



Research Paper

Tunisia as a Pathfinder for Peace, Justice and Inclusion: Progress, challenges and contributions to solutions

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Executive Summary

Tunisia has made exceptional progress in democratic transition in the eight years since the Jasmine Revolution. Its transition is not complete, and 2019 is an important electoral year when continued national efforts and international support will be needed.

But in comparison to other democratic and post-conflict countries, gains in peaceful political inclusion and some aspects of governance have been remarkably fast and comprehensive. **Indeed, the transition made in voice and accountability is on track to be the fastest in history** and some other governance markers are not far behind.

Although these issues will again be debated in the 2019 election, **the society has made enormous progress in resolving the existential crisis of power and identity in the political sphere that other countries in the region and beyond have faced**—between secularist and Islamist values, on participation and decentralization versus authority and hierarchy, and on the role of men and women in society. This does not mean that everyone agrees on these questions, but that most leaders and citizens have found modes of compromise on how to address them.

Tunisian society now faces a different type of challenge, of contestation less about the vision of society and more about “who pays and who benefits.” **In other words, the compromises needed now are less about values and more about interests.** To address this, we recommend an evidence-based fiscal dialogue, even stronger investment in economic inclusion and community participation, and a “window case” approach to corruption and transitional justice.

Many of Tunisia’s international partners have prioritized governance-related assistance to Tunisia in the years since the Revolution. One question prevalent amongst donors is whether this has delivered results, and whether governance progress is fast enough. Comparison with other countries indicates that, combined with strong Tunisian leadership, it has indeed delivered results. As noted above, Tunisia is on track to have one of the fastest governance transitions in history. For international partners, it is often easy to forget how long it took to build sustained progress in other countries, and how well Tunisia is doing in comparison. In particular since 2019 is an election year, moderating expectations over further governance reforms that create winners and losers may be important.

A further question for the government and its partners in the international community is whether the focus on governance should continue at the same level. Here it may be important to think about the evolution of risks. In the early period after the revolution there were indeed many risks around basic governance issues. At the current moment, the risks appear to have shifted to the contestation in the socio-economic arena—the fiscal balance, jobs, lagging regions, and rural-urban migration. While some risks in areas such as political governance and justice certainly continue, it is a valid question to ask whether a higher proportion of domestic resources and international aid should be dedicated to address risks related to socio-economic issues.

In summary, Tunisia has important positive lessons on solutions to contribute to other Pathfinder countries in political inclusion, gender equality, voice and accountability, and aspects of justice reform. It has launched innovative programs to support youth entrepreneurship. It also faces challenges common to other members in on-going reforms: including the politics of pro-equity fiscal reform; youth employment; bridging with populations in lagging regions; and broader administrative reform to improve citizen security, access to justice and government effectiveness.



1. Introduction

This analysis is a result of the **Pathfinders mission on Peace, Justice, Inclusion and Inequality**, held between 16 and 20 December 2018. It lays out some ideas to frame the progress made in Tunisia and the challenges remaining. The Pathfinders mission proposes that the final note be used to underpin a series of events with other Pathfinder member states in 2019—as well as within Tunisia if the authorities desire.

2. Framing the achievements in comparison with other democratic transitions

Above all, Tunisia has achieved a peaceful transition, preventing the conflict that has plagued other countries in the region and expanding inclusion. Notable achievements include:

- The process of political compromise between labor, business, civil society, and political parties which produced the 2014 constitution and subsequent government arrangements.
- An impressive volume of legislation and statutory action protecting freedom of expression and other basic human rights. The establishment of important constitutional organs to protect human rights, including the human rights council and the commission against torture (the first in the Arab world).
- The promotion of gender equality through legislative protection and actual political representation.
- Significant action—while not complete—on transitional justice and justice reform.

2.1 Peaceful and inclusive political dialogue

Post-revolution Tunisia is known worldwide for its inclusive political dialogue, recognized in the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. The Pathfinders mission was privileged to meet with labor, civil society, and political party leadership who had been deeply involved in this process. Key lessons include:

- **Bringing activists and followers along with political leadership.** The Tunisian process of 2013-14 was lucky to have organizations with a significant degree of internal accountability, including the trade unions, business, human rights and lawyers' associations, and the two main political parties. These organizations invested strongly in internal communication, and political party leadership was prepared to take risks ("leadership will resign if this does not work") to bring along their base.
- **Rapid action.** Several of the organizations involved acted rapidly to signal rising risks, for example, early statements after the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi.
- **An alignment of immediate compromises with long term interests.** The regional situation made this starkly evident, but all actors recognized the relationship of short-term compromise with their longer-term institutional strength.
- **Persistence.** The national dialogue which won the Nobel Prize was the second attempt, the first having failed: UGTT, the trade union federation was an early actor in both processes. The national dialogue was not the first or last transition moment to have been successfully negotiated, just the best known. Even the political tensions of 2018 may be viewed favorably as addressing some basic shared values around the central authority imbued in the former Presidential system and the parliamentary, a more decentralized system established in the 2014 constitution.

The results of Tunisia's continued attention to political dialogue and inclusion show in international ratings, with the country having moved from 9.4 points in 2010 to 39.7 points in 2017 (on the 0-100 scale) in the V-Dem's Participatory Democracy Index.



2.2 Governance, freedom of expression and protection of human rights

Progress on voice and accountability is particularly striking. If the World Bank World Development Report 2011 table on the faster institutional transformations worldwide was to be re-run today, Tunisia would be on track to qualify as the fastest transformation in voice and accountability since WWII (see Table 1). This measurement, taken from the World Governance Indicators covers a wide number of indicators on freedom of expression and association, conduct of elections, and transparency of state operations.

Table 1. Tunisia’s progress in relation to other transitions on voice and accountability

Indicator	Fastest 20 transitions	Fastest single country	Tunisia (if progress continues at ave. pace since revolution)
Voice and accountability	36	25	14 (2024)

2.3 Promoting gender equality

While the mission was in Tunisia debate was ongoing in regard to the law proposed by the government on equal inheritance rights for men and women. If approved, this will be the first in the Arab world. It builds on a series of legislative achievements since the Revolution:

- The Parity Law in 2011: Made it obligatory for parties to have 50 percent women for the Constituent Assembly and on their electoral lists
- Two far-reaching articles in the 2014 constitution on gender equality:
 - Article 21 which deals with equal rights and responsibilities of citizens was the center of debate over whether “equality” of men and women should be replaced with “complementarity”—“equality” prevailed.
 - Article 46, the result of a collaboration between Islamist and secular female parliamentarians and civil society activists, making it a responsibility of the state to protect women’s rights, and guarantee equal opportunities and parity in elective councils, as well as to work to eradicate violence against women.
- The 2017 Law to Eliminate Violence against Women: recognized as the best in the region and among the best in the world., working together with the amendment to the penal code to remove impunity for rape in the case of marriage to the victim.

The results in terms of political inclusion are impressive. Tunisia has a higher percentage of women in the national assembly than the United Kingdom, France, or the United States. In the recent local elections, 47% of new elected councilors are women and 37% under the age of thirty-five (compared with an average of 25% women local councilors across Europe).

2.4 Reforms in the justice sector

Important efforts have since been made to improve the independence and impartiality of the justice sector and to account for past human rights abuses. While incomplete, these actions have been a central part of preventing the recurrence of conflict:

- The 2014 Constitution created a **Supreme Judicial Council** that has the authority to review draft laws relative to the judicial system and make decisions on judges’ careers and disciplinary measures applied towards them.
- The government initiated a **transitional justice process**, including a Truth and Dignity Commission (which



recently concluded its work), a reparations fund for victims of the previous regime, and a special court to prosecute cases referred by the Truth and Dignity Commission. While the work of the Truth and Dignity Commission has caused some controversy, it has given an important platform to communicate the personal experiences of victims and press for accountability.

- It has **developed progressive legislation**, such as its reform of the Criminal Procedure Code to guarantee detainees the right to access a lawyer.

These reforms are also reflected in progress on international indicators. The World Governance Indicators show Tunisia as on track to equal the fastest transition in rule of law since World War II if the progress made since 2014 is continued (*see Table 2 overleaf*). It should however be noted that there are still significant challenges in this area: as is common to many transitions (because rule of law depends heavily on capacity as well as accountability), the rule of law situation actually deteriorated in some aspects immediately after the revolution and only started to recover from after 2013. A comprehensive reform of police and justice services is yet to be completed. There is still a need for vigilance, leadership, and considerable investment in reform and follow through to keep progress on track.

Table 2: Tunisia’s progress in relation to other transitions on rule of law (adapted from WDR2011)

Indicator	Fastest 20 transitions	Fastest single country	Tunisia (if progress continues at ave. pace since revolution)
Rule of law	57	34	17 (2027)

This does not of course mean that all is rosy. On government effectiveness, the situation is difficult (see below), and a central conclusion of the Pathfinders mission was a need to address the widening gap between legislation and implementation. Even on the legal framework, progress is incomplete: a central constitutional reform, the establishment of the constitutional court, has been delayed for four years. But overall governance reform is impressive, more so because other democratic transitions, from Latin America to South Africa, to Eastern Europe to Indonesia, took place in a much easier regional and global climate than Tunisia has faced.

3. Challenges and contributions to solutions

Tunisia faces four key challenges:

- **There is a disconnect between legislative progress and implementation**, combined with poor economic growth and rising prices, such that poor communities and the middle class see few dividends of the Revolution in their daily lives. This is common to many democratic transitions but nonetheless crucial to address. A similar disconnect is seen in the justice and security sectors, where legislative reforms (such as the right to a lawyer) have not yet translated to reality for people interacting with the justice system. Additionally, the 2014 Constitution’s provision for a Constitutional Court has not yet been realized. Because government effectiveness has deteriorated since the Revolution (from 0.22 to 0.07 in the World Governance Indicators), it is an urgent area for action.
- **Implementation cannot be addressed without fiscal reform.** The fiscal situation is very constrained, and there is a high degree of political and social tension on how to address this. The essential factor constraining the type of political compromise for which the country was recognized in the Nobel Peace Prize appears to be growing levels of suspicion that some societal groups are paying more than others and benefitting less (by socio-economic class, by region, by generation, by public versus private sector employment, by adherence to political party). In other words, the compromises required now are less about values and more about interests.
- **The neighborhood makes fiscal reform more difficult without continued strong external assistance.** Some of Tunisia’s loss of revenues and increased expenditures are spurred not by domestic dynamics



but by the international environment (for example: loss of economic activity came from the spillover of the Libyan conflict), and spending on security which has trebled in the budget to deal with international, as well as domestic demands for counter-terrorism action and the management of migration.

- **Some regions and groups remain particularly far behind and require ambitious policy action and investment.** Regional divides remain high in Tunisia. The decentralization process envisaged in the constitution has started to address this, but resources in lagging regions remain constrained and internal mobility is low. Youth unemployment is high at 36.3 percent. There is a particular imbalance in the percentage of unemployed graduates, which stands at 42 percent nationally and is most likely higher percent amongst young women. This is a risk for future prosperity and for social stability.

Tunisia has strong international support, but this also faces some challenges right now. The first is around expectations for the speed of institutional reform. While some of the issues at the center of donor preoccupations are longstanding and indeed appear justifiably central to future stability—the constitutional court, for example—others may be too ambitious for the environment. Fiscal reform, as argued above, is central to Tunisia’s challenges. It also takes significant political capital to pursue. An initial list in a meeting with international missions of desired reforms included wage restraint, reforming pensions, reforming state-owned enterprises, eliminating fuel subsidies, and expanding the tax base. While all of these are issues that Tunisian society will have to grapple with in the not-too-distant future, few if any other countries would be able to take all of this on in an election year. One only has to look across the Mediterranean to see the risks inherent in reforms that are not preceded by robust national dialogue.

A second challenge is over the focus of international assistance. After the events of late 2010, international development aid channeled to Tunisia doubled in size, reaching the level of 935 million \$US in 2015, equivalent of 2.37% of its GNI. Much of the assistance went into governance-related areas: areas where Tunisia has performed well in comparison to other countries in democratic transition. While there are significant investments in long-term growth through infrastructure, there is less emphasis on reducing inequalities and increasing cohesion, issues that the government and civil society leaders recognize as priorities going forward. For example, only two out the top seven bilateral donors refer to equality and social cohesion as a priority for their assistance strategies. None of those biggest donors currently focus strongly on pro-equality fiscal reforms in their priorities. At the current moment, the risks appear to have shifted to the contestation in the socio-economic arena—the fiscal balance, jobs, lagging regions, and rural-urban migration. While some risks in areas such as political governance and justice certainly continue, it is a valid question to ask whether a higher proportion of domestic resources and international aid should be dedicated to address risks related to socio-economic issues.

Table 3. Top three priorities stated by each of the seven biggest bilateral donors and the World Bank

	EU	Germany	France	AFESD	Japan	Italy	USA	World Bank
Priority 1	Promote good governance and the rule of law	Sustainable economic development	Boosting youth training programmes	Water management infrastructure (dams)	Domestic Reforms aiming at Impartial Political and Administrative Management	Agricultural development	Inclusive Private Sector Employment Increase	Good governance
Priority 2	Invest in the future: stimulating sustainable economic growth and generating jobs	Administrative reform and decentralization	Sustainable development throughout the country	Transportation infrastructure (highways)	Sustainable Industrial Development	Employment policy and administrative engagement	Social Cohesion Promoted through Democratic Consolidation	Shifting from an economy characterized by low value-added productivity and low-wage jobs to a “hub economy”
Priority 3	Strengthen social cohesion between generations and regions	Resource protection (water and energy)	Promoting sustainable agriculture, improving water protection and management	Health infrastructure (hospitals)	Human Resource Development to Undertake Domestic Industrial Development	Primary education	<i>Gender, youth, and geographic integration</i>	Promoting human development and social inclusion



3.1 Ideas for solutions

Tunisia shares challenges that have been identified by other Pathfinder countries: there would be interest from other countries in exchanging on solutions during 2019 and beyond. These include:

- The politics of pro-equity fiscal reform
- Supporting youth employment and social inclusion, including support for entrepreneurship, internal mobility, and vocational training.
- Bridging divides with disadvantaged regions, including community-based investments, poles of development, and access to housing to facilitate internal mobility
- How to improve delivery of and promote trust in the justice and security sectors
- How to mitigate spillovers from conflict in neighboring countries

3.2 Ideas—pre-election

Before the 2019 election there will be little bandwidth for new grand plans for reform: no country finds it easy to do this in an electoral year. The ideas below focus on what can be done within existing capacities, and on laying the basis for more comprehensive solutions after elections are completed.

- **Communicating Tunisia's progress and maintaining domestic and international support for gains made.** As noted above, while both citizens and international partners manifest some frustration, Tunisia is in fact making very fast progress on certain aspects of its transition. Communicating this could be a threefold effort:
 - *Communicating the average timelines in other countries and the progress Tunisia has made*, based on independent evidence, to help to manage expectations amongst citizens and international partners.
 - *Addressing vulnerabilities to a push for strong international support.* Obvious short-term vulnerabilities include the lack of progress on the constitutional court; disruption to schools and other governmental labor disputes; and slow disbursement of existing donor funds. The constitutional court is a key institutional provision and has been delayed for four years; the school strikes have disrupted exams for teenagers who already face a hard future in the job market. The funds of several donors, already approved on their side, are held up by delays in Parliament or in slow procurement and project management processes. This is important to resolve, since if existing funds are unspent the argument for additional funding is weaker.
 - *Making some specific arguments for additional support in the 2019-20 electoral period.* Tunisia is a highly strategic transition: the only survivor of the democratic movements of the Arab Spring; central to the efforts to prevent violent extremism and to manage migration. Yet while it has received a good deal of international support (Net ODA of \$627.4 million in 2016–1.5 percent of GDP), this is less in real terms than in case of other strategic transitions—for example South Korea (5-6 percent of GDP on average between 1960-1980)—received. Support from the European Union, while higher than other countries in the region is not close to that provided for other transition situations of strategic importance, such as the Balkans. Support from the IFIs has been high but is now reaching caps; Tunisia does not benefit from new concessional financing facilities. An argument could be made to access these based on the spillover effects of the Libya conflict.



New thinking on economic inclusion and youth employment

There was a general consensus amongst Tunisians interviewed of the need for new thinking on youth economic inclusion. The Minister of Employment noted the need to provide for different characteristics of youth facing challenges in finding productive employment and income resilience, including youth in different regions and those with higher levels of qualification and risk-taking characteristics. Tunisia is developing, implementing or piloting the following initiatives to address these different groups:

- **Urban Development and Local Government Program.** The Government is working towards decentralizing capital investments to municipalities, with the support of the World Bank and other donors. The national program aims to strengthen local governments performance to deliver municipal infrastructure, with specific targets to reach disadvantaged neighborhoods, the program is also supporting the capacity of local actors in border regions and less advantageous parts of urban areas to identify and address grievances related to real and perceived exclusion. This support benefits new locally elected authorities (elected freely for the first time), who took their offices in the second half of 2018.
- **Support for start-ups and entrepreneurship.** In April 2018 the Start Up Law, developed in consultation between Government and the private sector, laid out an innovative framework for support to start ups. It includes tax exemptions for startups for up to eight years, giving public and private sector employees one year to set up a new business after which they have the right to return to their old jobs, and a state-funded salary for up to three founders per company during the first year of operations. The “new generation of entrepreneurs” initiative also aims to support small enterprises in the sectors of road maintenance, environment and ICT. The quantitative evaluation of the program shows that since its launch in 2014 the measures undertaken have led to quite encouraging outcomes.
- **"Social and solidarity economy."** A new law, developed in consultation with UGTT, is under preparation by government. The draft law presents a reference framework for the social and solidarity economy, which defines in particular criteria to distinguish social enterprises, the conditions of their financial management and the creation of a government entity for their supervision called "the High Council of the Social and Solidarity Economy." The social and solidarity economy is understood as the set of activities of companies that aim to meet common needs and societal interests, and for which profit sharing is not a main objective
- **Vocational training.** The National Development Plan 2016-2020 places considerable emphasis on increasing vocational training opportunities and making them more responsive to labor market demands.
- **Support for youth unemployed before their first job.** At present, the social contract provides only for assistance to those who have lost their job, and hence excludes youth who are unable to find employment when they first enter the labor market. New initiatives include thinking on how to involve those representing unemployed youth and future workers and entrepreneurs in tripartite discussions: these already include the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fisheries (UTAP French acronym).



- **Deepening a dialogue on socio-economic issues before the election, in order to increase political consensus on reforms.** Almost all those whom the mission consulted with agreed that the central political questions are now primarily socio-economic and related to perceptions of fairness. Disagreements over “who pays and who benefits” from reform seem liable to hold up further progress on peace, justice, inequality, and inclusion unless addressed. Ideas for ways forward to lay the basis for solutions after the 2019 elections include:
 - *Requesting a neutral actor to support the provision of information and platforms for debate, provided neutrally to all political parties, on social and economic policies before the 2019 elections.*
 - *Estimating the equity/inclusion impacts of state policies and the tripartite social accord on different societal groups, covering taxation, expenditure (including subsidies), and gains or losses from the policy and regulatory framework such as monopoly rents. Considering the equity impact of one set of policies at a time—for instance income tax—does not give a full picture: one group may pay higher tax than another but if they receive even more in gains from state expenditure or regulation, they are still better off. Actual evidence on current impact may help inform renewed compromise, in particular if the analysis is conveyed in easy-to-absorb terms.*
 - Encouraging Tunisian civil society to monitor and report on economic and social investments.

3.3 Ideas—to develop during 2019 for implementation post-election

The longer-term challenges for Tunisia in the area of peace, justice, and inclusion focus on transforming an economy that was corporatist, state-led, and focused in a few areas on the coast to a more inclusive economy that promotes entrepreneurship and youth inclusion. To do this, more comprehensive fiscal reform will be needed to free up space for investments in physical and human capital. Some ideas include:

3.4 An economy that balances entrepreneurship with social solidarity and addresses lagging regions

Tunisia has already started to experiment with innovative initiatives to transform the economy (see Box). Ideas to develop going forward include:

- *Consider piloting measures to give even greater empowerment to local communities, including entrusting them with the actual management of small capital investment projects. This approach, which has been done in Indonesia and elsewhere, gives more power direct to the lowest level of community organization. It can be used to further gender equality as well as generalized household equality, by empowering women community leaders as well as male.*
- *Expand the programs for start-ups and small enterprises and link them to financial sector reform, professional and language training.* Tunisia has already reformed the regulatory environment for startups and is ahead of the region: underpinning this with more training and finance could enable rapid progress. Progress in reforming the inheritance law is relevant to enable the country to make the best use of female as well as male entrepreneurial potential.
- *Link vocational and tertiary reform to overseas as well as national labor market demands.* Tunisia, like many OECD countries, focused more on tertiary than on vocational training in recent decades, and has only recently started to rebalance. A large-scale expansion of vocational programs would assist Tunisian economic growth but also position young workers well for opportunities in the Mediterranean and the Arab region.
- *Facilitate internal mobility.* The decentralization and local governance policies, if fully implemented, will improve significantly services and basic infrastructure in lagging regions. But they are unlikely to produce a strong private sector surge in many of these areas, which are disadvantaged by lack of human and



natural resources as well as geography. Balancing efforts to invest in the lagging regions with a process of support to help young workers move to thriving coastal areas may be a useful strategy. There are cultural reasons for doing this too: young women graduates, for example, who have amongst the highest rates of unemployment, are unlikely to move unless they have safe housing.

- *Consider creating a hub of services to service Libyan institutions.* Tunisia suffers from the Libyan conflict in GDP losses, domestic revenue, remittances and the effect of disrupted supply on prices. Yet Tunisian capacities could also help those Libyan institutions still functioning (for example the Central Bank and payments system, oil) by providing a hub of services from the border regions, which are also amongst the most disadvantaged in Tunisia. This would be to the benefit of both countries as well as their international partners.

3.5 State institutions and a budget to service citizen needs

Tunisia's state institutions and budget are not yet well adapted to foster the economy and social solidarity needed: the fiscal situation is too constrained by the wage bill, debt, and subsidies; decisions are still highly centralized; seniority determines grade in the civil service. While the new Chapter VI institutions put in place since the Revolution—the five independent constitutional organs— have in general made progress, they are now coming under increasing criticism for bias or insufficient tangible results. Ideas on institutional reforms include:

- *A new social accord that focuses on fiscal issues and represents workers outside the civil service and the unemployed.* Tripartite dialogue is one of Tunisia's strengths. But the composition of the labor and employers' bodies do not represent all workers or the unemployed. Building on the pre-election dialogue and analysis of "who pays and who benefits" suggested, as well as partnership with additional social actors such as the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fisheries (UTAP: French acronym), a broader dialogue could address competing fiscal needs. These would include action on public sector wages, prices, taxation, subsidies, pensions, social protection and social services, and assistance for the unemployed and youth. It would be important in broadening not to make membership too diverse to deliver binding agreements.
- *Reforming professional associations from within.* The professional associations in Tunisia have played a key positive role in the transition, but they also have practices which constrain fiscal reform, for instance special taxation regimes. Their inclusion in a reform dialogue is important for successful outcomes.
- *Using a "window case" approach to follow up on corruption and transitional justice cases and others (violence against women/police responsiveness).* This would be in parallel to the planning of a systematic process to address abuses within the law and preventative reforms and mean adopting a strategy that addresses justice for selected cases or problems that illustrate wider patterns in relation to different types of crimes and victims. In the case of corruption, for example, it could mean the following priorities: identification of grand corruption cases that illustrate patterns and will not be seen as partisan; combine these with petty corruption cases that illustrate patterns, as well as with the completion of the beneficiary ownership registry as a preventative measure.



3.6 More emphasis on addressing economic and social inequality as well as on supporting fiscal reforms in international development assistance strategies

Current aid programs put much emphasis on generalized governance as well as setting up conditions necessary for economic growth. Tunisia’s development is still largely dependent on the stimulus and framework provided by those programs. Ideas to enhance those frameworks going forward are:

- Identify groups where stagnating or rising inequality presents a combined political, economic, and social risk. These may include the urban poor, lagging regions, and young men and women willing to migrate internally for jobs.
- Consider giving more prominence to reduction of inequalities in the goals stated by the ODA strategies. This could include new initiatives dedicated to addressing that issue as well as the existing projects putting more emphasis on inequality reduction within each sector.
- Collect more data on improvements related to various dimensions of inequality. More insight into the subject will shed light on the most recent dynamics regarding social inequalities and guide action toward reducing them.

4. Possible 2019 events to highlight progress and help needed to overcome challenges

2019 is the year when the international community will review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) on equality and on peace, justice, and inclusion. There are therefore numerous events at which Tunisia’s progress, challenges and contributions to solutions could be highlighted. We would recommend the following:

- **Pathfinders meeting – end of March.** A discussion with other Pathfinder countries on progress and challenges: review of a “challenge paper” for 2019 events by interested Pathfinder countries.
- **Panel at UN, mid-April.** Taking advantage of a planned high-level government visit to New York, a panel on transition progress, and Tunisia’s path for peace and development
- **IMF-WB spring meetings side event in April:** a focus on progress and challenges, the politics of fiscal reform and what it is reasonable to expect, as well as on international aid.
- **UN High Level Political Forum side event:** highlighting contributions to solutions and need for continued support
- **UNGA side event:** highest level, consolidating Tunisia’s profile as a Pathfinder.