



NYU Center on International Cooperation

BUSINESS PLAN

September 2023 – August 2025

NYU | CENTER ON
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Executive Summary

Vision

The Center on International Cooperation's (CIC's) vision is to advance effective multilateral action to prevent conflicts and crises—and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.

Mission and comparative advantage

Our mission is to strengthen cooperative approaches among national governments, international organizations, and the wider policy community to advance peace, justice, and inclusion. CIC's comparative advantage lies in three areas:

- First, CIC specializes in the links between politics, security, justice, humanitarian responses, and sustainable development. We have staff with expertise in these different areas, and as an institution we forge links between them.
- Second, we focus on analysis and idea generation that is principled, practical, and policy relevant. CIC is ambitious while also being sensitive to evolving political realities and constraints on collective action in response to international problems.
- Third, we have built a strong understanding and relationships of trust with multilateral institutions over two decades. In particular, we have a proven track record of working closely with the member states and organizational leadership of the United Nations (UN) and international financial institutions (IFIs).

Context

The world continues to face a disconnect between the accelerating speeds and frequency of shocks and the capacity of the multilateral system to respond to them. 2022-23 saw widening divides between the Global North and the Global South, increased tensions in world order and geopolitical competition— especially over the invasion of Ukraine, socioeconomic issues, and approaches to human rights.

Three elements will characterize the environment for our work in 2023-24:

- **Significant multilateral reform opportunities.** The role of the World Bank and of the United Nations will be under scrutiny in 2023-24, with discussions on the World Bank's Evolution Roadmap, and the SDG Summit and preparations for the Summit of the Future at the UN. Behind all these reform discussions lies the issue of financing: *with rising inequality both within and between countries, how can the disconnect between rising crises and the ability of governments and the multilateral system to deliver adequate responses be bridged?* It is imperative to identify new sources of finance through multilateral bank reform; medium-term overseas development assistance trends; assessed budget contributions at the United Nations; debt relief; and taxation and levies on both national and international levels to increase financial contributions from companies and high net-worth individuals. Financing needs to be complemented by policy and program cost-effectiveness and value for money, including measures against corruption and elite capture.
- **Results at country and global level on the Sustainable Development Goals.** Given the preoccupation of many countries with the war in Ukraine and with their own domestic

challenges, there is a risk of diverting diplomatic, technical, and financing attention away from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) just as they reach their halfway mark. **This is a political issue as well as a developmental one.** The SDGs represent critical areas of tangible delivery which are desired by people around the world: reversals and gaps in their achievements can spur grievances and instability. Attention to the SDGs at a global level is also important, since they represent the only example of a comprehensive rights-based approach that encompasses some of the divisions currently being experienced over issues such as gender equality and attention to other marginalized groups. If the SDGs are not consolidated in the coming 20- to 30-year period, the debate on a post-2030 development framework will risk the exclusion of some of these precious gains.

- **Forgotten crises.** Attention is being diverted away from fragile- and conflict- affected states in other parts of the world by focus on Ukraine, climate, and other global public goods. This also rings true for situations with upstream violence prevention risks. **It is important to keep emphasizing spillovers from crises, and their interconnectedness:** a failure to address prevention will result in higher costs down the line at regional and global levels, not only for the populations of the countries concerned. Humanitarian action will also need to adapt to greater localization, in the face of rising protracted crises that require more innovative efforts, and constrained funding.

Objectives and narrative

CIC's objectives over the next two years are to advocate for big ideas, while continuing to showcase small, practical steps that show the value of multilateral action, both in formal organizations and in more flexible multi-stakeholder groupings. We believe that a new narrative is needed to restore credibility in international actions. This must include understanding that at present “the political is economic, and the economic is political,” listening to what divides us, acting on what unifies us, and focusing on results that are visible to people around the world in their daily lives.

Organizational theory of change

Our organizational theory of change, across all of CIC's work, has the following assumptions:

- **National and international efforts support each other**—for example, using international platforms to showcase and give momentum to national reforms, and to bring new ideas and to address global issues which no one country can address alone.
- Successful change is generally achieved through a **complementary relationship** between those in charge of decisions (governmental leadership, private sector, and multilateral decision-makers) and those who can catalyze, advocate, and influence from civil society, academia, and member states.
- **Data and evidence are crucial**, both in building the case for change and ensuring that the changes we advocate are the right ones, likely to deliver results.

Multilateral reform

- Successful contribution to advocacy on inclusive multilateral development bank reform, financing for development, and debt—specifically including contributions to developing coordinated positions by regional or cross-regional groups at the SDG Summit, the international

financial institutions (IFI) Fall Meeting in Marrakesh, and in advance of the Summit of the Future in 2024.

- A new roadmap for reform of prevention and peace operations at the United Nations, as part of the New Agenda for Peace.

Country-level and global results on the SDGs

- 10 country-level or sub-national examples of impact, including strengthening the approach to people-centered and victim-centered justice in Ukraine, the green transition in Indonesia, violence reduction initiatives in South Africa, Switzerland, Costa Rica, and country experiences directly impacted by the situation in Ukraine.
- Launch of a flagship report on violence reduction, a new structure to support the Justice Action Coalition, and a renewed partnership for inequality and inclusion.
- Agreement to review the international indicators measuring inequality.
- A significant shift in mainstreaming support for peace, justice, and inclusion targets in one major multilateral agency.

Forgotten crises

- Major scale-up in analysis to support accountability and transparency around the election in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
- Start-up and establishment of new agreed international institutions for the missing and disappeared in Syria, with a particular emphasis on mental health.
- Pilot application of new approaches in at least two politically estranged (post-coups d'état) situations and two situations of upstream prevention.
- New framing policies adopted at the European Union, the OECD Development Assistance Committee, and United Nations on estranged situations.

Joint collaboration across CIC

Collaboration across CIC programs was a priority in our previous business plan, and we will build on this during the current period. Potential joint initiatives include:

- Work across CIC, led by Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Protracted Crises, on **the New Agenda for Peace**.
- Collaboration between Multilateral Reform and Pathfinders' Grand Challenge on Inequality and Exclusion regarding **financing for development and advocacy for reform**.
- A joint initiative between Multilateral Reform, Prevention and Peacebuilding, and the Pathfinders' Grand Challenge for Justice to **redefine the definition of basic services in humanitarian situations** to include community justice as a humanitarian service, **more integrated macroeconomic linkages**, and an **increase in localization to foster development actor engagement**.
- A joint initiative between Pathfinders' Grand Challenge for Justice and Humanitarian Crises on working towards **justice for refugees and displaced people**.
- Joint analysis between Pathfinders' Grand Challenge on Inequality and Exclusion and the Congo Research Group on **climate financing in the DRC**.
- A **collaborative program on data for violence reduction** between Pathfinders' Grand Challenge on Halving Global Violence and the Congo Research Group, with input from the Protracted Crisis team.

CIC Business Plan

September 2023-August 2025

1. Vision and mission

The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) is a non-profit research center housed at New York University (NYU).¹ The Center on International Cooperation's (CIC's) vision is to advance effective multilateral action to prevent conflicts and crises—and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. Our mission is to strengthen cooperative approaches among national governments, international organizations, and the wider policy community to advance peace, justice, and inclusion.

2. Thematic programs

Multilateral Reform program

The objectives of the [multilateral reform program](#) are to defend and promote multilateralism in a period of growing tensions and polarization. The program has three workstreams—the case for action and solutions, UN-IFI cooperation, and UN senior appointments.

The **case for action and solution** workstream has continued to engage in ways that respond to the issues facing the multilateral system and moments created within the calendars of the multilateral institutions. The past three years, building up into a crescendo last year, saw the multilateral system face what is arguably its greatest test of legitimacy and relevance since 1945. **The failures of a globally coordinated and supported COVID-19 response and the impacts that followed; the war on Ukraine and its secondary impacts; and the rising tangible effects of climate change are testing the multilateral's system ability to be adept at providing viable solutions to the challenges that the world faces today.**

In the coming year, CIC will continue to combine published monthly pieces and press commentary with quiet diplomatic support to member states aiming to create cross-regional bridges and solutions. In 2023-24, we will closely follow the developments and discussions leading up to the various multilateral processes and events, the SDG Summit, the Summit of the Future, and the World Bank/IMF annual and spring meetings. CIC will place particular attention to the calls for the reform of the global financial architecture, including the World Bank evolution roadmap, financing for development and debt. Our strength lies in convening cross-regional actors to discuss these issues and finding area of mutual convergence as well as providing synthesized pieces that accessible to a non-technical policy and political audience. We will also provide behind-the-scenes support to member states or groups of member states based in New York, in conjunction with the Pathfinders and regional groupings. Lastly, we will continue to provide on-demand analysis to the United Nations system on innovative and more systematic financing models.

CIC published a piece in early 2023, with Chatham House, on [staying engaged in politically-estranged situations](#). This piece, which has resulted in widespread interest from field leadership of multilateral and donor organizations and also from central policy units, will be the focus of follow up processes in the OECD Donor Assistance Committee (DAC), the European Union (UN), the UN, and the

¹ CIC is a research center in the Faculty of Arts and Science (FAS) at NYU. It shares with NYU the status of a tax-exempt 501 (3)(c) nonprofit under the US Internal Revenue Code.

multilateral banks (MDBs) in 2023-25. Linked to this area of work—because the dramatically rising number of coups d’etats signifies other causes, whether a failure of security or justice sector norms and governance—is a planned piece in 2023-24 focusing on the possibilities for the United Nations and World Bank to strengthen their engagement in these sectors.

The UN-IFI cooperation workstream will continue to support effective and efficient engagement of UN and IFIs in fragile-, conflict-, and violence-affected settings. **This will include providing country-level support in both prevention and politically estranged contexts.** In some cases, we will work jointly with UN and IFIs counterparts in the field; in others with one or other organizations initially. Some of the upstream prevention countries may include Jordan and Ghana, and the crisis countries—Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Yemen. The crisis countries will also serve as pilots for the staying engaged report recommendations and as part of the focus on strengthening policy responses relevant to politically estranged situations.

CIC has a long track record of working on senior appointments in the United Nations system, which will continue in 2023-24. Our analysis on senior appointments in 2023-24 will go beyond monitoring the commitment of the secretary-general to achieving gender parity to examining other intersectionality indicators such as regional representation, educational and professional backgrounds, as well as identifying trends related to member states dominance over certain positions or entities.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Promoting stronger multilateral approaches to current crises by building the case for action and solutions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Produce at least eight advance briefings to decision-makers, garnering positive feedback and broader coverage. • Publish at least two synthesis briefs about ongoing processes of MDB reform and themes related to reform of the global financial architecture. • Organize at least three member states convenings on debt sustainability within the different multilateral fora. • Organize at least two member states convenings at regional level. • Provide ongoing behind-the-scenes diplomacy for SDG Summit, Summit of the Future, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish at least eight advance briefings to decision-makers, garnering positive feedback and broader coverage. • Organize at least two high-level convenings on the global financing architecture.
<p>Outcome 2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop report informing leadership dialogue on security and justice sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide country-level support to at least four countries.

<p>Strengthened UN and IFIs approaches to fragility, conflict, and violence.</p>	<p>engagement at the United Nations and World Bank</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide country-level support to at least four countries • Provide behind the scenes engagement with OECD DAC, the European Union, UN, and IFIs on guidelines for staying engaged in politically estranged situations. • Produce at least one brief on the links between reform of the global financing architecture and FCV. 	
<p>Outcome 3</p> <p>Improved diversity and capability in UN senior appointments.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular updates and use of the dashboard <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Conduct preliminary analysis on findings on educational background. ○ Conduct preliminary analysis on findings on professional experience. ○ Conduct preliminary analysis on trends in succession and nationality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular updates and use of the dashboard <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Conduct composite analysis of trends in senior leadership appointments.

Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Protracted Crises program

The **Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Protracted Crises** program supports efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence and to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian response, development assistance, and peacebuilding (the HDP nexus) in countries grappling with protracted crises. The objectives of the program are to provide an evidence base for improving responses on the ground and to contribute to policymaking in support of collective action at the global, regional, and national levels.

The conflict in Ukraine has laid bare the shortcomings of the international machinery for preventing and responding to protracted crises, including spillover effects that exacerbate underlying risk factors in countries around the world. To this end, the program will focus on ensuring that the intergovernmental deliberations on the New Agenda for Peace and the negotiation of the peace and security elements of the Pact for the Future provide a way forward in addressing these shortcomings. The program will do this by building on the achievements of previous work on crisis prevention and peacebuilding, including on operationalizing the prevention agenda at the UN, supporting data-

driven approaches to prevention and peacebuilding, and strengthening the HDP nexus at the country-level, while also introducing a new area of research on peace operations reform.

Prevention and peacebuilding

In 2023-24, our work on **prevention and peacebuilding** will continue to highlight the universal applicability of nationally led prevention strategies to address the root causes and enablers of violence in societies. It will build on ongoing work identifying risk factors for violence and enumerating the key principles and necessary elements of effective national prevention strategies and will also identify ways that the United Nations system and bilateral donors can adjust their policies and practices to support such strategies more effectively. CIC will also continue its partnership with the NYU School of Law in promoting the findings of new research on what makes for successful upstream prevention. As part of all these efforts, the program will begin developing a body of guidance and best practices that can be drawn upon by practitioners and continuously updated to reflect lessons learned in the design and implementation of nationally led prevention strategies.

Our program—working with the Multilateral Reform program—will also work to align efforts of the United Nations and the international financial institutions on upstream prevention and continue it in the lead-up to the 2025 peacebuilding architecture review.

Humanitarian-development-peace nexus

The work of the **humanitarian crises** program is guided by the conclusions of our major, multi-year review of efforts by the UN and its partners to operationalize the triple nexus, and in particular to collectively address the risks and inequities that lock people into crisis, often for generations on end.

In the next year, the program will focus on unpacking the structural and cultural barriers to progress in the operationalization of the triple nexus to develop practical recommendations on changes to policy and practice that can be adopted by the UN to allow it to address protracted crises more effectively by leveraging the complementary approaches and capacities available across humanitarian, development, and peace actors. The program will also build on previous work on government and localization, working with the UN to strengthen its support to public institutions to take more ownership/leadership on the nexus in contexts of humanitarian crisis, wherever this can be done while respecting humanitarian principles.

Peace operations reform

The past decade has been marked by a precipitous decline in the perceived effectiveness and relevance of UN peace operations in responding to peace and security challenges. A major element of the challenge is the persistence of templated approaches within the UN Secretariat to the design of missions and the lack of progress in meaningful integration of effort between missions and country teams at the country level. In 2023-24, CIC will launch a new multi-year effort to define a new approach to respond to the observation in *A New Agenda for Peace* that peace operations must be significantly more integrated and should leverage the full range of civilian capacities and expertise across the United Nations system and its partners.

As part of this new program, CIC will work to articulate a clear vision for a new modular approach to peace operations, identify the necessary shifts in policy and practice required to implement such an approach, and begin to develop the elements necessary for a reform agenda that addresses not only

structural impediments to tailored adaptive approaches to peace operations, but also the elements of organizational culture and behavior that underpin existing approaches.

Data-driven approaches to prevention and peacebuilding

In 2023-24, CIC will work with the Complex Risk Analytics Fund (CRAF'd) facility to hold a fourth meeting on data for peace based on country-level analysis of social media. We will also scope out the possibility of a more consolidated capacity for capturing and sharing data related to the HDP nexus, which is currently fragmented across the UN system, to improve the coordinated planning, analysis, and reporting required for effective prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Strengthened operationalization of the UN prevention agenda to support national prevention efforts.</p>	<p>National prevention and evidence-based action</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete at least two country-level cases. • Develop three to four evidence-based policy documents directed either to national governments, the United Nations, and donor governments on how to design, implement, or support national prevention strategies. • Complete preliminary analysis of risk factors for violence. • Support the launch of a series of thematic reports on a framework approach to prevention. 	<p>National prevention and evidence-based action</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete at least two country-level cases. • Develop three to four evidence-based policy documents. • Voluntary guidelines adopted by UN Member States. • Provide support for the revision of UN policy and guidance on planning and analysis to reflect findings of research on prevention. • Launch matrix of risk factors for violence—which can be used by national governments, the United Nations, and donor governments to assist in the design, implementation, and support to national prevention strategies.
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Strengthen localization of humanitarian assistance and links to peacebuilding.</p>	<p>Localization in politically contested contexts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document policy and practical options for humanitarian engagement with local institutions/architecture (such as community development councils) in politically contested 	<p>Localization in politically contested contexts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Produce in-depth study on humanitarian approaches to countries in politically contested contexts. • Provide guidance/training for humanitarian donors and practitioners on localization.

	<p>contexts; as well as adaptation to basic services and the introduction of access to justice and work on macroeconomic dimensions of humanitarian crises.</p> <p>UN reform and capacity on the nexus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Produce a report on progress building on prior year’s consultations, progress, gaps, and new recommendations. • Hold expert-level retreat on UN reforms and support institutional discussion. 	<p>UN reform and capacity on the nexus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue report providing case and recommendations for enhancing alignment between the nexus and integration agendas. • Hold expert-level retreat on UN reforms and support institutional discussion.
<p>Outcome 3</p> <p>Strengthening the global ecosystem for innovative, data-driven approaches to prevention and peacebuilding.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convene a conference on data for peace to facilitate peer-to-peer exchange in the latest and best practices on data-drive approaches to peacebuilding and prevention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TBD based on availability of funding.
<p>Outcome 4</p> <p>Progress in intergovernmental deliberations on institutional reform at the United Nations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue report articulating vision for new modular approach to multilateral peace operations. • Convene a series of informal consultations for member states on thematic areas to be covered in the peace and security chapter of the Pact for the Future. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue report outlining necessary shifts in policy and practice required to implement new vision for modular approach to multilateral peace operations. • Provide support in follow-up to member state commitments under the peace and security chapter of the Pact for the Future.

Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just & Inclusive Societies program

At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda and acting on takeaways from the [recent mid-term evaluation](#), the Pathfinders will increase its focus on impact and implementation at the national level, while adhering to its model that national and local results are strengthened by international action.

Specific attention will be placed on improved collaboration between the Grand Challenges at national and local levels, clearer external communication of Pathfinders’ work overall (both the results of its multiple workstreams and how they work together), deepened member state and partner engagement based on asks and interests voiced, and continuing to identify and amplify solutions while further unpacking SDG16+ policy interlinkages at national and local levels—including through improved data.

Further, and amidst rising geopolitical tensions and the continued fallout from Ukraine, attention will continue to be placed on cross-regional collaboration, improved and more innovative financing, and protecting peace, justice, and inclusion as critical components of a global development agenda. Upcoming international and regional opportunities to leverage include the SDG Summit/post-Summit processes, 2024 SDG regional forums, HLPF 2024 where SDG16 will be under review, the Summit of the Future, and the World Social Summit, among other global and regional gatherings.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>“Occupying the space,” deepening the SDG16+ narratives, and advancing SDG16+ as a tool to address salient global challenges and opportunities—including the secondary impacts of the Ukraine War; climate change, gender, and youth as cross-cutting issues; and COVID-19 as related to global financing.</p>	<p>Membership and voice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determine the membership target for this year. • Hold two to three individual and small group meetings with member states on specific asks in the lead up to HLPF, the Summit of the Future, as well as IFI/Spring Meetings. • Convene five Permanent Representative/Deputy Permanent Representative (PR /DPR) meetings. • Produce one to two statements, including through the Global SDG16+ Coalition at SDG Summit, HLPF 2024, or other relevant fora. <p>Grand Challenges support and engagement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-developed updated Pathfinders strategy, with Theory of Change and Results Framework; support for online solutions repositories 	<p>Membership and voice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convene five PR/DPR Pathfinders meetings for. • Hold three to four expert-level meetings or smaller group meetings, depending on popularity from previous year. <p>Grand Challenge support and engagement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide events and strategy support, linked to global opportunities and strategic engagement (UN and IFI related). • Provide continued support for links to youth, climate change, gender, and financing.

	<p>across the Grand Challenges (GCs).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the GCs in identifying at least three to four opportunities for policy take-up in national development plans, sector strategies, or flagship programs in member states, including participation in at least two country visits or virtual discussions. • Produce two to three short resources following the SDG Summit and COP28, with an eye to HLPF 2024 and building on the 2023 SDG16+ Report. <p>SDG16+ engagement and events</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support GCs' contribution to SDG Summit and regional fora leading up to HLPF 2024. • Lead role at HLPF 2024 through key messages, linking VNRs to accelerated change, including as related implementation of GCs solutions. • Hold one pre-VNR workshop (in-person or virtual) with member states and/or other stakeholders. • Support Grand Challenges' engagement/events leading up to Summit of the Future and preparations for the World Social Summit, linking global advocacy with national/local results, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convene two to three national engagements (in-person or virtual) in collaboration with the Grand Challenges. • Continued support for policy take-up at national level and multi-stakeholder engagement. <p>SDG16+ engagement and events</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide continued leadership and focus on SDG16+ interlinkages/multiplier effect, with concrete links to addressing crises and domestic concerns, generating momentum for implementation and acceleration in the lead up to the Summit of the Future and the World Social Summit. • Continue UN and IFI meeting participation and influence, globally and regionally.
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	<p>including re: recent HGV Flagship Report, e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broaden cross-Grand Challenge’ engagement, participation, and influence through two city/municipal focused meetings at the global level. 	
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Mainstreaming SDG16+ in large, operational, multilateral, and governmental agencies—as well as in large international NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) —in collaboration with Grand Challenges).</p>	<p>Outreach and engagement, international and national</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have four initial engagements resulting in at least one successful mainstreaming within a global or regional strategy and one joint workplan or advocacy campaign (i.e., UNDP/interlinkages work, OECD, or OGP commitments. 	<p>Outreach and engagement, international and national</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued engagement with additional take-up of mainstreaming target agency strategy or workplan, and conduct one advocacy campaign—specifically targeting domestic constituencies.

Pathfinders for Justice

Following the publication of the [Justice for All](#) report in 2019, the Pathfinders for Justice program has been very successful in shaping and strengthening the movement and alliances on people-centered justice. Over 60 countries now endorse the principles of people-centered Justice.

As the secretariat to the [Justice Action Coalition \(JAC\)](#), the program supported joint statements by Justice Action Coalition (JAC) countries at the UN 6th Committee discussions and at the HLPF 2023. The program has also partnered with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to create an advocacy toolkit on [key messages on people-centered justice](#). Recalling the ambition of the Ministerial [Justice Appeal 2023](#), the program compiled and showcased JAC members’ [good practices on people-centered justice](#). Finally, the program also supported an international dialogue on people-centered and victim-centered justice in Ukraine and played a critical role in ensuring that 2023 US Summit for Democracy’s [cohort on rule or law and people-centered justice](#) aligned with the goals of the JAC.

Evidence-to-action remains crucial for ensuring equal access to justice for all. The program will continue to showcase effective and scalable solutions, providing spaces for peer-learning exchanges and continuing to work with donors to discuss evidence-based investments for the justice sector. Mindful of the intersecting crises as well as forgotten ones, the program will continue to break silos and encourage cross-sectoral collaboration by bringing together humanitarians, peacebuilders, and development experts to collaborate on [Justice for Displaced Populations](#) and people-centered justice during war and conflict as well as to explore the role of prevention in the justice sector.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Increased national action on people-centered justice to accelerate implementation of SDG16.3 (to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As part of the joint secretariat to the Justice Action Coalition, organize at least three meetings between key stakeholders on people-centered justice. • Work with three to five interested countries such as Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Timor-Leste, and Ukraine to strategize on and/or implement people-centered justice approaches in their work. • Continue to support and partner with the g7+Secretariat to promote people-centered justice in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and in politically estranged situations • Continue to support and work with Open Government Partnership (OGP) to co-create and register new commitments on justice and reporting on existing commitments under the national action plans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue strong role in peer exchanges, analysis, and targeted assistance through partnerships at country level, complementing other partners and work of the Justice Action Coalition.
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Develop more cohesive International support on data, evidence, innovation, and financing—for an empowered movement for justice for all.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote people-centered justice and the Justice Action Coalition at the 2023 SDG Summit. • Lead and coordinate the JAC workstream on justice financing and support the Legal Empowerment Fund supporting civil society. • Produce 6-10 reports and publications on people-centered justice including joint blogs with other Pathfinders Grand Challenges. • Participate in another ten events including one to two joint events in partnership with other CIC programs and/or Pathfinders Grand Challenges and cross-sectoral events. • Convene 10 -15 meetings on justice for displaced populations, people-centered justice in times for war and conflict, as well as for the Justice Action Coalition, Justice partners, Justice for Women, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to promote people-centered justice and convene key justice stakeholders at major justice and development events, including the 2024 HLPF and the Summit of the Future as well as the 2025 World Justice Forum. • Continue strategic and high impact work on evidence-to-action.

	and the Ibero-American Justice Alliance	
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Pathfinders: Inequality & Exclusion

In 2021, the Grand Challenge on Inequality & Exclusion published their flagship report, [From Rhetoric to Action: Delivering equality and inclusion](#), launched by seven heads of state and government, leading multilateral and civil society actors, as well as world famous actors and academics. Since then, the program has been working with their partner countries, multilateral and civil society actors to put research into action—finding policies countries want to pursue, and ways that all the key stakeholders can work together to advance issues of equality and inclusion at the international level.

Inequalities of all kinds have been getting worse since COVID-19 and in-country income and wealth inequalities have been rising for decades in the majority of countries. However, a more recent phenomenon is the growth of between-country inequalities, leading to frustrations between high-, middle- and low-income countries. Financing policies has quickly become a key priority for a number of our partners, and hence is more prominent in the program’s work. How to fund policies, including through addressing debt distress and climate financing, as well as broader reform of the international financial institutions are critical questions for reducing between and in-country inequalities. This work is shared in collaboration with the Multilateral Reform team, which has allowed the program to draw on expertise across CIC and build partnerships with a number of countries and regional organizations to advance thinking on policy solutions. Financing will continue to be a key global topic for 2023-24, and we are keen to also ask questions about how new money can best be spent to deliver on the SDGs.

Inequality and exclusion cover multiple areas, and in essence, every policy can and should be a policy that promotes equality. In July 2023, the program launched a new [“Inequality Solutions”](#) website which demonstrates this, covering policies from justice systems to renewable energy, as well as more traditional areas such as tax, drawing on experiences from dozens of countries. The program’s partner countries have chosen to work with us on multiple topics, including on divisive narratives, housing, and how to deliver green and just transitions. However, there are multiple ways to connect with partners, despite these different areas of domestic policy work., and most recently, we have embarked on a new initiative with UN AIDS, Oxfam, and DFI International on the measurement of inequality under SDG10.

As the work moves forward, the program will be seeking to expand the number of countries involved and continue to focus on policy solutions at both the national and international levels.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Visible international collective action to reduce within and between country inequality and exclusion.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear commitment from at least ten countries to partake in global action on inequality and exclusion through the Action Alliance. • Cross-country agreement on reviewing SDG10 indicators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convene heads of state and government for a senior ministerial event at the 2024 Summit for the Future. • Co-host fourth Arab Equality Forum in

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influence heads of states and governments’ language on issues related to inequality and exclusion i.e., on normative issues of gender, SDG10 etc. • Convene at least five key events using international moments (e.g., UNGA, IFI Annual meetings etc.). • Produce analysis for member states on the various financing tracks, linking the need for greater equality and contributing to the formation of common positions. • Produce further analysis of the polycrisis, laying out impacts on inequality and policymaking. Launch paper at the Arab Equality Forum with UN ESCWA. • Attract visible media attention for collective international efforts and have at least one joint statement or op-ed from partner countries on issues related to SDG10 indicators, financing and/or polycrisis work. 	<p>collaboration with UN ESCWA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have continued presence at COP meetings on just transitions or financing. • Continue advocacy on SDG10 indicators.
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Participating national actors will pursue some of the “comprehensive menu of policy options” from 2021 Flagship report to reduce economic inequality and exclusion of disadvantaged groups.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Host Indonesia workshop on just transitions. • Host South Africa workshop on divisive narratives, inequality, and violence (with the Halving Global Violence team). • Produce further work on housing in Mexico and Sierra Leone, and one additional country. • Convene at least one more workshop on how to measure distributional consequences of policy making in an additional country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generate demand for distributional training. • Finalize handbook/ toolkit on distributional impacts of policy. • Have additional countries join the initiative and ask for policy support. • Work with the Justice team on distributional impacts with the justice system. • Produce country case studies and wider

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct two to three country visits and/or work with local partnerships to identify policy priorities for collaboration. • Collaborate with civil society and national governments to ensure better measures of inequality and exclusion at the national level in at least eight countries. • Collate lessons from the country level to include at least 12 further examples of solutions on the inequality solutions website. • Publish new position paper on divisive narratives and inequality. • Produce one to two relevant research outputs, potentially on climate, inequality and financing with the Congo Research Group. 	<p>research drawing out links between violence, justice, and equality and inclusion.</p>
<p>Outcome 3</p> <p>Lessons from Pathfinders inspire others to act.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have at least two new national and two new multilateral or civil society members in the initiative. • Increase in the usage of new “Inequality Solutions” website and growing media presence. • Launch new partnership with London School of Economics, with up to three Atlantic Fellows for Social and Economic Equity fellows visiting CIC, with growing cross-fertilization of work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasingly seen as “go-to” on policy ideas, measured by increase in engagement from policymakers, multilateral institutions, civil society actors, and media outlets. • Increase funding from a wider set of donors.

Pathfinders: Halving Global Violence

In FY24, the **Halving Global Violence (HGV)** program will have several key priorities aimed at consolidating the accomplishments of the Halving Global Violence Task Force and guiding the initiative into its next phase, ensuring continued impact of the **Gender Equality Network for Small Arms Control (GENSAC)** and **Peace in our Cities (PiOC)**, and developing further country-level initiatives to both inform the Task Force’s work and turn its recommendations into action. This plan does not envision the formal elimination of existing workstreams or the creation of new ones.

However, it does entail significant evolution and potential expansion of existing initiatives within the current workstream and the potential creation of others.

The creation and launch of the HGV Flagship report will be a top priority. Significantly, the launch of the Flagship report will also initiate the process in which the Halving Global Violence Task Force transforms into its next phase—focused on calling attention to the report’s findings and driving implementation of its recommendations. Using the Inequality & Exclusion and Justice Grand Challenges as a guide, this could potentially involve the evolution of the Task Force into a new platform and adjustment in its membership. The next HGV Task Force meeting, scheduled for November 2023, will be a key factor in driving the processes above and will be both a programmatic and budgetary priority.

Both GENSAC and PiOC have a key year ahead as well, as they continue to be primary vehicles for both informing the Task Force’s work and turning its ideas into action. GENSAC will initially focus on successfully regaining momentum and reestablishing its presence in the spheres of gender, small arms, women’s empowerment, and peacebuilding after a five-month hiatus. GENSAC will then turn towards growing and diversifying its network, including through strategic efforts to recruit members that will bring greater geographic balance to the network and ensure active participation in youth. PiOC will similarly evolve into a new phase with the planned addition of its first dedicated grant. This will enable PiOC to hold key member events, conduct action-oriented research, and ensure the Network’s continued growth and stability in the coming years.

Finally, this plan envisions the potential creation of new country-level initiatives which include efforts to create a violence early warning mechanism in Timor-Leste, a joint initiative with the Congo Research Group to pilot projects to address interpersonal violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and national-level studies on gender-based violence to inform donor strategies. Any of the abovementioned activities would be funded from new grants or fundraising, which is currently being pursued.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Halving Global Violence Task Force consolidated as international reference in violence reduction policy discussions and research.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Host HGV Task Force meeting in South Africa with initial findings. • Publish HGV Flagship Report (2024). • Develop communications strategy and convene three launch-related events—including a major official launch in Geneva—to highlight results. • Begin transition to action/advocacy platform. • Develop advocacy campaign with member states to influence the New Agenda for Peace and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Host official launch of the action and advocacy platform. • Continue to highlight Flagship results and recommendations at strategic national and multilateral fora. • Convene meeting of the HGV Task Force follow-on mechanism (potentially held in South Korea or Costa Rica).

	<p>Summit of the Future deliberations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use findings at the SDG Summit, Summit of the Future, and the launch of the New Agenda for Peace. 	
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Pilot engagements on solutions completed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have successful conclusion of cost of violence studies. • Produce follow up and country-level and/or multilateral and IFI take up of approaches as a result of the cost of violence studies in Costa Rica, Switzerland, and South Africa. • Start new round of pilots to address interpersonal violence in fragile states (e.g., Timor-Leste or DRC). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launch additional pilot engagements in select countries and regions to advance Flagship Report recommendations. • Build off successes and implementation of new initiatives launched in year
<p>Outcome 3</p> <p>GENSAC consolidated as premier international reference on gender-responsive small arms, with established secretariat.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highlight results in four to five countries over two regions, which would be documented in a short analysis. • Convene annual GENSAC meeting (early 2024). • Have increased youth engagement in GENSAC. • Obtain additional resources to increase long-term viability of the GENSAC network. • Convene two regional dialogues: West Balkans and Latin America. • Involve participation of GENSAC members in three global policy events and HGV Task Force meeting. • Convene one training workshop in Latin America. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to grow and expand the network, including to new regions and diversified membership. • Host annual conference. • Develop three new advocacy campaigns. • Convene two regional dialogues. • Include participation of GENSAC members in global policy events.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop three member-led advocacy campaigns around key global moments to promote gender-responsive small arms control. • Appoint at least two Regional Focal Points. 	
<p>Outcome 4</p> <p>A robust and consolidated Peace in Our Cities (PiOC) network.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual members and partners strategy meeting, potentially in Durban, South Africa (2024). • 40 city members, with broader engagement of cities from sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. • Obtain additional funding to diversify the numbers of services and benefits provided to members and increase long-term viability of the network. • Set-up the Reimagining Multilateralism: Centering Cities in the Global Peace Agenda initiative. • Establish mechanism to swiftly respond to city-level requests for technical support. • Launch a series of convenings / publications elevating cities as partners in the UN’s New Agenda for Peace. • Develop a training to help cities engage in the global peace and security discussions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to grow, expand, and diversify the network, including through engagement with African and East Asian cities. • Further elevate PiOC as a premiere network addressing issues of urban violence, increasing membership, and establishing partnerships with other entities working in this space. • Secure greater financial independence of the Network and build capacity with additional staff. • Launch the training manual developed during the previous year through a series of workshops. • Wind down the Reimagining Multilateralism: Centering Cities in the Global Peace Agenda project and evaluate impact in partnership with the donor and other stakeholders.

3. Country-level programs

Congo Research Group program

The [Congo Research Group](#) (CRG) was founded in 2015 to promote rigorous, independent research into the violence that affects millions of Congolese. Today, this research aims to explain the complex interplay among violence, politics, and political economy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to a wide audience, to promote debate around policy solutions, and to empower Congolese voices. As part of this effort, CRG operates in a strategic partnership with a Congolese research institute, [Ebuteli](#). Together, their research and analysis focus on politics, violence, and governance.

Over the past two years, CRG and Ebuteli have pursued three streams of work:

- Political accountability and the state in DRC;
- Security in the east of DRC; and
- Political economy and economic governance.

Over 2023-25, CRG will build on these streams of work, while also seeking to expand research on the DRC at the crossroads of global geopolitical competition. This latter work will focus on two interrelated issues: first, on forging a coherent peace process in the DRC amidst the myriad of actors working on stabilization there, and in the context of the UN peacekeeping mission's upcoming withdrawal; and second, on heightened geopolitical competition over Congolese natural resources—such as cobalt and copper—between major powers like China and the United States, as well as other powers such as the European Union, United Arab Emirates, and Turkey.

Political accountability, governance, and the state, or “Mukalenga wa Bantu”

This work has now entered a second phase, with a greater focus on the presidential, legislative, provincial, and local elections scheduled to occur in December 2023. The online parliamentary and government tracker, “[Talatala](#),” has continued to document and analyze the work of the national assembly and the executive in DRC, while further growing in relevance as it becomes increasingly cited as a reference for evaluating parliamentarians' work. CRG will also publish three qualitative reports covering the following issues: electoral transparency; local governance in the DRC; and accountability within the national assembly, in addition to twelve blog posts on Congolese politics, a public debate among presidential candidates, and a series of four opinion polls.

Security in the east of DRC

CRG's work on violence will include the publication of several qualitative reports, including on the M23 crisis; the internal oversight mechanisms within the Congolese army; a genealogy of armed groups within the Eastern Congo; an updated mapping of armed groups in the Eastern Congo; an analysis of the political and security dynamics in the Uele region, on the border of the Central African Republic and South Sudan; and an analysis of the security dynamics in the *Hauts Plateau* region of the South Kivu province. These reports continue to be complemented by the work of the [Kivu Security Tracker \(KST\)](#), which records and maps incidents of violence in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu.

Political economy and economic governance

CRG's research on governance will produce three reports as part of two different projects. First, we will publish two reports on climate funding and the DRC: the first will critically examine the work of Congo's National REDD+ program, while the second looks at the DRC's position more broadly within the global political economy of climate funding. The second project looks at possible gas and

oil exploitation in Eastern Congo, with a view to understanding the impact of these activities on national politics, security, and governance.

Over the next two years, CRG intends to continue and intensify its public engagement through regular blog posts, the production of our weekly audio clip analyzing Congolese public events (“[Po Na GEC](#)”), and a series of public forums in DRC on issues of national importance. The program will also seek to hold public events and report launches in New York, Washington D.C., and elsewhere as part of upcoming work on the DRC and global geopolitics.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Produce detailed understanding of the dynamics of armed violence in the Uele, Ituri, and Kivu regions throughout innovative ways to monitor and analyze violence.</p>	<p>KST:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and redesign KST website. <p>Utafiti ya Amani:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish one thematic report on political and security dynamics in the Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele (northeastern DRC). • Publish eight blog posts on political and security dynamics in Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele (northeastern DRC). • Publish ten radio shows (podcasts) on political and security dynamics in Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele (northeastern DRC). • Publish one thematic report on conflict dynamics in the Hauts Plateaux region of South Kivu (Eastern Congo). • Publish one thematic report on oversight mechanisms within the Congolese Army (FARDC) and one on the M23 rebellion in North Kivu (Eastern Congo). • Publish updated mapping of armed groups in North and South Kivu and Ituri. 	<p>KST</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain KST website. <p>Utafiti ya Amani</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish regular blog posts on violence in the DRC.

<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Promoting the reform and accountability of Congolese institutions.</p>	<p>Mukalenga wa Bantu</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain, update, and add features to “Talatala” tracker. • Publish three reports on electoral transparency, local governance, and transparency in the national assembly. • Publish six blog posts or analytical notes. • Hold six public forums on political accountability in different Congolese cities. • Hold one policy retreat. • Organize one presidential debate prior to December 2023 elections. • Publish six public opinion poll analytical notes (four per theme—politics, governance, security). • Publish weekly audio clips analyzing Congolese current events (“Po Na GEC”). 	<p>Mukalenga wa Bantu</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain, update, and add features to “Talatala” tracker. • Hold two public forums on political accountability in the DRC. • Publish regular blog posts on Congolese politics. • Publish weekly audio clips analyzing Congolese current events (“Po Na GEC”).
<p>Outcome 3</p> <p>Political economy and peacebuilding</p>	<p>Mwangaza V</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish report on the international political economy of climate change funding and DRC climate funds in particular, potentially in collaboration with the Pathfinders’ Inequality and Exclusion program. 	<p>Mwangaza VI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish report on the political and economic dynamics surrounding proposed oil and gas production in Eastern Congo.

Middle East and North Africa program

The aims of our work in the MENA region are to contribute—through expert advice and selected country engagements—to CIC’s overall goals of preventing new crises and promoting peace, justice, equality, and inclusion. Since 2017, the focus of the program has been on Syria, with the appointment then of CIC’s Deputy Director to the UN Syria Commission of Inquiry (CoI). We have provided supportive analysis on how to improve justice outcomes for victims and survivors, in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Follow-up reporting and advocacy by CIC, ICTJ and the Commission of Inquiry have focused on a range of issues— [arbitrary](#)

[detention](#) and the [missing/disappeared](#) in Syria; the [challenges](#) with humanitarian situation and aid modalities; the impact of [the pandemic](#) on vulnerable groups; internment and [repatriation of families](#) of suspected ISIL fighters, and preventing the [re-emergence of violent extremism](#) in NE Syria.

During 2022-23, CIC saw its efforts to [build public support](#) for an international entity for the missing/disappeared in Syria come to fruition with the passing of [UNGA resolution](#) in June 2023 establishing this institution. This was the result of a [collaboration](#) with Syrian civil society actors and [families'](#) associations, international partners, and key member states. In addition to broader briefings at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, UNGA in New York, and the Syria conference in Brussels, we have also produced policy papers seeking justice outcomes for victims and survivors as well as a focus on [gendered impacts](#) of the conflict and [treatment in detention](#). The poor international response to the February 2023 earthquake which hit Turkey and Syria was also [critiqued](#) in a call to the UN secretary-general to undertake an inquiry, which has led to an internal review.

In the 2023-25 period, the program will focus on the startup and establishment of the new international institution for the missing and disappeared in Syria, with a special emphasis on mental health approaches in its work. There may also be an acceleration in rapprochement with the government of Syria, building on its return to the League of Arab States (LAS). While this presents challenges, given no rights-related conditionalities were proposed by LAS, opportunities may arise to press for improvements. One key area may relate to the increasing pressure to return Syrian refugees from neighboring countries, and CIC will explore with UN and other partners standards and good practices, including recommendations regarding monitoring any returns. Other opportunities for improvements may also arise and will be focusing on new approaches to the policies and practices relating to some of these issues: effective international cross border and cross line aid delivery, particularly in areas beyond government control; the negative impacts of unilateral coercive measures (sanctions); the challenges facing internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Syria who lack civil documents; and accountability for IS internees and detainees.

The MENA program will also continue to seek to expand its collaboration with CIC's programs aimed at preventing new crises and promoting peace, justice, equality, and inclusion by assisting in developing select country programs, identifying effective local partners, and in bringing experts from the region to in-person or virtual international forums.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Improved justice outcomes for victims and survivors in Syria.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prepare at least two policy briefs and two blogs on justice-related issues (likely the missing/disappeared; impact of unilateral coercive measures; return of refugees; civil documents for IDPs, accountability for IS internees and detainees). ● Consult and hold meetings/webinars (at least two) with experts in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prepare two policy briefs and two blogs on justice-related issues. ● Hold consultations; meetings, and webinars (at least two). ● Publish editorials, organize events, speak at forums, and utilize social media as advocacy to support the issues identified through the policy briefs.

	<p>preparation for the policy briefs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organize advocacy events, editorials, social media, etc. related to the above issues (at least two). 	
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Increased involvement of CIC programs in the MENA region aimed at preventing new crises and promoting peace, justice, equality, and inclusion.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist CIC programs to increase their programs in selected MENA countries including through joint programming. Increase the number of national partners or collaborators (double). Share experiences within MENA countries on a specific area/theme (likely on humanitarian delivery; transitional justice approaches during and after conflicts). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist CIC programs to deepen engagement in selected MENA countries including through joint programming. Assess the level of engagement with partners in MENA and further widen it. Review thematic engagement approach and look to deepen or expand to other themes.

4. Finance, operations, and communications

Finance and operations

As demand for our analytical, policy, and convening support continues to grow, CIC’s Finance and Operations (FINOPs) team has been seeking to strengthen and improve its capacity in two areas. First, in the processing of operational, financial, and human resource transactions, and second, in reducing bureaucracy while retaining high fiduciary oversight on consultancy contracts. We will continue to build on this in the coming two years.

In recent years, the team has focused on building a sustainable infrastructure to facilitate excellent donor stewardship, improving responsiveness and turnaround in contracting and payments processing; on providing CIC staff and partners with sound, reasoned guidance in the areas of procurement, hiring, compensation, and visa processing; and on improving and strengthening collaboration with key strategic areas within NYU (human resources, insurance and risk management, procurement, general counsel, sponsored programs, post-award accounting, et al.). As a result, we have seen progress toward resolving critical operational challenges that had stressed CIC’s relationships with donors, vendors, and research partners. This past year, we expanded the FINOPs team’s capacity by adding an experienced Grants Manager; however, due to staffing transitions with the departure of the FINOPS Director and previous Grants Manager, we will bring on a new Grants Manager in the later part of Q3 and are actively searching for a new Director.

Specifically in 2022-23, we coordinated CIC’s office relocation from NYU’s main campus to the United Nations Plaza area, eased event vendor contracting processes, added additional travel vendor options, continued to assess risk areas, and work with NYU internal partners to strengthen both compliance as well as service provisions.

In 2022-24, the team will focus on three main objectives, alongside our NYU counterparts.

Relevant outcome	Outputs Year 1: 2023-2024	Outputs Year 2: 2024-2025
<p>Outcome 1 Improve employee retention, satisfaction, and engagement.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to update and finalize staff salary comparability analysis to evaluate researcher pay equity across CIC and among peer institutions. • Implement modified pay practices consistent with equity findings. • Perform evaluation of progress against 2020-21 employee satisfaction survey findings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulate plan and launch efforts to address issues raised via 2023-24 staff survey.
<p>Outcome 2 Provide accurate, timely and insightful analysis to support accurate and timely donor reporting as well as to inform prudent, strategic decision-making.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue the process of evaluating outside alternative operating budget and financial planning platforms. Make recommendation regarding buying vs. building in-house to CIC leadership. • Onboard and train a grant manager to support comprehensive donor/project expertise as well as to add “bench strength” to support transaction processing and cross-training. • Hire a new Director of FINOPs. • Standardize modes and methods for monthly grant accounting review, inclusive of actual and planned expenditures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review and continue to improve the new operating budget and financial planning platform. • Leverage new platform to design “rolling” annual fiscal forecasting process.
<p>Outcome 3 Create streamlined, risk-balanced and replicable processes to ensure consistent, excellent service delivery and, critically, to facilitate programs’ ability to meet new or evolving donor priorities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement objective metrics and supporting tracking mechanisms to measure FINOPs turnaround times from initial receipt from program teams through the completion of processes. Identify hand-off points where materials are complete within CIC and then submitted to NYU partners. • Support implementation of NYU-wide travel and expense reporting system and explore additional travel vendor options to ease time and effort spend on travel coordination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey long-term vendors to gauge progress. • Continue to implement key identified improvements informed by the data collected from the tracking of turnaround times.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create staff training materials and tools that support complete and well-documented processes, especially in the area of reimbursement requests and reduce audit delays. Leverage framework to build out suite of staff support tools. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluate project management and document management tools.
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Communications

CIC’s **Communications** unit has been steadily strengthening its capacity and expanding its early role of building an institutional brand identity to cultivating an enhanced and more sophisticated communications outreach and visibility as a thought leader in the multilateral space on preventing conflict and crises and on building peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.

Over the course of 2022-23, to elevate the institutional visual identity and better external communications, we successfully completed the website redesigns for CIC and the Pathfinders, along with a brand update for the Pathfinders.

Additionally, CIC’s digital following has reached over 58,400 across our digital channels, in addition to over 10,400 subscribers receiving our mailing lists and regular communications and 130,000 website visitors. In the past year, CIC has published over 40 reports, policy briefs, and analysis notes in addition to 35 blog posts in English, French, and Spanish over the course of the year. Further, through the Pathfinders’ [Inequality Solutions](#) project, we have published an additional 60+ policies with partners from around the world.

Concurrently, CIC has completed the first stage of an internal review of the role of communications within CIC and are in the final stages of recruiting a head of communications and firming up staffing in Q1 2024, to streamline and build a team to support organizational needs. In the first half of 2023-24, the Communications unit will be developing a new institution-wide media strategy; improving outreach to traditional media; elevating our publications and reports’ visibility to the wider policy and research community; and further enhancing the staff’s communication skills. The Comms team aims to update outputs and outcomes in the mid-year to reflect the new organizational communications strategy.

Relevant Outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2023-24)	Outputs in year 2 (2024-25)
<p>Outcome 1</p> <p>Enhance CIC’s outreach as a thought leader to wider audiences globally using omni-channels such as organic/earned media and digital tools; making our products more accessible to public audiences; and building</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Websites: Enhance visitor experience by improving search engine optimization, accessibility, and resources. • Traditional media: Assist CIC authors to publish op-eds in at least two major media outlets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional media: Assist CIC authors to publish one op-ed at least once per quarter.

<p>the communication skills of our staff.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social media/digital tools: Publish six to ten regular newsletter and eblasts relevant to programming, having a social strategy for each published piece. • Staff trainings: Survey staff to understand any additional communication training needs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social media/digital tools: Publish ten to fifteen regular newsletter and eblasts relevant to programming, having a social strategy for each published piece. • Staff trainings: Provide annual staff communications training.
<p>Outcome 2</p> <p>Support CIC events (both virtual and in-person) across workstreams through an integrated communications strategy, which includes (where appropriate) press/media outreach, social media support, direct outreach, and newsletter/eblasts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Events: Provide communications capacity for at least one large in-person/virtual event, and three to four virtual webinars or small-scale events per quarter. Provide a dedicated full-stack media strategy for significant events such as the launch of the Halving Global Violence flagship report, UNGA 2023, the Summit of the Future, and the SDG Summit in 2023. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Events: Provide communications capacity for one to two large in-person/virtual events, and three to four virtual webinars or small-scale events per quarter. Provide a dedicated full-stack media strategy for significant events such as UNGA, HLPF, the Spring and Fall Meetings for the World Bank and IMF.

Risks and risk mitigation

Overall, CIC goes into 2023-25 with a good track record of delivery against plan in previous years, sound finances, a strong staff and management team, and excellent relationships with a range of governments and civil society partners. Over the successive global crises of the last three years, we have developed a model of sticking to our core vision and mission while adapting to show the relevance of crisis prevention and the promotion of peace, justice, and inclusion to changing global events.

In the coming year, the current Executive Director will step down after nine years in the post. We are also moving offices, so there are several transitions upcoming. We will continue to strengthen our internal communications with staff and partners through these transitions with a view to ensuring the best mix of continuity and change, and to working together as a team to take advantage of new opportunities for impact.

Area	Risk	Risk Mitigation
Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rising divisions between member states may constrain collaborative work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CIC has developed a relationship of strong trust with both Northern and Southern countries and across regions that is expected to continue.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inability to reach agreement on reforms at the UN or IFIs may prevent take-up of some work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategy includes country- and regional-level work which can continue and intensify when global work suffers delays or setbacks.
Financial sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shift in some member state government priorities and reforms in foundations may affect grants and timelines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CIC has good diversity of funding and is exploring expanded relationships with some actors as priorities shift for others. We will continue to maintain strong and frequent contacts with our donors to ensure that work is well understood and that, within our own strategy and plan, activities can be adjusted as needed.
Human resource turnover	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in leadership may pose transition pains. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good search and transition plan in place, along with previous Executive Director to provide handover support.