Why Would Peace Be Controversial at the United Nations? Negotiations Toward a Post-2015 Development Framework

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The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community.

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Executive Summary

Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice. Democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best assures these rights.

- Millennium Declaration, 2000

Despite a strong evidence base and widespread affirmations – from the multilateral level down to grassroots civil society movements – of the connections between peace, good governance and development, these issues remain among the most controversial discussed in the post-2015 development agenda, and are at risk of being left off the agenda in the intergovernmental process to forge a final agreement.

How can we understand this seeming contradiction? Simply put: the objections are political not substantive. This paper outlines the evidence, analyzes the political constraints, and puts forward recommendations on how to navigate reasonable political concerns without ignoring some of the most compelling lessons of the Millennium Development Goals.

The Millennium Declaration, endorsed by all UN member states, clearly recognized the importance of peace and governance to the achievement of poverty reduction and development. However, the resulting Millennium Development Goals framework did not include specific goals or targets on peace, governance, or justice. A growing body of evidence shows that accountable and effective institutions are crucial to sustained development. Where these institutions are lacking, the least progress has been made on the MDGs.[1] In addition, recent extensive consultations conducted by the UN system have underscored the importance of participation and good governance in the lives of people around the world.[2] Tackling peaceful and stable development within the post-2015 framework is gaining considerable momentum at the multilateral level.[3]

The Rio +20 Conference on Sustainable Development, *The Future We Want*, reaffirmed, "the importance of freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, […] the rule of law, gender equality, women's empowerment and the overall commitment to just and democratic societies for development."[4] It also acknowledged "good governance and the rule of law, at the national and international levels, as well as an enabling environment, are essential for sustainable development, including sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection and the eradication of poverty and hunger. We reaffirm that, to achieve our sustainable development goals, we need institutions at all levels that are effective, transparent, accountable and democratic."[5]

In September 2012, Heads of State and governments adopted the "Declaration on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels"[6], reaffirming that human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, and that they belonged to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations.

Yet whether and how peace, governance, and justice are incorporated into the post-2015 agenda remains in question.

If the linkages between peace and development are so widely accepted, why is the inclusion of peace and governance in the post-2015 development agenda so contentious among member states? The answer: political concerns. These specific concerns must be understood to make progress on the overall peace and stability agenda. This paper reviews the linkages between peace, stability, governance, and development, and analyzes the political landscape and the main objections, including around specific targets. It concludes with options on how to reconcile the underlying development realities with the political landscape to create space for these issues to be integrated into the final post-2015 agenda.

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Why do Peace, Stability, and Governance Matter to the Post-2015 Agenda?

The world has made tremendous progress towards achieving the MDGs, yet many countries lag behind. Conflict, violence, and political instability have, in many places, severely limited development gains. On average, a country that experienced major violence over the period from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21% higher than a country that saw no violence[7]. These countries are the furthest behind in meeting MDG targets.

Conflict and Development: The Human Cost

People living in countries affected by conflict are:

- three times as likely to be unable to send their kids to school,

- twice as likely to see their children die before the age of five, and

- twice as likely not to have access to clean water.

- Countries affected by violence account for:

- 60 percent of the world's undernourished

- 61 percent of the world's impoverished

- 77 percent of children not in primary school

- 59 percent of children not in secondary school

- 70 percent of infant deaths

- 64 percent of unattended births

- 71 percent of child under 5 deaths

- 43 percent of persons living with HIV/AIDS

- 65 percent of people living with access to improved sanitation

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Report: Conflict Security, an d Development* (Washington 2011)

Apart from a failure to meet global poverty reduction and development goals, countries affected by systemic violence suffer debilitating costs. In 2005 in Guatemala, the costs of violence – in terms of health, material losses, institutional costs, private security expenses, and damage to the investment climate – were estimated at $2.4 billion or 7.3 percent of GDP. This figure is more than double the damage caused by Hurricane Stan in the same year and more than double the combined budget for the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Education in 2006.[8] Moreover, relatively stable countries may see their development gains eroded by their conflict-affected neighbors. A country making development advances, such as Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7 percent of GDP every year for each neighbor in conflict.[9]

With substantial gains in poverty reduction globally, the persistence of poverty is increasingly concentrated in countries affected by conflict, and in isolated parts of otherwise middle-income countries.[10] It will be nearly impossible to achieve zero-based-goals, such as eradicating extreme poverty, or to meet social and environmental goals without addressing the persistent insecurity in which people live. This will be most challenging in countries that experience chronic cycles of conflict and violence. But, it will also be extremely difficult in countries with widespread criminality, pockets of persistent violence, or which are disproportionately affected by external stressors such as trafficking and organized crime.

Research and experience show that good governance and effective institutions can prevent and mitigate conflict and often buttress sustained development progress. The 2011 *World Development Report*, for example, found that building resilient institutions was essential to ending repeated cycles of conflict. Inclusive, effective, transparent, and accountable governance underpinned by the rule of law ensures that human development is peaceful and lasting. Without the capacity for people to determine their own futures, countries risk falling into violent conflict, possibly reversing the level of development achieved.[11]

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Building effective institutions includes the ability of states to manage their own resources and revenues and improve service delivery, but extends beyond, to building trust between the state and society.[12]

Institutions (including customary and informal institutions) are essential for managing a country's natural resources sustainably, mediating conflicts when they arise, and creating an enabling environment for commercial activity and investment.

To promote inclusive and sustainable growth, the good governance of natural resources is a particularly acute need. Resource rich low-income countries face unique growth opportunities as more high- and middle-income countries seek new sources of natural resources to power their growth and new mineral wealth is discovered[13]. But to realize these opportunities, current approaches will not be sufficient. Poor resource management has been estimated to cost Africa alone $38 billion a year in lost revenue.[14] And as the African Development Bank has argued, where there has been substantial growth, it has been "accompanied by insufficient poverty reduction, persisting unemployment, increased income inequalities and in some countries, deteriorating levels of health and education."[15]

Effective governance brings well-managed revenues and promotes policies and programs that lift people out of poverty. Effective governance can generate a virtuous cycle of improved living standards and increased productivity to drive further growth, while clear and effective legal and regulatory frameworks can ensure protection of the natural environment.

What does good governance look like in practice? The rule of law is an essential component of good governance, and vital to enabling people to live free from fear of violence and oppression. Crucially, it also provides stability for investment and commerce. The protection of land, property, and other resource rights; enforcement of contracts; regulation of labor; protection of small- and medium-sized enterprises; fair trade rules; and equal access to markets can foster investment by individuals and businesses, bringing growth that is shared and sustainable.[16] Commercial ac-

tivity thrives in a stable environment in which the rule of law assures transparency, predictability, and accountability, and in which dispute resolution mechanisms are independent, timely, and just. Research shows a correlation between judicial independence and economic growth.[17]

The Post-2015 Political Landscape: Why Is the Inclusion of Peace, Stability, and Governance So Sensitive?

Numerous global leaders, policy makers, academics, and practitioners have helped raise awareness within the development and conflict management communities that large portions of the world's poor are increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected and fragile states. The UN Peacebuilding Commission, the g7+, the International Dialogue, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and the 2011 World Development Report have all made essential contributions to this effort. The challenge is that there is no natural constituency for this argument among the traditional member state groupings at the UN.

Despite the lack of a natural constituency, initial efforts have contributed to growing support for the notion that there are linkages between development and security, though much of the discussion to date has been framed as a critique of the Security Council and the P5 for a perceived lack of attention to development. Indeed, the lack of attention from the Security Council is one of the main reasons that the Peacebuilding Commission was established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Security Council.

Reinforcing the sensitivities about the role of the Security Council, the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda made an early misstep in its report *Realizing the Future We Want for All*.[18] Released in June 2012, this report included "peace and security" as one of the four core dimensions of their vision for the future. This brought important issues around peace and freedom from violence to the core of the agenda, but it also raised immediate concerns. Framing the issue in terms of the UN's "peace and security" agenda, rather than through the lens of a development-security linkage, invokes

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the interventionist language of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was interpreted to suggest a securitization of development issues, implying a role for the UN Security Council. And it encompassed a wide range of security challenges beyond those relevant to poverty reduction and economic development. The use of the "peace and security" framing drew criticism in the UN and played into the hands of those actors that were already predisposed to resist the inclusion of peace in development discussions.

There was extensive debate on these issues in the High-level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP) meetings. Three important shifts took place in the framing and substance of this agenda, which enabled the HLP to reach consensus on these issues in its report, while dampening potential opposition.

The shifts were:

1. moving away from the language of "peace and security"'(addressing concerns about the securitization of development);

2. shifting from a "reduce" approach – reduce violence, reduce insecurity, etc. – to a "build" approach. Reduction is too associated with a negative or punitive agenda, can bring the concern of intervention back to the discussion. The focus on "building," and more specifically on institution building, is more acceptable to emerging powers; and

3. shifting from a focus on the state to a focus on society. These shifts are reflected in the goal proposed by the HLP on "building stable societies." This formulation incorporated some Latin American countries' concerns about "citizen security", thus broadening the base of support for these issues, and isolating those who opposed the new formulation.

Despite this reframing towards an explicitly development purpose, several member states are still skeptical about the inclusion of peace and stability issues. Solidifying the understanding of peace and stability from a development lens – and in particular, addressing the socio-economic causes of violence – rather than a security lens can

mitigate these concerns. This is an important conversation to have and one that has not yet been had in post-2015 discussions in New York.

Another political challenge is that discussions of violence and governance go to the heart of state capacity and legitimacy. Several actors, particularly among middle-income countries (MICs), are concerned about the implications of discussing domestic conflict and instability within a global and potentially universal framework. Their concern is that measuring these global issues threatens their sovereignty and creates the potential for their countries to be placed on "the wrong list." For example, the Declaration of Santiago, which came out of the first summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) strongly rejects "the unilateral and illegitimate assessments, lists and certifications made by some developed countries which affect countries of the region, in particular, those referring to terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking and other related measures."[19] Combining specific goals and targets that also identify external factors will help to alleviate this concern and ensure a more truly universal agenda.

At a practical level, there is concern among some member states that aid will shift towards fragile states. Given reductions in ODA from a number of western governments, funding is a central concern of the overall post-2015 agenda. However, current trends belie this fear, and actually show a shift of aid towards middle-income countries, primarily China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Aid to countries with the highest poverty levels and which are the furthest behind on the MDGs is likely to stagnate, including Sub-Saharan African countries such as Burundi, Chad, Madagascar, Malawi, and Niger.[20]

For middle-income countries for whom ODA is less relevant, the priority issue in the post-2015 agenda negotiations is the balance between ODA and climate finance. They will seek to forge as broad a coalition as they can for their arguments, leading them to seek support for their position within the G77. If powerful countries in the G77 want to push to include conflict and governance issues, the

emerging powers will likely go along. The conflict issue is not a priority for them, and they are likely instead to focus their energies on climate finance.

At present, the constellation of member states supporting the inclusion of peace, stability and governance in the post-2015 agenda is comprised of OECD and g7+ countries. While the g7+ are strong and effective advocates for peace and stability, their credibility is limited, particularly among the G77, who see the g7+ as linked to and even controlled by the OECD. In addition, there is a strong civil society constituency, the most vocal of which are based in OECD countries, which further contributes to the perception that goals around peace, stability, and governance constitute a "northern agenda."

This is clearly not the case, as reflected in extensive global, regional, and national consultations conducted by the UN system, but a stronger voice from southern civil society will be needed to make clear that the inclusion of peace and stability in the post-2015 agenda is a universal demand. Initial efforts have been influential, but it will be important to continue to bring in external voices to the discussions in New York and to promote genuine dialogue around these issues.

From Rhetoric to Targets

One way through the various member state sensitivities is to get down to the level of possible targets, which may help move the debate from generalities to specifics and create opportunities to accommodate some of the concerns in reasonable ways.

A common objection from detractors is that targets for peace, stability, and governance cannot be reliably measured, rendering them inappropriate for the post-2015 development agenda. While it is true that these are challenging phenomena to measure, and that existing data is limited and poor, this is generally a convenient political cover. Considerable work has been done to develop meaningful and measurable targets[21], and this work can and should be further developed. The High-level Panel's call for a data revolution that includes defining robust targets and indicators, gathering reliable baseline data

and building capacity across countries to track progress is a useful and actionable way to address these concerns.

That said, some observers have warned that some measurement challenges are serious enough to limit the power of the targets. External stressors (organized crime, drugs, trafficking, etc.) could fall into this category. This is not to say that these and other hard-to-measure issues are not important or deserving of emphasis, but that in selecting and advocating for specific targets the arguments around measurement need to be tight and defensible.[22]

Looking specifically at some of the illustrative targets related to peace and stability proposed by the HLP, there are a number of challenges ahead, but also ways to navigate the political concerns and find feasible paths towards inclusion of these targets.

Reduce violent deaths per 100,000 by x. During the HLP process, there was a consensus among the 'pro' community that this was a target worth including and fighting for, because it is the target most likely to drive genuine data collection, research, measurement, and development change. But it will attract a lot of opposition, especially from middle-income countries that have sub-national territories with ongoing violence. Framing this target in ways that are less punitive and instead emphasizing progress may be one way to navigate the political difficulties. Another is combining this target with targets that make the task more universal, for example those on external stressors. Progress will come from a more fine-grained understanding of the various country positions and ways to mitigate their specific concerns.

Ensure justice institutions are accessible, independent, and well resourced and respect due-process rights & Enhance the accountability and legitimacy of the security forces, police and judiciary. These two targets address core components of participation and accountability, which are needed to forge a strong state-society relationship (and thereby, a more effective and resilient state). However, they are likely to attract substantial opposition from a combination of authoritarian states, transitional states and others that are particularly sensitive about having their domestic security institutions examined under the microscope. The targets

will be depicted as injecting a democracy-promotion agenda into the UN's development framework – something some countries have accepted only very reluctantly in the UNDP governing board and successfully resisted for years in the General Assembly. Navigating a middle path that builds upon recent developments and consensus on the rule of law, for example, is one way forward. Pairing the more controversial accountability and participation aspects with a commitment from developed countries to help with capacity building may also make this set of targets more palatable.

Stem the external stresses that lead to conflict such as drugs and arms trafficking. This target addresses the concern that it is not simply internal factors, but also external factors, which lead to systemic violence and conflict. It is possible that this attracts back-room opposition from a combination of western countries whose practices could be more transparent and accountable, as well as authoritarian states. However, it is a target that countries will not want to be seen opposing, so it may be accepted, notwithstanding the measurement challenges. And there is important ongoing work on the definition and measurement of this target, which may strengthen the case for its inclusion. It will likely also be seen as a complement to a target on the measurement of violence (see above).

Some observers have emphasized the value of starting from a base of targets around which the broadest supportive constituency can be built. It is also worth considering which targets will help focus attention on areas of existing or growing consensus. Where possible, these targets also ideally have a multiplier effect, bringing change across several social objectives, including but not limited to peace and stability. Potential targets that meet these criteria include:

- Provide free and universal legal identity, such as birth registrations

- Increase by x% the share of women, men, communities, and businesses with secure rights to land, property, and other assets

- Prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against girls and women

- End child marriage

- Increase the number of good and decent jobs and livelihoods by x

- Decrease the number of young people not in education, employment or training by x%

To measure progress on peace and effective institutions, analysts and experts argue that better capacity does not always mean better outcomes. For change to be truly transformative, all social groups must perceive improvements in their basic rights and access to services, as well as improved safety.[23] Experts therefore propose using baskets of indicators that include measures of public perception, though this approach is likely to be controversial among member states.

Horizontal inequalities are a significant driver of conflict and can be through maximum disaggregation of targets and indicators. The HLP's call to leave no one behind by disaggregating data and considering no goal or target to be considered achieved unless all groups in society had achieved the target was an important step and does not seem to have generated significant resistance among member states.

Ultimately, there may be some room to find compromise positions and define targets. An approach that links targets to several objectives and carefully chooses consensual language may foster greater progress with less supportive member states.

Conclusions and Options

Resistance to the inclusion of peace, stability and governance in the post-2015 agenda is political, not substantive. Many players that wield considerable power in various country groupings are concerned that these issues are the embodiment of a northern agenda to securitize development issues and threaten national sovereignty by putting their domestic affairs under the microscope. Others wish to see certain environmental and financing issues dominate the agenda and are reluctant to cede political space to issues of peace, stability and governance. In this context, impassioned arguments about the links between peace and development will not win the day; it is necessary to consider the various interests and concerns and identify politically feasible options.

The inter-governmental process will be characterized by two years of challenging negotiations within the General Assembly, beginning with the Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals.[24] Following the presentation of the OWG report, which is expected to provide a proposal on sustainable development goals, intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 framework will begin in earnest when the 69th session of the General Assembly kicks off in September 2014.

Negotiations on this scale are unprecedented. A collective negotiation, by all 193 member states at the General Assembly (represented by their foreign ministries), of not just the broad approach to development, but the specific language of goals and detailed targets, will be a drawn out battle. There is absolutely no precedent for this. The politics within the UN have changed enormously since Monterrey, which is the only instance of collective negotiations that comes close to what will occur within the next two years around the post-2015 development agenda.

This process will have both the character of international negotiations (capitals, civil society, agencies) and of the basement rooms of the General Assembly. The international community should neither underestimate how much will happen in basement room negotiations nor how important continued capital-level engagement

will be to stop the basement room dynamics from eroding this agenda.

Despite initial positive reaction to the Secretary-General's report and the HLP report, negotiations will be long. Nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed, and the language and targets around peace, stability, and governance are likely to be a locus of genuine debate and subject to wider negotiating issues.

There are three important steps to create the political space necessary to forge compromise. **First, it is important to ensure that the concerns of the emerging powers are understood and accommodated so that they do not become a blocking force**. Analytically, several of them recognize the need to act to build peaceful and stable societies. Politically, the issue is not a priority for them, and they will likely concentrate their efforts elsewhere in the coming debate. As we have argued, these countries are sensitive to the possible crowding out of their priorities. They need to be reassured that there is not a zero-sum relationship among the issues across the agenda. Substantial work will be needed - most of it in capitals - to keep the emerging powers open to the inclusion of peace and stability. The language provided by the HLP is a productive starting point for this.

Language and framing matter; the issues must be situated squarely within the realm of development, rather than security. Building on the work of the HLP, adopting a positive formulation will be essential. It will be essential to focus on building stable societies and effective institutions, rather than emphasizing conflict, violence, and security. This approach can help reassure reluctant countries that their interests are being considered, and that the approach to these issues will remain rooted in their links to development.

Second, a common African position will be essential. The African group has the potential to play a decisive role in negotiations on building stable societies, and indeed they have the most at stake in the final outcome. They recently pursued a General Assembly resolution on challenges specific to Africa and included language about

conflict issues that was redolent of some of the language included in the HLP report. In fact, there was a deliberate effort to align the HLP language with the African's General Assembly language. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's chairing of the African Union's High Level Committee process to produce an African Common Position is promising, and the outcome of the this process will have substantial implications for New York dynamics.

Lastly, and following from the second point, **a genuinely independent southern voice will be decisive** on whether or not these issues are included. A broad coalition is needed that realizes that governance and institutions are universal and are not limited to conflict-affected countries. Many countries are vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and external stressors that can foment insecurity and instability. The critical factor that will tip the balance in favor of including these issues is the voice of a set of developing countries themselves saying, "this matters to us."

Advocates among OECD countries need to allow southern voices to reflect on their common interests and negotiate an approach. Too hard a push from developed countries is likely to hurt rather than help the chances for inclusion in the final agenda.

The challenge of advancing peace, stability, and governance within the post-2015 agenda cannot be underestimated. But an awareness of the political context can help shape reasonable paths towards consensus. The opportunity to improve development outcomes for an enormous concentration of the world's poor who struggle daily with the mutually reinforcing dynamics of conflict, instability and poverty, and the opportunity to build the foundations of more sustainable global growth and development, cannot and should not be overlooked.

Endnotes

[1] See for example, the *World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, 2011).

[2] See A Million Voices: the World We Want, a UN Development Group post-2015 report, available at http://www.undg.org/content/achieving_the_mdgs/post-2015_development_agenda/undg_post-2015_report_1_1_1.

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[4] UN General Assembly, *The Future We Want*, A/Res/66/288, para. 8.

[5] A/Res/66/288, para. 10.

[6] UN General Assembly, *Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels*, A/67/L.1, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/L.1

[7] The World Bank, *World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, 2011).

[8] UNDP, The Economic Cost of Violence in Guatemala, 2006. 9 WDR, 2011. 10 WDR, 2011.

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[11] Charles T. Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence*, Georgetown University Press, 2012.

[12] "Governance and Institution Building: Lessons from fragile and conflict affected states Monrovia HLP Post 2015 Meeting" H.E. Emilia Pires, Minister of Finance, Timor Leste http://www.pbsdialogue.org/documentupload/Minister%20Pires%20Speech-Monrovia-31Jan-Final.pdf

[13] The IMF notes that over fifty percent of Africa will be considered resource-rich in the coming years, see IMF Regional Economic Outlook http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf, chapter 3 summary

[14] Africa Progress Report 2013.

[15] Alexis Akwagyiram, "Africa rising – but who benefits?" *BBC Africa*, June 18, 2013.

[16] Matthew Stephenson, *Economic Development and the Quality of Legal Institutions*, World Bank, 2005; and several academic articles cited herein.

[17] Feld and Voigt, "Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence using a new set of indicators," *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19 (3), 2003: 497-527.

[18] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/untt_report.pdf

[19] *Declaration of Santiago of the First CELACE Summit*, January 2013, para. 24, see: http://www.gob.cl/media/2013/01/Declaration-of-Santiago-engl.pdf

[20] OECD-DAC, "Aid to Poor Countries Slips Futher as Governments Tighten their Budgets," (Paris, 2013), see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm

[21] See The New Deal agreement on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs): http://www.newdeal4peace.org/peacebuilding-and-statebuilding-goals/ and the work of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding on indicators: http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/03%20PSG%20Indicators%20EN.pdf

[22] Aug 28 NYU CIC, *Advancing the Building Stable Societies Agenda within the post-2015 framework*, http://cic.nyu.edu/content/advancing-building-stable-societies-agenda-within-post-2015-framework-0

[23] UNICEF, UNDP, PBSO, *Report of the Expert Meeting: An Accountability Framework for Conflict, Violence, Governance and Disaster in the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, Glen Cove, NY, June 2013.

[24] The Open Working Group (OWG) was established on 22nd of January 2013. The 30-member OWG was mandated by the Rio+20 Outcome document to prepare a proposal on the Sustainable Development Goals for consideration by the General Assembly in 2014. For the moment the OWG is the main intergovernmental forum for debate on the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs. The OWG is co-chaired by the Permanent Representatives of Hungary and Kenya. A constituency-based system of representation was designed to determine membership in the OWG. This means that several countries- usually two or three- share most of the available seats. See further information at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1549

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