinned by a robust development rationale and subject to appropriate risk assessment—are anchored in its reconstruction and development mandate.

Nevertheless, this policy has not always enabled confident staff engagement in these sectors. First, the policy is quite narrow in its definition of the security sector, stating that "in most countries, the security sector typically includes defense, military, paramilitary, and intelligence services … It may also include some elements of the criminal-justice or law-enforcement sectors, notably police."[81] This aligns with the WB's mandate on public sector institutional strengthening and governance, but it does not capture some of the work the institution has done through people-centered security and community-driven development mechanisms. The updated policy has also introduced some ambiguity in terms of how the World Bank engages in one of its core areas of comparative advantage—PERs. The policy specifically states that:

> "…The Bank, when carrying out public expenditure reviews, requests information from member countries on their military-related expenditures at an aggregate level. In countries where there are growing imbalances between development and military expenditures, the Bank may pursue the matter through analytical work and policy dialogue with a focus on adequate resource allocations for development activities. The Bank, however, refrains from introducing conditionality related to security or military expenditures."

World Bank staff have cited particular confusion on how to interpret this provision. It is seen as a direct constraint to undertaking PERs, because it technically makes it impossible to undertake an SPER. The expected staff guidance to be issued for this policy could help clarify the boundaries for engagement in the security and justice sectors, fostering a more facilitating environment for such engagement.

The introduction of the FCV envelope in International Development Association (IDA) 19, provides additional resources to eligible IDA countries facing FCV risks. This is enabling the World Bank in collaboration with partners to directly and indirectly support client governments to implement FCV prevention and transition strategies that could include governance and security dimensions. The example cited above of the DRC's Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA) eligibility included milestones under access to justice and the fight against impunity and security and stabilization. The FCV strategy 2020 MTR report[82] notes that the dialogue that is part of this process has enabled multistakeholder dialogues on the drivers of fragility and elaboration of the country strategy, building a

sense of national ownership. It also provides an opportunity to identify areas of possible collaboration and partnership between various actors, as has been the case with the UN in Burundi, with Chatham House in Mozambique, and with the EU in the DRC and Chad. This is usually government led, though coordination mechanisms have varied from one country to another. The MTR report also notes that in 14 countries that have undergone the eligibility process for the FCV Envelope, portfolios have become more strongly aligned with FCV drivers. This is because it is a requirement that countries fully recalibrate their portfolios to address the root causes of FCV to access the PRA and Turn Around Allocation (TAA). In this process, governments such as DRC and Chad have identified security and justice issues as priorities for and included them in the milestones developed towards the prevention and resilience allocation eligibility. There are however no examples yet of security and justice operations in the countries who have received these allocations. This is an opportunity for future consideration on how priorities identified by client governments can inform the recalibration of country portfolios.

The WB's work in the justice sector is well established, with fewer ambiguities, although not with less sensitivity. **Since the early 1990s, the World Bank has worked with justice institutions from member countries—particularly courts, ministries of justice, and legal aid providers—including a strong justice for** the poor program that works with paralegals and community service organizations (CSOs).[83] In 2006, the General Counsel's Legal Opinion on World Bank engagement in criminal justice reform clarified that there is no impediment to support law enforcement institutions as long as a development rationale exists. The Counsel did not go against the principle of staying away from political matters. The 2012 Legal and Guidance Notes on World Bank Support for Criminal Justice Activities laid out further clarifications on limitations and opportunities.

Going forward, the World Bank commits to exploring ways to strengthen the justice and rule of law dimensions of its operational and analytical work. Its goals are manifold: to help countries better address grievances; enforce rights; reduce and manage crime; resolve disputes over land and natural resources in an equitable manner; promote legal aid and access to legal services; and strengthen contract enforcement and commercial dispute resolution.[84] This also includes facilitating access to legal and justice services for prevention, protection, and prosecution for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

The Bank also has a small portfolio of investment operations mainly targeting violence reduction. These have focused primarily on addressing the risk factors of those most vulnerable to violence as perpetrators and as victims, such as youth, women, and urban poor. These include a wide range of programs such as community-driven violence prevention, school-based violence prevention, alternative life options for youth, and drug-related crime and SGBV prevention. They also include consideration of help from the WB in analyzing national policy issues in social and econ0mic impacts for issues such as gun control and alcohol restrictions.

Reducing urban violence and crime represent the highest investment sub-category, followed by SGBV. Community-based violence prevention activities have focused on promoting social cohesion, increasing community safety, and local service provision. The World Bank's technical expertise on environmental and social safeguards and its increasing focus on climate change vulnerability provide further opportunities for understanding the need for investment in the security and justice sectors, all of which are strongly corelated.

The World Bank has built substantial capacity in the security and justice sectors. Such capacity is an asset to the institution, but due to the profile of these issues internally, it is scattered in ways that have dissipated its impact. Career incentives within the organization have not provided sufficient enticement to allow this capacity to concretize and deepen in ways that it can be drawn upon more efficiently.

Using a public sector approach and people-centered approach to engaging with the security and justice sectors provides a justifiable way in which the World Bank can engage in security and justice sectors. This involves looking at the main parameters of analyzing public services, including its impact on the macro-fiscal position; the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery; transparency and accountability as well as people's experience and enjoyment of these services. In at least all these, the WB would be able to engage within its mandate and authorizing environment as well as partnering with the UN through all the various instruments it has, including knowledge products that would inform policy decision-making.

The portfolios of other development banks show that there is demand for MDB assistance in these areas. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has a large portfolio related to interpersonal violence, police, and the criminal justice system, with programs focusing on prevention and strengthening institutions. To guide its work, IADB has developed a conceptual framework for the sector,[85] and an Operational guideline for program design and execution in the area of civic co-existence and public safety.[86] In addition, it has also developed the first attempt at a one stop portal of impact evaluation of security and justice sector operations. Providing a repository of what has worked well and where. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is also now considering financing assistance based on security outcomes.[87] AfDB is working on an innovative security-indexed investment bond platform to mobilize public and private resources to address the root causes of insecurity. Other MDBs, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) have investments in the security sector that can be considered beyond the World Bank's scope.

2.3: Lessons from UN-World Bank partnerships

The study revealed that despite the long history of UN and World Bank engagement in the security and justice sectors, there has not been much strategic collaboration. Indeed, while there have been a few very compelling examples of joint work (e.g., SJPERs in Liberia or Somalia), or strategically sequenced mutually reinforcing interventions (as in The Gambia), these instances are the exception rather than the norm.

Box 2 on Sudan highlighted how in this case though there was a very strong collaboration between the UN and the WB, there was a failure to sufficiently leverage insights drawn from their different internal competencies including from external partners. This then can result in the overlooking of warning signals and missed opportunities to engage on SJSR/G preventively, with significant implications for the countries concerned and their people. In contrast, Box 8 on Liberia below shows a very straightforward example of the value of working more intensively together. In this instance, the UN and World Bank have collaborated on SJSR/G, they have drawn on the mechanisms and resources they

have in place to operationalize their intent, such as the UN-WBG Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations, and they have delivered results. Such collaboration has provided an opportunity for each organization to leverage on the other's comparative advantages and capacities and thus inform respective strategies.

Box 8: United Nations–World Bank partnership on the Liberia Public Expenditure Review, January 2013

The Liberia public expenditure review was initiated during preparations for the drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It focused on the implications of the upcoming closure of the UN mission and the need to factor the costs of sustaining the associated security transition in the country's first medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), broadening the scope of the review to the entire security sector.

Financing from the UN-World Bank Partnership Trust Fund was used to conduct a review of public expenditure in the Liberian security sector and an assessment of the needs specific to the security transition. The objective of this first phase was to "identify the likely fiscal implications of different UNMIL transition scenarios" and "assist the government of Liberia and the international community" in reaching an informed decision on which drawdown scenario to adopt. The process involved robust engagement with relevant national authorities, including through the establishment of a government task force involving principals of all relevant ministries to fuel "national ownership of the process and encourage the government of Liberia to take the lead in the important follow-up phase of the work."

UNMIL [was] responsible for the analysis and quality assurance of the security-related issues including risks and threats, the Liberian security institutions and structure, their strengths and weaknesses, as well as security needs and basic functions to be carried out by the Liberian security agencies. The World Bank was responsible for the analysis and quality assurance of public expenditure management and issues in the security sector, the estimated cost of a basic security package, fiscal space, and financing gap in the context of a MTEF. The UN facilitated discussions with the Ministers of Defence and Justice, as well as members of the Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs, and of the House Committee on National Security. The World Bank also facilitated discussions with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs. The Liberia Public Expenditure Review Note was developed through this joint process.[88]

A follow-on joint justice and security PER was conducted after the closure of UNMIL in 2018, jointly by the World Bank and UNDP. Additionally, a broader ranging PER including aggregates for the justice and security sector was also undertaken in 2021.[89]

Collaboration in undertaking security sector public expenditure reviews has emerged as an area where the World Bank and the UN, have collaborated in different contexts. The security sector PER process in Liberia that Box 9 describes was the first-ever such process conducted jointly between the World Bank and a UN peacekeeping mission. It led the UN to factor public financial management considerations in its approach to SJSR/G, and to identify the skillsets needed in both mission and non-mission settings to support its increased focus on governance and sustainability. The

World Bank provided the UN with an understanding of the proportion of the overall budget going to the sector, and where sectoral spending efficiency could be improved. It also facilitated a deeper engagement in public financial management policy discussions with the government. Overall, the Liberia PER process demonstrated how the two organizations could leverage each other's comparative advantage and expertise (without overstepping their respective mandates) to deliver critical advisory support to countries seeking to reform or develop their security sectors sustainably. Other examples include Somalia and The Gambia that further illustrate this point.

"Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Côte d'Ivoire," November 2014, ©UN Photo/Abdul Fatai.

Another area that has been a natural place for collaboration has been in DDR projects. The United Nations and the World Bank have engaged in DDR activities, both separately and in partnership since the 1980s. Collaboration in this area has offered examples of mission-driven complementary work. Indeed, while some UN entities can more readily engage in the political dialogue necessary to broker and implement the process, the World Bank can only provide support after combatants have been disarmed and demobilized. The focus of DDR has evolved over time from initiatives contributing to the implementation of peace agreements, primarily targeting former fighters from both statutory and non-statutory forces, concerned with "force reduction" and resource reallocation from military budgets (first-generation DDR). In the 1990s, drawing the lessons of earlier interventions, and "as the nature of armed conflict changed," DDR started to broaden in scope, providing more robust assistance to the socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants, giving increased attention to child soldiers and gender dimensions, and including as beneficiaries the dependents of ex-combatants and the communities in which they were seeking to reintegrate (second-generation DDR). Box 9 below provides examples of the lessons learnt from these arrangements.

Box 9: Lessons from United Nations–World Bank collaboration in support of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants

- World Bank-led Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), 2002–2009: This was an endeavor "involving over 40 national and international partners" designed to provide financial and technical assistance to seven countries "embroiled in a regional conflict that played out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s and early 2000s."[90] As the MDRP was already championing ownership, donor harmonization and partnership, "its implementation highlighted how complex partnerships with a large collection of dissimilar organizations are inherently difficult to manage," and required "dedicated specialized staff and resources."[91] Other lessons point to the need to ensure that DDR is "anchored in a wider security transformation process," that it is "complemented with other recovery activities," and informed by "data and analytics at micro-local levels, along with monitoring and evaluation."[92]
- UN-led development of Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), 2006: Originally developed to provide guidance in post-conflict contexts [...], usually where peace operations have also been established and mandated to support national DDR efforts," the IDDRS have been updated over time in a process that "culminated with the launch of the revised UN Approach to DDR in 2019." The revised approach "provides guidance to DDR practitioners working in both mission and non-mission settings as well as for DDR efforts within and outside the framework of comprehensive peace agreements."[93] Further revisions are nearing completion and they introduce "immediate and targeted measures that may be used before, after or alongside DDR programs or when the preconditions for DDR programs are not in place." These measures (third-generation DDR) include "pre-DDR, transitional weapons and ammunition management (WAM), community violence reduction (CVR), initiatives to prevent individuals from joining armed groups designated as terrorist organizations, DDR support to mediation, and DDR support to transitional security arrangements."[94]

The lessons highlighted in Box 9 above have informed UN-WB collaboration on DDR with the African Union (AU), notably in support of the AU DDR Capacity Building Program through a partnership framework between the AU Commission, the UN Office to the AU, UN DPO/DDRS and the Social Sustainability and Inclusion team in the East and Southern Africa Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. The partnership established in 2012, initially focused on "developing a suite of operational guidance notes [including on women, children and reintegration processes] requested by member states and Regional Economic Mechanisms (REMS)."[95] The partnership has since supported the establishment of technical capacity within the AU Commission and PSOs, and conducted "joint assessment missions in the Comoros, Sudan, Libya, South Sudan, Somalia and CAR."[96] In its second and third phases, it has sought to provide operational support, technical assistance and increased collaboration with local partners. In October 2023, it entered a fourth phase that aims to build on the foundations established during the preceding phases, and to focus on the political aspects and preventive role of DDR.

Concomitantly, the WB and UN have maintained some engagement in a number of countries engaged in DDR process. They recently undertook a joint mission to the DRC, see Box 10 below. Joint UN missions, especially by the leadership, are beneficial not only because they send the right signals to staff on the ground about the need to collaborate, but they also enable the mission team to engage a diverse range of actors including ministry officials from ministries that are not traditionally engaged by the respective organizations. These work well due to the multistakeholder nature of issues in the security and justice sectors.

Box 10: The Democratic Republic of Congo, Positive impact on joint high-level engagement

A senior-level joint mission between UN and World Bank to the Democratic Republic of the Congo on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), and Stabilization took place from February 7–11, 2023. The mission aimed to support the implementation of the East African Community (EAC)-led Nairobi process and the Programme de Désarmement, Démobilisation, Relèvement Communautaire et Stabilisation (P-DDRCS). Key staff from both organizations engaged with the government of the DRC, including the Prime Minister, relevant Cabinet Ministers, and other stakeholders.

Given the complex context of the DRC, marked by insecurity, armed groups, and upcoming elections, the mission identified challenges and opportunities. It emphasized the need to align efforts with the political process, particularly the EAC-led Nairobi process, and highlighted the importance of an integrated approach to DDR and stabilization. The delegation acknowledged the existing funding commitments, such as the World Bank's USD 250 million for the Stabilization and Recovery in Eastern DRC (STAR-EST) Project and noted the necessity for coordination and avoiding duplication of efforts.

Recommendations stemming from the mission included the establishment of a multistakeholder coordination platform, developing a common vision on DDR, creating a strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR), exploring re-alignment of funding, and leveraging the Peacebuilding Commission's role. The next steps involve the formation of a working group to follow up on recommendations, the development of a diplomatic strategy, and identification of critical reforms contributing to UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)'s transition. The joint commitment aims to encourage sustainable support for DDR and stabilization efforts in the DRC.[97]

Knowledge generation has also been an area where the World Bank and the UN have engaged collaboratively in the past. This has involved undertaking joint diagnostics using tools such as the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment and producing guidance and analytical tools such as the joint UNDP–WB report (Re)Building Core Government Functions in Fragile and Conflict Affected Settings: Joint principles for assessing key issues and priorities. This report sought to provide government and donor partners with an overview of the main priorities and actions needed to re-establish core government functions, including the security sector, in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

The UN and WB have also signed the partnership framework for conflict affected situations.[98] The framework highlights a commitment to strengthen coherence,

engagement, and coordination for prevention while reducing needs, risks, and vulnerability to scale up results. Joint analysis, diagnostics, and production of tools and guidelines become useful when both organizations bring their complementary expertise to the table. The objective should be about bringing better solutions, better operational responses and scaling up impact through improved efficiency and effectiveness. Production of knowledge and tools should be undertaken with the client in mind, understanding the knowledge needs of governments going through justice and security sector reform processes. Bringing actors such as ministry officials from other contexts to share their experiences and lessons learned sometimes goes much further in terms of delivering value than publications.

In summary, the lessons that have been learned regarding partnership in the security and justice sectors have included the following:

First, addressing security and justice issues is now more urgent than ever. This sense of **shared urgency should drive collaboration**—including on SSR/G and linked justice issues—to ensure that the nearly 600 million people currently living under coups d'état will be afforded an adequate model for the provision of humanitarian and development assistance, and that those at risk of such a change receive preventative assistance. These politically estranged situations require more deliberate effort in seeking to understand how to engage in a way that supports their affected populations without legitimizing unconstitutional regimes, while opening windows towards peacebuilding and exit from constitutional crisis. A common understanding of the political economy, coordinated dialogue, and messaging are crucial.

Second, **collaboration allows the two organizations to complement their engagement.** UN close collaboration with national security institutions such as ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and interior enables it to bring these actors to the table when required. The World Bank, on the other hand, possesses considerable technical expertise on public financial management (and specifically on PERs), combined with substantial development assistance. Therefore, it brings the entry point on national budgets that is indispensable in dialogue on SJSR/G, as well as experience with integrating security and justice into community driven development (CDD) and infrastructure. Jointly, therefore, the UN and WB can support a comprehensive discussion with all relevant government stakeholders present.

Third, **closer collaboration allows both organizations to better understand when specific support from either may be required.** This division of labor and responsibilities in accordance with their respective expertise and comparative advantages can avoid duplication of efforts and the inefficiency of resource allocation. Governmental requests for support can receive better responses when it is clear which organization has capacity in a specific area, and how their respective interventions might be sequenced to deliver the most effectiveness. In practical terms, this could also mean coordinating other donors. This cross-agency collaboration is beneficial for a government seeking support, and also for ensuring efficient use of resources. The Gambian example clearly demonstrated this, where the UN was involved in providing capacity support to the country's National Security Office, which then played a key role when the World Bank undertook a public expenditure review at the request of the president. The PER was made possible through an institutional home already in place which could act as

interlocutor for this process on the government side, while also facilitating coordination of the different stakeholders involved.

Fourth, the reality is that there is **not that much financing for security and justice sectors** because these have not made it into mainstream development discussions. Security and to a much lesser extent justice issues are not discussed as mainstream development issues, and this therefore constrains how much resources are being allocated to addressing them as development services. Collaboration will strengthen the case on the centrality of these issues to sustainable development.

Despite these demonstrated benefits, collaboration between the two organizations has not been consistent. It has remained ad-hoc and dependent on the personal working relationship between field leadership of both organizations. Several reasons were given for this state of affairs, some of which have been described in previous sections. Additional reasons include:

1. **A lack of institutional incentive to collaborate, and a need to improve this.** Collaboration tends to be time-consuming and includes high transaction costs that disincentivize teams in the field from collaborating. The World Bank's language regarding mission-driven partnership/collaboration speaks to this. A parallel view from UN field leadership (resonant in the consultations undertaken) reveals that any collaboration is judged on whether funds flow from the World Bank to the UN. Although there are instances when UN entities do implement World Bank-funded projects, as is currently the case in Yemen and other crisis situations, this should not be the main ambition driving collaboration. This shows the need for institutional incentives that recognize and reward effort to collaborate when it results in better delivery of solutions, and achieves impact on the ground, no matter who receives and executes the funds.

2. **The lack of a clear focal point for engagement with the UN on SSR/G matters is seen by World Bank personnel as a complicating factor and a disincentive to collaborate.** Ensuring that the GFP bolsters UN country teams' capacity to engage effectively with the World Bank would be helpful, as would clarifying the GFP's purpose for World Bank teams—or alternately, arranging a different coordinating arrangement if the GFP is not seen to work adequately for this purpose. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)–World Bank partnership (see Box 11) was identified as an example of successful collaboration from which valuable lessons can be drawn: the World Bank partnered with a single UN entity and was not involved in the complicated coordination processes that typically characterize multiagency actions. Efficient coordination within the UN remains a challenge for World Bank engagement. Notwithstanding this overall sense of a successful arrangement, from UNHCR's perspective the partnership is challenged by the still-salient delay to bring real results on the ground. In particular, even though money is disbursed from the World Bank to governments, the results in long-standing solutions for refugees remain difficult to see.

3. **The level of top leadership commitment to UN-World Bank collaboration has a strong bearing on any collaboration in the field.** For example, when Jim Yong Kim, the former World Bank President, and current UN Secretary-General António Guterres undertook joint missions to Bangladesh in 2018 to assess the Rohingya crisis, they

issued joint statements which served as strong signals to field teams to take up the issues they mentioned. The World Bank has identified fragility and conflict as critical themes for their evolving agenda around strengthening support for global public good. Stronger messaging around the need for both organizations to collaborate on the nexus of security, justice, development, and climate would help their field teams better understand the need to find common ground.

Box 11: The UNHCR-World Bank partnership on forced displacement: a complementary, mission-driven partnership

Rationale and objective

Low- and middle-income countries host the vast majority of the forcibly displaced, often over extended periods of time. Data collected in 2022 confirms this trend, with 76 percent of the world's 108.4 million refugees and other people in need of international protection hosted in countries in these income categories. This number is despite the increase in the percentage of refugees hosted in high-income countries due to the number of Ukrainians who have sought refuge mainly in European countries since February 2022.[99]

The fact that both refugees (and even the communities receiving them) are among those most likely to live in poverty and be vulnerable to facing serious violations of their human rights has cast forced displacement as a development challenge as well as one of protection. This has led UNHCR and the WB to partner in an effort to complement humanitarian interventions with development assistance focused on the medium-term socioeconomic dimensions of displacement for both refugees and their hosts, and to encourage refugee-hosting countries to adopt sound policies on the issue.[100]

Process

Collaboration was shepherded by personnel from each organization who understood the mandate, comparative advantages, and modus operandi of the other, as well as the added value of partnering on this issue. Collaboration began with the World Bank FCV Group consulting UNHCR on "forced displacement" concerning a doctrine paper[101] the WB was drafting to clarify its development approach to the refugee question. The regular engagements included several multi-day retreats—fueling mutual understanding and respect which has led the two teams to deepen their collaboration.

Characteristics of the partnership and outcomes

The UNHCR-WB partnership is built on complementarity actions, not funding flows. This has allowed the two organizations to work toward shared objectives, shape global policy[102] on the subject, engage refugee-hosting countries in mutually reinforcing policy dialogue informed by more robust data, and generate synergies while operating within their respective mandates and comparative advantages.

Several instruments support these efforts:

- The **Refugee Policy Review Framework** is an analytical tool that allows the two organizations to reach a shared diagnostic on the strengths and weaknesses of a given country's public policy on refugees. It is designed to support their respective dialogue with authorities on the issue.
- Agreement on indicators under the Framework has enabled the WB to scale up its engagement with USD 2 billion under the IDA18 Sub-window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW), and USD 2.2 billion through the IDA19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR). It also allows for monitoring of progress under the corresponding IDA window. This support aims "to complement humanitarian interventions by focusing on the medium-term socioeconomic dimensions of displacement."[103]
- The **Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement** was established to respond, "to growing demand for more and better data, to inform a stronger global response to forced displacement and improve policies and programming to help affected people."[104] The two organizations signed a memorandum of understanding in 2018 to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the JDC's management committee. A member the World Bank staff heads the Center, with a staff member of UNHCR as deputy. The remainder of personnel comprise equal numbers of staff from both organizations, and both organizations fund the Center and manage the funds jointly.
- A new global framework data-sharing agreement[105] was signed by the two organizations in June 2023 "that will facilitate timely access to data related to the socioeconomic condition of refugees, internally displaced and stateless populations." The agreement is expected to support the design of targeted World Bank "programs that build long-term economic resilience and individual potential," and inform "UNHCR's assistance to forcibly displaced and stateless people as well as host communities."[106]

Chapter 3:

Recommendations

There is great potential for the UN and the World Bank to strengthen their assistance—individually and collaboratively—to help countries reduce uncertainty linked to the security and justice sectors, and to increase their potential to foster inclusive development.

A great deal more can be done to promote a more systematic and strategic partnership, starting with information sharing; joint analysis where necessary; reinforcing each other's messaging; coordination and harmonization of efforts; and leveraging respective convening platforms and relationships. Strengthening this work is a challenge for organizational change in which the most senior UN and World Bank leadership can play a role, involving a culture transformation and fresh view of their people's perspectives of incentives. The following joint and individual recommendations therefore range from the cultural/strategic, to the more technical.

Recommendations for the UN and World Bank to do jointly together

1. **Adopt joint messaging on security and justice as a service and public good.** There is no question that security sector and justice issues impact development in fundamental ways. The question is how to get this across. Leadership in government needs confidence that proposed reforms are not attempts to interfere in sovereign matters or political issues. Yet it also needs a frank dialogue on how these issues affect development. The messaging, including from the top leadership of the UN and the WB, from the secretary-general and the president down, could emphasize that (a) security and justice are critical public goods and people-centered services; and (b) while they are sensitive, action in these areas is sovereignty-enhancing, and successful outcomes bear significant political dividends grounded in enhanced governance, a strengthened social contract, and conditions more conducive to sustainable development.

2. **Agree on a joint framework, realistic for both organizations.** The UN and WB should develop a joint framework that reflects the lessons of past collaborations, including the UNHCR–World Bank partnership on forced displacement. Such a framework can be useful in ensuring that the ad-hoc nature of collaboration becomes more systematized and focuses on mission-driven strategic objectives that are cognizant of the comparative advantages of both institutions. Engaging in the security and justice sectors requires a balance that draws on the strengths and expertise both organizations possess. It will also lay out a division of labor that creates not only effectiveness, but efficiency in approach. A possible UN-World Bank partnership framework can be built on the following comparative key lessons:

a. Security sector and justice governance cannot be placed outside the "development" areas —these are public services and public goods, and no matter how development actors are unaccustomed to these issues, they have to be seen as central to development.

b. In comparative advantage terms:

    I. The UN brings expertise in political analysis and dialogue; peacebuilding; constitutional, oversight and accountability issues; technical specificities of reform; and local reach.

    II. The World Bank, for its part, brings economic and Public Financial Management/Public Expenditure Review (PFM/PER) expertise, dialogue on national budgets, and experience with integrating security and justice into community driven development (CDD) and infrastructure.

c. Mission-driven partnership should aim at improving strategic and programmatic alignment, leveraging the distinct comparative advantages of the two institutions, anchored in data and knowledge sharing, and built on mutual understanding and complementarity, and focused on optimizing impact on governance and institutions not on funding flows. In this area:

    I. The two organizations could agree to create a common impact hub on security and justice reform as a one-stop shop for the UN system and WB. Initial focus on analysis, evaluation, data, and indicators to measure/assess impact of security and justice reform on prevention, resilience, and sustainable development. (This possibly also includes constitutional data, and although this was not the focus of this study, it is linked).

    II. The two organizations could jointly assist countries in carrying out studies of their security and justice needs, either (ideally) as part of regular household surveys or as separate exercises. As a note, legal needs surveys have to date been carried out separately and could also be incorporated as part of regular household surveys, depending on efficiency judgments.

    III. The UN and the WB could agree to start with a joint publication bringing together research on this issue stemming from points (i) and (ii) and looking at solutions that can be offered to clients, leading (depending on demand) to a longer-term program. This could also include regularly documenting impactful case examples that can be shared with clients as part of lessons sharing.

    IV. Understanding the political economy of security and justice sectors is critical towards effective engagement in these sectors. Jointly undertaking political economy analyses of security and justice sectors would benefit from leveraging of the respective expertise and experience on various issues relevant to these sectors.

V. Beyond joint efforts, another way of facilitating collaboration is allowing the respective organization to provide feedback and inputs into each other's analytical products, strategies, and diagnostics. Finding a way to efficiently systematize this within both organizations could go a long way in cross-fertilizing ideas between the organizations. This could be achieved by including this engagement as one of the steps in the process cycle of products before a document is submitted for internal leadership approval.

d. As with all areas that can be sensitive, messaging from top leadership is important.

3. **Pursuing shared understanding.** Security and justice sector reform and governance are essentially political, and dialogue needs direct involvement of field leadership. Sensitivity of the issues requires careful, time-intensive, gradual dialogue; thus, senior advisory capacity is vital to support field leadership. Building partnership between the two organizations would include developing a common understanding of how security and justice sectors impact other development sectors, along with parameters for engagement that define the boundaries of each organization's respective mandates. This includes the most obvious current cases of the coup d'état countries where the questions are on the political economy of these regimes, and understanding what paths there may be to an exit. This level of mutual and joint understanding can help address some of the frustrations arising from collaboration. To this end, the UN and the WB could fuel mutual understanding through joint retreats, including with outside partners.

Recommendations for joint United Nations-World Bank action

1. The top leadership within both institutions needs to communicate the importance of the strong linkages that exist between justice, security, and sustainable development and ensuring that international assistance yields people-centered outcomes, not just institutional reform. Top leadership should issue clear directions to field leadership to support those governments who wish to include security sector and justice reform in their national development plans as a service to the population. As such, both organizations need to evolve in their thinking to make people-centered justice and security the defining parameters of engagement, not just institutional building and reform. The World Bank and the UN should examine where successes have been most evident and/or have reflected this shift in thinking. Both organizations are at different stages of making such appreciation a part of their core strategy. Ensuring that field leadership and personnel engage in a manner that balances top-down and bottom-up concerns and approaches; considers how to engage with non-state providers of justice and security in areas beyond the reach of the state (managing hybridity as necessary); fostering inclusion, broad local ownership and thus contributing to conflict prevention[107] will help avoid the "isomorphic mimicry" that has sometimes characterized actions in these sectors with limited actual positive change for the people.[108]

2. Based on the realization that security and justice are fundamental and universal factors affecting the development prospects of countries, there is a need to integrate security and justice consistently in country analytical work, diagnostics, and other strategic assessments. There is also a need to develop gender-responsive and intersectional indicators to measure the effectiveness of security and justice interventions. To achieve this, analysis should explore how security and justice dynamics uniquely influence different individuals within communities. This approach can be integrated within existing assessment and diagnostic tools within both organizations, while adopting gender-sensitive perspectives and inclusive data collection methods such as gender-disaggregated and inter-sectional data (e.g., in risk and resilience assessments, systematic country diagnostics by the WB, and common country analysis by the UN).

3. Where lacking or needing specific clarification, both organizations should issue relevant operational guidance for staff on the scope and mandates for engagement:

    - **World Bank:** This pertains to the Development Cooperation and FCV Policy, which could clarify the parameters for engagement with the security and justice sectors and would reassure staff that they can respond to client demand regarding public expenditure reviews and other mandated requests from clients.

    - **UN:** This would involve encouraging responsiveness from country teams to requests from government–including in CCAs/SDCFs and clarifying approaches to security and justice sectors engagement in the exceptional circumstances guidance.

4. Successful reform is almost always multistakeholder, often involving regional partners as well as civil society and community groups. Supporting the framework for this multistakeholder engagement serves to build broad-based ownership and civilian accountability in these sectors. The WB can increase its engagement in relevant multistakeholder arrangements, such as the multistakeholder task force to reduce violence under the SDGs.

5. It is evident that both the UN and the WB bring complementary yet distinct capacities into justice and security sector engagement. To build on this and support meaningful collaboration, both organizations need to define a limited number of security and justice engagements as core operational offerings to clients. Communicating these offerings within the two organizations and with national actors would foster a sense of coordination and manage expectations. These could include:

    - **UN:** Assessment and analysis of SSR/G and the justice sector; mediation, process, and dialogue support; comparative experience on constitutional, legal, and technical reforms; human rights, accountability, and gender equality in the security forces; crime prevention and trafficking; and community-based initiatives delivered through and outside government.

    - **World Bank:** Security and justice PERs; follow-on analytical work in DPOs; poverty and social analysis; investment operations for violence reduction that involves security and justice as a service and for government-led, community-based initiatives.

Strengthening this work is a challenge for organizational change in which the most senior UN and World Bank leadership can play a role, involving a culture transformation and fresh view of their people's perspectives of incentives.

"Bangladeshi Helicopter Pilots Serving with MONUSCO," Democratic Republic of Congo, January 2018, ©UN Photo.

Conclusion

The events of the past two years have demonstrated the relevant role of security and justice in promoting stability. A secure, safe, and just society promotes better prospects for economic development and social well-being. When the fabric of a society decays and there are no guarantees of access to security and justice, the situation creates an opportunity for societal breakdown and hence, the neglect or failure of Security and Justice Sector Governance should be considered as a driving factor for civil unrest and coup d'état attempts. The rising number of coups d'état in the world—following government takeovers by the military in Myanmar, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Guinea, and most recently Niger and Gabon—have demonstrated this in varied forms and structure. While the genesis of each of these coups is context-specific, a common element is a deficit in both normative understanding of the role of security forces and practical checks and balances on their activities. Serious reflection is needed within both the UN and the World Bank, as well as with regional partners, on what could have been done in these countries to avoid escalation to their current situations; what necessary capacities were absent; what can be done to help restore these countries to a constitutional path; and what can prevent the occurrence of other coups in other countries with similar risk factors.

Appendix 1: List of individuals consulted for this report

United Nations:

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Sam Opoku-Agyakwa	UNAMA RoL Officer; Former UNMIL RoL
Karin Landgren	Security Council Report Executive Director; Former UNMIL SRSG
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Marcelo Fabre	Senior Conflict and Violence Specialist
Hélène Grandvoinnet	Governance Global Practice, Lead Governance Specialist
Bernard Harborne	Country Manager, Timor-Leste; Former Lead Specialist Peace, Conflict and Violence
Soukeyna Kane	FCG Director; Former Country Director Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger
Markus Kostner	Former Global Lead, Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice
Victoria Kwakwa	Vice President, Africa East & South
Gary Milante	SIPRI Programme Dir & Focal Point for the Global Registry of Violent Deaths (GReVD) initiative; Former World Bank Senior Economist
Martin Raiser	Vice President, South Asia
Henriette von Kaltenborn	Resident Representative for Libya; Former FCV Group Senior Operations Officer
Koen Davidse	Director General, Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; Former World Bank Executive Director; Former UN DSRSG in Mali; Former Director for Peacebuilding and Stabilisation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Kingdom of the Netherlands

Other entities:

Paul Bisca	IMF Senior Project Officer; UN Security Sector PER Advisor; Former World Bank Conflict and Security Consultant
Yero Baldeh	AfDB, Transition States Coord Office Director
Fernando Quevedo	Inter-America Development Bank

Appendix 2: Impact of A New Agenda for Peace on the Sustainable Development Goals

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[63] Both the Peacebuilding Fund and UNDP's Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development provide some funding to the activities the GFP coordinates.

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