

A CALL TO
action

TRANSFORMING THE GLOBAL REFUGEE SYSTEM

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A CALL TO
action

TRANSFORMING THE **GLOBAL REFUGEE** SYSTEM



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contents

foreword	v
preface	ix
one	
THE PROBLEM	1
two	
THE KEY TO CHANGE: POLITICAL WILL	13
three	
STRENGTHENING RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FOR REFUGEES AND IDPs	21
four	
STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF IDPs	27
five	
TRANSFORMING GOVERNANCE FOR REFUGEES AND IDPs.....	33
six	
BUILDING A SOLID FINANCIAL BASE	41
seven	
MOBILIZING NEW SOURCES OF SUPPORT	47
eight	
LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT REFUGEES AND IDPs.....	55
nine	
ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AT ALL STAGES OF DISPLACEMENT	61
ten	
TAKING THESE IDEAS FORWARD	73
annex	77
works cited	79
acknowledgements	87
biographies	
ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE WRC.....	103
acronyms and abbreviations	109
About CGI	111
About the World Refugee Council	111



foreword

Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor observed in *The Secular Age* that “our age makes higher demands of solidarity and benevolence on people today than ever before. Never before have people been asked to stretch out so far, and so consistently, so systematically, so as a matter of course, to the stranger outside the gates” (Taylor 2007, 695).

Certainly, the demands for solidarity and benevolence have never been higher, but is there a sufficient societal stretch to reach out to the strangers outside the gates? What have been the political responses to the refugees and displaced persons who by the thousands, on a weekly basis, seek to escape the violence and larceny of warlords, dictators, xenophobic politicians and nationalistic leaders? How is the global system adapting to the systematic undermining of international governance systems and the failure to meet the exponential growth in financial demands? How do you reach out in this time of distemper when the loudest voices and most active agents are haranguing against immigration, building walls and turning away “strangers at the gate”?

The refugee issue carries serious tones of gender discrimination and is marked by widespread sexual and gender-based violence. At present, border crossings between Venezuela and Colombia are sites rife with incidents

of sexual harassment and assault. Yet, the capacity of women to be agents of change in addressing refugee issues has been largely overlooked in government responses. This wasting of potential is particularly evident in the scant attention paid to providing education for displaced women and youth.

The first words of this report state, “Our world suffers not so much from a refugee crisis as from a political crisis — a deficit of leadership and vision and, most fundamentally, a shortfall of humanity and empathy.” Those holes have been filled instead with a surfeit of indifference, cynicism and greed. One answer is that women and youth, when given the chance to lead, will provide solutions.

It’s time for an honest appraisal and an urgent call to action for governments and stakeholders to stretch out, to make the refugee response system fair, effective and efficient for refugees and governments alike. This distempered time, with its attacks on global refugee principles, demands a recasting of the system to protect those fleeing danger, supply host country needs, alleviate citizens’ fears, hold those leaders generating displacement accountable and re-establish international cooperation.

Through cooperation, secure management of borders can be reconciled with humane and ultimately

Opposite page:
AP Photo/Petros
Giannakouris.

beneficial treatment of the forcibly displaced. When the boat people began their exodus from the Indochinese Peninsula in the early 1980s, an ad hoc group of some 15 countries, along with humanitarian organizations, coordinated their responses and worked out shared responsibilities. Large numbers of people were resettled, without today's paranoia about terrorist influx, because border management, including supervised transportation of those seeking sanctuary, was assured by the coordinating group.

Contrast that experience to today, where international cooperation is losing ground to the trolls of nationalism. There needs to be a clear call for reforms to meet the contemporary reality.

This has been the mission of the World Refugee Council (WRC) over the past year and half. It takes up the call of Charles Taylor to stretch out and urges a major overhaul of the global refugee system, including the concomitant shifts in political and governmental behaviour.

The WRC is an independent group of individuals with experience in government, politics, business, academia and civil society, who have come together at the invitation of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and with the support of the Government of Canada and major foundations. The WRC's mission has been to work together to build a political network of like-minded governments and civil society entities to pursue substantive reform of the refugee regime.

The WRC follows in the path of similar collaborative efforts to promote international reform, such as the "Ottawa process" that achieved international agreement to ban landmines, the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the development of the Responsibility

“
IT'S TIME...TO
STRETCH OUT, TO
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RESPONSE SYSTEM
FAIR
”

to Protect (R2P) concept for protecting civilians. In these reform initiatives, the challenge was always to balance strongly entrenched views on sovereignty with the necessity of working collegially on global issues.

This need to reconcile sovereignty and international responsibility was powerfully expressed by former US President Barack Obama in his Nelson Mandela Lecture this year in Johannesburg.

In the West's current debate around immigration, for example, it's not wrong to insist that national borders matter; whether you're a citizen or not is going to matter to a government, that laws need to be followed; that in the public realm newcomers should make an effort to adapt to the language and customs of their new home. Those are legitimate things and we have to be able to engage people who do feel as if things are not orderly. But that can't be an excuse for immigration policies based on race, or ethnicity, or religion.¹

In pursuing our mission, the WRC has worked to build on the present UN effort to find agreement on a new compact for refugees. We have endeavoured to add value by working outside the constraints of the UN negotiating system to promote innovative, structural change.

We created a platform for the voices of refugees themselves, for those working on the front lines of humanitarian assistance, for thinkers who are doers, for governments that are prepared to shape policies and practices that fit the new global realities and for advocates of progressive restructuring of the system. This work took us to various regions experiencing the pressure and demands of growing refugee movements. It gave us a chance to engage with those working on the ground, in particular, those in the Global South who carry the substantial weight of large refugee settlements. It also gave us the freedom to think in innovative, constructive ways, while recognizing the counterpressure of nationalistic political ideologies that obstruct cooperative international action.

¹ See Obama (2018, para. 50).

The fragmentation and divisiveness apparent in the European Union's inability to mount a unified position on the displaced have weakened the capacity of that institution, long a bastion of refugee support, to respond wholeheartedly. Yet, there are a number of progressive initiatives in Sweden and Germany, in particular on resettlement issues, that need to be given attention, as a way of changing the narrative of fear being promulgated by the alternative right-wing forces dominating the conversation.

Over the past year, the WRC has been on a trajectory of discovery, revelation and, at times, frustration, as we witness the shrinking of political resolve and goodwill. That journey has strengthened the WRC's determination to tackle head-on the corrosive forces weakening the possibility of effective and fair treatment of refugees and to restore the ancient rights of sanctuary and asylum for those displaced by war, conflict and environmental degradation.

Along the way, we were continually confronted by the appalling reality: there are countless millions who are not considered refugees, because they could not cross a border. The plight of those called internally displaced persons (IDPs) is a case of refugees *within* borders who suffer the same ravages as those who seek safety by crossing a frontier. The very idea of R2P was conceived by the international statesman Francis Deng as a way of resolving the disconnect of the IDPs in being denied anchor in an organized community. This report lays out a road map for inclusion of IDPs in the system of protection for forcibly displaced persons.

The outcome of our work is contained in this report; it is based on a general consensus of WRC members at our meeting in Greece at the beginning of the summer. It is a compendium of



WRC Chair Lloyd Axworthy meets with refugees at the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan. (CIGI/Laila Muharram)

evidence and ideas that converge in a series of recommendations, which, taken together, comprise a plan of action for the next decade and can bring about a refugee regime that is fair, properly funded and capable of managing a system in an orderly way. It goes beyond the traditional practices of humanitarian aid or even development practices and brings to bear recommendations utilizing contemporary measures in trade, finance, judicial and political accountability, peacekeeping, technology and governance reform.

The underlying premise of the WRC's work is that there is a basic framework of universal justice that both defines our common humanity and promotes our common progress. This is the template of refugee reform. In his May 2018 commencement speech at New York University, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada spoke against today's trend to tribalism: "There is not a religion in the world that asks you to 'tolerate thy neighbour.' So let's try for something a little more like acceptance, respect, friendship, and yes, even love" (Trudeau 2018).

In our meetings in Bangladesh, Colombia, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Jordan, Uganda and Tanzania, the WRC also heard that there is too much centralization, with too many top-down decisions on refugee policy and operation and not enough involvement of regions, clusters of countries, and refugees and IDPs themselves, who can better interpret the translation of universalist goals into well-tailored local action. This imbalance is one reason why the strongmen dictators, such as those in Eastern Europe, and authoritarian politicians, such as those in Asia and North America, can prey on local fears, and why Southern host countries, who give home to 85 percent of the world's refugees, feel a sense of grievance.

This imbalance is also why the WRC believes that the refugee issue cannot be resolved in the existing hierarchical and siloed system. Governance that is inclusive, accountable and regionalized, building on a well-stocked tool box of financial measures, is a major component of our reform agenda.

Our work also zeroes in on the failure of the present security system to restrain the acts of warlords and mercenary political leaders. Many of us were dismayed to learn of the widespread sexual assaults taking place on the Venezuela/Colombia border because of the lack of governmental security. The ambition by the new Colombian government to form a new regional forum for dealing collaboratively with refugees is one we strongly recommend and endorse.

The report prescribes ways of revising the refugee protocols to include IDPs. It seeks to build on the pioneer work of some governments to seize frozen assets hidden away by corrupt leaders and to return purloined funds to be used for the welfare of those who have suffered from their malfeasance. It argues for a peer review system that puts the spotlight on those renegeing on their commitments. It reviews the potential for applying new data and emerging technologies as an enabling force in establishing identity and creating individualized financial accounts for refugee and IDP families.

We were disturbed by the shaky and insufficient funding for refugee assistance and concerned by the near total extent to which UN and major non-governmental humanitarian agencies are forced to rely on voluntary

contributions as the main source of their funding. The result is a continual and growing deficit that shortchanges basic needs and thwarts resettlement of refugees into host country economies.

In this report, we call for systematic assessments to provide a base of certainty, to be enhanced by a much broader use of private sector assistance and investment. Unfreezing frozen assets can result in resources being directed to the victims of crime, violence and terror. Trade preferences for development including refugees can be a major economic incentive for host countries. Targeted capital can be mobilized through social finance to enhance economic opportunities for refugees. Refugees' voices and insights must be included and actively shape the decisions affecting them. Most of all, there must be a turning from the negative stereotyping and rabid attacks on those seeking sanctuary and asylum to a positive view of the value and contributions refugees can bring to their new homes and communities. It's time for a new, positive narrative on refugees.

This is a report that will not sit comfortably on a shelf. The WRC is determined to be an agent of change and draw upon the skills and experiences of its members and partners to initiate serious

structural reform. To that end, we envision building a constellation of international players to work in a united network to steward reforms. To counter those who want to return to "might is right" behaviour, the organization of the global system should be reconfigured to enable more flexible arrangements, coalitions, constellations and networks that draw together progressive members of our global community. A manifest form of that is the mobilization of a Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced, beginning with a pledge by potential members to serve the cause of refugee protection, followed by a series of coordinated and collaborative actions to improve the refugee and IDP system.

The meeting of women foreign ministers in Montreal in September 2018 presents an example of a group that can provide support to the Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced. Such a group, or a similar body, can initiate the actions necessary to bring women's leadership front and centre on refugee and IDP issues.

The Global Action Network will promote diplomacy and political collaboration, sharing resources and communicating proactively, in efforts enriched by goodwill and focused on new policy initiatives and action. We invite you to join us in that cause.

WRC executives (left to right): Deputy Chair Paul Heinbecker; Co-chairs Hina Jilani, Jakaya Kikwete and Rita Süßmuth; Chair Lloyd Axworthy. (CIGI/Trevor Hunsberger)



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preface

The global refugee system is facing pressing challenges as a result of ineffective governance, a lack of political will, insufficient and inefficient financing, and an absence of accountability. As of June 2018, 68.5 million people were forcibly displaced, including 40 million IDPs and 25.4 million refugees.¹ In recognition of the urgent need to fill gaps in the international protection system for refugees and IDPs, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants on September 19, 2016. Member states agreed to work toward the adoption of a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).

The WRC was launched in May 2017 by CIGI to complement the GCR process and in recognition of the need to work beyond the confines of the UN system to enact transformative systemic change through a series of recommendations supported by a wide range of actors and institutions. The WRC consulted with hundreds of experts from around the world, including civil society, private sector and government actors; refugees and other forcibly displaced persons; and

representatives of international and regional organizations. Their names appear in the Acknowledgements at the end of this document. This consultation process involved more than 10 conferences, workshops and site visits on five continents. As a result of these consultations, the Council focused its recommendations on seven key areas — governance, responsibility sharing, political will, gender, finance, technology and accountability — in order to enact the changes needed to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the system. Lloyd Axworthy, former foreign minister of Canada, chaired the Council, joined by 23 distinguished individuals representing a wide range of stakeholders from around the world.

The work of the Council has been generously supported by the Government of Canada, the International Development Research Centre, the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Georgetown University, the Exodus Institute, the Centre for Global Development, Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Aspen Ministers' Forum of the Aspen Institute, the Inter-American Dialogue, CARE Canada, the International Peace Institute and the InterAction Council. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Alex Neve, secretary general of Amnesty International Canada, whose

¹ See www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.

support was instrumental in helping get the Council launched; to former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) CEO Paul Twomey, who supported and advised the WRC in its work on digital technologies; and to Steve Lee, who helped organize several of our major meetings abroad.

The Council commissioned more than 20 papers on topics including financing for host states, accountability, gender equality, the impact of hosting refugees, xenophobia, cities and refugees, political will, responsibility sharing, governance, durable solutions, refugee entrepreneurship, IDPs, technology, youth engagement and other research areas relevant to refugees and IDPs. This scholarship informed the deliberations of the Council and the recommendations put forward in this report. The Council's diverse expertise and its concerted efforts to engage with key stakeholders have given the Council a unique opportunity to create an actionable vision for a well-functioning global refugee and IDP system.

The work of the Council and the skillful drafting of the report by Special Adviser Elizabeth Ferris was supported by a steering group, whose members comprised Paul Heinbecker, Jessie Thomson, Allan Rock, John Packer, Andrew Thompson, James Milner, Bushra Ebadi, Jonathan Kent and Jacqueline Lopour. Hayley Avery and Liliana Araujo served capably and efficiently as WRC project managers. CIGI Publisher Carol Bonnett and CIGI Publications Editor Lynn Schellenberg edited the final report and Graphic Designer Melodie Wakefield designed it. In addition, I would like to thank my other CIGI colleagues Jeff

Stoub, Spencer Tripp, Madison Cox, Andrea Morales Caceres, Diane Luke, Shelley Boettger, Sean Zohar, Som Tsoi, Aaron Shull, Sam Anissimov, Anne Blayney, Andrea Harding, Bryan Atcheson, Muriel O'Doherty, Trevor Hunsberger and Stephen D'Alimonte, who have ably supported so many different aspects of the Council's work.

Guy Goodwin-Gill, University of New South Wales, and Xavier Devictor, World Bank, reviewed the report and provided useful suggestions for revision.

Throughout this process, we have worked closely with our colleagues at Global Affairs Canada and its missions abroad who have provided invaluable advice and support.

The WRC would also like to thank CIGI President Rohinton Medhora, who has generously supported the enterprise from its early inception to the completion of the final report.

This report intentionally provides concrete recommendations and actions that should be undertaken to secure effective governance, accountability and systemic change. As one might expect from such a diverse group of Council members, not everyone agrees with every detail of these recommendations; however, Council members support the report as a whole.

Fen Osler Hampson

Executive Director, World Refugee Council & Director, Global Security & Politics Program, CIGI

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AP Photo/
Eldar Emric.





one

THE PROBLEM

Overview

Our world suffers not so much from a refugee crisis as from a political crisis — a deficit of leadership and vision and, most fundamentally, a shortfall of humanity and empathy. A UN system designed for another age and another need is left to cope as best it can with today's mass displacement, applying conscience-salving, humanitarian remedies to political and economic problems with entirely predictable and inadequate results. Leaders shrink from intervening when conflict is preventable, and decline to hold perpetrators to account when they commit crimes against refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). At best, politicians who know better turn a half-blind eye to their own people's fears that, while not groundless, are often exaggerated. At worst, these leaders themselves fan the embers of xenophobia for political gain. Funding to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is entirely voluntary and never enough. The result is that millions of people are left to suffer, while the rules-based international order on which global stability depends is steadily undermined.

The number of forcibly displaced people is at its highest since World War II — 68.5 million by the end of

2017, according to the latest figures from the UNHCR (2018b), almost three million more people than the year before. It was the fifth year in a row that a postwar record was set, and the numbers continue to rise.

The Syrian conflict has forced half that country's population to leave home with no end to their displacement in sight. Hundreds of thousands of people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been displaced multiple times over decades. Rohingya refugees live precariously in makeshift camps along riverbanks in Bangladesh, their fate unknown. Afghan asylum seekers are forced to return to their country, only to join the swelling ranks of people who have been internally displaced. Every day, thousands of Venezuelans arrive in Colombia, many experiencing sexual and physical threats, and assault on their journeys and at the border by militia and cartel irregulars (Faiola 2018). Women and girls, in particular, desperately need protection. Australia intercepts and detains asylum seekers on remote Pacific Islands, restricting their mobility and access to basic needs, in violation of international human rights laws. In the United States, a president invokes an "America First" creed, impugns Muslims, disregards

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AP Photo/
Visar Kryeziu.

BOX 1.1: A SOBERING LESSON

The Evian Conference held in 1938 to address the situation of refugees from Nazi Germany presents a sober lesson for today. The conference had a dual mission — to encourage countries to resettle refugees and to persuade Germany to establish an orderly emigration process. From the beginning, it was clear that not much would happen at the conference. In calling for it, US President Franklin Roosevelt made it clear that he was not asking any country, including the United States, to change its refugee policy. Subsequently, no government pledged to resettle significant numbers of refugees (except for the Dominican Republic’s rather vague offer). Nor did the conference condemn the repressive policies that Germany had already taken against Jews, although individual delegations expressed sympathy for the victims. After the conference, in a speech to the Party Congress in Nuremberg in September 1938, Adolf Hitler pointed to the hypocrisy of the countries that condemned Germany’s policies but would not admit Jewish refugees: “Lamentations have not led these democratic countries to substitute helpful activity at last for their hypocritical questions; on the contrary, these countries with icy coldness assured us that obviously there was no place for the Jews in their territory” (Haynes 1942, 719–20). This recognition that other countries would do little to save the Jews and other refugees paved the way for the Holocaust.

— Susan Martin, WRC member

the rules-based international order, threatens the International Criminal Court, ends funding for Palestinians and shreds refugee resettlement programs. In Europe, where millions of refugees have sought safe harbour, “not welcome” signs are up even though many civil society groups have reached out to support arriving refugees and to protest xenophobic policies. Ships carrying migrants and refugees rescued in the Mediterranean are turned away from port after port, in a distressing echo of Jews trying to flee the Nazis’ tightening grip on Europe in the 1930s (see Box 1.1). Refugees are sent back to countries where their lives are in danger, in direct violation of article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2010). And, in more than 100 countries, people displaced within the borders of their own countries remain in limbo, largely out of sight and out of mind and unable to return to their homes or settle elsewhere.

Today, we are witnessing states individually and collectively abrogate their responsibility to help those displaced, by:

- failing to address the causes of displacement;
- denying the right to asylum to those needing protection;
- failing to find solutions for those who are displaced;
- refusing to provide adequate funding for protection and assistance to the displaced; and
- failing to hold the perpetrators of the crimes that cause refugee flows accountable.

The present international refugee system, created in the aftermath of World War II, is simply inadequate for today’s world. Bold new measures are urgently needed.

There are moral, political, strategic and economic reasons for transforming the present system:

Morally, it is a violation of fundamental principles of humanity — central to all world belief systems — when people forced from their homes are not treated with compassion and respect. It is a violation of basic human rights when the right to asylum is denied and when refugees and IDPs are denied sufficient assistance to allow them to live in dignity and security.

Politically, governments have a responsibility to protect their people, including through control of their borders. Governments will be accorded the social licence by their constituencies to resettle refugees only to the extent that the citizens are confident that their governments control the immigration process. Just as sheltering the dispossessed is integral to humanity, managing border entries is essential to stability. The two are not incompatible, as the highly successful rescue of the Vietnamese boat people demonstrated to an earlier generation.

Strategically, peace and security require the resolution of conflicts, which in turn can depend on durable solutions for those displaced. Brexit and the rise of the extreme right in Europe are linked to the mass movement of refugees out of Syria into Europe.

Economically, the effective integration of forcibly displaced people can contribute to economic development for newcomers and host communities alike, and alleviate potential costs associated with infrastructure, services and resources.

The ramifications of the present inadequate refugee system extend beyond the lives of the millions of individuals forced to flee their homes. The displacement of people is a clear indication that the rules-based



Zaatari refugee camp officials speak with WRC members. (CIGI/Laila Muharram)

international order is in jeopardy, as governments fail to protect their people and as the UN Security Council, largely paralyzed by the veto of its permanent members, is unable to prevent and resolve conflicts, and unable — or unwilling — to hold perpetrators of displacement accountable for their actions.

These challenges are daunting, but they are not insurmountable. The number of refugees and IDPs, although extremely high, represents just *one-third of one percent* of humanity, and support for them by a world of 7.6 billion people is not an unbearable burden. The international community has demonstrated a capacity for collective action in the past — to resettle the Vietnamese boat people in the 1980s, to confront the scourge of landmines in the 1990s and to agree on strong collective measures to reduce the threats posed by climate change in the 2000s, among other examples. There is much that can and should be done to redress the current system's principal problems: major deficits of state and personal accountability; inadequate responsibility sharing and

governance structures; insufficient funding; and political narratives fuelling xenophobia. These obstacles can and must be surmounted to prevent conflict, and to increase the certainty and effectiveness of the world's response to refugees and people displaced within the borders of their own countries. Political will is the key.

Investing political energy to transform the present system is necessary not only to address the urgent needs of those who are displaced now, but also to create a system capable of meeting the challenges of the future.

Searching for Solutions: The Approach of the World Refugee Council

The World Refugee Council (WRC) was created to address the lack of political will to prevent and respond to massive forced displacement, and to recommend actions to transform the current dysfunctional system. The WRC is an independent global body made up of 24 political leaders, policy advisers, academic experts, and private sector and civil society representatives

from around the world. Since it was established in May 2017 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), and under the leadership of former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, the WRC has analyzed the present global refugee system and developed innovative ideas for addressing its principal shortcomings. Over the past 18 months, the WRC has travelled to Jordan, Germany, Tanzania, Greece and Geneva, and supplemented its formal meetings with smaller group visits to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, the Organization of American States in Washington, the European Commission in Brussels and the African Union in Ethiopia, as well as to Uganda, Bangladesh and Colombia. At each stop, the WRC gained insights from refugees, civil society, government officials, representatives of international organizations, academic experts and others. The Council also held workshops in Washington on responsibility sharing and on financing, in San Francisco on technology, and in New York on conflict prevention. As well, the Council relied on third-party reports from regions where members were unable to visit. Finally, the WRC commissioned research papers from experts from around the world, which helped to sharpen the Council's recommendations on particular issues.

In this travel to five continents over the past year and a half, the WRC has seen first-hand the severe hardship suffered by tens of millions of displaced people caused by conflict, instability and political xenophobia. Members heard of the system's continued failure to meet the unique and specific needs of women, youth and of people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. The central message that emerged from the Council's work over the past 18 months is that the challenges plaguing refugees and IDPs are the result of serious failures of national political leadership.

The Global Compact on Refugees and the WRC

In recognition of the problems confronting the present refugee system, the 2016 New York Declaration called for the UNHCR to develop a new Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and set out an intergovernmental process to adopt a new Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (UN General Assembly [UNGA] 2016b). Over the past two years, the UNHCR has convened a series of thematic and regional consultations, followed by six rounds of consultations with states on the draft text of the GCR and has piloted the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in more than a dozen countries. The results of this process are impressive. Among other measures, the GCR envisages a periodic ministerial-level refugee forum at the global level, as well as national arrangements, including support platforms. With the adoption of the GCR in December 2018 by the UNGA, the international community has signalled its willingness to change its ways of working to respond to the changed global context.

From the beginning, the WRC has seen its work as complementary to the United Nations' GCR and is committed to supporting its adoption and implementation.

Nonetheless, there are inherent limitations in the UN process, because of the dominance of the major powers, including big donors; the policy of consensus decision making and the North-South divide at the United Nations; the hierarchical nature of its institutions; a generalized fear of undermining the 1951 Convention; and the built-in limitations of the UNHCR's mandate.

Furthermore, in the UNHCR's own words, "the global compact on refugees...is entirely non-political in nature" (OECD 2017, 2). An assertive political approach is a driving imperative because, as the former High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata put it, "there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems" (Ogata 2005, 25). There are only political solutions.

The WRC is able to bring the unique perspective of high-level political leaders from most regions of the world, as well as its ability to convene stakeholders across sectors, backgrounds and geographies. In addition, because the WRC is an independent body not tied to the United Nations, its findings are not limited by the need to achieve a political consensus of the 193 members of the United Nations. While the UNHCR process to develop the GCR was intended, from the outset, to be non-political, the WRC's work deliberately engages with politically contentious issues, such as internal

displacement and the need to hold governments accountable when they displace people. The Council urges global action that complements and reinforces the important work of the GCR process. The needs of the forcibly displaced are simply too desperate to allow delay in transforming the international refugee system. Accordingly, the WRC calls for the establishment of a new Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced to carry forward the calls to action laid out in this report and the GCR.

The WRC's proposals in the following chapters and as summarized in Table 1.1 reflect its comparative advantage in several areas — namely, its freedom to engage directly with politics (the Council does not have a non-political mandate) and its ability to both work across policy fields (development, security, human rights, humanitarianism) and engage across all phases of the displacement cycle (root causes, internal displacement, protection and solutions).

TABLE 1.1: THE WRC'S PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE REFUGEE SYSTEM

GAP IN THE SYSTEM	PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS GAP
Politics	Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced
Norms	Development of additional protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention
Evidence	Intergovernmental Panel on Refugees and Displaced Persons
Authority	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internal Displacement
Accountability	Repurposing of seized assets to support the displaced
Finance	Refugee sovereign bonds, equity investment funds and trade preferences
Technology	Online service providers to make existing technologies accessible to refugees and IDPs

BOX 1.2: DEFINITIONS

The 1951 Convention, as “amended” by the 1967 Protocol, defines a **refugee** as “a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of the country of his habitual residence..., is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 2010, art. 1). The 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention expands the definition of refugee to include not only those fleeing persecution but also those who flee their homelands “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” (UNHCR 1969, art. 1(2)). Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration (UNHCR 1984) and the European Union’s Subsidiary Protection (European Union 2011) expand international protection to a broader set of beneficiaries.

Asylum seekers are people seeking sanctuary in a country other than their own and awaiting a decision about their status (UNHCR 2017).

Internally displaced persons are defined in the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 1998).

Data and Definitions: What Do the Numbers Mean?

Headlines about refugee movements use phrases such as “unprecedented numbers of refugees” and “highest numbers since World War II,” accompanied by photos of refugee camps, long lines of families waiting at borders or flimsy boats packed with desperate asylum seekers making their way to developed countries. It is these very headlines and narratives that have obscured the human face and drowned out the stories and experiences of the individuals who seek safety and a better life for themselves, free from persecution, violence and insecurity.

As earlier cited, the total number of displaced persons — both within and across borders — is more than 68.5 million people. This is a large number — indeed, the largest number since the establishment of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1950. However, a closer look at the numbers reveals that 40 million of these people are IDPs still within their

own country; 20 million are refugees living outside of their home countries, under the mandate of the UNHCR; five million are Palestinian refugees in the Middle East;¹ and 3.5 million are asylum seekers who have not yet been recognized as refugees. The distinctions between these groups of displaced people (see Box 1.2) matter. Even though the lived experiences of those forced from their homes are often similar, different legal frameworks and different institutional mandates apply to each group of displaced people.

These levels of displacement are not completely new. There were, in fact, more refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate in the early 1990s. The largest increase in numbers is seen among IDPs — those displaced within the

borders of their own country. Some of this increase may be explained by better collection of data on IDPs, but much of it is likely due to the fact that, as borders have closed, people fleeing for their lives have been forced to remain within their countries, where they are often at greater risk than those who find safety in nearby countries. As a result, the number of IDPs displaced by conflict is almost twice the number of refugees. Yet, the international response to IDPs continues to be characterized by ad hoc responses, turf battles and — in spite of 12 years of humanitarian reform and the introduction of a UN system for coordinating responses (known as the “cluster system”²) — unpredictability.

Although media and policy makers’ attention often focuses on those who

1 The number of Palestinian refugees grew from 1.4 million in 1970 to 5.4 million in 2017 — largely due to natural demographic increases (UNHCR 2018b). There have been no new groups of Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) since the 1967 Six Day War. Nor have there been any solutions for Palestinian refugees.

2 In the absence of an international agency with mandated responsibility for IDPs, the cluster system was introduced in 2005 as a way of ensuring coordinated action by UN agencies to address the needs of IDPs (Ferris 2014b). Over time, it developed into a coordinating mechanism for broader humanitarian issues.

make it to more developed countries, 85 percent of the world's refugees live in low- and middle-income countries, including some of the poorest in the world. Altogether, more than two-thirds of the world's refugees came from just five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia (UNHCR 2018b). Countries that generate large numbers of refugees also tend to have large numbers of IDPs, but there is not a direct parallel. (See the annex.)

A few other characteristics of refugee and IDP numbers are important.

First, there is the reality that two-thirds of the world's refugees and IDPs are living in *protracted situations* — sometimes for decades. More than four million people are living in displacement situations that have lasted 20 years or more, such as Afghans in Pakistan, displaced for more than 30 years (UNHCR 2017, 22). In some cases, as in Dadaab refugee camp in

Kenya, a third generation of refugees is growing up in refugee camps. And, of course, the displacement of Palestinian refugees has lasted for almost 70 years. As more time passes, solutions become more difficult.

All three of the *traditional durable solutions* for refugees — voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement to third countries — are becoming more difficult. As wars grind on, prospects of returning home diminish, and as refugees stay longer in neighbouring countries, their welcome thins out. Partly as a consequence, refugees are forced to depend on humanitarian aid that is almost never enough to meet their needs. Host governments and communities become impatient with the continuing presence of refugees. And, the possibility of resettlement to other countries is diminishing — largely because of cuts in resettlement opportunities in the United States and the European Union. For IDPs displaced for many

years — usually because conflicts have become protracted — solutions seem similarly distant (Kälin and Entwisle Chapuisat 2017).

Second, this movement is only part of *a larger movement of people migrating* for economic, environmental, family and other reasons. In 2017, there were 258 million international migrants, constituting 3.4 percent of the world's population, compared to 2.8 percent in 2000 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017, 1). The issue of migrants, although not directly addressed in this report, is important, because migrants and refugees often use the same routes, and often the same smugglers, in their journeys across borders.

Third, more than half of the world's refugees and IDPs are women or girls, and half of all refugees are children under the age of 18 (UNHCR 2018b). Women and girls face particular risks of violence before, during and after their movement. Women and girls are also all too often viewed solely as victims, left out of decision-making processes and leadership opportunities, despite the crucial role they play in keeping their communities and families together through crises. Women and girls have specific health needs, in particular for reproductive and maternal health care. Despite the unique vulnerabilities, as well as capacities, of refugee women and girls, responses are all too often gender-blind or even gender-harmful. Currently, we lack sufficient gender- and age-disaggregated data that could be used to assess how funding is being distributed and to better understand the specific impacts and vulnerabilities experienced by different sectors of the population. Children and youth, whether travelling alone or with their families, are at risk during their journeys, at borders and during their displacement (Bhabha and Dottridge 2017). Youth are a key demographic

Sprawling camps in places such as Khartoum, Sudan, have housed millions of displaced people, some for decades. (Photo by Yves Gellie/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images)



in ensuring that solutions in the global refugee system are sustainable. There is an urgent need for education at all levels and for health education in areas such as HIV prevention and family planning. Evidence suggests that youth comprise a majority of the UNHCR's "persons of concern" (Evans, Lo Forte and Fraser 2013). Yet, global refugee governance processes fail to facilitate meaningful intergenerational dialogue and participation that could help to ensure that refugees' diverse needs are met and their unique contributions realized.

Fourth, most of the world's refugees do not live in camps but rather are dispersed among *host communities*. No one wants to live in camps or shelters for any length of time, and the fact that refugees increasingly live in communities and cities is, by and large, a positive trend. On the one hand, living in camps can deprive refugees of the dignity of self-reliance and distort relations with host communities. On the other hand, refugees who do not reside in camps are often invisible, and destitute. Further, the impact on host communities is considerable, particularly because infrastructure in the developing countries that host refugees is often inadequate to provide for a country's own citizens — let alone large numbers of newcomers. At the municipal level, mayors and other local government authorities are often at the front lines of providing refugees and IDPs with the resources and services they need, without having the political and financial support they need to do so.

Fifth, there are real *inequities in funding* for refugees in different parts of the world — and probably even starker discrepancies for IDPs. In this regard, it is illustrative that several individual European countries spend more on processing and receiving thousands of asylum seekers than the UNHCR spends for all the rest



Rohingya Muslim women carry their sick children in Bangladesh. More than half of the world's refugees and IDPs are women or girls. (AP Photo/Dar Yasin)

of the millions of refugees in the world. For example, in 2015, Sweden spent US\$7.1 billion (€6 billion) on 163,000 asylum seekers (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2017). In comparison, the UNHCR's budget for 2017 was nominally US\$7.3 billion for the 61 million people of concern to the agency (UNHCR 2018a).

Sixth, as borders are fortified and become less accessible, migrants and asylum seekers alike take *ever riskier journeys*. More people are turning to smugglers to facilitate their travel, and more are being abandoned and exploited by those smugglers.³ Even those who would qualify as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention are too often forced to turn over their savings and put their lives in the hands of exploitative criminal networks to access other countries to ask for asylum, as a result of the many existing barriers to seeking asylum through "legitimate" or official channels.

Finally — and perhaps most importantly — the displacement of people is a result of the failure

³ The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in the past two decades (1996–2016), at least 60,000 people have lost their lives trying to reach their destination (Brian and Laczko 2016, 1).

of national authorities and the international community to address the *causes of displacement* — war, armed gangs, endemic violence, widespread human rights violations, inequality, poverty, hunger, corruption, and weak and abusive political leadership. Addressing those causes, however, is beyond the remit of humanitarian actors. Development agencies, with their focus on good governance and rule of law, are better placed to address some of the causes of displacement. But, fundamentally, it is the responsibility of the UN Security Council — charged with upholding international peace and security — to prevent and resolve the conflicts that displace people, and by and large, the Security Council has failed in this task. Difficulties of reaching agreement within the Security Council on conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Myanmar and Nigeria, as well as on lesser-known crises in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, have meant that the humanitarian community has had to deal with the human casualties of these wars for far too long. Efforts to develop early-warning systems have improved but are, so far, unaccompanied by early and effective action. Peacekeeping forces have increasingly sought to protect civilians, support humanitarian

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actors and prevent the escalation of conflicts. However, they have been unable to prevent conflicts from intensifying and people from fleeing their homes and their communities, and, in too many cases, they have been themselves perpetrators of abuse against the civilian population — adding to the risks faced by women and children in conflict zones.

Equally, the breakdown of consensus to work on interdependent problems collectively, and the increasing trend of individual governments to focus on bolstering border security, leads to a troubling stereotyping of refugees as security threats, while denying the valuable contributions they bring.

The WRC’s Work: Core Principles and Guidelines

Ten foundational principles and guidelines emerged as central to the WRC’s work throughout its deliberations:

- The global displacement crisis does not stem from a surge in the numbers of refugees and IDPs but from poor political leadership. Political leaders have a responsibility

to promote informed public opinion and not to stimulate anti-foreigner sentiment in their constituencies for political purposes.

- Those governments, including individual leaders, who trigger refugee flows and displace people must be held accountable for their actions; those governments that fail to protect asylum seekers must be held accountable for their failure to do so.
- Protecting refugees and IDPs and finding solutions to their plight is a collective responsibility, not just the obligation of the countries to which refugees first arrive or the state in which IDPs are displaced.
- The needs of the host communities must be central to all work with displaced populations.
- Without sufficient, guaranteed funding, bold ideas for change remain aspirational.
- Male bias in refugee policy and gender blindness in response to the global displacement crisis is no longer acceptable, because “gender affects every stage of the

refugee journey, from reception to durable solutions” (Pittaway and Bartolomei 2018, 2). The specific vulnerabilities and needs, as well as capacities, of women and girls, men and boys, and people of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities are significantly different and must be taken into full account.

- Meaningful engagement of refugees and IDPs, including women, youth and those of diverse sexual orientation and gender identities is crucial for an effectively functioning system that upholds their rights and dignity.
- Both greater sensitivity and institutional change are needed to redress the invisibility and lack of action toward IDPs.
- A broad, inclusive, network of national governments, municipalities and mayors, regional organizations, private businesses and a vast array of civil society organizations is needed to address the challenges of displacement.
- There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems; only political action can address the challenges of forced displacement.

Key Elements of a Transformative Agenda

There are glaring shortcomings at all phases of displacement — from deterring human rights abuses, to prosecuting perpetrators, to meeting the immediate needs of refugees and IDPs, to finding enduring solutions for those displaced.

There is a significant need for reform both within and beyond the United Nations. Most immediately, we see a need for a system of *responsibility sharing for refugees and IDPs*. Currently, neighbouring countries that receive

refugees shoulder the cost of helping them, and governments with large numbers of IDPs are largely left on their own. There needs to be a recognition that protection and assistance of refugees and IDPs is in the common global interest and thus a collective responsibility. Governments that decline to resettle refugees should contribute in other ways on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities in keeping with their capacity to do so. Resettlement of refugees should be re-invigorated and designed to meet a greater percentage of the needs of an increasing number of refugees. Compliance with commitments needs to be monitored.

In particular, the Council underscored the need to devote much *more political attention to internal displacement*. Currently, there are twice as many IDPs as there are refugees, and their rights are violated daily. In spite of 20 years of discussions, the international response to IDPs is, simply, inadequate.

The important work of the UNHCR needs a *broad-based network of political*

support to respond to refugee and IDP flows, comprised of willing governments; international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and regional multilateral banks; the business community; civil society; and the media. National governments and international actors need to find effective mechanisms for ensuring the active and *meaningful participation of refugees* and other affected communities in decision-making processes.

At the international level, fundamental change is needed in how the refugee regime intersects with other regimes (for example, development, security, peacekeeping, human rights, humanitarian, migration) (Betts 2010). At the national level, the welcome moves toward whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches will bring in a broader array of actors, including refugees, local hosts, civil society, municipal government leaders and the private sector, all of which need to be reflected in international governance arrangements. More robust engagement by regional organizations

— and more international support for those organizations — and decentralization of policy decisions and operational practices is needed. In Africa, for example, regional groupings, including the African Union (AU), the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are important instruments of cooperation that should be engaged in order to overcome the existing refugee governance crisis.

The Council learned, in its meetings in Colombia, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan and Tanzania, the importance of *engagement at the local community and municipal levels*. Often the most effective forms of integration and reintegration are carried out by mayors and local authorities working in partnership with refugees. In fact, about 60 percent of refugees and 80 percent of IDPs reside in large, medium and small cities (UNHCR 2018b).

There is a strong imperative for authentic organizations to *give refugees*

UN Secretary-General and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres meets with Chadian community representatives in Darfur in 2007. (AP Photo/Nasser Nasser)



a voice in the decisions that affect their lives at all levels of governance.

As well, the system needs *transformational change in how funding is mobilized and allocated*. The present system of financing humanitarian response is clearly no longer fit for purpose. The fact that the UNHCR relies on voluntary contributions not only means that it must appeal for money for each major emergency, but that the donors have disproportional political clout with the agency, including in situations where donor governments are violating basic principles of refugee protection (Crisp 2018). A system built on voluntary contributions is unlikely ever to be adequate. Financial support is rarely sufficient to cover the costs to public services, infrastructure, the economy and the environment of host countries. In addition, all too often, funding for gender-specific needs (sexual, psychological and reproductive health, and sexual- and gender-based violence) is not prioritized or seen as life-saving.

We need to rethink the way we prioritize disposition of existing pots of funds, and as funding becomes more predictable, the specific needs of vulnerable populations must be a priority. In order to effectively identify these needs, gender- and age- disaggregated data and the inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups is needed (Brun 2017). In particular, there is a need to ensure that funding is used to support both the needs and empowerment of women. There is a plethora of ideas for raising more money — from assessed contributions to levies on international transactions to refugee enterprise and the confiscation of perpetrators' assets — but there is a dearth of political will thus far to do so.

Bilateral and multilateral trade and finance arrangements with host states can hasten development and benefit

both refugees and host citizens. Loan underwriting can free up capital and encourage host state development, opening the way to inclusion and integration of refugees. Any bilateral and multilateral trade and finance arrangements must be underpinned by a strong gender analysis, to ensure that they do not simply reinforce harmful power dynamics and gender inequality. One proposal that has generated a lot of attention is to use the frozen assets of perpetrators and direct them for the benefit of the people in the country of origin, including those who have been forced to flee their communities. Acting on this proposal would both increase available funding and enhance accountability by eliminating the impunity of corrupt kleptocrats.

Reliance on voluntary contributions also creates tremendous inequities. Refugees in high-profile emergencies are more likely to receive needed assistance than those where Western media outlets or journalists are not present. And available data suggests that IDPs receive

far less per capita international assistance than do refugees.

The present international refugee regime is characterized by a lack of accountability at all levels. Upstream, political leaders cause — or allow — conflicts to occur with impunity, displacing vast numbers of people. If perpetrators are not held accountable through national systems, they must be held accountable by the UN Security Council and, where possible, by the International Criminal Court. Just as polluters must pay for pollution, perpetrators must pay for their crimes.

Downstream, accountability is lacking when donors make pledges they do not honour, and when governments evade their obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and reject bona fide refugees who cross their borders or subject them to inhumane and degrading treatment at the point of reception. An *independent peer review mechanism is needed* to monitor and critique the performance of governments.

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There is, as well, an institutional lack of accountability when some international organizations operate in silos and measure their efforts in terms of activities rather than outcomes.

These issues are interrelated: Enhanced accountability mechanisms must be central to new governance systems. The lack of accountability of the governments of countries of origin is often most acutely evident in the inadequate response to IDPs. Without the necessary funds, none of the reform suggestions made in this report will function properly.

Addressing these broad issues offers the opportunity to resolve the major weaknesses of the international refugee system, including the scarcity of solutions for refugees and IDPs living in protracted situations. Far too many refugees and IDPs have been displaced for far too long. A different approach is greatly needed.

Making the Case for Change

While the WRC recognizes that millions of lives have been saved and refugees protected under the current system, it also believes that the present international refugee system needs fundamental change. It also believes that important change is possible, even in the present political climate.

States and international organizations alike resist change. It is easier to continue working as usual than to adopt bold and untested ways of working or to admit new players into an already established system. The incentives for both states and other actors are to continue doing things the way they have always been done, just harder. In order to bring about

meaningful reform, the incentive structures need to be changed.

In order to bring about the changes suggested in this report — more effective responsibility sharing, financial arrangements, governance mechanisms and accountability — governments must see such measures as being in their national and collective interests.

This realization can come from individual political leaders responding to perceived needs and domestic constituency pressures from civil society and other groups. The WRC believes that those governments that share common commitments to changing the system can form the nucleus for broader change.

Historically, it has been mid-sized liberal democracies — such as the Nordic countries and Canada — which have had the most interest in and incentive for developing international law and multilateral systems, not the major powers. In today's world, states receiving large numbers of refugees and the mid-sized powerhouses of Latin America, Asia and Africa, together with traditional humanitarian donors and civil society, could come together as a “coalition of support” or undertake mini-multilateral initiatives to act as catalysts for broader change. This model has been effective in many other contexts — from the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines to the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative and from the Platform on Disaster Displacement to the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The issue of mobilizing political will — the foundation for all the recommendations in this report — is the subject of the next chapter.

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THE KEY TO CHANGE: POLITICAL WILL

Political will is essential to changing the way in which the system responds to refugees — both at the national level, where political leadership shapes public opinion toward refugees and IDPs, and at the global level, where leadership is needed to transform the refugee and IDP systems.

Political Will and Public Opinion

Political leadership and public opinion about refugees and IDPs are linked. In some cases, such as the United States and Hungary, political leaders have made the calculus that their road to political power lies in closing the doors to refugees and immigrants. They argue that such xenophobic policies reflect public pressure from their constituencies. In a few cases, such as Canada, Germany, Greece, Kenya, Rwanda, Sweden and Uganda, politicians have provided leadership in welcoming refugees (Boxes 2.1–2.3) and largely brought public opinion with them, although, as the Council witnessed in Germany, such measures can also fuel a backlash against refugees, and against the political leaders who supported them. As well, there are many refugee-hosting countries where political leaders and

the public alike were initially positive about refugees but then changed their attitude, because of a perception that the refugees were either posing unacceptable strains on resources by or staying too long (as in Jordan and Lebanon, for example), or because the political calculus of leaders shifted (as in Turkey), or because expected international assistance did not materialize (as in Tanzania).

Investments in People Pay Off

It is unlikely that the political leadership required to transform the refugee system will come from all 193 members of the United Nations. However, those countries leading the way provide compelling evidence of the contributions that refugees make to welcoming communities, as evidence from Sweden and Canada illustrate:

- “Sweden’s rapid intake of huge numbers of refugees and migrants, about 600,000 in total over the past five years, has produced some of the highest growth rates in Europe and will also help it address the challenges of an otherwise aging population... Gross domestic product increased

Opposite page:
Carsten Koall/
picture-alliance/
dpa/AP Images.

CALLS TO ACTION

Building Political Will at the Local, National and International Levels

ACTION 1

The WRC calls for the establishment of a new independent partnership, the Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced, to promote changes to the global system for refugees and IDPs, including advocating for measures to strengthen accountability, governance, responsibility sharing and funding mechanisms.

ACTION 2

The WRC urges political leaders to eschew xenophobic impulses and short-term political gains when they are making policies affecting refugees and displaced persons. True leadership entails the protection of the most vulnerable and disenfranchised populations; it means doing what is right even when there are incentives to do otherwise.

ACTION 3

The WRC calls on religious, ethnic, business, academic, media, technology, municipal and other influential constituencies to put maximum pressure on the political leaders of their countries to take positive action to ensure protection, dignity, assistance, empowerment and solutions for refugees and displaced persons within their own countries and worldwide.

ACTION 4

The WRC proposes the establishment of a process to create an independent intergovernmental panel on refugees and displaced persons (IPRDP), using the model of the highly successful Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

ACTION 5

The WRC recommends that a network of global women leaders, in support of the WRC's recommendations, be convened as part of the Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced.

Anti-migrant demonstration in the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. (Sipa via AP Images)



BOX 2.1: GERMANY'S REFUGEE POLICY

Article 16a of Germany's Basic Law grants victims of political persecution an individual right of asylum. The Asylum Procedure Act governs the admission procedure for asylum seekers, granting them a certificate of permission to reside in the country. Case workers from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) question asylum seekers on their travel route and reasons for persecution. This interview is recorded in writing and translated into the asylum seeker's language, with a copy given to the asylum seeker. Written decisions, based on this interview and further investigations, are provided to asylum seekers.

Persons granted asylum or refugee status receive a temporary residence permit and are given the same status as Germans within the social insurance system. They are entitled to social welfare, child benefits, child-raising benefits, integration allowances, language courses and other forms of integration assistance.

If neither asylum or refugee protection can be granted, the BAMF examines whether there are grounds for a deportation ban. As a rule, asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected are required to leave the country. (It should also be noted that there are various other forms of protection available in Germany to people who don't meet the refugee definition but who are allowed to remain. Other important aspects of German policy include subsidiary protection and resettlement.)

Source: German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/asylum-refugee-protection/asylum-refugee-policy-germany/asylum-refugee-policy-node.html.

more than 3 percent in the first two quarters of the year [2018], which is considerably faster than the euro zone's roughly 2 percent growth... Foreign-born workers accounted for all the job growth in the industrial sector last year and for 90 percent of the new jobs in the welfare sector, in particular health care and elderly care" (Lindeberg 2018, paras. 3-4). See also Box 2.3.

- "Between 1979 and 1981, Canada accepted 60,000 'boat people' from Southeast Asia. Within a decade, 86% of those former refugees were working, healthy and spoke English with some proficiency, achieving the basic criteria for success set out by academic Morton Beiser in his landmark study of their integration into Canadian society. They were less likely to use social services and more likely to have jobs than the average Canadian. One in five was self-employed. They weren't a drain on the taxpayer — they *were* taxpayers" (Cowan 2015, para. 4).

As WRC member Ratna Omidvar remarked, "We have seen the enormous contributions made by refugees in Canada. Canada wouldn't be where it is today without refugees. But it takes patience. The short-term costs are considerable, but the investment pays off in a few years. We have a shortage of patience today."

An Increase in Xenophobia and Islamophobia

While there has never been a golden age of tolerance and multiculturalism toward refugees — at least not in the past century — the negative narrative around refugees seems to have increased in recent years. This negativity is due in large part to political leaders' and the press's conflation of refugee movements with terrorism and to the increasing securitization of migration issues. Further, the fear of Muslims, and in particular of Muslim refugees, seems impervious to an analysis of facts and, indeed, in some countries, there is an

outright rejection of objective facts. For example, although none of the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States were of Afghan, Syrian or Iraqi origin, individuals from these countries continue to experience backlash in the aftermath of the attacks. Yet, in spite of negative opinions about refugees in some parts of the world, communities have continued to welcome refugees in many other places — from Brazil to Malaysia and from Germany to Colombia (Box 2.4).

Governments have a legitimate responsibility to protect their borders and to control who is allowed to enter their territory. There is room for reasonable debate on immigration and border enforcement policies. Too often, however, public debates are driven by fear-mongering rather than measured, evidence-based discussions of national interests and migration.

The rise of far-right political movements is but one indication of the growth of xenophobia; in fact,



Two young people farm a field at the Rhino Refugee Camp Settlement in the north of Uganda, home to about 90,000 refugees from South Sudan. (Thomas Koehler/Photothek via Getty Images)

BOX 2.2: THE MOST WELCOMING REFUGEE POLICY IN THE WORLD

In 2016, Uganda received more refugees than any other country. Once an arriving family goes through processing at a reception facility, they are given enough land — 90 square metres — on which to build a house and to farm. The region offers plenty of space for the refugees, more than a million of whom have arrived from South Sudan, because Ugandans do not like to settle in the region (the land is barren). However, it offers a safe place for refugees who have long shared culture and trade with the host community.

As Christoph Titz and Maria Feck write in *Der Spiegel* (2017), as welcoming as it is,

Uganda's refugee policy isn't purely altruistic. For the underdeveloped northwestern part of the country, the international aid pouring in is extremely helpful. Aid groups have bulldozed hundreds of kilometers of roads into no-man's land and communities now exist where previously there was only rocky, thorny bush.

Camps have become villages and the influx of food, water and medical supplies from international aid organizations translates into a lot of money coming into the country. About 40 aid organizations have now registered with the prime minister's office and they employ thousands of people, most of them local Ugandans. They must be housed and they need offices, trucks and cars along with drivers to operate them.

Markets, housing and restaurants are shooting out of the ground, representing several hundred thousand euros in investment made possible by the needs of a million people without possessions — and by the daily work and trade carried out by the South Sudanese refugees.

In order to provide political leadership at the national and community levels, political leaders need to make the case that policies toward refugees are in the country's — or the community's — interests. This argument can be on the basis of national values — for example, both the United States and Australia in the past have seen refugees as compatible with their national identities as nations of immigrants. They are now in the camp of the refugee deniers. Others have couched their refugee policies in humanitarian terms, although as Jeffrey Crisp, former senior official at the UNHCR, argued in his meeting with the WRC in Berlin, “simply appealing to humanitarian instincts is not enough; other strategies must be used to mobilize and sustain political will.”

the whole debate about migration and refugees has moved to the right. Opposition to migrants and refugees is also found among left-leaning organizations, such as labour unions in many countries that fear the economic and social consequences for their members and do not welcome the competition of migrants or refugees. The polarization of politics and the loss of a rational centre in many countries makes it difficult to chart a way forward. As Gerald Knaus, Founding Chairman of the European Stability Initiative, warned at our Berlin session, “Politicians need incentives to help refugees, and civil society can hold them accountable for commitments they have made. But if politicians who help refugees lose elections, there will be no political will to make things better.”

This xenophobia takes different forms in different countries. While perhaps most visible in the United States and Europe, it is also apparent in such countries as South Africa, Australia and Myanmar — where the Rohingya Muslim minority are depicted as illegal migrants.

BOX 2.3: SWEDISH REFUGEE POLICY

Sweden’s migration policy comprises refugee and immigration policy, return policy, support for repatriation and the link between migration and development. In July 2016, Sweden introduced a temporary act to bring its asylum rules in line with the minimum standards set by EU law. This act grants temporary residence permits for persons eligible for subsidiary protection. In June 2017, the act was amended to allow newly arrived young people to obtain a residence permit enabling them to complete their upper secondary school education. This amendment will continue to apply after July 2018. In 2017, 2,800 people who applied for asylum in Greece and Italy were relocated to Sweden under a 2015 EU decision.

Sweden is actively involved in the European Union’s ongoing negotiations on a revised common asylum system consisting of seven legal instruments. Sweden is working with other countries to stress the need for greater responsibility sharing and collaboration, and enhanced governance, at the international level.

Source: Government Offices of Sweden (2018).

Research indicates that xenophobic attitudes are difficult to change (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015) and that political leadership plays a key role in setting the tone of the debate (Miller 2018), for good or ill. The Berlin meeting also

heard reports from researchers at the Overseas Development Institute that surveys show that younger, more educated people tend to be more welcoming of refugees and migrants, (Dempster and Hargrave 2017, 11, 17). Further, as Lubna Rashid observed during the same meeting in Berlin, “We need a lot of awareness of what or who a refugee is and to acknowledge the diversity of refugees. We can’t get support for refugees by pitying them. We need to see refugees as humans. We need to focus more on transforming narratives.” Refugees themselves have agency and need control of their own lives.

Yet another approach is to address the underlying fears of those holding anti-immigrant perspectives. As Robert Grimm, director, Ipsos Public Affairs, said in the Berlin meeting, “Anti-refugee/migrant sentiment is an expression of anxiety in an ever-changing world and we can’t neglect the concerns and fears of people; otherwise, they will be lost to the far right.” There may be ways to facilitate

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POLITICAL
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ABOUT REFUGEES
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BOX 2.4: A RECIPE FOR INTEGRATION: GERMAN MOBILE KITCHEN

Founded by a group of students in 2013, Über den Tellerrand (Beyond Your Plate, in English) is a German civil society initiative focused on building ties between refugees and local communities. “Beyond your plate” is a commonly used German expression meaning “open-mindedness.” The initiative sets up opportunities for newcomers and Germans to interact around cooking and eating. For example, the group creates and sells cookbooks, organizes cooking classes led by refugees, arranges trips and holds other events. They also build mobile kitchens inside shipping containers (“Kitchen on the Run”) and take them from town to town where refugees live alongside locals. They meet at 3:00 p.m. and prepare food together, then sit around a table sharing stories and experiences over a meal.

The initiative is meant to foster social bonds through face-to-face interactions between local communities and refugees, tear down stereotypes, open lines of communication and build political support and a sense of belonging.

There are many other examples of civil society groups working throughout Germany to welcome and support refugees. For instance, Seebrücke is an international movement demanding safe routes for refugees and migrants and an end to criminalization of sea rescue.

Sources: See <https://ueberdentellerrand.org/en/>; <https://seebruecke.org/en/start/>.

Kitchen on the Run, a mobile kitchen built in a shipping container, brings together refugees with local community members in Germany. (Über den Tellerrand/Ute Peppersack)



interactions between refugees and host communities using technology, but technology alone is insufficient in overcoming anti-refugee sentiments; meaningful, ongoing interactions are needed to overcome bias, misperceptions and fear of the “other.”

The WRC believes that one of the drivers of xenophobia, in particular, concerning refugees, is the disregard of basic facts: facts about the motivations and impact of refugees. By providing a strong new independent mechanism to serve as a clearing house for academic research and data collection on refugees, the new IPRDP proposed by the WRC will provide a strong evidence base for policy makers in all regions.

Based on the best available evidence, the IPRDP would prepare assessments on all aspects of displacement and its impacts, with a view toward formulating realistic response strategies and ensuring that the system is fit to meet future challenges, including the effects of climate change. IPRDP reports would be impartial with respect to policy and would aim to reflect a range of views and perspectives on the evidence.

In its discussions, the WRC highlighted a number of other ways that the narrative about refugees and IDPs can be improved, including:

- developing messages around refugees that respond to popular fears of host communities and that uphold national and community values;
- leveraging social media and other digital platforms to shift the narrative about refugees away from fear and hatred to acceptance and inclusion;
- providing more opportunities for refugees to speak on their own behalf, supporting more personal interactions between refugees and host communities, and supporting refugee-led organizations (Jones, forthcoming 2019);
- highlighting underpublicized and long-term benefits of refugees in responding to demographic realities (for example, Trines 2017);
- recognizing the contributions of municipal actors and empowering them with the tools and funding necessary to work more effectively;
- promoting opportunities for refugees and members of the host community to get to know each other on a personal level; and
- training and raising awareness of journalists on displacement issues and developing voluntary codes of conduct for the media.



three

STRENGTHENING RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FOR REFUGEES AND IDPs

Over and over again, members of the WRC heard from representatives of countries hosting refugees that they felt unsupported by the international community. For example, the Council heard from Tanzanian officials that they had responded generously to five different waves of refugees but felt abandoned by the international community. As one Tanzanian government representative said, “We have reached a point where we are unwilling to take on more debt to provide for refugees. This should be an international responsibility.” Or, as the Council heard in Amman, “Jordan is the second-poorest country in the world with respect to water per capita, and no amount of international aid will compensate for this. Water supplies were already strained prior to the arrival of the Syrian refugees, and the rapid population growth has put further strain on our water resources.”

Responsibility sharing is certainly one of the greatest weaknesses in the present international refugee regime. There is no binding legal obligation for other states to share the costs associated with receiving refugees, although governments affirmed in the preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention that international cooperation is fundamental to the refugee system. In

fact, a recommendation by the UN Secretary-General in 1950 for inclusion of a specific article on burden sharing in the Convention was rejected at the time by the drafters of the Convention (Goodwin-Gill 2016). Since then, efforts to develop mechanisms for responsibility sharing have been unsuccessful, although there have been good initiatives to respond collectively to specific refugee situations, notably in Indochina and Central America.

The WRC has worked on the principle that maintaining the international refugee regime is a collective responsibility. It is in the interest of all states that there is an effective system through which refugees are protected and assisted. When refugees seek protection in a nearby state, it is not just the responsibility of the receiving state to ensure that they receive the protection and assistance they need. Nor is it solely the responsibility of the receiving state to find solutions for those refugees: this is an international responsibility. Moreover, it is a manageable task if all states provide the necessary support (see Box 3.1). There is no question this support is needed. As the Council heard in Jordan, “We fear that there will be a lost generation of Syrian refugees and that the educational environment for Jordanian children

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BOX 3.1: REFORMING EU ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICY

On June 28, 2018, the European Council adopted conclusions on migration. The Council reconfirmed the need for “more effective control of the EU’s external borders, increased external action and the internal aspects, in line with our principles and values” (para. 1). It concluded that “additional efforts are needed to fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement, prevent new crossings from Turkey and bring flows to a halt.” Additionally, it was decided that “the EU will support, financially and otherwise, all efforts by Member States, especially Spain, and countries of origin and transit, in particular Morocco, to prevent illegal migration” (para. 4).

The European Council recognized the need to eliminate the incentives to embark on dangerous journeys through “a new approach based on shared or complementary actions among the Member States to the disembarkation of those who are saved in Search And Rescue operations” and accordingly called on the Council and Commission to “explore the concept of regional disembarkation platforms, in close cooperation with relevant third countries as well as UNHCR and IOM” (para. 5). The plan is to return irregular migrants and relocate and resettle those who are found to be in need of international protection, “on a voluntary basis, without prejudice to the Dublin reform” (para. 6).

The Council also recognized the need to increase development funding to African countries, in line with Agenda 2063, and to create a new framework enabling a substantial increase of private investment from both Africans and Europeans. It also recognized the need for flexible financing instruments to combat illegal migration, as part of the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The Council concluded that “internal security, integrated border management, asylum and migration funds should therefore include dedicated, significant components for external migration management” (para. 9).

In recognition of the need to ensure effective control of the European Union’s external borders, the Council welcomed “the intention of the Commission to make legislative proposals for a more effective and coherent European return policy” and called on member states to “take all necessary internal legislative and administrative measures to counter [secondary movements of asylum seekers] and to closely cooperate [to this end]” (paras. 11-12).

Source: European Council (2018).

will be negatively affected. Schools were overcrowded before the refugee crisis. To cope, the Ministry of Education has moved from ‘one-shift’ schools to ‘double-shift’ schools for about 200 schools. The government worries about youth becoming radicalized, especially those who are not in school.”

As Peter Sutherland, former UN SRSG for International Migration, said, “Refugees are the responsibility of the world... Proximity doesn’t define responsibility” (Sutherland 2015). Responsibility sharing also means that the states of origin ought to share responsibility, in particular, to be accountable for creating the conditions that cause refugees to flee. A state is not absolved of responsibility for protecting its citizens when they leave the country.

More can and should be done to hold governments accountable for displacement — a theme to which we return in chapter nine on accountability.

This chapter considers responsibility sharing in terms of sharing the costs of responding to — or hosting — refugees when they arrive, as well as of sharing responsibility for finding durable solutions for refugees.

While most discussions of responsibility sharing focus on national authorities, other actors also have responsibilities, including municipal governments, who are often on the front line of responding to refugees; refugee-led organizations; civil society actors; and the private sector (Box 3.2). Similarly, the Council underscores that while much attention focuses

on the role of global actors, regional organizations have important roles to play — both in responding to refugees and in supporting solutions. For example, free movement arrangements within both ECOWAS and Mercosur (the Southern Common Market) make it easier for refugees to move to areas where they can find jobs and integrate into local societies, while other free-movement arrangements do not apply to third-country nationals. At the same time, there are limits on regional cooperation. As a Jordanian government representative told the Council, “The challenge to regional cooperation is that countries need to agree on priorities. It is not easy to get everyone to agree. As a result, there isn’t much regional cooperation on things like water, resettlement, etc.”

CALL TO ACTION

Responsibility Sharing at the International Level

ACTION 6

The WRC calls for the formation of an ad hoc and regionally balanced group of international jurists with the mandate to draft a new protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, on responsibility sharing for refugees. Such a protocol should include a definition of responsibility sharing; a commitment to share responsibility for refugees; a requirement to ensure that all responsibility sharing measures consider the differing specific needs and vulnerabilities, including gender and sexual diversities, of women, girls, men and boys; an agreement on the modalities by which responsibilities could be shared, including financial contributions and resettlement; and other expressions of solidarity, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

The WRC acknowledges that the GCR includes important measures on responsibility sharing. Its final draft proposes regular ministerial-level refugee fora to review implementation of the Compact and take stock of progress toward financial, policy and other pledges, as well as toward platforms for specific refugee situations. These are good initiatives and the Council supports them; our recommendations are intended to complement, support and go beyond these efforts.

While some have argued that responsibility sharing has achieved the status of customary international law, “the more widely-held view is that while the principle of responsibility- or burden-sharing is a critical norm of international refugee law,



Canadians have welcomed some 275,000 refugees since 1979 through a program that has become a model for other countries. (Shutterstock)

BOX 3.2: MODELLING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Unique in the world, Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) Program has allowed Canadian citizens and organizations to offer protection and new homes to more than 275,000 refugees since 1979 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2018). Canadian citizens or residents can sponsor refugees through one of the PSR Programs, as Groups of Five, Community Sponsors or Sponsorship Agreement Holders. As sponsors, they agree to provide financial, emotional and social support to refugees for a one-year period, helping them to find jobs and housing. Beyond aiding in refugees’ resettlement, this model of community sponsorship gives thousands of sponsors a direct familiarity with refugees — not only as vulnerable people in need of help but as individuals who, when given a good start, become engaged citizens. It also creates among sponsors a feeling of engagement and participation in an international human security initiative.

The Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative (GRSI) works to assist and inspire countries around the world to open new pathways for refugee protection by sharing Canada’s experience and leadership in private sponsorship. Working in partnership with the government of Canada, the UNHCR, the Open Society Foundation, the Radcliffe Foundation and the University of Ottawa, the GRSI offers training, public education, community-building activities and advisory services, supporting efforts in other countries to adopt private sponsorship for refugees.

CALL TO ACTION

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

ACTION 7

The WRC urges interested states and other stakeholders to convene a task force to develop a fair, equitable and predictable mechanism for sharing responsibility for refugees. This mechanism should build on initiatives taken by the GCR and elaborate the various specific ways that responsibility should be shared.

it does not impose legally binding obligations on States” (Dowd and McAdam 2017). Unlike the principle of international cooperation — which is mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention — the concept of responsibility or burden sharing to protect refugees is not contained in any international treaty (Garlick 2016).

Even though the present international climate does not seem favourable for introducing new binding treaty obligations, the development of a new protocol would complete the obligations outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and would move the concept of responsibility sharing from a general expectation to a legal obligation. As such, it would further reassure countries on the front line that they will receive the support necessary. Such a legal framework could provide the normative foundation for the development of a specific mechanism to share responsibilities.

Inspiration can be drawn from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which refers to the principle of “common

but differentiated responsibilities” (Wall 2017) and to efforts to use the cap-and-trade climate change model to encourage reduction of carbon emissions. However, “though some developed States have acknowledged the need for greater responsibility-sharing for refugees, they have been reluctant to recognize any concrete obligations on their part” (Dowd and McAdam 2017). And yet, if the system is to be transformed on the basis of equitable sharing of responsibility for refugees, a clear and effective mechanism needs to be put in place.

There have been various efforts by academic researchers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to propose mechanisms by which responsibilities can be equitably apportioned,¹ and which could serve as a basis for development of a new mechanism.

Such a new responsibility sharing mechanism would need to include several components. Effective responsibility sharing must be built on trust — trust that countries in both the

1 See, for example, Dowd and McAdam (2017), Hathaway and Neve (1997). See also Anker, Fitzpatrick and Shacknove (1998) for critical perspectives on these efforts. Several NGOs have developed other sets of criteria for determining what is a “fair share” for assigning responsibility for refugees. Oxfam (2016), for example, examined the fair share contributions of countries with respect to the Syrian refugee crisis. On the European level, the European Union’s Relocation Scheme for Syrian Refugees was based on a distribution key based on four factors: “a country’s population size (given a weight of 40% in the calculation); a country’s GDP (40% weight); the per capita average number of asylum applications received by a country over the previous five years (10% weight); and a country’s level of unemployment (10% weight)” (Grech 2016). A weighted average was then calculated, and an allocation of Syrian refugees was made among the 28 EU member states using this key. Although the EU relocation scheme was not successful — relocating in the end only about 30 percent of the projected numbers of Syrian refugees and being rejected outright by several EU member states — it does offer an example of the way in which such a responsibility sharing mechanism could be developed.

Global North and the Global South will do their part to support refugees. There would need to be agreement on the tools for sharing responsibility, including financial contributions and resettlement places and other actions that alleviate the refugee burden. Presently, some developed countries, such as Japan and Korea, are reluctant to grant asylum or to accept refugees for resettlement, but are generous financial contributors to the UNHCR and host countries. There are also examples of effective collective action to find solutions for refugees and IDPs, such as the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, and the International Conference on Central American Refugees. Increasing possibilities for resettlement of refugees is a concrete way of expressing responsibility sharing.

From the beginning of the refugee regime’s establishment, there was an assumption that humanitarian assistance would be needed for refugees for a short time — until solutions could be found. Either refugees would be given a new home through resettlement (particularly the case for refugees fleeing formerly communist countries) or they

CALL TO ACTION

Increase Refugee Resettlement as an Expression of Responsibility Sharing

ACTION 8

The WRC calls for the resettlement of 10 percent of the world’s refugees every year, including through private sponsorship, and asks interested states and other stakeholders to develop a plan to meet this objective.

would be able to go home once the diplomats had negotiated a peace agreement. Humanitarian aid created breathing room for political actors to do their work, which in turn meant solutions for refugees. Fast forward to the twenty-first century and we see conflicts dragging on, with refugees and IDPs living in limbo for decades and still dependent on humanitarian aid. The diplomats and political leaders have not been able to do their work — either to find lasting resettlement solutions or to resolve conflicts so that people can return home.

Political action is needed to find solutions for refugees and IDPs. The GCR recognizes the need for comprehensive solutions for such situations, but the WRC believes more needs to be done — to support voluntary repatriation, local integration and the resettlement of refugees to third countries. Resettlement for IDPs living in protracted situations has never been considered as a potential solution, but given the large number of IDPs who have been displaced for over a decade (Kälin and Chapuisat 2017), this view needs to change.²

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REFUGEES ARE THE
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PROXIMITY
DOESN'T DEFINE
RESPONSIBILITY.

—PETER
SUTHERLAND (2015)

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2 Note that the United States defines refugees to include those still in their countries of origin who would be refugees if they crossed an international border. This definition is the mechanism through which the United States carried out in-country processing of refugees and, thus, there is no reason why IDPs couldn't qualify for resettlement through that provision of law. As the United States resettled Vietnamese refugees from re-education camps in Vietnam in years past, there is even precedent for resettling IDPs.



four

STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF IDPs

People who have been *internally* displaced make up almost two-thirds of the more than 68 million people displaced by conflict in the world, and their number has nearly doubled since 2000. As they remain closer to the violence that displaced them, IDPs face significant difficulties in finding security and receiving assistance. Access by international agencies is often problematic, as governments and non-state actors in places such as Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, Myanmar and others restrict the operations of aid agencies in areas of internal conflict (Box 4.1). Under international law, it is the responsibility of national governments to protect and assist those displaced within their borders — even when those governments have directly or indirectly caused their displacement. Moreover, most of the world’s IDPs are in protracted displacement, which not only affects displaced persons but also their host communities. “Most IDPs today live outside camps or collective shelters in informal settlements or with host families in poor parts of urban areas where they compete with local populations over basic services and face difficulties to access livelihoods” (Kälin, forthcoming 2019, 1).

Although systematic data is lacking (Internal Displacement Monitoring

Centre 2017), the relationship between internal and cross-border displacement seems intuitive. In its report *Women on the Run*, the UNHCR (2015, 5) found that 69 percent of the Central American women they interviewed were first displaced within their own countries before they sought protection in the United States. Further, when refugees are returned to their countries but unable to return to their own communities, they become IDPs. As a participant stated in the WRC’s meeting in Amman, “We can’t advocate for [Syrian] refugees to return to Syria only to [have them] become IDPs.”

While there is a legally binding convention for refugees and a single designated UN agency mandated to protect and assist them, IDP-related governance is “scattered and weak” (Kälin, forthcoming 2019). At the normative level, the UN *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* are an important — but non-binding — international framework. Although more than 40 countries have adopted laws or policies on internal displacement (Box 4.2), only a third of those laws and policies have been implemented (Orchard, forthcoming 2019).

Within the United Nations, the issue of internal displacement has no formal institutional home: there is no

Opposite page:
AP Photo.

CALLS TO ACTION

Building Political Will at the Local, National and International Levels

ACTION 9

The WRC calls on the UN Secretary-General to name a special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on internal displacement, to be charged with coordinating international responses to internal displacement among humanitarian, development, and peace and security actors and with engaging in high-level political dialogue with affected states.

ACTION 10

The WRC further calls on this SRSG to convene a global summit on internal displacement; review current institutional shortcomings in international response to IDPs; and recommend ways of addressing those shortcomings. The review should evaluate existing coordination mechanisms, funding and agency mandates, and consider ways to support states to find solutions to protracted displacement.

ACTION 11

The WRC calls on donors to respond to existing requests for funding that directly affect IDPs, with special attention to those that would enhance protection and provide for basic needs. In the same vein, the WRC urges development actors to integrate IDPs into each of the specific goals of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and to more fully account for the situation of IDPs in their financing of programs to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

ACTION 12

The WRC calls on UN agencies and, in particular, the UNHCR, to ensure that its funding requests are commensurate with the needs of IDPs.

ACTION 13

The WRC encourages the IOM to adopt a human rights and protection-oriented focus in its work with IDPs and, if necessary, to develop the capacity to implement a human rights approach.

ACTION 14

The WRC calls on interested states and other stakeholders to ensure that internal displacement remains on the international agenda and to regularly review progress made by the international community in strengthening its response to and financial support for IDPs.

Iraqi refugees return from Egypt in 2008 after years of exile. Many refugees are unable to go back to their own communities when they return to their countries. (AP Photo/Karim Kadim)



BOX 4.1: DISPLACEMENT IN YEMEN

The escalation of conflict in Yemen in March 2015 has led to widespread suffering. ACAPS (the Assessment Capacities Project), an organization with a mission to provide neutral and independent analysis of the humanitarian situation through worldwide monitoring of all humanitarian sectors and all types of crises, reports on its website that as of mid-2018, 17.8 million people — about 61 percent of the country's population — were considered to be food insecure, including 8.4 million who were severely so. UN projections, as reported by ACAPS, indicate that additional people could be at risk by the end of 2018. Yemen ordinarily imports 55 percent of its food for consumption but conflict, port restrictions and infrastructure destruction have severely limited imports. At the same time, the conflict has led to lower agricultural production, resulting in high food prices and widespread food shortages.

More than two million people are internally displaced, and displacement is becoming increasingly protracted as an estimated 89 percent of the IDPs have been displaced for over a year. Women and children comprise 76 percent of IDPs. Over 130,000 people were displaced between December 2017 and May 2018, with another 121,000 people displaced between June and July 2018.

International assistance to civilians is impeded by insecurity, checkpoints, import and visa restrictions, fuel shortages and the reluctance of transporters to access volatile areas. Fighting and air strikes limit civilians' ability to access humanitarian assistance. Medical facilities and health workers are being targeted in the conflict. More than 1.2 million people in need are located in the most inaccessible areas of Yemen and an additional eight million are in areas where humanitarians regularly face access obstacles.

Source: Reported figures as of November 5, 2018; see “Crisis Analysis — Yemen,” www.acaps.org/country/yemen/crisis-analysis.

organization or agency with an explicit mandate to protect and assist IDPs. No coherent processes exist where internal displacement issues can be regularly discussed and decided among member states as in other areas of UN activities. While the cluster system of the United Nations' Inter-Agency Standing Committee has contributed to a more predictable and coherent humanitarian response to IDPs, particularly in emergency situations, it is ill-equipped to effectively address serious protection issues and to find durable solutions that require development rather than humanitarian assistance (Kälin, forthcoming 2019, 1-2; Ferris 2014b).

In addition to a much less clear and predictable response mechanism, IDPs receive far less funding than refugees, likely due to the fact that international agencies working with IDPs, such as the UNHCR, have broader mandates.

Although the UNHCR has set up complex mechanisms for its framework

for refugee response, the United Nations' CRRF (including pilot-testing programs in more than 10 countries), no such attention has been directed toward the far larger number of IDPs. More international attention is needed to bring about focused action on internal displacement, and efforts are underway to do so in light of the twentieth anniversary of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (UN OHCHR 2018b).

Internal displacement also requires more than humanitarian action; people displaced within the borders of their own countries pose development challenges and, particularly when they are displaced for long periods of time, need to be incorporated into national and local development plans. IDPs are a challenge for peace and security actors and, as discussed further below, there is presently no mechanism for bringing together peacemaking and humanitarian actors to resolve displacement. The important mandate

of the special rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs is a voluntary position not sufficiently equipped to play the key advocacy role necessary to make progress. The cluster system has improved coordination of assistance to IDPs, but it remains an unwieldy system with decidedly mixed results in different countries, often reflecting both the particular political context and the personal skills and commitments of the lead agency representatives.

A Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Internal Displacement

As a first step, the UN Secretary-General should name a special representative to provide high-level political coordination between the multiple UN agencies presently working with IDPs and to coordinate actions with other important actors, such as multilateral development banks, regional organizations, the

BOX 4.2: A LONG HISTORY OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA

Colombia, with over six million IDPs, ranks second in the world in number of IDPs, surpassed only by Syria. Unlike other countries experiencing large-scale internal displacement, Colombia has a strong legal tradition of laws and policies with respect to internal displacement, and over the years it has developed a rich body of jurisprudence. Its first law on IDPs was adopted in 1997, even before the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* were finalized. In 2004, the Constitutional Court passed decision T-025 in response to petitions by IDPs themselves, declaring that “the fundamental human rights of the country’s internally displaced persons were being disregarded in such a massive, protracted, and repeated manner that an ‘unconstitutional state of affairs’ had arisen” (cited in Ferris 2014a, 18). The Court issued follow-up orders in subsequent years, requiring institutions to provide evidence that they were taking steps to ensure the adequate allocation of resources, and undertaking timely institutional restructuring to guarantee that adequate services were provided to IDPs, as outlined by law.

In 2011, the Victims and Land Restitution Law was approved. The “Victims Law,” as it is colloquially called, recognizes for the first time the presence of an internal armed conflict and attempts to provide reparations for its victims — including IDPs. This law led to the creation of a new institutional system for responding to the victims of Colombia’s internal conflict. In 2014, there were some 52 national governmental entities involved in the process of assistance, protection and reparations to the displaced (Ferris 2014b, 19-21).

A Colombia soldier guards a health centre at a camp for internally displaced people fleeing violence in Pavarandó, Colombia. (AP Photo/Ricardo Mazalan)



private sector and civil society. The SRSG, in cooperation with interested states and other stakeholders, should convene a UN summit on internal displacement. The summit would bring together UN and non-UN actors whose expertise is needed, including UN departments on peacekeeping and the World Bank, to negotiate a global compact on internal displacement that further spells out the responsibilities of not only national authorities but also international and regional actors in support of national efforts. While such an appointment could both increase the visibility of IDPs at the international level and promote joint action, steps should also be taken to consider other needed systemic changes, such as:

- updating the mandate of the UNHCR to include IDPs on an equal footing with refugees;
- establishing a new international organization with specific responsibilities for protecting and assisting IDPs, where needed; or
- revitalizing the cluster system to be more effective with regard to internal displacement.

Addressing Inequities in Funding and Mandates of IDP Programs

The disparity in funding between programs for refugees and IDPs is striking, as these recent UN numbers illustrate:

- Although the number of IDPs was more than twice the number of refugees, only 15 percent of the funds requested by the UNHCR were intended for IDPs.
- The difference between funding for IDPs and refugees varies considerably by region. In Africa in 2016, for example, the UNHCR’s budget for Pillar 1 (refugees) was

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\$2,181,388, of which 53 percent, or \$1,148,812, was received. Funding for Pillar 4 (IDPs) was \$329,344, of which 35 percent, or \$113,855, was received.

- In other words, IDP funding was 15 percent of the total request and eight percent of the funds received.
- By the end of 2016, there were 5.1 million refugees and 11 million IDPs in Africa who were protected/assisted by the UNHCR.
- In Syria, the UNHCR's June 2018 appeal includes \$388.5 million for refugees in neighbouring countries, and \$64 million for IDPs — although the number of Syrian IDPs is slightly higher than the number of refugees.¹

It is difficult to draw exact comparisons between the financial needs of

refugees and IDPs; for example, it may be that fewer funds are needed for IDPs because, unlike refugees, they should have unrestricted access to state-provided education and health services. At the same time, UNHCR appeals for refugee funding do not include all of the contributions made by host countries.

There may also be practical challenges. Sometimes international agencies simply do not have access to IDPs — and thus no way to responsibly spend funds. As well, sometimes to support IDPs means channelling funds through the government that is causing the displacement. On a more technical level, it is also difficult to track financial expenditures for IDPs in the humanitarian appeals and financial tracking mechanisms of the UNHCR, the IOM and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

At the core, however, are mandate issues. While the UNHCR has a mandate to work with refugees in all aspects and through all stages of displacement, its responsibility for

IDPs is limited to the sectors in which it is assigned a lead role — protection, shelter and camp management. Other agencies are responsible for key areas of health and education. Unlike in refugee situations, the UNHCR does not step in to encourage or fund other agencies to fulfill these responsibilities toward IDPs. When funds are tight, programs for IDPs are often cut before programs for refugees. Refugees, not IDPs, are, after all, the UNHCR's core mandate. There are other international actors working with IDPs whose efforts need to be supported and their coordination strengthened, such as the OCHA and the IOM; the latter has emerged as a major operational agency working with IDPs, although its programs are dependent on project-specific funding from donors.

If the mandates of agencies are not changed, then it will fall to donors to play the key role in assuring adequate funding for IDPs.

¹ Figures on numbers of IDPs and refugees are from UNHCR (2018b); figures on funding for African refugees and IDPs are from UNGA (2017, Tables I.11 and I.12). Figures for Syria are from UNHCR (2018d). (All values in US dollars.)



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TRANSFORMING GOVERNANCE FOR REFUGEES AND IDPs

The modern refugee regime was created to respond to the consequences of World War II in Europe, which left some 55 million people displaced (Loescher 2001). Today, the refugee regime consists of a strong normative framework — the 1951 Refugee Convention — as well as a UN agency charged with protecting and assisting refugees (the UNHCR) and a state-based governance structure for the regime.¹ Yet, the regime itself has come under serious stress in recent years and the existing international structures need to be strengthened. Regional organizations also have the potential to play a more important role in the refugee regime and should be encouraged — or pushed, if necessary — to do so. The efforts of other actors at the international level — including those working on development, peace and security, and broader migration issues — need to be more effectively coordinated to ensure a more coherent response to challenges facing refugees and IDPs.

CALLS TO ACTION

Strengthen and Expand Institutions

ACTION 15

The WRC calls on member states of the United Nations to support efforts toward strengthening the capacity of the international organizations responsible for refugees and displaced persons, including the UNHCR, the IOM, the UNRWA, the OCHA and their implementing partners.

ACTION 16

The WRC calls on both the UNHCR (for refugees) and humanitarian organization clusters (for IDPs) to review their mechanisms for including refugees and IDPs, civil society organizations and the private sector in their work. Similarly, the Council calls on the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the UNHCR's Executive Committee to ensure that they include representation from refugees, just as they include representation from NGOs. Diverse representation from displaced communities is needed to avoid reinforcing pre-existing harmful power dynamics.

Opposite page:
AP Photo/Peter J.
Carroll.

¹ For more discussion of the refugee regime, see Milner and Betts (forthcoming, 2019), as well as the WRC's interim report (WRC Secretariat 2018).

Strengthening the Existing Refugee Regime

Established in 1958, the UNHCR's Executive Committee has grown from 29 members to 102. While refraining from suggesting changes to the UNHCR's governance structure, the WRC observes that this body has become unwieldy. As is often the case when governing bodies become larger and more inclusive, decision making may move to smaller, less transparent fora. Some of the recommendations made elsewhere in this report — such as improvements in the funding mechanisms for the UNHCR (chapter seven) — will strengthen the agency.

Responsibility for refugees is fundamentally a state responsibility, and states often need support to carry out their responsibilities. The GCR's proposal to establish an asylum capacity support group (UN 2018, para. 62) to provide technical expertise and staff as needed by states, particularly when they are confronted with a mass influx, is welcome. Some have suggested the establishment of a centre for excellence to provide ongoing training and support for governments — with a strong focus on protection and on coordinating whole-of-society approaches — which would also be a welcome development. While responsibility for refugees is fundamentally a state responsibility, there is also a need for multi-stakeholder engagement, including refugees, municipal authorities, civil society and the private sector. Similarly, efforts to develop a robust climate regime have involved associations of municipal authorities, who have developed good practices for their cities and are sharing these with other cities in these networks/associations. As the GCR foresees the engagement of these actors in the proposed global and regional mechanisms, they should be supported.

CALLS TO ACTION

Tapping the Potential of Regional Organizations

ACTION 17

The WRC calls on regional organizations at all levels to take the lead in developing robust consultative mechanisms with refugees, IDPs, civil society organizations, municipalities and the private sector.

ACTION 18

The WRC calls on regional organizations to increase their monitoring of potential displacement situations; develop the capacity to support governments in the region when displacement occurs; and play a central convening role, by bringing together governments of countries of origin and receiving countries, to develop solutions for refugees.

ACTION 19

The WRC calls on regional organizations to establish consultative processes as well as peer review and peer support mechanisms to hold members accountable for their response to refugees and IDPs. The Council further calls on donor governments to support regional and local capacity-building initiatives in this regard, including the support of sanctuary, welcoming and solidarity cities around the world.

As well, the meaningful participation of young people and women should be assured in these mechanisms.

Outcomes for refugees and displaced populations are increasingly shaped by politics in policy fields that fall outside the scope of the refugee regime. Over the past 50 years, international institutions have proliferated, many of which overlap in scope and purpose with the refugee regime. For example, outcomes for refugees are shaped by decisions made within regimes relating to travel, labour, human rights, humanitarianism, development and security, each of which may claim authority over certain aspects of refugee movements (Betts 2010).

Because refugee movements occur primarily within regions, regional organizations have a potentially large role to play in acting to prevent displacement; in supporting their members in responding to displacement, when it does occur;

and in finding enduring solutions for displaced people. It is in the interests of regional organizations that refugee and IDP flows not become a threat to regional peace and security. Article 52 of the UN Charter, for example, makes it clear that regional initiatives to ensure peace and security should be used first — before bringing issues to the UN Security Council (UN 1945, art. 52). However, the engagement of regional organizations on displacement issues has been, at best, uneven.

Some regional organizations have played an important role in developing normative standards for displacement; in Africa, the Organisation of African Unity developed a definition of refugees in 1969 that was broader than that contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention and later developed the first binding regional treaty on internal displacement, the Kampala Convention, which entered into force in 2012. Regional organizations

in Latin America played similarly important roles in developing normative standards (for example, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees) and collective regional responses to displacement crises in Central America (the International Conference on Central American Refugees) and today in Venezuela. Efforts to develop a collective approach to Venezuela's massive displacement crisis received a boost with the appointment of WRC councillor Eduardo Stein as a Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants by the UNHCR and IOM. Some sub-regional groups — such as ECOWAS and Mercosur — have enacted agreements providing for free movement of people, which contributes, albeit indirectly, to finding solutions for refugees, while others have played leadership roles in attempting to negotiate an end to the conflicts that displace people, such as IGAD's efforts in Somalia.

There are significant differences between regional organizations in terms of their priorities, capacities and internal political dynamics. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), although it played a critical intermediary role between the international community and the Myanmar government in the 2008 aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, has eschewed involvement in controversial issues in the region. Most regional organizations rely on external financial support. Although all have touched on refugee issues — for example, by sending missions to particular refugee hotspots — they have yet to play a significant role in mobilizing assistance to refugees² (and virtually none to IDPs) (Zyck 2013).

2 Note, however, that the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has announced plans to support, in collaboration with the Islamic Development Bank, a fund to support Palestinian refugees (Emirates News Agency 2018).

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IN A CRISIS, TIMELY
INTERVENTION BY
FRIENDS OR PEERS
CAN SERVE TO
AVERT ESCALATION
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In the Middle East, for example, the Arab League, the OIC and the Gulf Cooperation Council all have the potential to play more active roles in refugee response, not only in mobilizing financial support, but also in encouraging dialogue between countries of origin and refugee-hosting countries. Generally, in terms of humanitarian engagement, regional organizations have been more likely to coordinate regional efforts in disaster risk reduction than in the more politically fraught displacement context. Although most regional organizations have developed memoranda of understanding with the UNHCR, these agreements seem to be formalities rather than entry points for coordinated efforts.

Setting regional standards on displacement is an important contribution, especially when it leads to more action on the national level (Kneebone 2016). However, while regional organizations would seem to be well placed to respond to refugee situations occurring in their regions, they generally lack the capacity to do so.

In a crisis, timely intervention by friends or peers can serve to avert escalation and outbreak of violence. Independent organizations, such as The Elders and the Global Leadership Foundation, use this model to help political leaders avoid crises that would otherwise destabilize societies and result in conflict. Former global leaders may meet privately with political leaders to help them think through alternative approaches to crises, or they may issue public statements encouraging those leaders to make constructive decisions. They may also act as intermediaries between political antagonists or between governments and their people.

Crises of displacement usually do not erupt overnight. They are often the result of a long-simmering period in which the government makes a number of decisions that may either stem social turbulence or increase it. Timely consultation and feedback by a set of former leaders, some of whom faced similar challenges while in power, may help current political leaders avoid decisions that could result in social turmoil and mass displacement.

CALLS TO ACTION

Bridging the Humanitarian-Peacemaking Divide

ACTION 20

The WRC encourages groups such as The Elders, the Global Leadership Foundation, the InterAction Council and the Aspen Global Leadership Network to continue to view potential displacement as a cause for concern and to prompt action, whether in private consultation with political leaders or in more public venues. The Council also supports the creation of an independent panel of former leaders whose principal focus would be to identify and engage with developing crises that may lead to mass displacement.

ACTION 21

The WRC recommends that academic and policy researchers create a displacement assessment tool for application in conflict and potential conflict situations, to assess the human and other costs that are likely to occur if a conflict erupts or continues. This assessment could enable all potential parties to a conflict to understand the consequences of their actions and could encourage donors to intervene to prevent conflicts. Efforts should be made within the assessment to ensure that the gendered and age-related impacts are effectively identified.

ACTION 22

The WRC advises interested states and other stakeholders to develop concrete measures, aligned with their national action plans on women, peace and security as urged in (UN Security Council Resolution 1325) and on youth, peace and security (UN Security Council Resolution 2250), to:

- increase donor support to civil society organizations (including women's groups, youth groups, faith leaders and the private sector) and national human rights institutions working on conflict prevention and peace building;
- develop opportunities for increased interactions between peace-making and humanitarian actors; and
- support the development of regional organizations' capacity to prevent conflict and strengthen rule of law and reform of the security sector at the national and municipal levels.

ACTION 23

The WRC calls on the UN Security Council to include displacement as a standing item on its agenda and designate one of the elected members with the responsibility for carrying this forward.

UN peacekeepers from Rwanda await members of the UN Security Council during a visit to South Sudan. (AP Photo/Justin Lynch)





Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu played a key role in the Guatemalan peace process, a rare example of internally displaced people and refugees being involved in such negotiations. (AP Photo/Scott Sady)

While humanitarian agencies have generally done an excellent job in responding to the immediate needs of refugees and, in many cases, IDPs, their work is often carried out in isolation from others working on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building. Unlike the progress in closing the humanitarian-development gap, there has been little progress in overcoming the divide between humanitarian and political — or peace — actors. While humanitarian agencies need to be politically aware, they are constrained from overt political activity by the principles of neutrality and independence that provide them some protection and credibility in difficult operating environments.

Yet, the intersections between peace and displacement are many. While they obviously have a strong interest in peace processes, refugees have rarely been included in track 1.0 peace negotiations, the major exceptions being Liberia and Guatemala, where refugees played an important role.

BOX 5.1: REFUGEES, IDPs AND PEACE PROCESSES

There are few examples where refugees or IDPs have been directly involved in peace processes. An exception was the Guatemalan peace process where Guatemalan refugees, organized in Permanent Commissions (*Comisiones Permanentes*), sought and achieved a place at the negotiating table. Beginning in 1987, these Permanent Commissions presented their demands to the negotiators and were successful in seeing their concerns incorporated into the accord of October 8, 1992, signed between the Commissions and the Guatemalan government. In addition to reaffirming basic constitutional rights, the Accord met the Commissions demands for mechanisms to ensure the return of their lands. In January 1993, the first group of refugees returned to the country under the leadership of the Permanent Commissions. Over a three-year period, a total of 11 separate peace accords were negotiated with the Permanent Commissions serving to represent refugees' (and to a lesser extent, IDPs') interests.

While there are few examples of refugees and IDPs participating in track 1.0 peace negotiations, there are a few more cases where refugees and IDPs have participated in track 2.0 peacemaking initiatives. For example, during the Liberian peace process, women's organizations were influential in raising concerns of displaced populations in the peace process. In another example, IDP organizations in Georgia worked closely with women's groups in track 2.0 peace processes, especially with the Coalition of Women's NGOs of Georgia and Women's Unity for Peace.

Source: Brookings-Bern Project (2007, 19, 22)

“ WOMEN AND GIRL REFUGEES AND IDPs FACE DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION AND EXCLUSION FROM TRADITIONAL PEACE PROCESSES ”

When peace agreements refer to refugees (as in agreements for Burundi, Guatemala, Georgia; see Box 5.1), they usually call for facilitating the return of refugees in general terms. In addition, women's participation in peace processes remains a critical challenge, as women often lack access to the capacity building and support needed to effectively engage, which all too often results in tokenistic participation of women in peace talks and post-conflict reconciliation processes. Women and girl refugees and IDPs face double discrimination and exclusion from traditional peace processes, due to gender and their displaced person status. At the same time, refugees can be spoilers in the peace process if their concerns are not addressed properly. Refugee returns can create tensions that can exacerbate conflicts, as returns may be perceived as undoing the territorial gains of a particular group and often cause disputes over housing, land and property, because refugees' property may be occupied by others (Brookings-Bern Project 2007).

There are also opportunities for those working with refugees to

engage more closely with other UN processes focused on peace and security concerns. In particular, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security are directly relevant to preventing and resolving the conflicts that cause displacement.³

Security for returnees is paramount, as the Zaatari camp elders told the Council in Jordan. The UN peacekeepers and human rights monitors can be essential to voluntary repatriation, in particular around issues such as the presence of armed groups; the proliferation of weapons, landmines and unexploded ordnance; the lack of political stability and rule of law; and broader issues around security and justice sector reforms, including police and judiciary. Even when relative peace and security is in place, refugee women and girls and people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities may still not be

safe, due to the specific risks they face even in times of peace. This reality, coupled with weak justice systems, means that these returnees may be unable to seek justice or protection from the risks that they face. The presence of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) can encourage refugees to return and provide security to them when they do. Citing studies showing that the presence of PKOs prevents conflicts from recurring, the Better World Campaign found that in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, PKOs had a definite positive impact on displacement, while in the Central African Republic, high levels of violence persist; in South Sudan, displacement has actually *increased* in spite of robust engagement of peacekeepers (Better World Campaign 2017).

Much less attention has been devoted to the relationship between security sector reform and refugee returns, although effective local policing is likely to be as important as PKOs to returnees (Miller and Ferris 2015). Several peace-building measures are particularly relevant to returns: establishing security through

³ See www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/ and www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm, respectively.

demobilization, demining and rule of law; solving property-related issues (reconstruction; restitution/compensation for housing, land and property); furthering reconciliation between communities; post-conflict reconstruction and restoration of infrastructure; political transition; and transitional justice measures.

In addition, regional and sub-regional organizations have vital roles to play in this regard, as evidenced by the Organization of American States' actions with respect to Venezuela and the AU's efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as IGAD's initiatives to deploy forces in support of the Somali government and to spearhead negotiations intended to lead to an eventual peace agreement in the case of Somalia.

However, the United Nations' humanitarian, development, peace-building and PKO initiatives are largely carried out in silos (in spite of regular meetings convened by the United Nations on specific situations in which different actors are invited to contribute from their areas of expertise). Further, within governments, academic institutions and international NGOs, different departments are

responsible for following — and supporting — different tracks of the work. The WRC notes that major reform efforts are underway at the United Nations on management, development and peacekeeping, which seek to overcome these divisions. As such, there is a critical opportunity to enact the reforms suggested in the report to more effectively address the challenges around refugees and IDPs.

The international migration regime is very different from the refugee regime. While there is a convention on migrant workers, it has not yet been ratified by major migrant-receiving countries, although human rights law and International Labour Organization conventions provide a solid basis for upholding the rights of migrants. Even within the UN system, there is no common definition of “migrant,” and a multitude of actors are engaged with migration. The IOM is the only UN agency with a mandate focused exclusively on migrants, but its mandate does not include legal protection, solutions, or development of international law or normative standards (Goodwin-Gill 2016).

The New York Declaration called for a state-led process to develop guidelines on responding to migrants in vulnerable situations, but this call has not (as of now) been taken up by states. This is a tricky area, beginning with the

difficulty in defining vulnerability. The United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), for example, has argued that all migrants in irregular situations are vulnerable (UN OHCHR 2016), which of course is true but not particularly helpful in providing policy guidance for states. The GCM refers to “situations of vulnerability arising from the circumstances in which they travel or the conditions they face in countries of origin, transit, and destination” (UNHCR 2018e, para. 23).

Forced migrants, vulnerable migrants, crisis migrants, survival migrants, environmental migrants — all are terms that have been used to refer to people who may not meet the definition of refugee but are in need of protection. This gap needs to be addressed. The IOM appears to be the UN agency most likely to have the interest and capabilities to play a leadership role in this regard. For example, the organization convened states to develop the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, which provides technical support and training on how to prepare for and respond to situations in which the countries in which migrants are living are caught in conflicts and natural disasters. The IOM could play a similar role in developing guidelines for migrants who are not refugees but have specific protection needs.

CALL TO ACTION

Overcoming the Refugee-Migration Gap

ACTION 24

The WRC urges the IOM, in collaboration with other relevant agencies, to develop guidelines and criteria for protecting and assisting migrants who, in different ways, fall through the cracks of the present regimes, for example, children, those in transit and survivors of trafficking.

Migrants who fall through the cracks of the present regimes, which include children, those in transit and survivors of trafficking, must be protected. (AP Photo/Martin Nangle)





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BUILDING A SOLID FINANCIAL BASE

The present financial base for responding to refugees is inadequate. There is a need not only to increase the funds available to UN agencies and others working with refugees, but also to revisit the way that present funds are spent. Given the financial realities and the fact that protracted displacement has become the norm, much more emphasis needs to be placed on supporting refugees to

become self-reliant. And, as will be explored in a later chapter, more innovative measures for supporting host countries and agencies working with refugees need to be adopted.

There is not enough money to meet the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees and IDPs. Simply put: more funds are needed. Although the total volume of humanitarian contributions has increased in recent years — from

CALLS TO ACTION

Increase Funding for Refugees

ACTION 25

The WRC calls on international agencies to increase their support for capacity-building in host governments at the national, state and municipal levels to administer funds, and to incorporate a focus on collective outcomes in their programming and reporting.

ACTION 26

The WRC calls on donors to increase their funding of the UNHCR to the level needed to reduce the agency's funding gap — in 2017 at 43.3 percent — to less than 10 percent by 2030.

ACTION 27

The WRC calls on regional development banks to provide more concessional financial support to countries hosting refugees and IDPs. While the World Bank has taken important steps toward increasing its support for countries hosting refugees, there is an important role for regional development banks as well.

Opposite page:
AP Photo/Lisa
Rathke.

TABLE 6.1: TOTAL HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

YEAR	AMOUNT REQUESTED (US\$)	AMOUNT RECEIVED (US\$)	PERCENTAGE FUNDED
2010	11,254,500,000	7,247,898,000	64.4
2011	8,917,500,000	5,742,870,000	64.4
2012	9,248,800,000	5,808,246,400	62.8
2013	12,839,300,000	8,217,152,000	64.9
2014	18,049,200,000	11,010,012,000	61.0
2015	19,334,800,000	10,808,153,200	55.9
2016	19,734,500,500	11,840,700,300	60.0
2017	23,574,500,000	14,238,998,000	60.4

Data source: OCHA (2018).

US\$11.3 billion in 2010 to US\$25.4 billion in 2018 — the fact is that humanitarian needs are rising faster than contributions. Responses to UN humanitarian appeals have fairly consistently remained in the 60–65 percent range (Table 6.1). In the case of the UNHCR in particular, in 2017, 43.3 percent of its budget was not funded in 2017 (UNHCR 2018a). If the international community cannot prevent or resolve conflicts, then it must be prepared to donate more funds to care for the human beings who are victims of these conflicts.

The funds that are available for refugees and IDPs are not distributed equitably — and often not transparently. Disparities are evident between the amount of funds requested and received in different emergencies. Emergencies with high media coverage in the Western world receive a higher percentage of funds than those with less media exposure. The UNHCR appears to spend about half the amount on IDPs as it does on refugees — even though it is presently working with more IDPs than refugees. Allocation of funds should be based on need and donors should provide funds with fewer earmarks

to enable humanitarian agencies to determine where funding should be allocated. Moreover, reporting on financing is presently focused on the percentages funded by appeals rather than on the outcomes of spending. For example, while humanitarian agencies routinely report on the amount of food delivered, they do not generally report on outcomes, such as nutrition and health. There is also considerable variation by region, with wildly different amounts spent per refugee in different situations. Concrete efforts should be made to support refugee-led organizations, which are in a unique position to assess needs in their communities and to develop sustainable programs.

Most humanitarian funds are spent in responding to new emergencies or to maintaining old caseloads of refugees; relatively little goes into preventive or preparedness activities. Further, according to Development Initiatives’ *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018*, 86 percent of the funds went to medium-term and long-term situations (Urquhart and Tuchel 2018, 22); 60 percent went to multilateral agencies, while only 2.5 percent went directly to national governments, and

0.04 percent went directly to national and local NGOs (ibid., 11, 51).

Moreover, the present funding model is unsustainable. Originally intended as short-term relief, today humanitarian funds are used to assist refugees for years — too often, for decades. Yet, there is little multi-year funding available, so it is difficult to plan for longer-term needs and opportunities.

Most humanitarian funding is used to support care and maintenance of refugees who have been displaced for a long time. A fundamental reorientation is needed in the way in which humanitarian funds are mobilized and spent, to move away from care and maintenance, and toward supporting refugee self-reliance and empowerment and the development of countries hosting refugees.¹

Important work has been done in this regard that needs to be replicated and scaled up (Refuge Point 2018; Women’s Refugee Commission 2018). Countries hosting refugees need to be supported in their own development aspirations. Accordingly, the orientation of funding appeals needs to change. Rather than being asked to contribute to supporting refugees indefinitely, donors need to perceive that they are contributing to solutions and that there is an achievable objective in sight.² Win-win outcomes need to be the basis for sustainable funding.

In this regard, it is important to note that refugees and IDPs themselves are contributors to economies, not just an economic burden. In Turkey,

1 Note that transformative research is already taking place on issues of refugee economies (Betts et al. 2017).

2 A lesson may be drawn from appeals for climate change funding, where contributions are sought to achieve a measurable outcome, for example, the reduction of carbon emissions by a specific amount within a time frame.

CALLS TO ACTION

Supporting Refugee Self-reliance

ACTION 28

The WRC calls on international agencies, donor governments and NGOs to reorient existing care and maintenance programs toward supporting self-reliance and empowerment of refugees, including development of indicators and scaling up the small existing programs. In recognition of the key role played by remittances from migrants overseas, such programs should include financial literacy to ensure that both senders and receivers of remittances are able to optimize these resources.

ACTION 29

The WRC calls on refugee-hosting governments, with the support of incentives from the donor community, to remove regulatory barriers on refugee labour that prevent refugees from exercising their rights to work and freedom of movement.

ACTION 30

The WRC calls on donor countries to invest in more quantitative research, including more longitudinal studies, to understand the short-, medium- and longer-term impacts of remittances on displacement. This investment would improve the evidence base regarding the flow of remittances to refugees, IDPs and their families at home.

ACTION 31

The WRC calls on governments of both donor and host countries to review and revise regulations regarding financial transfers to ensure that families are able to receive remittances in conflict- and terrorism-affected countries.

ACTION 32

The WRC calls on donor governments to channel at least 10 percent of their funding for refugee programs directly to refugee-led organizations by 2030.

ACTION 33

The WRC calls on international and regional organizations, think tanks and universities to commission research to measure the economic and social impact of refugees and IDPs, including the differential impact of the presence of refugees in different parts of the countries, including cities.

Syrians have established 6,000 formal businesses; when both formal and informal businesses are included, estimates jump to between 10,000 and 20,000 Syrian businesses (Karasapan 2017). These enterprises provide 100,000 jobs to both refugees and Turks (Anadolu Agency 2017). Even when refugees are not able to work legally in the formal sector, they work in the underground economy, contributing to the development of their communities. These resources are generally not counted in calculating the costs of refugees to the host community. If more refugees were allowed to get work permits and work

legally, it is likely that they would be able to contribute even more to the economy and cover more of their own costs. As Manyang Reath Kher, a social entrepreneur and former refugee who arrived in the United States 10 years ago and is working to raise awareness of refugees' economic contributions, states, "We need to allow refugees to work. There's currently no guarantee that you have the right to start a business, even if you have the money. Some people have resources and they've been displaced by war but have the means to start a business. We need to give them opportunities to do so."

Finally, the effect of humanitarian aid on the local economy must be taken into consideration when looking at the costs of hosting refugees. The impact of refugees on the host economy is uneven; while the pressure of refugees on government services is usually considerable, large humanitarian operations provide a boost to local retailers, the housing market and the construction sector. More research is needed to understand the economic impact of refugees and IDPs, including the benefits they bring and the impact of their presence on particular sectors of the economy.



A former Afghan refugee makes and sells dresses at her clothing shop in Kabul. The dresses are made from burqas once mandatory under the Taliban regime. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)

Remittances are a major source of funding for millions of households worldwide. The World Bank estimates that total remittances in 2017 amounted to US\$613 billion, with US\$429 million going to low- and mid-income countries (Ratha et al. 2018). Remittance flows are far larger than official development and humanitarian aid, and in some countries, they exceed direct foreign investment and trade flows. Among the recipients are refugees and IDPs, as well as individuals who remain in their home communities and whose family members are working elsewhere. In some cases, the remittances come from families in the source countries, who send funds to those who have crossed into other countries but are unable to work legally and have inadequate aid. Other remittances come from relatives who have been resettled or otherwise moved to wealthier countries. Still

other remittance support comes in the form of collective donations from diaspora members. Unfortunately, estimates are not available of the amount of money that goes to support refugees, IDPs and their families at home. Case studies, however, point to the important role played by remittances in providing basic support as well as opportunities for investment for these families (Vargas-Silva 2016). Yet, remittance flows to refugees and IDPs are hindered by a number of factors. First, the cost of remittances is often high and getting access to the funds difficult, because the recipients' locations are isolated and poor, there is lack of security, refugees do not have the identification needed to use formal channels for remittances and there is weak banking infrastructure. Second, international regulations hamper the efforts of families to remit to countries such as Somalia, where money

laundering and terrorism are problems. Third, financial literacy with regard to the best ways to send, receive and use remittances is often lacking among refugees and IDPs who come from rural and poor areas. Fourth, although remittances tend to be counter-cyclical (families send more remittances when crises occur at home), they are also often episodic and do not provide a regular source of income. Finally, even if refugees and IDPs wish to use some of their remittances to invest in income-generating activities, they may not be able to do so within the legal boundaries that host countries and communities impose.

All of these factors point to the need for major changes in the way international work with refugees is funded. While it is difficult to re-orient financial procedures, the costs of failing to do so are very high.

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THERE IS NOT ENOUGH
MONEY TO MEET THE
IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN
NEEDS OF REFUGEES
AND IDPs

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Some Changes Underway Provide a Starting Point

It is important to acknowledge that some positive and significant changes are occurring. The United Nations' Central Emergency Response Fund and country-based pooled funds allow for more immediate and needs-based allocation of funds. International awareness by all stakeholders of the economic needs of host countries has increased, and financial allocations have been reallocated to ensure support for the host communities as well as for refugees. After decades of acknowledging the humanitarian-development gap, there are signs that the development community is (finally) becoming engaged with refugee response. In 2016, the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank Group and other partners created the Global Concessional Financing Facility to provide concessional financing to middle-income countries hosting large refugee populations. This was a groundbreaking initiative, and it was complemented by the World Bank's International Development

Association's eighteenth replenishment of funds, opening a US\$2 billion financing window for states seeking longer-term solutions benefiting refugees and host communities. The development of new refugee compacts or agreements to support refugee-hosting countries, as in Jordan, Lebanon and Ethiopia, are generally positive new models for financing (Huang et al. 2018) and lessons can be drawn from them. In particular, they incentivize allowing refugees to work — legally — in a host country.

The WRC is encouraged by these initiatives and hopes that they will lead agencies to work together to define shared outcomes and targets at the global and country levels. However, these changes are not enough to address the problems listed above, such as the disparities between funding for refugees and for IDPs. Also, “as a development donor, the World Bank moves relatively slow compared to humanitarian response... planning [in Uganda] around World Bank-funded projects could go on for years. Meanwhile, refugee and

host communities will hang in the balance” (ibid., 13). In addition, the limited gender analysis in the design and planning of these interventions has meant that they have reinforced existing power dynamics, rather than created new opportunities for men and women. For example, of the work permits issued under the Jordan Compact, only three percent have been issued to women to date (Buffoni 2018). More can and should be done to ensure that all refugees and IDPs benefit from these new and exciting initiatives.

The United Nations' High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) is another noteworthy and positive development. Its work has led to less donor earmarking of grants and more multi-year funding in exchange for greater efficiencies by agencies. The call of the World Humanitarian Summit for channelling more funds to local organizations (UNGA 2016a) is a step in the right direction, but implementation is still lacking.



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MOBILIZING NEW SOURCES OF SUPPORT

New sources of funding are needed. Traditional humanitarian donors are overstretched and donor fatigue is increasing. Currently, just 10 countries, including the European Union, provide 77 percent of the UNHCR's funding (UNHCR 2018b). Moreover, unlike the United Nations' peacekeeping missions, the UNHCR's work is funded almost entirely through voluntary — rather than assessed — contributions. This arrangement means that the UNHCR has to raise new funds for each major emergency. Humanitarian funding needs to be more predictable and certain.

In 2017, the UNHCR received US\$43.4 million from the United Nations' regular budget — less than one percent of the agency's US\$4.511 billion budget (UNHCR 2018a, 5). While there are precedents for major changes to the UN's assessed budget, notably the establishment of the peacekeeping support account in 1991, the environment among member states is much more divided now than it was in the aftermath of the Cold War. There is less willingness to back stronger multilateral action with significant resource increases. In early 2018, the UN Secretary-General's modest proposal for US\$255 million in assessed funding to

ensure the sustainability and neutrality of the United Nations' worldwide development coordination system was rejected. The WRC therefore recognizes that this is a long-term prospect, but believes it should remain on the table to make the point that a fairer "fair share" system is needed for effective responsibility sharing in the longer term. Furthermore, only 15 percent of the voluntary contributions received

CALL TO ACTION

Building Support

ACTION 34

The WRC calls on the UN Secretary-General, together with interested states and other stakeholders, to begin the political task of building support for changing the present system of voluntary funding for the UNHCR to one of assessed contributions. The UNGA could annually review a report of the estimated humanitarian needs and risks for the coming year, then propose a budget with a mix of paid-in-grant funds, for predictable long-term crises, and additional funds, available to be mobilized for situations at risk.

Opposite page:
A Better Shelter
tent provided by the
IKEA Foundation
in Diavata, Greece.
(Jodi Hilton/ For *The
Washington Post* via
Getty Images)

CALLS TO ACTION

Using Trade Policies and Flexible Debt Management to Support Host Countries

ACTION 35

The WRC calls on the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference to waive members' obligations under Article IX of the Enabling Clause for developing countries to allow trade concessions for refugee/migrant host countries.

ACTION 36

The WRC calls on individual WTO members to seek duties relief within the scope of the existing Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), including appropriate qualifying criteria, to support refugee-hosting countries.

ACTION 37

The WRC calls on the IMF to develop a facility that provides longer-term loans on highly concessional terms for countries hosting large numbers of refugees. In analyzing the debt sustainability of these countries, due account should be taken of the fiscal pressures arising from hosting refugees, allowing some temporary flexibility beyond standard debt sustainability norms. In some instances, debt relief (rescheduling or cancellation) may provide an effective way of increasing fiscal space for these countries.

by the UNHCR are not already earmarked (UNHCR 2018c, 42); a larger percentage of unearmarked funds would give the agency greater flexibility in responding to urgent needs.

One way to support refugee-hosting countries is to help them grow their economies through trade and flexible debt management policies. Trade policy can be used as a way of assisting refugee-hosting low-income countries (LIC) and low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) and has, in fact, been used in the Jordan Compact, which provided EU trade concessions to Jordan for product lines produced by Syrian refugees. The idea of using trade policy as a means of assisting refugee/migrant communities and host countries has been addressed in general terms in the WTO's 2017 *Aid for Trade Global Review* (WTO 2017), but specific mechanisms are lacking.

One of the challenges is that most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligations under the Agreement Establishing the WTO require that imported goods from all sources be given equal treatment in terms of duties, taxes, regulations and the like. Any special or differential treatment in the context of refugee relief must find its way through these MFN obligations. Another limiting factor is that the WTO Agreement itself has no specific provisions covering humanitarian situations.

The result is that trade policy options in the refugee context — for example, tariff concessions for goods produced by refugees or firms that have an active policy of hiring refugees — may have to be addressed outside the mandate of the WTO as an institution. This possibility has also been mentioned in the Strategy for Global Trade Growth agreed by the Group of

Twenty (G20) in July 2016,¹ as well as by the European Commission's communication of 2016 establishing a new partnership framework with third countries on migration (European Commission 2016).

Another possibility to extend trade to refugee-hosting countries is to use the waiver adopted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1979 to create the GSP, a waiver that has been carried over into the WTO system. Under the GSP, developed countries offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment (such as zero or low duties on imports) to products originating in developing countries. Preference-giving countries unilaterally determine which countries and which products are included in their schemes.² The GSP offers several advantages as it has already been approved within the WTO framework under the GATT waiver provisions, and because GSP schemes are unilateral, developed WTO members can designate the beneficiary countries and the list of qualifying goods under their respective GSP measures, allowing tariff relief measures to be applied to individual circumstances. However, such differential and favourable treatment must be “generalized, non-reciprocal [and] non-discriminatory”³ with respect to developing beneficiary countries, that is, any duty relief for a specific product must apply on an MFN basis among listed beneficiaries.

To effectively address the current refugee/migrant challenges, the terms of the 1979 waiver would have to be altered by a WTO decision

1 See www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160710-trade-annex2.html.

2 Detailed information on the GSP is found on the WTO and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) websites: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d2legl_e.htm and <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx>.

3 See <https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/About-GSP.aspx>.

CALLS TO ACTION

Create New Platforms for Finance, Investment and Philanthropy in Refugee-hosting Countries

ACTION 38

The WRC calls on interested states and the financial community to develop a bank and fund manager forum for refugees, to be a standing body that would draw on domestic, regional and international capacity and expertise with the goal of developing innovative financing mechanisms, such as refugee bonds (akin to “green bonds” in climate change) and other private equity vehicles to promote growth and investment in refugee-hosting states and within refugee communities.

ACTION 39

The WRC recommends the establishment of a global refugee business coalition to provide private sector input into its work. The global refugee business coalition could also liaise with other private networks. The Council further urges the private sector to support initiatives – such as the Tent Partnership for Refugees – that are bringing together representatives of the private sector to support solutions for refugees. The Council also urges the development of an online database of private sector initiatives working to find solutions for refugees and IDPs. Such a database could provide accountability for commitments made in other fora and serve as a resource for humanitarian actors working to find solutions for refugees and IDPs in specific country situations.

ACTION 40

The WRC encourages philanthropic organizations to increase their support for refugees, IDPs and the communities that host them, and to direct a portion of their contributions to both addressing the causes of displacement and reforming the present global refugee system.

to allow preferential forms of GSP tariff relief to be applied to exports from refugee-hosting countries.

While the World Bank has developed new instruments for concessional financing to support refugee-hosting countries, the IMF has yet to do so. Allowing more flexibility in managing debt of refugee-hosting countries would be a concrete way of supporting these countries.

Creative funding mechanisms that move beyond voluntary contributions and concessional financing arrangements should also be considered. For example, securities in the nature of municipal bonds could be used to attract the financial services sector and take advantage of investor interest in major, refugee destination countries. Those bonds could be attached to a continuous and reliable revenue stream (toll roads, utilities, water and sewage) and would include tax incentives to

attract investors to those regions of the country where many forcibly and internally displaced people are located.

While there seems to be growing interest and good will among private sector enterprises to support further engagement with refugees (see Box 7.1), so far, most such initiatives are carried out on an ad hoc basis — at a time when concerted and strategic action is needed.

The WRC’s recommended actions would build on existing emerging and frontier financial market foundations, and appeal globally both to large conventional institutional as well as social impact investors.⁴ The global refugee business coalition could be established independently or as a separate arm of existing

support organizations and would be a main channel for collaboration and dialogue with official and non-government partners.⁵

Humanitarian actors have seen the private sector as a source of funding for their work, for example, through programs of corporate social responsibility. But in the past few years there has been a sea change in this perception, with a move toward engaging the private sector to mainstream social and environmental impact into its core business offerings and to do what it does best: start businesses that provide profits, jobs, technology and expertise. By doing so, the private sector can contribute to the economic integration of refugees, helping them make meaningful and impactful contributions to their

4 For example, see the work the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is doing through impact bonds for physical rehabilitation in conflict-hit countries (ICRC 2017).

5 For more details on constraints on repayment, restructuring and austerity obligations for refugees, see Zamore (2018).

BOX 7.1: THE TENT PARTNERSHIP

The Tent Partnership for Refugees was launched in 2016 with support from the World Economic Forum and the US administration. This public-private partnership involves more than 80 major companies and non-profit groups dedicated to helping refugees worldwide, with the ultimate goal of finding solutions to end the global refugee crisis. The initiative focuses on three areas: hiring refugees and integrating them into their supply chains where they live; tailoring goods and services to meet the unique needs of refugees; and investing in refugee-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises and those that meet refugee needs. The Tent Partnership sees both a humanitarian need for including refugees and a strong business case for doing so. The private sector can create more sustainable and scalable solutions to engage and empower refugees as employees, entrepreneurs and consumers. By doing so, the Tent Partnership also seeks to benefit host communities which often experience economic shocks as a result of the arrival of large numbers of refugees. So far, the Tent Partnership commitments have provided support for nearly 200,000 refugees and are being implemented across 34 countries.

Private companies and employers also connected to the Tent Partnership are committed to hiring refugees. For example, Greek yogurt producer Chobani employs refugees and aids their resettlement; the company WeWork has committed to hiring 1,500 refugees; and Starbucks is planning to employ 10,000 refugees in 75 countries. The Tent Partnership also supports and conducts research into the involvement of refugees in the private sector and labour market; as well, it encourages the private sector to mobilize political support for refugees.

Source: See Tent Partnership, www.tent.org.

communities. Businesses can also offer internships, apprenticeships and educational support — and use their communication channels to change the current negative narratives into stories demonstrating successful integration and benefits of increased diversity in society.

Corporations can be involved in working with refugees, IDPs and others affected by conflicts, in several ways, including through corporate social responsibility and philanthropy programs, business development and product design, and advocacy (No Lost Generation, n.d.).

In some cases, philanthropic investments are needed to create a basis for livelihood and self-reliance, as in the examples in Box 7.1 and Box 7.2. But in other cases, the private sector can engage in business development from day one and no charitable contributions are required — only some patient capital and a willingness to take risks and “think

outside of the box.” The WRC noted, however, that even when business interests and philanthropists are willing to commit major resources to support refugees, it can be difficult to responsibly spend the funds.

In the absence of a formal structure whereby businesses can partner, collaborate and regularly meet to contribute to and develop solutions for the global refugee system, private sector engagement will remain ad hoc. A failure to maximize the potential of the private sector and other key stakeholders in the development and implementation of solutions for refugees and other forcibly displaced persons will only exacerbate existing issues and increase the costs associated with responding to and finding solutions for refugees and IDPs.

As these and other private sector projects, and other initiatives such as the B20 (the G20 dialogue with international business) and the United Nations’ GCR, work on related issues,

including the Sustainable Development Goals, they provide more opportunities for greater private sector engagement in support for refugees and IDPs and the communities that host them.

Encouraging Greater Collaboration with Private Philanthropic Organizations

Private philanthropic contributions — from foundations of various sizes, faith-based organizations and social impact initiatives — have traditionally been important sources of financial support for humanitarian work. More should be done to engage private philanthropic organizations to support humanitarian relief efforts, for example, by encouraging *zakat* contributions to be channelled to refugees and organizations that support them (see Box 7.3). This could increase overall funding for humanitarian work and take some of the pressure off of the traditional refugee-serving agencies. Social impact

initiatives, with their emphasis on self-reliance and measurable outcomes, are already contributing to a change in the approach to refugee and IDP assistance. Foundations, including smaller family foundations, are often more flexible and more willing to take risks than government agency funders. But many philanthropists find it easier to support disaster response — perceived as non-political — than either conflict-induced displacement or longer-term efforts to transform the global refugee system.

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THE PRIVATE
SECTOR CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO
THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION OF
REFUGEES
”


BOX 7.2: THE IKEA FOUNDATION

The IKEA Foundation began working in the south of Ethiopia seven years ago, in a cluster of five camps sheltering 200,000 Somali refugees. From the beginning, the focus of the Foundation’s work was on promoting self-reliance, which is unusual in a camp setting, but the Foundation felt that ignoring the assets refugees bring would be wrong, and that providing a purpose in their life could only be for the good. Its work has focused on building livelihoods, providing better education for children, and introducing renewable energy to increase quality of life, enhance safety and enable livelihood opportunities. This is really development work in a humanitarian situation, which made it particularly challenging. As well, the Foundation worked to provide the same benefits for the host community, on the principle that host communities are often equally impoverished and tend to see refugees as threats to their community. By doing so, the Foundation helped defuse tension between the refugees and host communities, and invoked a collaborative spirit.

Refugees and host community families started to improve their incomes significantly through several livelihood opportunities that were developed collaboratively by the refugees and the host community. Access to microfinance (usually unheard of for refugees) helped incubate new jobs and created additional wealth. A special project designed to turn 1,000 hectares of desert into fertile land through irrigation investments has provided livelihood and new income for hundreds of families. Refugee and host community members have been organized into cooperatives and share the farming output 50/50. This project is expected to turn into sustainable businesses that will eliminate the need for further investment from outside sources.

Based on this successful out-of-the box approach, the Ethiopian government made it part of its 2017 pledge to make another 10,000 hectares of land available for the refugees and the host community to farm together, subject to international funding. When governments see that a refugee situation can generate international resources and when those resources can be deployed to also benefit the host community, a win-win situation is created. It then becomes politically more acceptable to talk about future integration, work permits and free movement — all of which support solutions for refugees.

—Per Heggenes, IKEA Foundation, and WRC member



BOX 7.3: ZAKAT

Islamic countries are becoming major humanitarian donors. Between 2011 and 2013, humanitarian aid from members of the OIC increased from US\$599 million to US\$2.2 billion, representing an increase in the percentage of global humanitarian assistance from Islamic countries from four to 14 percent. At the same time, 75 percent of the people living in the top 10 recipient countries of humanitarian aid in 2013 were Muslims (Stirk 2015, 3). In 2017, the number of refugees originating from just three Muslim majority countries was close to 10 million — almost half the total number of refugees worldwide. In addition, the number of IDPs in Syria, Iraq and Yemen alone is more than 12 million, making it likely that a substantial percentage of the total number of displaced people in the world are Muslim (UNHCR 2018b).

The potential for increased humanitarian aid from Islamic states, organizations and individuals is tremendous, in particular because there is an obligation under Islam to make charitable contributions of 2.5 percent of total assets, every year, to those in need (Islamic Relief Worldwide 2018). This contribution, known as *zakat*, is in addition to voluntary contributions, known as *sadaqah*. A study in 2012 estimated that annually “between US\$200 billion and US\$1 trillion are spent in ‘mandatory’ alms and voluntary charity across the Muslim world” (Reliefweb 2014). Islamic financial analysts point out that “at the low end of the estimate, this is 15 times more than global humanitarian aid contributions in 2011 of \$13 billion (UN Financial Tracking System)” (ibid.). Given the fact that the number of Muslims in the world is projected to grow by 30 percent from 2010 to 2030, the potential for *zakat* to support humanitarian response is significant (Stirk 2015, 16).

According to the website Muslim Aid (2018),

The Qur’an is very specific about who should benefit from Zakat donations. The main purpose is to help only those who cannot help themselves; people living in poverty, those who are disabled or elderly and those who are incapable of supporting themselves. Consider this verse from Surah At-Tauba: “*Zakat is for the poor, and the needy and those who are employed to administer and collect it, and the new converts, and for those who are in bondage, and in debt and service of the cause of God, and for the wayfarers, a duty ordained by God, and God is the All-Knowing, the Wise.*”

There are, unsurprisingly, sensitivities and concerns about how these funds can be used, with different scholars and different religious schools interpreting the Qur’an differently on issues such as whether non-Muslims can benefit from *zakat* and about how it should be channelled, with some believing that *zakat* should be given directly to individuals rather than to third parties (Stirk 2015, 3).

Recently, the UNHCR, with the support of Muslim faith leaders, launched a *zakat* platform for Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon (Zaatari 2018), and many sharia-compliant organizations have been set up to receive *zakat* and to use these funds to support humanitarian work.

Opposite page:
A 25-year-old Syrian
refugee injured in
an airstrike received
prosthetic legs
funded in part by
the Zakat House of
Kuwait in Istanbul.
(Cem Genco/
Anadolu Agency/
Getty Images)



eight

LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT REFUGEES AND IDPs

Considerable work has been done in recent years by both the public and private sectors to use technological innovation to enhance the delivery of services to refugees and IDPs. These innovations include such measures as cash transfers; iris scans for identification; crowdmapping and crowdsourcing; mobile phone fund transfers; apps for information sharing between refugees and between refugees and service providers/governments; new shelter options; online education programs; and many others. These innovations enable funds to be spent more effectively, enhance the dignity of refugees and provide for greater accountability in the use of funds.

Policy makers know that mass displacement and sudden, unexpected surges in the movement of people can have destabilizing effects on institutions and economies, and above all, can lead to the suffering of large numbers of people. Yet, the field reports of officials and aid workers on the ground who anticipate these emergencies are often overlooked by those with the political authority to take meaningful action. The evolution of artificial intelligence and machine learning create potential opportunities to develop forecasting and early warning systems that can improve

the basis for taking political action. If meteorologists can influence the decisions we make on a daily basis, then similar forecasts and indices predicting refugee and migration emergencies may be able to influence policy makers in taking action. The recent big data trend has led to the emergence of forecasting systems in other contexts, including the prevention of genocides, conflicts and economic crises. Applying this kind of technology specifically to refugee and displacement situations would fill a void in the available governance tools.

Refugee resettlement is a complex and lengthy process. It often requires finding temporary accommodations along the path to a final destination. In 2017, Airbnb launched its Open Homes initiative, enabling proactive individuals in Canada, Germany, the United States and Greece to host refugees. The initiative not only supports those forcibly displaced but also has the potential to build political will, much like the private sponsorship scheme used in Canada, especially if it is able to mitigate the risks vulnerable populations, such as visible minorities face using these types of platforms.

During the resettlement process, officials typically face two choices in placing refugees. The first is

Opposite page: AP Photo/The Christian Science Monitor, Ann Hermes.

CALLS TO ACTION

Enhance Support to Refugees and IDPs Using Technology

ACTION 41

The WRC urges online service providers to convene to explore ways of working together to make existing technologies accessible to refugees and IDPs at low cost, with a particular emphasis on ensuring excluded groups, such as women and girls, the elderly, people with disabilities, and people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, have access.

ACTION 42

The WRC urges online service providers to review and, if necessary, supplement existing platforms, so that technology representatives, refugees, IDPs and humanitarian aid workers can work together to share ideas on technological solutions to problems faced by refugees and IDPs.

ACTION 43

The WRC calls on researchers, policy makers and practitioners to create early warning systems using big data analytics and predictive techniques to forecast repression, incitements to violence and other forms of coercion that can lead to forcible displacement. Such technologies could also be deployed to anticipate the impact of large refugee movements on nearby cities and neighbouring countries, including their effects on vulnerable populations.

ACTION 44

The WRC calls on interested states and other stakeholders to spearhead a data privacy or data collection statement such as the Toronto Declaration that is based on fundamental human rights. This statement should be signed onto by host and donor countries along with technology companies.

ACTION 45

The WRC supports the establishment of a data protection and technology ethics board in which companies designing applications for and with refugees and IDPs seek accreditation by disclosing their practices, committing to ethical handling of data, and mitigating the risks and potential harms of the products and services they are developing. This technology ethics board would involve a diversity of stakeholders and be developed in coordination with app providers, for example, Apple and Google Play.

determining whether a refugee has an existing network of support in that country. Technology can be better utilized to help reunite families or identify networks of support across the world. Often, however, case workers cannot find such a network, and resettlement officers must then assess where, among potential communities, the refugee has the best potential to integrate, based on an evaluation of an individual's skills, experience and characteristics. It is this second process in which technology can be leveraged to assist the process. Machine learning and big data methodologies can be used to enhance human decision making to ensure better outcomes for both the refugees and the host communities. For example, the Immigration Policy Lab is developing an algorithm to improve the consistency and quality of outcomes for refugees.¹

Language barriers are a universal challenge in communicating with refugees. Translation and language learning apps have been helpful in enabling refugees to access medical care and education. For example, NaTakallam offers translation from English or French to other languages including Arabic, Kurdish, Spanish and Farsi, and also provides translation and transcription services delivered by refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It also facilitates language instruction via Skype from Arabic-speaking displaced persons, offering them a source of income.² Tarjimly is an app that provides free, real-time translation services to both refugees and aid workers;³ for more nuanced interactions, refugees can sometimes

Refugees stay connected with free internet access in Budapest, Hungary. (Peter Zschunke/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images)



1 See <https://immigrationlab.org/>.

2 See <https://natakallam.com/translation/>.

3 See <https://natakallam.com/translation/> and www.tarjim.ly/en.

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REFUGEES, IDPs AND THOSE WHO CARE FOR THEM NEED ACCESS TO DATA, BUT ACCESS CAN BE A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

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access volunteer interpreters who will translate for them remotely using messenger apps such as WhatsApp.

Leveraging technology in support of refugees and IDPs should take into consideration the levels of access to technology that are available to men, women, girls, boys and people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. According to a report from the GSMA Connected Women Global Development Alliance program, as of 2015, 1.7 billion women still did not own mobile phones in emerging markets (GSMA 2015). While the specific difference in ownership for displaced women and girls is not known, this power imbalance in ownership and control of technology must be factored into all efforts aimed at leveraging technology to improve the overall response to refugees, as it risks leaving half of the population behind.

A major challenge facing refugees who are in protracted situations in host countries is achieving a sense of autonomy. Access to finance and capital to initiate small businesses would be an invaluable resource. On the one hand, some refugees have

capital in their countries of origin and are simply unable to transfer their money abroad. Blockchain and other digital technologies can allow refugees to transfer their capital through text messaging. On the other hand, many refugees or displaced people have few, if any, existing assets. For these groups, access to traditional loans from financial institutions is unlikely, because refugees and displaced people are regularly labelled flight risks or have little to no documented credit history. In this respect, crowdfunding has emerged as a viable alternative to acquire new financing for people who are traditionally deemed high credit risks.

While technological developments can enhance the overall response to displacement situations, for the most part they do not provide either solutions to the causes of displacement or answers to the difficult questions around unequal responsibility sharing or access to IDPs. More problematically, unscrupulous applications of technology can actually *exacerbate* the fragile situations refugees and displaced persons face in host countries. Blockchain technologies

have yet to achieve critical mass, and so technology companies and international response organizations continue to store massive amounts of sensitive data regarding biometrics, identity, family ties and the location of displaced persons on centralized storage systems. Refugees, IDPs and those who care for them need access to data, but access can be a double-edged sword. If nefarious actors penetrate the cyber defences around centralized data storage systems, they will have hit the proverbial jackpot of data. If this data gets into the hands of intelligence agencies from authoritarian regimes, displaced persons may be re-exposed to the exact kind of danger and human rights abuses they fled from in the first place. There is currently little consistency in privacy and data protection standards among NGOs, international organizations and governments concerning data about refugees. Moreover, technology companies are not currently accountable for privacy issues or for exposing vulnerable people to harm. The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the Right to Equality and Non-discrimination in Machine Learning Systems, a



Social entrepreneurs, refugee engineers, policy makers and others gathered at the first Techfugees Global Summit in 2017, held in Paris, to talk about technology for and with refugees. (Techfugees/Jawad Allazkani)

statement based on international human rights standards, may serve as a useful model for addressing some of these concerns (Amnesty International and Access Now 2018).

At a WRC workshop in San Francisco focusing on technology, councillors met with companies such as Uber, YouTube, Facebook and Airbnb that use online platforms.⁴ Among the many issues discussed at the workshop was the crucial need for data protection. Many participants pointed to current data protection policies of the UNHCR and the need for any agreement to be based on basic human rights principles. In this regard, the promulgation in May 2018 of the Toronto Declaration was identified as one of the most progressive statements on the issue to date (ibid.). As well, academic experts pointed to the need for an accreditation process for technology companies similar

4 A report of this meeting can be found at www.worldrefugeecouncil.org/event/role-technology-addressing-global-migration-crisis.

to the process whereby researchers apply for ethics approval prior to conducting fieldwork (interviews and participant observation).

These technologies — in particular those developed by social entrepreneurs and social impact investors — also carry the benefit of broadening the funding base for support for refugees and IDPs. For example, it is unlikely that some of those developing these technological innovations would be willing to channel their time and money to traditional humanitarian appeals, but they are willing to contribute through their technological expertise. Some technologies provide support for solutions to displacement, notably in areas such as monitoring the safety of returnees or providing new business models that reduce tension between host communities and refugees. Engaging the tech community also has the effect of mobilizing a potentially younger constituency to support refugees. However, designing specific refugee apps is not the most practical means

of scaling technological solutions for refugees, because of the high per unit cost due to the relatively small target demographic. Indeed, it is better to use and tailor existing technologies to meet the needs of refugees.

One of the gaps also identified at the WRC technology workshop was the lack of fora for representatives of the technology sector to interact with practitioners working with refugees and IDPs and with the displaced themselves. The WRC notes the work being undertaken by NetHope, a non-profit tech consortium of 57 global NGOs, working closely with many private sector companies and conflict-affected populations, to co-design solutions to migration-related challenges (including education, livelihoods, connectivity and protection).⁵ Techfugees provides another example.⁶ Techfugees brings together technologists and displaced populations to develop technology-

5 See <https://nethope.org/>.

6 See <https://techfugees.com/>.

based solutions for the global refugee system and holds hackathons in which refugees meet with technologists and learn how to code and design apps. Refugees communicate with engineers, informing them of their problems and what they would like to see available to assist them. (See also Box 8.1.)

Perhaps the most significant technological barrier is the absence of an environment in which refugees can actually access the technology available. The case of e-Estonia illustrates some of the potential applications of new digital technologies in service delivery. In Estonia, citizens interact with the state through electronic means including e-Voting, e-Tax Board, e-Business, e-Banking, e-Ticket, e-Health and Ambulance, and e-School via the internet. Some of these technologies could be harnessed to improve refugees' quality of life, provided they are applied with appropriate privacy and security safeguards.

BOX 8.1: USING TECHNOLOGY IN LEARNING INNOVATIONS FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES

In August 2016, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and its partner the International Education Association launched a learning intervention called “Coder-Maker” in 41 public schools throughout Lebanon. Coder-Maker was developed as part of the IDRC’s Digital Learning Innovations project, aimed at enhancing the quality and accessibility of learning for host communities and Syrian refugees. Through summer camps and weekly sessions, Coder-Maker presents Syrian and Lebanese students with real-life problems to solve using design thinking, the Internet of Things and coding using open-source software. For example, one group of students designed, made and installed traffic lights running on Raspberry Pi coded with Python to solve a traffic problem in their village. This learning experience nurtures participants’ skills in critical thinking, computational thinking, analysis and reflection. Most importantly, the intervention has demonstrated how social learning and collaboration can be fostered in overtaxed schools among refugee and host community students. Coder-Maker provides evidence of the potential for digital learning innovations to improve learning outcomes and to create more inclusive learning environments.

Source: IDRC. For more information, see www.idrc.ca/en/project/digital-learning-innovations-syrian-refugees-and-host-communities and coder-maker.org.

Syrian and Lebanese students collaborate on solutions using low-cost and accessible technology through programs in host community schools. (International Education Association)





nine

ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AT ALL STAGES OF DISPLACEMENT

Accountability, Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane have suggested, “implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met” (cited by Orchard, forthcoming 2019).

In looking at the global refugee system, it is clear that accountability is in short supply at every stage: from addressing the causes of displacement, to responding to IDPs and refugees, to finding durable solutions. While aid organizations are accountable to their donors, there are varying levels of accountability to affected populations. In particular, the voices of displaced people, especially those of women, girls and individuals with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, are too often ignored, with limited participation in decision making at all levels (UN Women 2018, 5).

Being displaced is a terrible experience. To be forced from your home and your community, to leave behind your belongings and often your family

members, to leave your livelihood, culture and way of life is a deeply painful experience. A survey by the ICRC and Ipsos in eight countries almost a decade ago found that people feared displacement more than just about anything, including death — only loss of a family member and economic hardship ranked higher (ICRC and Ipsos 2009). Yet, in today’s world, more than 68 million people have been forced from their homes and communities, with little accountability demanded of those responsible for their displacement. Even when the causes of displacement are well-known and where individuals responsible for the displacement can be identified, as in South Sudan, Venezuela and Myanmar, there is little accountability. The lack of accountability for causing displacement means, in turn, that political leaders and insurgent groups alike can act with impunity — without regard for the immense suffering caused by their actions.

The international refugee regime, according to Grant Dawson and Sonia Farber, “does not and was not intended to, place any positive obligation on governments to refrain from displacing

Opposite page:
Under President
Maduro, millions of
Venezuelans
have been forcibly
displaced.
(AP Photo/Richard
Drew)

individuals within their borders or to apprehend those who commit forcible displacement within their borders” (cited in Orchard forthcoming 2019).¹

However, as Phil Orchard (*ibid.*) points out in a research paper commissioned by the WRC, there are clear prohibitions in international law against forced displacement, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and, in particular, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. International humanitarian law prohibits forced displacement of people, unless it is intended to protect civilians or absolutely necessary for military reasons.

When it comes to holding governments accountable for displacing people, it is not the responsibility of humanitarian agencies to address the causes of the displacement. The granting of asylum is seen as a non-political act and the UNHCR’s statute specifies that its work is of an “entirely non-political character” (UNGA 1950, 4). But addressing the causes of displacement is *always* a political act, and for the UNHCR to engage in actions to try to prevent displacement could place serious limitations on its ability to operate.

1 The United Nations’ Economic and Social Council’s 1998 *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* do note a prohibition on arbitrary displacement, which frames internal displacement as a rights-based problem and creates a duty on states to ensure that arbitrary displacement is prevented. Specifically, in Principle 6, the council maintains that displacement is arbitrary “(a) When it is based on policies of apartheid, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or similar practices aimed at/ or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population; (b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand; (c) In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests; (d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation; and (e) When it is used as a collective punishment” (UN Economic and Social Council 1998).

CALLS TO ACTION

Accountability for Displacement

ACTION 46

The WRC calls on governments of countries in which regimes have deposited financial assets to develop appropriate legal measures to confiscate and repurpose such assets for the benefit of the people in the country of origin, including those who have been forced to flee their communities because of the actions by the regime in question.

ACTION 47

The WRC recommends that the World Bank, the IMF and regional financial institutions develop fair and effective means of reducing allocations to countries causing displacement and that they reallocate these funds to support governments hosting refugees, with requirements mandated to ensure a gender-responsive approach.

ACTION 48

The WRC urges governments of countries hosting refugees to pursue criminal charges against political leaders who deport or forcibly expel their citizens or habitual residents from their territory, including charges for crimes perpetrated during the forced displacement of populations, in particular, acts of sexual and gender-based violence.

ACTION 49

The WRC urges competent civil society advocates to collect information contemporaneously on forcible transfers and deportations, to serve as evidence in any future criminal trials.

And, as the New York Declaration (UNGA 2016b) affirms, there are resolutions galore from the UN Security Council and other international and regional bodies for governments to stop persecuting their people and to prevent and resolve the conflicts that force people to flee their communities. The issue of protection of civilians has been on the Security Council’s agenda since 1999 — almost 20 years (UN Security Council 1999). If the measures included in those statements, reports and resolutions had been implemented, there would not be more than 68 million displaced people in the world today.

In addition, there is an urgent need to ensure that international justice

mechanisms respond to the systematic violations of all those who are displaced — in particular, crimes of sexual or gender-based violence, which are often invisible to human rights monitors and international investigators. Too often, gender-specific crimes against humanity, such as “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence” (UNGA 1998, art. 7(g)) have been notoriously difficult to prosecute in comparison with other crimes against humanity (UN Women 2017).

The WRC considered a number of possible ways that governments can be held accountable for displacing people.

The WRC noted that while the UN Security Council has been constrained in recent years, efforts should continue to support — and to press — the Security Council to fulfill its obligations under the UN Charter and in subsequent resolutions. The Security Council has a range of possible actions in its tool kit — ranging from sanctions to military intervention. Specifically,

- The UN Security Council should continue to press governments to protect civilians, including to protect them from displacement through the Security Council and through relevant regional organizations.
- The UN Security Council should take action under R2P to respond to those situations of forced displacement that are the result of crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.
- The UN Security Council should mandate peacekeeping forces not only to protect returning refugees and IDPs, but also to create and maintain conditions conducive to returns.
- The UN Security Council should undertake more fact-finding missions, such as the 2018 visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh.
- The UN Security Council should make refugees and IDPs a standing item on the agenda of the Security Council.

Repurposing Frozen Assets

The WRC believes that financial measures should be used as a tool for holding governments accountable for displacing people, specifically, by repurposing frozen assets and working with international financial institutions. While these are seen primarily as measures to strengthen



UN Mission in South Sudan chief David Shearer visits the troubled region of Yei, in South Sudan. (AP Photo/Sam Mednick)

accountability, they also have the potential of easing financial shortfalls in host countries and communities.²

In increasing accountability of governments for displacing people — as well as in generating new sources of funding — the issue of confiscating and repurposing stolen assets was considered by the WRC. In 2015, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Selim Can Sazak called on those states responsible for creating refugees to assume the financial burden for their care. They noted that this idea dates back to 1939 but is presently relevant and suggest that “those countries that drive people from their homes should pay the costs of providing them with a humane life. An important step in this direction would be to allow refugee-receiving states or competent international institutions to draw on the assets of refugee source countries” (Goodwin-Gill and Can Sazak 2015).

² The Enough Project works to support peace and end mass atrocities in Africa. Together with its investigative arm, the Sentry, it conducts research into the “money trail” of autocratic regimes. See <https://enoughproject.org/about>.

As a discussion paper prepared for the WRC put it:

In considering accountability, it is important to remember that forced displacement is often the result of bad governance. Violent or oppressive regimes, or those that fail or refuse to protect their populations, are responsible for much of the forced migration in the world today. Those regimes are also often corrupt, stealing from their treasuries and placing the money and other assets offshore for the unlawful benefit of the rulers and their associates.

When the jurisdictions in which the purloined assets are placed become aware of the assets’ existence, they frequently ‘freeze’ them and, if the property can be traced, seize it. These steps may be authorized by court order, by domestic legislation or through sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council...

As a result, such assets are often tied up for extended periods.

BOX 9.1: SWITZERLAND'S PROGRAM FOR FREEZING AND REPURPOSING ASSETS

Despite Switzerland's popular reputation as a haven for stashing illicit funds, over the past 30 years its government has led the way in the freezing and repurposing of assets of "politically exposed persons" (PEPs). Since the mid 1980s, Switzerland has returned almost US\$2 billion deposited by PEPs, which is more than all other financial centres in the world by far. The list of dictators and other corrupt officials that have used Swiss banks to keep their assets, which Switzerland has frozen and then returned for redistribution, is extensive: Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), Vladimiro Montesinos (Peru), Mobutu Sese Seko (former Zaire), José Eduardo dos Santos Santos (Angola), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), officials in Kazakhstan, Raul Salinas (Mexico), Jean-Claude Duvalier (Haiti), Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia) and Hosni Mubarak (Egypt). In July 2016, Switzerland passed new legislation on the freezing, confiscating and returning of illicitly acquired assets of PEPs. Among other things, the new legislation improves on existing practices by increasing transparency and monitoring of the confiscation and restitution of assets.

An example of this concept in action comes from Kazakhstan. During the 1990s, some US\$84 million was placed in a Swiss bank as a result of corrupt dealings among Kazakh officials. The United States, Switzerland and Kazakhstan had conflicting claims to the money. The three governments agreed that the money should be placed in a trust foundation for the benefit of poor Kazakh children. A foundation was created to oversee the disbursement of the funds, and just over US\$115 million (US\$84 million plus accrued interest) was disbursed through conditional cash transfers, scholarships to attend Kazakhstan higher education institutions and grants to support innovative social service provision. Although there is some criticism of the arrangement, it involved a number of monitoring mechanisms and conditionalities. The government of Kazakhstan was required to make anti-corruption reforms to ensure the funds would be used properly and to promote better governance. The trust foundation tasked with disbursing the funds was monitored and overseen by the World Bank. Most importantly, the confiscated and repurposed money went to support the future development of Kazakhstan's youth and not to corrupt government officials.

Source: Greta Finner Zinkernagel and Kodjo Attisso, cited in WRC (2018, 6).

Meanwhile, host countries struggle to manage the cost of accommodating large numbers of refugees or displaced persons whose dislocation was caused by the very regime that stole the money. (WRC 2018, 1)

The question then becomes, is it possible to use the stolen money

to support refugees and those who host them in order to not only generate more funds but also achieve both greater accountability and serve as a concrete expression of responsibility sharing?

There are examples where measures are in place to confiscate frozen assets and return them to the country of

origin. In 2015, Switzerland enacted the Foreign Illicit Assets Act (FIAA),³ under which the Swiss government can apply to the Swiss Federal Court for an order authorizing the confiscation of frozen assets. Provided certain conditions are met, the Court can authorize the government to seize the assets. Once the assets have been confiscated, Switzerland can seek to restore the assets to the country of origin for the purpose of "[improving] the living conditions of the inhabitants of the country of origin" and strengthening "the rule of law in the country of origin and thus contributing to the fight against impunity" (FIAA, art. 17, as cited by WRC 2018). Switzerland has also used civil society organizations to help ensure transparency when assets are returned to the countries of origin, and to monitor the process. For example, in returning assets to Kazakhstan following criminal bribery proceedings in Switzerland (see Box 9.1), an independent non-profit foundation was set up to monitor the return of the assets. As an added layer of transparency, the foundation was supervised by the International Research and Exchanges Board Washington and Save the Children (Fenner Zinkernagel and Attisso 2013).

There are similar, although less-developed, mechanisms either in place or under discussion in other countries to repurpose illicitly acquired assets. The discussion paper prepared by Allan Rock and colleagues (WRC 2018) presents an outline of how this could be implemented in Canada, but similar processes can be used elsewhere. Progressive countries should pass similar legislation, and themselves freeze and confiscate assets, thus narrowing the scope for concealing ill-gotten gains and deterring other prospective perpetrators from following suit. Such actions should be carried

³ See www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20131214/index.html.

out in consultation with the victims, as per good transitional justice practice.

In addition, other measures could be taken to hold accountable those responsible for displacing people, including the following three examples.

Freeze or transfer part of a country's allocation from international financial institutions from the country of origin to the host country in the case of mass displacement.

Allocations from the IMF, the World Bank and regional development banks could be tailored to penalize governments of countries that displace people. Funds for a country causing displacement could be held back, to a degree proportional to the number of people who were forced to flee, and made available to support a viable plan for return (regionally or internationally monitored where appropriate). If no viable plan for return is implemented, the grant portion of the funds could be used each year by the refugee-

hosting country. Thus, allocations to Myanmar for example, could be held back to support eventual return of refugees and, in the meantime, could be added to Bangladesh's allocation. In addition, such mechanisms with requirements related to gender-responsive programming could be used to incentivize and/or require that responses are no longer gender-blind.

Use the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review process as a model to hold governments responsible for forcibly displacing people. Signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention have an obligation to consider the asylum claims of those arriving on their territories and an obligation not to practise *refoulement*, that is, the returning of refugees to countries where their lives are in danger. Indeed, the principle of *non-refoulement* has become customary international law for all states, whether or not they have signed the 1951 Convention. Nonetheless, there are

many cases, such as return of asylum seekers to Libya, where governments, in their desire to prevent the arrival of asylum seekers on their borders, are acting in ways that violate basic principles of refugee protection.

The Universal Periodic Review mechanism, created in 2006, sought to ensure that the human rights performance of all UN member states would be reviewed on a cyclical basis every four years or so. The state under review, the OHCHR and NGOs submit reports, which are used as the basis for discussion. This process has been used to call out incidents of forced displacement, to encourage states to adopt relevant laws and standards and has provided an opportunity for non-state actors to present evidence within the specific recommendation process.

In order to assess progress on responsibility sharing for refugees, indicators should be developed to measure the extent to which governments are acquitting their responsibility. These indicators should reflect the full range of measures, from hosting refugees to providing technical advice to contributing funds to confronting xenophobic narratives. In particular, the WRC notes that good work is presently being carried out by DARA to develop a refugee policy index.⁴ An independent monitoring group is best placed to keep track of governments' compliance and to issue regular public reports.

Once known as a safe haven for investments by corrupt leaders, Switzerland now has one of the most effective programs for freezing and repurposing assets. (AP Photo/Martin Ruetschi)



⁴ DARA is "an independent non-profit organisation committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of humanitarian action for vulnerable populations affected by armed conflict and natural disasters," see <https://daraint.org/about-us/>.

BOX 9.2: THE ROHINGYAS OF MYANMAR

At the heart of the current crisis of Rohingya refugees are the human rights violations against Myanmar's population of around one million Rohingya Muslims — an ethnic Muslim minority, living mainly in Rakhine state, who are not recognized as citizens by the Government of Myanmar (BBC 2018).

As a result, the vast majority of the Rohingya are effectively stateless. The government has institutionalized discrimination against them through restrictions on marriage, family planning, employment, education, religious choice and freedom of movement. Rohingya must seek governmental permission to marry and to travel outside their townships. Widespread poverty, poor infrastructure and a lack of employment opportunities in Rakhine state have exacerbated the cleavage between the Buddhist majority and the Muslim Rohingya minority.

Over the past decades, Rohingyas have been displaced in large numbers as a result of counter-insurgency campaigns and widespread human rights violations. The situation of the Rohingya took a dramatic turn in August 2017, when the military mounted a brutal campaign that destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages and forced nearly 700,000 Rohingya to flee Myanmar for neighbouring Bangladesh.

Discussions about the future of the Rohingya refugees have been difficult. The Bangladesh government sees their stay as temporary, and there is virtually no discussion of their resettlement to third countries, leaving return to Myanmar as the most viable option. Many Rohingya maintain that they will not return until their rights, safety and citizenship can be assured — a process that is likely to be long and limited. Past efforts to register the Rohingya as citizens have required proof of their ancestry in Myanmar — documentation that is simply lacking for most Rohingya.

Given the continued lack of humanitarian access to Rakhine state, there are deep concerns about the security of returning refugees and the ability of independent observers to monitor their conditions. Meanwhile, authorities in Myanmar have reportedly cleared abandoned Rohingya villages and farmlands to build homes, security bases and infrastructure. Negotiations have taken place between the United Nations and the Myanmar and Bangladeshi governments over the return of the Rohingya, but as yet no clear timetable for repatriation nor agreements on security guarantees have been worked out.

The case of Myanmar raises multiple questions about accountability. First and foremost is the accountability of the Myanmar government, which has engaged in policies of ethnic cleansing or genocide. In August 2018, a UN fact-finding mission called for the investigation of top Myanmar military officers for crimes against humanity and war crimes (UN News 2018). The need to balance holding the Myanmar government accountable for its actions toward the Rohingya with the need to work with the government to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees is a difficult one. Questions about assuring the safety of the returnees and about the access of international monitoring groups inside Myanmar raise issues about the relationship of the international community to decisions taken by a sovereign government.

Over the years, the United Nations has taken many actions with respect to Myanmar, including the appointment by the Human Rights Council of a Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and statements by the Security Council calling on the Myanmar government to refrain from “excessive use of force,” although more strongly worded resolutions have been blocked by China. Regional organizations, in particular ASEAN, which includes Myanmar as a member, have been largely silent on the Rohingya crisis.

Although the persecution and flight of the Rohingya have received considerable attention in recent years, Myanmar has a long history of conflict with ethnic minorities, resulting in periodic and often large-scale displacement of ethnic Chin, Karen, Karenni and other groups both within and across Myanmar's borders.

Data sources: Albert (2018); International Crisis Group's webpage on Myanmar at www.crisisgroup.org/myanmar.



Forced from their villages in Myanmar, Rohingya Muslims cross into Bangladesh in late 2017. (AP Photo/Dar Yasin, File)

Use International Criminal Law, in particular, the Rome Statute.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes “deportation or forcible transfer of population” as a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” (UNGA 1998, art. 7(1)(d)). While this provision is on the books, there have been few cases where it has been used (Orchard, forthcoming 2019). Vetoes by the permanent members of the UN Security Council have precluded prosecuting perpetrators who are under their protection.

However, the forced deportation of over 700,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh opens the possibility to argue that, even though Myanmar is not a party to the Convention, the court has jurisdiction, because part of the crime occurred on the territory of Bangladesh, which is a party to the Rome Statute. The court recently ruled that it does indeed have jurisdiction (Safi 2018), opening the possibility of more cases being brought to the International Criminal Court by refugee-hosting states, charging that deportations in other cases are

crimes against humanity. Global Affairs Canada’s report by special envoy Bob Rae on the situation in Myanmar found “strong signals that crimes against humanity were committed in the forcible and violent displacement of more than 671,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State in Myanmar” (Rae 2018, 4), and suggested that “Canada should lead a discussion on the need to establish an international impartial and independent mechanism (IIM or ‘Triple I-M’) for potential crimes in Myanmar, such as was established by the UN General Assembly for Syria” (ibid., 5). In August 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar released its report, calling on the “Security Council [to] ensure accountability for crimes under international law committed in Myanmar, preferably by referring the situation to the International Criminal Court or, alternatively, by creating an ad hoc international criminal tribunal” (UN OHCHR 2018a, para. 105).

Others believe that in the interests of finding solutions for refugees — as in the case of the Rohingyas, who may eventually return to Myanmar — the international community should find

ways of working with governments that have committed abuses in order to strengthen democratic and rights-respecting elements within the government. Others point to regional organizations such as ASEAN as being in a strong position to advocate with the Myanmar government.

The balance between holding governments accountable for displacement and, at the same time, working with those governments to find solutions for refugees is a delicate one (see Box 9.2). Governments should proceed with care in trying and sanctioning perpetrators.

At the national level, governments have different forms of accountability built into their political systems. The lack of a national legal framework is a major deterrent to strong government policies to support refugees and IDPs — and also to encouraging accountability to national institutions. For example, one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world, Pakistan, has neither ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention nor adopted national legislation to deal with the millions of refugees who have sought protection on its territory or to respond to the

CALLS TO ACTION

Accountability for Policies toward Refugees and IDPs

ACTION 50

The WRC urges interested states, in association with key stakeholders, to develop gender- and age-disaggregated indicators and to issue regular reports on how governments are fulfilling their responsibilities toward refugees.

ACTION 51

The WRC calls on interested states and other stakeholders to develop a new peer review mechanism to hold both states and non-state actors accountable for displacing people; *refoulement* of refugees; and finding solutions.

ACTION 52

The WRC urges regional organizations to develop regional mechanisms for accountability regarding refugees and IDPs, building wherever possible on existing models in the region. The Council further calls on donor governments to support the development of these regional peer review mechanisms, which could build on the example of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee's peer review process.

ACTION 53

The WRC recommends that interested states and other parties draft a new protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention that includes a monitoring and accountability mechanism for compliance with the obligations assumed under the Convention.

millions of Pakistanis who have been displaced within its borders (Azlam 2017). In fact, four of the 10 countries hosting the largest number of refugees have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or its later Protocol.

In democratic regimes, the role of legislative and judicial bodies is crucial in holding governments accountable for their actions toward refugees and asylum seekers. Legislatures are mandated to develop laws and policies, and courts interpret and monitor compliance with the law. Among other actions, these bodies can conduct investigations, hold hearings and hold executive agencies to account. Interparliamentary dialogues, information exchanges and joint efforts, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are tools that can be used to increase accountability. In addition, courts have often played a critical role in holding governments accountable for their actions. For

example, in the United States, a series of court rulings have postponed or stopped many executive policies related to border enforcement and detention. In some countries with large numbers of IDPs, for example, Colombia, judicial bodies have played a key role in enforcing compliance with laws and policies; thus, the Constitutional Court of Colombia insisted that the government comply with its own laws toward IDPs, even going so far as to declare in 2004 that the government was in an unconstitutional state of affairs because of its failure to ensure adequate conditions for IDPs. National human rights institutions and regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well as civil society groups, can also play important roles in raising awareness of human rights issues and monitoring the well-being of refugees and IDPs.

While policies are set at the national level, municipal authorities are

frequently on the front line of responding to IDPs and refugees, although often they do not receive the support they need to provide services to the displaced — even when formally mandated to do so. For example, in Colombia, which has strong national legislation and judicial institutions, municipal authorities often complain that they are responsible for providing education and health care to IDPs without additional funds (Ferris 2014a). In a research paper commissioned by the WRC, Robert Muggah and Adriana Erthal Abdenur (2018) argue that cities in the developing world, which often operate in isolation from one another, would benefit from more channels for sharing experiences and adopting best practices.

At the international level, there is no formal accountability — or even reporting — mechanism attached to the refugee system, so the costs of non-compliance with the norms

and principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention are virtually non-existent. For example, governments that return people to places where their lives are in danger — in flagrant violation of the convention — are not sanctioned. Nor is there a mechanism to hold governments accountable when they enter into bilateral deals to prevent refugees from arriving on their territories without considering the potential harm to asylum seekers and others fleeing life-threatening situations. States that refuse admission to asylum seekers should be seen as international pariahs who are in violation of their obligations under both treaty and customary international law. This behaviour has particularly come to the fore in the case of migrants and asylum seekers who are apprehended in the Mediterranean, by Libyan authorities with financial support from the European Union, and returned to Libya where they face detention, exploitation and inhumane conditions (see Box 9.3).

It is time to supplement the 1951 Refugee Convention with a protocol establishing a mechanism for monitoring compliance with obligations assumed under the Convention, and to consider mechanisms to hold governments accountable for their actions.

At all stages of displacement, accountability for sexual and gender-based violence is largely absent. As

BOX 9:3: LIBYA

Each year thousands of people fleeing war, persecution and poverty at home attempt the treacherous journey across the Mediterranean. Countless lives are lost along the way. European states and Libyan authorities are intercepting migrants fleeing by sea and returning them to Libya as a means to prevent arrivals to Europe. EU-supported Libyan coast guard vessels have intercepted unprecedented numbers of people on the Mediterranean Sea in 2018, only to return them to Libya. Throughout Libya, refugees and migrants face alarming levels of violence, extortion and exploitation, and many report the widespread criminal practice of kidnap for ransom (Médecins Sans Frontières [MSF] International 2018b). As MSF President Joanne Liu said: “The detention of migrants and refugees in Libya is rotten to the core. It must be named for what it is: a thriving enterprise of kidnapping, torture and extortion. And European governments have chosen to contain people in this situation. People cannot be sent back to Libya, nor should they be contained there” (MSF International 2018a).

Eileen Pittaway and Linda Bartholomei (2018) explain in their research paper written for the WRC, sexual and gender-based violence is endemic in all refugee situations due to increased vulnerability from the process of displacement, lack of finances/ possessions, uncertain legal status and social isolation. It occurs as part of the initial persecution, during flight, as refugees seek to cross borders, in countries of first asylum and often continues during resettlement. It includes systematic rape in conflict and post-conflict situations, which leads to stigmatization and shaming of the families of rape victims and other types of abuse, including intimate partner violence and denial that the violent

acts took place. Disabled women, girls and boys are often more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, exploitation and discrimination/harassment. Lesbian and transgender women can be subjected to physical and psychological abuse. In fact, people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities are especially vulnerable to persecution and lack substantial support within the existing refugee and IDP systems. Many women are forced to engage in survival sex to feed themselves and their families, which can lead to further stigmatization in their communities. Trafficking, forced marriage and domestic violence are common. Too often, humanitarian workers and forces intended to protect civilians themselves engage in sexual exploitation and abuse.⁵

This type of constant threat, founded on pre-existing gender inequalities, increases vulnerabilities due to gender or to sexual orientation during displacement (see Box 9.4). The consequences of this type of violence are both physical and psychological

CALL TO ACTION

Accountability and Gender

ACTION 54

The WRC calls on the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Standing Committee to institute accountability measures to prevent all sexual exploitation and abuse, including clear policies to hold perpetrators accountable in both humanitarian and development settings.

⁵ See www.codebluecampaign.com/.

BOX 9.4: CENTRAL AMERICAN DISPLACED WOMEN AND SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

The large-scale migration of Central American women and particularly unaccompanied children and adolescents to the north, crossing or increasingly staying in Mexico, has become a major policy issue. In 2014, 60,000 unaccompanied children and adolescents arrived at the US-Mexican border. Sexual and gender-based violence is common for women and girls making the dangerous journey from their homes in Central America through Mexico. It is estimated that six out of 10 migrant women and girls are victims of sexual violence carried out by illicit actors, government authorities and intimate partners. However, most of what is known is anecdotal and there is an urgent need for a stronger evidence base in order to inform policy. With the support of IDRC, ECAP (Equipo de Estudios Comunitarios y Acción Psicosocial) from Guatemala, Voces Mesoamericanas and the Center of Human Rights Fray Matias de Córdoba (the latter two both based in Chiapas, Mexico) jointly explore the conditions and causes of displacement of women, children and adolescents in Guatemala and the south of Mexico. This research project seeks to understand the forms and perpetrators of sexual violence being carried out against Central American women and to identify effective policies and practices to counter and prevent the violence. Based on participatory action research, the project proposes public policy recommendations to protect the rights and safety of Mesoamerican migrant and refugee women.

Source: Contributed by staff of IDRC.

Central American migrants, many fleeing violence, walk in a "caravan" on their way to the US border. An estimated six out of 10 migrant women and girls are victims of sexual violence. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)



CALL TO ACTION

Accountability to Refugees, IDPs and Host Communities

ACTION 55

The WRC commends efforts to increase accountability of humanitarian actors to refugees and IDPs and calls on both public and private donors to require that all of their beneficiaries put in place gender-responsive accountability measures.

and affect communities around the individuals as well as the individuals themselves. Women additionally face the stigma that can come from bearing and raising children born of rape; young girls frequently die from pregnancy when they are too young and small to give birth to a child; and women and girls are often shunned from families or communities and bear a huge burden of shame (ibid.).

There is growing awareness of sexual and gender-based violence in displacement settings as evidenced by the 2018 decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Nadia Murad, a Yazidi survivor of sexual violence from Iraq, and to Dr. Denis Mukwege, a Congolese physician known for his work in treating thousands of women who had been brutally raped during the the Democratic Republic of Congo's many years of conflict.

While there have been many studies, guidelines and training programs on sexual and gender-based violence (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2015), the fact that it remains so pervasive indicates that a different order of action is needed. Those responsible for protection and

assistance of refugees and IDPs need to be held personally accountable when sexual and gender-based violence occurs. Government officials at all levels, as well as UN and international and local NGOs, need to make it clear that perpetrators will be held accountable if these attacks occur in areas for which they are responsible. Significant investments need to be made to address the root causes of sexual and gender-based violence. Fundamentally, more work needs to be done to create environments that allow for greater gender equality and justice, overcoming toxic gender norms.

For the past two decades, humanitarian actors have considered how to be accountable to the people they serve — and not just to the donors that fund their work. From 2003 to 2015, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) was the locus of much of these discussions, developing standards by which NGOs could be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they were accountable to beneficiaries. In 2015, HAP merged with People in Aid to form the CHS Alliance, with CHS standing for the Common Humanitarian Standard.⁶ Humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR and many NGOs have developed various tools to ensure the participation of refugees and other affected communities in the assessment of needs and programmatic decisions. Still, much more needs to be done. As researcher Lubna Rashid told the Council in Berlin, “Many refugees don't trust foreign aid efforts or other organizations who claim to be helping them...Money ends up going to other large organizations and not civil society groups who are working directly with displaced people and where it would arguably be most effective and impactful.” This issue underscores the importance of including refugees,

such as through the Network for Refugee Voices, in programmatic and policy decision-making processes.

More specifically, women and youth are often left out of accountability mechanisms, because of the multiple barriers they face in meaningfully accessing and participating in these activities. True accountability to affected populations will only be achieved when all those who have been displaced have their voices heard. While some progress has been made to ensure that women not only participate but also take an active role in leadership and decision making, more needs to be done to ensure that such progress is systematic and sustainable.

⁶ See www.chsalliance.org/what-we-do/chs.

**I WELCOME
REFUGEES**



**NO BAN
NO WALL**



AMNESTY

**WELCOME
REFUGEES**



ten

TAKING THESE IDEAS FORWARD

This report lays out a number of bold calls to action which, taken together, would transform the present global system for refugees and IDPs. The WRC recognizes that this is an ambitious agenda for change, particularly given the present negative climate toward refugees, and that priorities will need to be set. Nonetheless, the Council is convinced that without bold change, the system will ultimately collapse. It will be replaced by a system in which states act unilaterally, taking some palliative action in countries they deem of strategic importance to them, while fortifying borders to keep out the rest. These actions will not only be ineffective in a globalized international system, but they will also lead to greater human suffering and a more insecure, unstable and divided world.

The consequences of failing to strengthen collective responses to displacement for our international rules-based order are deeply troubling, as evident in the progressive weakening of the European Union over the past few years because of its inability to develop a collective strategic approach responding to refugees and migrants. Many more millions of people in the future may be forced to flee their communities, and eventually

their countries, because of climate change. It is worth the effort to devote substantial resources of time, energy and funds to strengthen the present global refugee system to meet the needs of both today's and tomorrow's refugees and IDPs.

The Council supports the GCR process and will use resources at its disposal to mobilize support for the compact's adoption and implementation. But, as a United Nations process, it is necessarily limited by the need to achieve consensus among the 193 member states. The WRC is proposing a different model — a model to complement but also go beyond the UN global compacts process.

Implementation of this report's recommendations can help to build trust and foster political will. Together, the recommendations provide the basis for a "new deal" between refugee-hosting and donor states, supported by others, that will demonstrate the benefits of collective action and inspire the will needed to pursue multilateral responses to protection and solutions for refugees. The reforms around responsibility sharing, governance, finance and accountability can be used as incentives for host states to engage with the Global Action Network and be part of the coalition. They can also

Opposite page:
AP Photo/Frank
Augstein.

be used as opportunities to build trust among key constituencies and to foster a collaborative environment in which collective action can be advanced.

A Political Process: The Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced

The WRC calls for the establishment of a new independent partnership to promote changes to the global system for refugees and IDPs: the Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced (“The Global Action Network”).

The Global Action Network will be an independent political process operating outside the formal intergovernmental context. It will begin as a small group of committed governments and other actors who are willing to work together to bring about fundamental change in the way we respond to the needs of the forcibly displaced — both refugees and those displaced internally.

The Global Action Network will champion and lead change in the global refugee system — change that builds on and goes well beyond the GCR. As its momentum develops, others will join in. This approach draws on the political experience of members of the WRC who have seen first-hand what can be accomplished in a relatively short period of time by a nucleus of committed people working “from the outside in” for change in the world.

Why a network? A network gathers those with common interests and goals in a light and agile grouping. In contrast to a rigid structure of a top-down hierarchy, a network can shift and adapt as circumstances require, drawing on different actors depending on the issue, deploying task forces or creating ad hoc working groups as the need requires. The use of networks has contributed to the success of many ventures in the past, including the Human Security Network and the

Internet Governance Forum, as well as the network whose work resulted in the Paris Agreement on climate change.

Similarly, the Global Action Network proposed by the WRC can use a flexible series of groupings to advance its work in a number of ways, with the groupings changing in form and composition depending on the stage to which the work has progressed.

For example:

- Regionally balanced groups of experts can be asked by the network to draft the protocols to the 1951 Refugee Convention that the Council has recommended.
- Once experts have reached consensus, the network can mobilize civil society and NGOs to exert political pressure on decision makers to move the draft protocols into the formal treaty-making process.

Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland (right) greets counterparts (from left) Retno Lestari Priansari Marsudi (Indonesia) and Lindiwe Nonceba Sisulu (South Africa) at the Women Foreign Ministers meeting in Montreal. (Paul Chiasson/The Canadian Press via AP)



- The network's member states can then dispatch their heads of government or senior members to lead that process.

In the same way, refugee women and men can take the lead in developing a robust mechanism for holding those responsible for sexual and gender-based violence; leaders in financial markets can work with interested host governments to pilot innovative bond offerings to support refugees and IDPs; a particular donor agency can agree to take the lead in developing measures for more equitable funding of IDPs — all at the same time and all under the aegis of the Global Action Network and in service of its objectives.

Membership in the network will be open: to promote one reform, the network may enlist mayors and other local leaders; for another, it may look to regional organizations or provincial governors. Its fluid and dynamic nature means that the network's methods can be pragmatic, just as its approach will be practical.

In short, the network will provide the most flexible and effective way to marshal the energy and commitment of its disparate members — as they move in parallel on various fronts, at the same time, to advance the changes that are needed.

Who will be members of the Global Action Network? It is unlikely that the leadership required to respond to the WRC's calls to action will come from all 193 members of the United Nations at the same time. However, those governments that are prepared to respond can provide the catalyst for broader change.

The network can begin with mid-sized liberal democracies — such as the Nordic countries and Canada — that have historically developed international law and introduced new norms. Also welcome are states

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receiving large numbers of refugees and the mid-sized powerhouses of Latin America, Asia and Africa.

The network will not be limited to states. To this coalition must be added traditional humanitarian donors, major NGOs, municipal representatives and key actors from civil society, private sector business interests, and refugee and IDP representatives. The network will be intentionally broader than the traditional humanitarian and civil society sector. The global response to forced displacement requires a broader basis, and it can be provided by the coalition the Council proposes.

This model has been effective in many different contexts — from the Ottawa Treaty process to the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, and from the Platform on Disaster Displacement to the concept of the R2P.

How will the initial members of the network be invited to take part? The WRC — whose

members are drawn from every region of the globe — will begin the process, by encouraging their governments, members of civil society organizations and broader networks in their countries of origin to join.

Regional actors will thereby become part of a much broader network, one that can mobilize support and political pressure around the world. As momentum grows, other actors will join in, and the network will evolve.

The WRC hopes that many others — refugee voices, IDP associations, women's groups, universities, trade associations, mayors of host communities — will want to join in this movement for change. The network itself will ensure regional representation as it develops appropriate working methods.

What will be on the Global Action Network's agenda? Simply stated, the network's objective is to implement the WRC's calls to action.

All participants in the network will be expected to:

- Promote an equitable sharing among nations of responsibility for refugees, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
- Embrace the pursuit of greater accountability as proposed by the WRC, by insisting on consequences for those who cause forced displacement and for member states who do not do their part in responding when it occurs.
- Advocate for the meaningful inclusion of refugees and IDPs and, in particular, of those with special vulnerabilities, whether because of age, gender, sexual orientation, health status or a minority status.
- Address the great funding and institutional gaps between refugees and IDPs.
- Tap the potential of regional organizations' and global cities' networks to anticipate and respond to forced displacement and to convene appropriate parties in the search for solutions.

An early task for the network will be to find a way to ensure that, in its own work, the authentic voices of refugees and the internally displaced will be heard. This might be done by making modest funding available to enable refugees and IDPs to submit proposals to the network about how best to involve them in its deliberations.

The network may also want to further explore and promote innovations identified by the Council during its mandate. These include, for example, new technologies that might provide early warning that significant refugee flows may be imminent,

and better and more humane management of migration flows.

Are there particular tasks for those members of the network who are states? For those in the network who are states, there are several WRC calls to action that can be implemented immediately:

- adopting domestic legislation that empowers the government to confiscate frozen assets within their jurisdictions, and to repurpose those assets for the benefit of the population of the country of origin, with special consideration for the interests of the forcibly displaced;
- pursuing concessionary trade arrangements for the benefit of countries hosting large numbers of refugees — host countries — in order to ease the economic and political pressures experienced by these countries;
- encouraging international financial institutions to accord special consideration to host countries when establishing terms for loans and investments;
- convening and facilitating the operation of fora for private sector investors, to explore and create financial instruments by which the private sector can raise money for the benefit of the forcibly displaced;
- submitting to and participating in the multilateral reforms recommended by the Council, such as universal periodic peer review and annual assessed contributions for the UNHCR;
- adopting and promoting practices and policies that can change the negative narrative that so frequently attaches to refugees and asylum seekers; and

- working with other members of the network to advocate for a humane, balanced and honest characterization of the forcibly displaced.

What work will the other members of the network take on? All members of the network will contribute in their own way to the achievement of its objectives, whether through developing and sharing best practices, working at the community level to promote the private sponsorship of refugees, advocating for refugee-led organizations to be incorporated into institutional processes or lobbying officials of governments who have not yet joined the Global Action Network.

Will the network have a home base? The network may operate most often as a virtual entity, linking, sharing and planning through electronic communication. Ideally, however, the network will have a secretariat, to keep its records in an orderly fashion in a central place; organize its occasional meetings and workshops; circulate information about progress in various activities; publish reports about the network's activities and achievements; and support network members in their various efforts.

annex

STATISTICS ON DISPLACEMENT

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	NUMBER OF IDPs
Syria	6.3 million	6.784 million
Afghanistan	2.6 million	1.286 million
South Sudan	2.4 million	1.899 million
Myanmar	1.2 million	635,000
Somalia	986,400	825,000
Colombia	277	6.509 million
Democratic Republic of Congo	537,087	4.480 million
Iraq	277,672	2.648 million
Sudan	906,599	2.072 million
Yemen	270,919	2.014 million

Data sources: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2017); IDP figures from Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2018); refugee figures from UNHCR (2018b).

As the boxes below illustrate, refugees are hosted primarily by countries in the Global South.

TOP 10 HOSTING STATES AND SIZE OF ECONOMY

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	GDP (2017) US\$ (IN MILLIONS)
Turkey	3,500,000	851,102
Pakistan	1,400,000	304,952
Uganda	1,400,000	25,891
Lebanon	1,000,000	51,844
Iran	980,000	439,514
Germany	970,000	3,677,439
Bangladesh	930,000	249,724
Sudan	900,000	117,488
Ethiopia	890,000	80,561
Jordan	690,000	40,068

Notes: Total: 12.66 million refugees in top 10 hosting states, out of 20 million refugees worldwide (63 percent). These states' economies together account for seven percent of world GDP.

Data sources: UNHCR (2018b); World Bank GDP data, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDPMKTPCD>.

TOP 10 LARGEST ECONOMIES AND NUMBER OF REFUGEES HOSTED, 2017

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	GDP (2017) US\$ (IN MILLIONS)
United States	287,129	19,390,604
China	321,718	12,237,700
Japan	2,191	4,872,137
Germany	970,365	3,677,439
United Kingdom	121,937	2,622,434
India	197,146	2,597,491
France	337,177	2,582,501
Brazil	10,264	2,055,506
Italy	167,335	1,934,798
Canada	104,778	1,653,043

Note: Total: 2.5 million refugees in 10 largest economies, out of 20 million refugees worldwide (13 percent). These economies account for 67 percent of world GDP.

Data sources: UNHCR (2018b); World Bank GDP data, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDPMKTPCD>.

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Rafael Paredes Proaño	Ambassador of Ecuador	Embassy of Ecuador in Colombia
Monique Pariat	Director General, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection	European Commission
Champa Patel	Head of Asia-Pacific Programme	Chatham House
Lina Peña	Migration Program Manager	Caritas Colombiana
Luis Fernando Pérez	Program Officer	The Ford Foundation

NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
Stephanie Perham	Donor Relations Officer	UNHCR
Eleni Petraki	Head of Public Relations and Communications Office	Greek Asylum Service
Kate Philips-Barrasso	Director, Humanitarian Policy	InterAction (Humanitarian Financing)
Karen Pierce	UK Permanent Representative to the UN	UK Government
Surin Pitsuwan	WRC Councillor, 2017	
Eileen Pittaway	Council Member	Asian Women's Human Rights Council
Mark Plant	Director of Development Finance, Senior Policy Fellow	Centre for Global Development
Lev Plaves	Senior Portfolio Manager, Middle East	Kiva
Father Angelo Plodin		Scalabrinian Order, New York
Jennifer Poidatz	Vice President, Humanitarian Response	Catholic Relief Services
Fabrizio Poretti	Managing Director	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Lauren Post	Policy and Advocacy Advisor	International Rescue Committee
John Prendergast	Founding Director	Enough Project
Jonathan Price	Director for International Partners	Aspen Institute
Kaitlyn Pritchard	Second Secretary, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs	Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
Rafael Quintero	Coordinator, Minister Counsellor	Internal Working Group for the Determination of Refugee Status
Steven Rahman	Secretariat Member	InterAction
Marta Lucía Ramírez	Vice President-Elect of Colombia	Government of Colombia
Lucía Ramírez Bolívar	Researcher	Dejusticia
Lubna Rashid	Doctoral Candidate	Technical University of Berlin Center of Entrepreneurship
Killashandra Rashid	Program Officer, Global Affairs Canada	Government of Canada
Michael Ray	Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary	Western Digital
Nathaniel Raymond	Lecturer at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs; Founding Director of the Signal Program on Human Security and Technology	Yale University; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
Manyang Reath Kher	Founder	734Coffee (https://734coffee.com/)
Vanessa Redgrave	Actress and political activist	
Sarnata Reynolds	Policy Lead, Humanitarian Campaigning (Rights in Crisis)	Oxfam International
Anne Richard	Former Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration	Obama Administration (2012–2017)
Ariel Rivera Solari	Programme Development Manager	Norwegian Refugee Council
Maria Clara Robayo Leon	Researcher	Universidad del Rosario/ Observatori de Venezuela

NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
Ivan Roberts	Minister-Counsellor and Senior Director, Embassy of Canada in Ethiopia	Government of Canada
Maria Paula Rojas	Program Associate	The Ford Foundation
Liza Romanow	Communications Assistant for ASG Chair Madeleine Albright	Albright Stonebridge Group
Marco Romero Silva	Director	CODHES
Ben Roswell	Founder; Canada's Ambassador to Venezuela	Perennial Software; Global Affairs Canada
Janemary Ruhundwa	Country Director	Asylum Access Tanzania (AATZ)
Jannik Rust	Senior Project Manager	Robert Bosch Stiftung
Bonaventure Rutinwa	Secretary to Council and Corporate Counsel	University of Dar es Salaam
Bushrah Sabra	Youth Representative	Amman
Osama Salem	Founder	Network of Refugee Voices
Ana Caridad Sanchez	Program Associate, Latin America and Caribbean Program	The Carter Center
Elina Sarkisova	Consultant	IF4D and Kois Invest
Karina Sarmiento	Regional Director for Latin America	Asylum Access
Anna Sauerbrey	Editor; Opinion Writer	<i>Der Tagesspiegel</i> ; <i>New York Times International Edition</i>
Jason Schmaltz	International Development Officer of the Embassy of Canada	Government of Canada
Jamie Schnurr	Deputy Director — Operations, Bilateral Development Program, Embassy of Canada in Ethiopia	Government of Canada
Cornelia Schu	Managing Director of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, Director of the Expert Council's Research Unit	Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration
Gesine Schwan	President	Humboldt Viadrina Governance Platform
Eric Schwartz	President of Refugees International	Refugees International
Tenzin Seldon	Co-Founder and CEO	Kinstep
Claudie Senay	Political Counsellor	The High Commission of Canada in the United Kingdom
Stefano Severe	UNHCR Representative, Jordan	UNHCR
Emmanuel Shangweli	Executive Director	Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services
Jake Sherman	Director of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations	International Peace Institute
Michael Shifter	President	Inter-American Dialogue
Ambassador Yahya Simba	Deputy Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs	Ministry of Home Affairs, the United Republic of Tanzania
Hardeep Singh Puri	Union Minister of State, Independent Charge in the Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs	Indian Government

NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
Selene Soto	Senior Attorney	Women's Link Worldwide
Dominique Souris	CIGI Graduate Fellow	Balsillie School
Sanj Srikanthan	Executive Director	International Rescue Committee UK
Susan Stigant	Director of Africa Programs	US Institute of Peace
Laura Strömpel	Project Manager	Robert Bosch Stiftung
Ambassador William Swing	Director General	IOM
Sarah Taylor	Research Fellow	International Peace Institute
Frank Teeuwen	UN Senior Liaison	ADRA International
Yewbzaf Tesfaye	Private Secretary to the Commissioner of Social Affairs, Department of Social Affairs	African Union Commission
Sonya Thissen	Minister Counsellor	The High Commission of Canada in the United Kingdom
Alice Thomas	Climate Displacement Program Manager	Refugees International
Nadine Thwaites	Political Affairs Officer	Mission of Canada to the European Union
Shewaye Tike	Child and Youth Protection and Development Coordinator	International Rescue Committee
Leila Toplic	Lead, No Lost Generation Tech Taskforce	Net Hope
Cynthia Tregillis	Vice President, Global Brand Protection & Trademarks, Western Digital Corporation	Western Digital
Al Trenk	Chair	Exodus Institute
Andres Triviño	Program Officer	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Carlos Holmes Trujillo	Ambassador of Colombia and Foreign Minister-designate	Government of Colombia
Volker Turk	UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner for Protection	UNHCR
Christine L. Turner	Head, Global Policy	WhatsApp
Paul Twomey	Distinguished Fellow	CIGI
Radoslaw Tyszkiewicz	Counsellor, Economic and Social Affairs	Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the UN
Hamdi Ulukaya	Founder; Founder and CEO	Tent Partnership for Refugees; Chobani
Dar Vanderbeck	Chief Innovation Officer	CARE USA
Mandana Varahrami	Volunteer	Techfugees HQ
Roberto Vidal	Director and Professor	Group on Political & Legal Theory, Faculty of Law, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
Caitlyn Vito	Political Officer	The High Commission of Canada in the United Kingdom

NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
H.E. Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg	Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany	Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva
Peter Walsh	Country Director, Tanzania	Save the Children
Michael Watts	Immigration Manager	Embassy of Canada in Colombia
Najeeba Wazefadost	Chairperson	Australian National Committee On Refugee Women
Elisabeth Wilde	Deputy Permanent Representative of Australia	Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva
Christian Wolff	Programme Manager, Migration & Displacement	ACT Alliance
Brenda Woods	Program Manager, Global Security & Politics	CIGI
Maha Yahya	Director	Carnegie Middle East Center
Mark Yarnell	Senior Advocate, UN Liaison	Refugees International
Leah Zamore	Senior policy analyst	Centre for International Cooperation
Greta Zeender	Adviser on Internal Displacement	OCHA
H.E. Valentin Zellweger	Ambassador and Permanent representative of Switzerland	Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office and to the other international organizations in Geneva
Tamar Ziff	Program Assistant, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program	Inter-American Dialogue
Berthe Zinga Ilunga	Permanent Secretary	Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés, République Démocratique du Congo
H.E. Mr. Omar Zniber	Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco	Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva



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Robert Bosch Academy



biographies

ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE WRC

EXECUTIVES

Lloyd Axworthy, Chair

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy is the chair of the World Refugee Council and one of Canada's leading voices on global migration and refugee protection. After a 27-year political career, where he served as Canada's minister of Foreign Affairs and minister of Employment and Immigration, among other postings, Mr. Axworthy has continued to work extensively on human security, refugee protection and human rights in Canada and abroad. He was presented with the Pearson Peace Medal by the Governor General of Canada in May 2017. In his term as president and vice-chancellor of the University of Winnipeg, Mr. Axworthy initiated innovative programs for migrant and aboriginal youth communities, and has also done a great deal of work on refugee reform as a Richard von Weizsäcker fellow at Germany's Robert Bosch Academy.

Paul Heinbecker, Deputy Chair

Paul Heinbecker is a retired career diplomat and a former Canadian ambassador to Germany and permanent representative of Canada to the United Nations in New York City.

Paul was the first director of the Centre for Global Relations of Wilfrid Laurier University. He is a distinguished fellow in international relations at CIGI and also affiliated with the Balsillie School for International Relations. He is author of *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada*. His opinions are published frequently in *The Globe and Mail* and he also comments regularly on radio and television. He has advised three successive Canadian governments on foreign policy.

Hina Jilani, Co-chair

Hina Jilani is an internationally respected activist on human rights and democracy. She led the establishment of the first Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and has served as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights Defenders. She currently serves as a lawyer and advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Jakaya Kikwete, Co-chair

His Excellency Jakaya Kikwete, former President of Tanzania, is a regional leader on migration and refugee policy. As Tanzania's President, he led the naturalization of 162,156

Opposite page:
Councillor Aya
Chebbi (standing)
and research
associate Bushra
Ebadi (seated, far
right) speak with
youth in Berlin
about co-creating
solutions for the
refugee system.
(CIGI/Anita Back)

refugees from Burundi. To this day this is considered the highest number of refugees to be naturalized at once, and one of the most powerful precedents of state-driven generosity towards refugees in the region.

Fen Osler Hampson, Executive Director

Fen Osler Hampson is a CIGI distinguished fellow and the director of CIGI's Global Security & Politics Program. Most recently, he served as director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and as co-director of the Global Commission on Internet Governance. Fen currently serves as chancellor's professor at Carleton University and continues to provide leading research and insight to policy makers in the areas of Canadian foreign policy and international and regional security.

Rita Süßmuth, Co-chair

Rita Süßmuth is a German politician and scholar. She has served as president of the German Federal Parliament (1988–1998) and as federal minister for Family Affairs, Women, Youth and Health (1985–1988). Before that, she was professor at different universities. Her main topics are HIV, education, woman and society. An expert on migration, she has chaired several advisory councils, such as the Independent Commission on Migration in 2000, and was a member of the UN-Global Commission on International Migration (2003–2005). At present, she is a member of the Transatlantic Council on Migration at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC.

COUNCILLORS

Pamela Aall

Pamela Aall is a senior fellow with CIGI's Global Security & Politics program. She is currently leading a project that examines Africa's regional conflict management capacity. Pamela is also a senior adviser for conflict prevention and management at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), where she was founding provost of USIP's Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding. Pamela's research interests include conflict management, mediation, reconciliation, capacity-building, and education. In addition to her research and management work, she has directed conflict transformation and capacity-building programs for Sudan, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Bosnia.

Shaima Al Zarooni

Her Excellency Shaima Al Zarooni is the founder and president of Camp01, a US-based public benefit corporation, which enables partners and clients to plan and manage humanitarian and development projects worldwide for vulnerable populations. She is also the vice-president and a board member of the August Medical Foundation, which provides services and grants in health care and education. She also serves on the board of trustees of the UK Start Network, comprised of 42 aid agencies, whose aim is to enable members to deliver aid in crises. Previously, she was the director of Special Initiatives for HRH Princess Haya Bint Al Hussein and the chief executive officer of the International Humanitarian City, the largest worldwide logistics hub of humanitarian aid and emergency response.

Alexander Betts

Alexander Betts is professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs, and director of the Refugee Studies Centre, at the University of Oxford. His research focuses mainly on the political economy of refugee assistance, and he has also written on migration and humanitarianism. He has given TED talks on refugees and Brexit, with combined views in excess of three million. In 2016, he was named by *Foreign Policy* magazine as one of the world's top 100 global thinkers, and was honoured as a World Economic Forum Young Global Leader. He has written for *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and *Foreign Affairs*. He is the author of 10 books, including, with Paul Collier, *Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System*. He previously worked for the UNHCR and is the founder of the Humanitarian Innovation Project. He is a former European Universities Debating Champion and has run the London Marathon in 2:38.

Aya Chebbi

Aya Chebbi is an award-winning pan-African feminist and renowned blogger. Her blogs were published at Al Jazeera, OpenDemocracy and Foresight Africa, among other media. Aya is the co-founder of the Voice of Women Initiative (feminist collective) and founding chair of Afrika Youth Movement, one of Africa's largest pan-African youth-led movements. She previously worked as Africa and Middle East Programs Director at World Peace Initiative Foundation and currently sits on the board of directors of CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation and the Advisory Committee of FRIDA Young Feminist Fund. Over the span of seven years, Aya supported, mentored and worked with hundreds

of youth on empowerment and peace-building projects, blogging, advocacy and mobilization. In recognition to her achievements, Aya received Women4Africa Award in London and appeared on top lists of people to watch, including at the *Huffington Post* and 100 under 40 Most Influential Africans. As Mo Ibrahim Foundation Scholar, Aya holds her master's degree in African politics from SOAS, University of London.

Sarah Cliffe

Sarah Cliffe is the director of New York University's Center on International Cooperation (CIC). Prior to this, she was the special representative for the *World Bank's World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development*, and the special adviser and assistant secretary-general of civilian capacities to the United Nations. Sarah has worked for the last 20 years in countries emerging from conflict and political transition. For the past two years, CIC has been supporting new ways of working in humanitarian crises, publishing two UN interagency think pieces, entitled *Addressing Protracted Displacement: A Framework for Development-Humanitarian Cooperation* and *After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian-Development Cooperation for Sustainable Results on the Ground*.

Jérôme Elie

Jérôme Elie is the senior policy officer forced displacement for the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). He is the lead on topics and issues related to forced displacement and also manages ICVA's work promoting civil society engagement in the development of a "Refugee Compact."

Jonathan Fanton

Jonathan Fanton currently serves as the president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Previously, he served as the president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the New School for Social Research. He has served as board chair for several organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the Security Council Report and the New York State Commission on Independent Colleges and Universities. He currently serves on the boards of Scholars at Risk, the Asian Cultural Council and the Benjamin Franklin House, and chairs the advisory board of the Newman's Own Foundation.

Leymah Gbowee

Leymah Gbowee is a recipient of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize. A long-time Liberian peace activist, social worker and women's rights advocate, Leymah is the founder and president of the Gbowee Peace Foundation Africa, based in Monrovia. Leymah is best known for leading a nonviolent movement that brought together Christian and Muslim women to play a pivotal role in ending Liberia's devastating, 14-year civil war in 2003. This historic achievement paved the way for the election of Africa's first female head of state, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. It also marked the vanguard of a new wave of women emerging worldwide as essential and uniquely effective participants in brokering lasting peace and security.

Per Heggenes

Per Heggenes is the CEO of the IKEA Foundation, the philanthropic arm of IKEA, the home furnishing company. For years, he has led IKEA's philanthropic work in areas such as migration and humanitarian relief, as

well as in development work focused on helping children and youth in poor communities to better opportunities in life. Prior to joining the foundation, he held various international leadership roles in private sector organizations such as Burson-Marsteller and Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics.

Susan Martin

Susan Martin is the Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emerita of International Migration at Georgetown University. She was the founder of the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and currently serves as chair of the Thematic Working Group on Environmental Change and Migration in the Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development at the World Bank. Previously, Susan served as the executive director of the US Commission on Immigration Reform, established by legislation to advise Congress and the US president on immigration and refugee policy.

Marwan Muasher

Marwan Muasher is a vice president for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington and Beirut on the Middle East. He served as foreign minister (2002–2004) and deputy prime minister (2004–2005) of Jordan, and his career has spanned the areas of diplomacy, development, civil society and communications.

Devota Nuwe

Devota Nuwe is a lawyer who currently works with HIAS Refugee Trust of Kenya (Uganda office). In this position, Devota manages the operations and acts as the focal person for HIAS in Uganda. She has also worked with the

UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on forced migration issues. Devota received a Bachelor of Law degree from Makerere University, Uganda, and a master's degree in criminal justice from the University of Kent, England.

Ratna Omidvar

Senator Ratna Omidvar is an internationally recognized voice on migration, diversity and inclusion. In April 2016, she was appointed to the Senate of Canada as an independent senator representing Ontario, and she also serves as co-chair of the Global Future Council on migration hosted by the World Economic Forum. Senator Omidvar is a Member of the Order of Canada and a recipient of the Cross of the Order of Merit from Germany. She continues to work on issues of inequality and immigration in Canada.

George Papandreou

George A. Papandreou is a former prime minister of Greece (2009–2011). First elected as a member of Parliament in 1981, he has served at many governmental posts. As the minister of education (1988–1989), he founded the Open University in Greece and promoted multicultural programs. As the minister of foreign affairs (1999–2004), he promoted peace building and European integration in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans and managed a breakthrough in Greek-Turkish relations. In 2015, he founded, with Ipek Cem, the Cem-Papandreou Peace Award. He is the leader of the Movement of Democratic Socialists, one of the members of the Democratic Alignment, a coalition of Greek progressive parties. He is the president of the Socialist International, which brings together 150 political parties and groups from all continents.

Nirupama Menon Rao

Nirupama Menon Rao is a retired Indian diplomat, foreign secretary and ambassador. She was educated in India and joined India's foreign service in 1973. She was the first woman in India to be a spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, as well as the first woman to serve as high commissioner to Sri Lanka and to represent India as ambassador to the People's Republic of China. She served as India's foreign secretary from 2009 to 2011. At the end of that term, she was appointed India's ambassador to the United States, where she served from 2011 to 2013.

Güven Sak

Güven Sak is the executive director of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), and a professor of public economics at the TOBB University of Economics and Technology. Previously, he worked as a senior researcher at the Capital Markets Board of Turkey, taught in the Department of Public Finance at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University, and was as an external founding member of the Monetary Policy Council of the Central Bank of Turkey. In 2004, Güven became the founding managing director of TEPAV, the first and only economic policy think tank in Turkey. The Area Studies Program of TEPAV, which he directed, has been active in entrepreneurship and private sector development projects in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Güven co-chaired the Forced Migration Task Force of the Think 20 during the German presidency of the Group of Twenty in 2016–2017.

Eduardo Stein

Eduardo Stein is a regional leader on peace building and conflict management. Eduardo has served as the vice president of Guatemala from 2004 to 2008 and as the foreign minister of Guatemala from 1996 to 2000, and has since taken on a leadership role in coordinating the Central American network of think tanks. Best known for his role in the Guatemalan peace process, Eduardo continues to work on issues of peace building, governance and migration. In September 2018, Eduardo was appointed joint special representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants by the UN Refugee Agency and the UN Migration Agency.

Jessie Thomson

Jessie Thomson is a civil society leader on international refugee protection. She is currently the senior director of CARE Canada's Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Team and has worked with CARE for the last six years. She has worked as a protection delegate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in Pakistan, and as a senior policy adviser at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, leading policy development related to refugees and Canada's relationship with the UNHCR. Jessie is also co-chair of an Ottawa-based private sponsorship of refugees group supporting a newly arrived Syrian refugee family and sits on the board of the Ottawa Community Immigrant Services Organization.

ADVISERS

Elizabeth Ferris, Special Adviser

Elizabeth Ferris is a research professor with the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She also serves as a non-resident senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. From January to September 2016, she also served as senior adviser to the UN General Assembly's Summit for Refugees and Migrants in New York. She is an expert in the areas of migration, refugee protection and humanitarian assistance, and continues to conduct research and lead projects in these areas.

James Milner, Research Director


James Milner is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. His research and publications over the past 20 years have examined the politics of the global refugee regime, the history of the UNHCR, protracted refugee situations and the politics of asylum in the Global South. James has worked as a consultant for the UNHCR in India, Cameroon and Guinea and at its Geneva headquarters.

Allan Rock, Special Adviser

Allan Rock is the president emeritus and a professor of law at the University of Ottawa. A former trial lawyer, he entered politics in 1993 and spent 10 years as a federal cabinet minister in the Justice, Health, Industry and Infrastructure portfolios. Allan was Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations between 2003 and 2006 and the president of the University of Ottawa from 2008 to 2016.

Andrew S. Thompson, Special Adviser

Andrew S. Thompson is a CIGI senior fellow, and adjunct assistant professor of political science at the University of Waterloo. His research focuses on international human rights, civil society movements and fragile states. Along with numerous journal articles and book chapters, he has written two books, and co-edited three others. He has testified before the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, and the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights. From 2011 to 2017, he served on the board of Amnesty International's Canadian Section. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Waterloo.



acronyms and abbreviations

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany)
CHS	Common Humanitarian Standard
CIGI	Centre for International Governance Innovation
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
ECAP	Equipo de Estudios Comunitarios y Acción Psicosocial
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FIAA	Foreign Illicit Assets Act
G20	Group of Twenty
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GRSI	Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPRDP	intergovernmental panel on refugees and displaced persons
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LIC	low-income countries
LMIC	low- and middle-income countries

Opposite page:
Launch of the WRC
at Global Affairs
Canada in May
2017. (CIGI/Chris
Roussakis)

Mercosur	Southern Common Market
MFN	most-favoured-nation
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PEPs	politically exposed persons
PKOs	peacekeeping operations
PSR	Private Sponsorship of Refugees
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SRSR	special representative of the Secretary-General
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees/UN Refugee Agency
UN OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency
WRC	World Refugee Council
WTO	World Trade Organization

ABOUT CIGI

We are the Centre for International Governance Innovation: an independent, non-partisan think tank with an objective and uniquely global perspective. Our research, opinions and public voice make a difference in today's world by bringing clarity and innovative thinking to global policy making. By working across disciplines and in partnership with the best peers and experts, we are the benchmark for influential research and trusted analysis.

Our research programs focus on governance of the global economy, global security and politics, and international law in collaboration with a range of strategic partners and support from the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario, as well as founder Jim Balsillie.

ABOUT THE WORLD REFUGEE COUNCIL

There are more than 21 million refugees worldwide. Over half are under the age of 18. As a growing number of these individuals are forced to flee their homelands in search of safety, they are faced with severe limitations on the availability and quality of asylum, leading them to spend longer in exile today than ever before.

The current refugee system is not equipped to respond to the refugee crisis in a predictable or comprehensive manner. When a crisis erupts, home countries, countries of first asylum, transit countries and destination countries unexpectedly find themselves coping with large numbers of refugees flowing within or over their borders. Support from the international community is typically ad hoc, sporadic and woefully inadequate.

Bold Thinking for a New Refugee System

The UNHCR led a consensus-driven effort to produce a new Global Compact for Refugees in 2018. The WRC, established in May 2017 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, is intended to complement its efforts.

The WRC seeks to offer bold strategic thinking about how the international community can comprehensively respond to refugees based on the principles of international cooperation and responsibility sharing. The Council is comprised of thought leaders, practitioners and innovators drawn from regions around the world and is supported by a research advisory network.

Centre for International
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