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THEMATIC SERIES

BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE
UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Canada 

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Foreword

Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations

We began this series, “Building More Effective UN Peace Operations,” in May 2009 with a view to exploring the challenges facing UN peace operations. The goal was to provide a forum for open discussion of potential ways to confront these challenges.

In 2009, it was clear that the UN was approaching a critical moment in peacekeeping. In 2013, that critical moment is now. The changing face of conflict and the emergence of multidimensional peacekeeping require a common understanding of the challenges we face and flexibility in our responses as an international community.

This series has allowed for an informal, yet substantive dialogue among Member States. It has allowed us to explore specific issues of modern peace operations to help build this shared understanding and promote better collective decision-making. In this second instalment of the series, begun in March 2011, we have focused on the use of force in UN peace operations, reflected on the experiences of major troop contributing countries by looking at the case of Brazil in MINUSTAH, discussed the impact of technological innovations on peace operations, and reviewed training modules on how to strengthen the capacity of peace operations to prevent and respond to threats to civilians including in the form of conflict-related sexual violence.

Drawing on the expertise of leading practitioners, we have endeavoured to offer a glimpse into the practical realities in the field that peace operations must address and the challenges they face when doing so. We also emphasized the vital role played by troop contributing countries, and increasingly police contributing countries.

The Permanent Mission of Canada has been proud to partner with the Center on International Cooperation in the venture, as well as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the participants and colleagues who shared their expertise, their experiences, their lessons and ideas for new ways ahead. I sincerely hope that the series has contributed to advancing our common goal of promoting more effective peace operations.



Foreword

Hervé Ladsous

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations

The past year has seen considerable debate on the consolidation of long-standing United Nations peacekeeping missions as well as discussion about the role of regional peacekeepers in response to emerging conflicts and threats. At the same time we have seen new tasks and tests in long-standing peacekeeping missions, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the possible deployment of new United Nations operations in Mali, Somalia and elsewhere. Facing these challenges requires a shared understanding of obstacles facing United Nations peace operations as well as a common vision of the way forward.

The 2011-2012 series on “Building More Effective UN Peace Operations” provided the opportunity to reflect on a number of important issues facing United Nations peacekeeping from a variety of vantage points and helped forge a common vision of the challenges we are facing today and into the future.

The first event on the use of force in defence of mandated tasks raises important and timely questions. In this regard, the need for appropriate capabilities and effective command and control are important, but there are also a number of strategic implications that need to be considered, including the role of the United Nations in relation to other partners.

The experiences of troop-contributing countries provide important insights for future decision-making processes and mission deployments. The importance of mission planning and of building strong partnerships with the many diverse actors in peace operations emerged as a key element for effectively implementing peacekeeping mandates.

Practitioners and academics came together to explore the use of new technologies, including aerial surveillance systems, and their potential to increase the effectiveness of mission operations. I believe that greater use of these technologies can improve situational awareness and thereby improve the safety of peacekeepers as well as the populations they are mandated to protect.

The series also explored scenario-based training modules on the protection of civilians and sexual violence which are new tools to ensure that United Nations peacekeepers are informed of their mandate and responsibilities. We are encouraged that Member States, training institutes and missions are using these tools to improve the impact of our operations on the ground.

This series offered an important opportunity for informal and interactive dialogue between Member States, United Nations officials and academic experts on some of the most relevant issues facing peacekeepers in the field and their implications for decisions at United Nations Headquarters and Member State capitals. The topics covered underscore the importance of information-sharing between all peacekeeping stakeholders to strengthen the partnership which is the foundation of United Nations peacekeeping operations. I thank the Government of Canada for supporting this important work and the many representatives of Member States who attended the seminars and enriched the discussions with their thoughts.



Executive Summary: Building More Effective UN Peace Operations

In 2012, crises in Syria and Mali highlighted new challenges for deploying peace operations, while developments in Sudan and South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lebanon illustrated the trials faced by long-standing peacekeeping missions. These events, while demonstrating the continuing role for peacekeeping operations as a tool of crisis management, occurred amid considerable pressure to downsize UN peace operations due to continuing financial constraints.¹ The current environment has forced difficult decisions and considerable debate on how to simultaneously strengthen both the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peace operations.

Against this backdrop, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, in partnership with the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University, convened a series of thematic discussions on critical issues facing multilateral peacekeeping. The goal of this series was to establish a dialogue between key stakeholders on issues affecting peace operations on the ground, at UN headquarters and in member state capitals. These discussions have provided the opportunity for frank exchanges between member states, the UN Secretariat, peacekeeping officials in the field and leading academic and NGO experts on some of the most pressing issues facing global peace operations today. This publication brings together the background notes and summaries from the events in this series.

Peace Operations and the Evolving Policy Context

The 2011-2012 series builds on an earlier round of thematic discussions organized by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations and CIC during 2009 and 2010.² At that time, UN peacekeeping had reached a point of strategic uncertainty. Record level troop deployments and calls for new missions were precariously balanced against mounting financial difficulties as a result of the global financial crisis. At the

same time, there were growing questions about the political dimension of international crisis management in addition to how to effectively support countries emerging from crisis, including on multifaceted issues such as the rule of law.

Since the first series, a number of important developments have further shaped the dialogue around UN peace operations. There has been an acknowledgement that a number of peacekeeping missions must contract and drawdowns have proceeded in countries where the security situation has stabilized such as in Liberia, Haiti and Timor-Leste as well as in environments where the situation remains precarious as in Darfur. While there continues to be pressure to scale down UN peace operations, a number of new crises have prompted calls for the deployment of new missions. The Security Council authorized the short-lived UN peacekeeping mission in Syria in April 2012 and in December 2012 authorized an African-led military mission in Mali. As insurgents continued their advance in Mali in early 2013, the French military launched an operation in early January, at the transitional government's request, to halt the Islamists, while member states considered the possibility of deploying a follow-on UN peacekeeping force.

There is also an increasing interest in the role of civilian-led political missions, in immediate post-conflict environments, as in Libya, as parallel deployments to peacekeeping operations, as in the case of Somalia, as well as a follow-on presence after the departure of a peacekeeping mission, as in Burundi and Sierra Leone.

A number of important policy processes have also been undertaken since this series was initiated that seek to strengthen aspects of UN peace operations. The 2011 Review of International Civilian Capacities sought to improve the international community's capacity for identifying and deploying civilian experts to post-conflict countries. The Review's findings are particularly relevant for UN peace operations, where civilians play an increasingly central role in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Also critical for the work of UN peace operations were the findings of the 2011 World

Bank World Development Report *Conflict, Security, and Development*, which underscored the need for a new approach to breaking cycles of violence that plague some fragile states. The report called for greater investment in citizen security, justice and employment in post-conflict and crisis-affected contexts. In addition, since 2010, the UN Department of Field Support has worked to implement the Global Field Support Strategy and realized a number of important gains in efficiency, including on supply chains and logistics, and costs associated with peacekeeping.

Building More Effective UN Peace Operations

Based on these developments and assessing future trends in the deployment of UN peace operations, the series comprised four events focusing on the **use of force**, the experience of troop contributing countries (TCCs), the use of new technologies, and scenario-based training for protection of civilians and conflict-related sexual violence.

The UN Security Council has steadily demonstrated an increased willingness to authorize the use of force in peacekeeping missions. This evolution has demonstrated a number of conceptual limits for what peacekeepers can reasonably be expected to accomplish as well as how force should be used. It also comes with operational requirements for missions including the need for force enablers and rapid reaction capacities. The doctrine presents strategic risks both at UN headquarters and in the field. A common vision shared among member states is crucial to overcome the operational and strategic obstacles in robust peacekeeping operations.

The continuing high levels of troop deployments combined with additional authorizations have meaningful implications for **troop contributing countries**. TCCs, and increasingly police contributing countries (PCCs), are a critical stakeholder in the partnership for UN peace operations. They provide personnel and expertise, as well as materiel resources for implementing Security Council mandates. They are an essential source of knowledge

about the realities facing peacekeepers on the ground. TCC experiences can inform future decision-making processes in the Security Council as well as strengthen future mission planning. This is particularly true for specialized experiences, as in the case of Brazil's contributions to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake.

Recent developments in some of the UN's largest peace operations have underscored both the potential and continuing controversy surrounding the **use of new technologies** in UN peace operations. The use of enabling technologies is an area of increasing interest for the potential to strengthen the range of operations, accuracy of information and to help bridge the gap between mission mandates and their capabilities. Technologies such as infrared imaging, aerial surveillance systems, radar, seismic detectors and night vision are increasingly affordable and some have already been deployed in the field. However, the use of some of these technologies raises concerns for some member states and TCCs. This was illustrated most recently in January 2013 when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations proposed using surveillance drones to support the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a proposal that was subsequently authorized by the Security Council.

Several high profile incidents in UN peacekeeping operations in 2012, including the fall of Goma in the Democratic Republic of Congo, have elevated concerns about the ability of peacekeeping operations to implement **protection of civilians** (PoC) mandates. The protection of civilians has become a core task of UN peacekeeping missions and is included in the mandate of eight of the UN's sixteen current peacekeeping missions. The protection of civilians encompasses a number of activities including monitoring, preventing and responding to incidents, and supporting host countries in strengthening their protection capacities. Combating conflict-related sexual violence has become a progressively more important component of peacekeeping protection activities. The ability of a



peacekeeping operation to protect civilians in its area of operations, including from conflict-related sexual violence is often the standard by which a mission is judged.

In 2009 the Security Council called for adequate training for peacekeepers on protection of civilians issues and in 2010 the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping requested the development of training modules for this purpose. In response, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support developed protection of civilians training modules for pre-deployment and in-mission training, which includes conflict-related sexual violence issues. Looking forward, the UN is in the process of developing mission-specific training on these issues to ensure that peacekeepers are well informed on context-specific issues impacting the ability of the mission to protect civilians, particularly those who are victims of sexual violence.

Conclusion

As this series came to a close, a number of the issues raised in the thematic discussions were being tested in the field and at UN headquarters. Member states were debating the use of drones in the UN's peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN Mission in South Sudan worked to protect civilians as protests erupted in the town of Wau. At UN headquarters and capitals, member states continued to discuss options for engagement in Syria and Mali. While UN peace operations continue to face considerable financial pressures, they have also demonstrated their continuing importance as instruments of international crisis management.

Endnotes

¹While UN peacekeeping remains near record levels of deployment, the number of uniformed peacekeepers deployed in 2012 was nearly three percent less than in 2011. Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.

²The executive summary and background paper from the first event of the 2009-2010 series are provided as annexes in this publication. The full publication for the 2009-2010 and 2011-2013 series is available online at <http://cic.nyu.edu/content/thematic-series-more-effective-peace-operations>

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Defending Peacekeeping Mandates: the Use of Force

Background Paper for the March 3rd, 2011 Event for the Thematic Series “Building More Effective UN Peace Operations”

Since the failure of UN peacekeeping to prevent the tragedies in Bosnia and Rwanda during the 1990s, the Security Council has steadily demonstrated an increased willingness to authorize peacekeeping missions to use force under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The response to crises in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti during 2000-2005 were characterized by peacekeeping missions that were increasingly mandated to use force to protect both themselves and civilians, to implement peace agreements, and, where state capability and legitimacy were deteriorating, to safeguard governments and extend state authority.

Today, the ability of peacekeepers to use tactical force to defend their mandate is largely accepted. Yet, as recent events in Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, and the DRC underscore, the effective wielding of force continues to be challenged by a lack of consensus over its conceptual limits, its operational requirements, and its strategic risks.

The emphasis in recent mandates on protection of civilians (PoC) implies a moral obligation for peacekeepers on-the-ground to do what they can to prevent and halt violence against non-combatants, and of the need for UN Member states to ensure that missions have adequate capabilities and resources to act. Moreover, PoC mandates increase expectations of protection even when peacekeeping forces are drastically below the levels to protect populations. Far too often, as mass rapes in the DRC illustrate, missions are inadequately resourced and sized to prevent such atrocities to the detriment of civilian lives and UN legitimacy.

The use of force should be viewed as one tool to accomplish the political aims of the mission – to

demonstrate the resolve of the international community in the face of spoilers. Consequently, the ability to use force to change the course of action on the ground and to ensure the physical protection of civilians should not be overestimated, particularly since most UN missions lack the necessary capacities to do so. Effective projection of force by a peacekeeping mission requires a consensus among the international community on how tactical force is best utilized and what situations it is best suited to address. Member states must also acknowledge that the use of force causes operational constraints on the ground and carries strategic implications for the missions themselves and the UN as a whole.

Conceptual Limits

Identifying what peacekeeping can reasonably be expected to achieve in post-conflict settings is a starting point to addressing when and how force should be used to accomplish discrete mission goals. Peacekeepers can protect inchoate political processes, extend government authority, and thwart spoilers without risk of becoming a full-fledged counter-insurgency operation. Selective use of force in these situations is largely uncontroversial. However, dilemmas arise in contested political environments, as Côte d'Ivoire shows, or in complex, unresolved, and ongoing conflicts, as in DRC. In these theaters, selective uses of force and robust postures have given rise to a host of political and operational dilemmas, not least of which are accusations of taking sides in a conflict and war-fighting.

To overcome these challenges more political consensus is needed in order to provide clear guidance for mission leadership on the use of force. Divisions among the Security Council, TCCs, and force commanders, inhibit alignment behind a common strategy. By tasking peacekeepers to do more in ever-challenging and



riskier environments, a solid political backing and sustained international engagement is required.

Operational Requirements

In addition to an increase in troop deployments, effective conduct of the use of force requires better intelligence, quick reaction capabilities, and force enablers, such as helicopters. However, the UN's ability to effectively increase missions' capacities is impacted by the prevailing economic environment and military overstretch both of which have caused governments to cut their defense budgets and UN contributions.

Another impediment to operationalizing mission-wide preparedness for robust action is the lack of collective engagement in UN peacekeeping efforts. Given the heavy involvement of a limited set of troop contributors in current operations, it is unreasonable to expect the same countries to shoulder the burden of increased risks required when using force.

Strategic Risks

If the use of force is to be recognized as a collective signal sent by the international community, member states have to convey this message by showing their universal commitment to the mission. The absence of Western forces in many UN military deployments undermines and weakens the message of universal support necessary for the success of such operations.

Because of the fluid environment in which the use of force may be utilized, decisions made at UN headquarters and the field have immediate strategic implications. In order to react to fast changing situations, force commanders should have the authority to make decisions on when to use force. At the same time, to uphold its legitimate and strategic control over missions, members of the Security Council should be closely involved in these decisions as well (though not on a tactical level). The strategic guidance provided to field missions by the UN Secretariat, meanwhile, should be strengthened.

Under certain circumstances, where the strategic risks are especially high, command and control arrangements for robust operations may warrant greater control and guidance from both the Security Council and the Secretariat, while upholding flexibility and operational decentralization to allow mission leadership to react to arising situations quickly. Striking the appropriate balance between the Secretariat, the Council and mission leadership is difficult, requiring negotiation and flexibility.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping has evolved from its original principles of impartiality, consent and the minimum use of force to more robust rules of engagement. This evolution has not come without its challenges. While the initial principles governing peacekeeping remain as core principles today, there is a lack of a common understanding how and where the use of force fits with these principles. A common vision for the use of force is necessary to address the operational and strategic implications that come with more robust operations. In addition, the use of force has to be embedded in a viable political strategy in order to be utilized effectively.

The Security Council's decision to authorize the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire's troops to use force to protect its staff, civilians and key political actors shows confidence in the ability of robust peacekeeping to ensure stability in deteriorating contexts. However, the impact of additional troops and more robust rules of engagement on a broader political resolution to the post-election impasse remains uncertain. Indeed, the situation in Cote d'Ivoire highlights the limits of the use of force as much as it demonstrates its increasing relevance.



Defending Peacekeeping Mandates: the Use of Force Summary the March 3rd, 2011 Panel Discussion

Introduction: **Ambassador John McNee**
Former Permanent Representative of
Canada to the United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis
Diplomacy and Global Peace
Operations, Center on
International Cooperation at New
York University

Panellists: **General Maurice Baril (ret'd)**
Former Chief of the Defence Staff
For Canada, Former Military Advisor
to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and Former Inspector
General in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations

Mona Khalil
Senior Legal Officer in the United
Nations Office of Legal Affairs

Following opening remarks by Ambassador John McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, and introductory comments by Mr. Gowan, General Baril discussed how robust peacekeeping should be viewed as one of many tools at the disposal of the Security Council, the Secretariat, and mission leadership. Ms. Khalil discussed the legal prerogative for the use of force within peacekeeping, emphasizing judicial accountability to enhance greater credibility and morale within missions.

While the selective use of tactical force within peacekeeping missions is widely accepted, overcoming challenges of political consensus will be required to consolidate an effective strategy. In this respect, the

panelists focused on several perceived shortcomings of the use of force in the context of today's peacekeeping initiatives. Referring back to principles outlined in the Brahimi Report, many participants reiterated that projection of force should not function in a vacuum, but must operate in conjunction with political processes. This can include enhancing dialogue within the TCCs own political apparatus and implementing greater integration with local political processes.

In addition to political obstacles, other shortcomings addressed during the discussion included the strategic implications of operational constraints. Mandates, as discussed by participants, must more clearly and actively reflect resource requirements and what can be asked of peacekeepers. It was also noted that ambiguity within mandates and rules of engagement persists regarding self-defense and defense of mandate, and that improved training and education for troops could enhance overall effectiveness and mission credibility.

Regardless of the differences of opinion about how and when use of force is best utilized, there was clear recognition that in order for peacekeepers to successfully engage in robust actions, missions must be better resourced with clear and functional command and control and communications systems. Additionally, political strategies – including mediation, dialogue, and negotiation – must remain paramount. The session ended with a reflection that the debate should not get sidetracked in terminological arguments about what “robust peacekeeping” means, but instead should focus on negotiating substance first and vocabulary second.

Reflecting on the Experiences of Major TCCs – the Case of Brazil in MINUSTAH

Background Paper for the April 10th, 2012 Event for the Thematic Series “Building More Effective UN Peace Operations”

Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping has become increasingly diverse and multidimensional. Nonetheless, the military component of missions remains a principle, defining element of peacekeeping. Troop contributing countries (TCCs) – and, increasingly, police contributing countries (PCCs) – are vital to the partnership which enables UN peace operations. They provide peacekeepers to implement the Security Council-mandated tasks on the ground, from establishing and maintaining basic security, to supporting the extension of state authority and protecting civilians. In addition to personnel, T/PCCs provide materiel resources and capabilities, as well as experienced and knowledgeable military and police commanders to peace operations. They are an essential source of knowledge regarding realities on the ground and can provide credible and relevant information to decision-makers in capitals and UN headquarters.

Sharing the experiences of major TCCs and PCCs with the broader UN diplomatic community can benefit decision-making processes in the Security Council and can help to better inform the planning of future operations to strengthen their efficiency and effectiveness. By sharing their knowledge and lessons learned, major T/PCCs can also provide guidance to new and potential contributors.

MINUSTAH's Response to the January 2010 Earthquake

In January 2010, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake that caused widespread destruction and the loss of tens of thousands of lives. The mission acted as a crucial first responder to the crisis, despite having suffered immense losses itself, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, his principle Deputy, and the acting Police Commander. In the disaster's aftermath, MINUSTAH, collaborating with

international and national actors, helped to provide emergency shelters to over one and a half million Haitians and food and water to over four million.

The imminent disaster relief operations necessitated a rapid reorientation of MINUSTAH's tasks and strategic planning, requiring the mission to quickly adapt from an operation in its early consolidation phase to a multidimensional disaster relief operation with an integrated approach to security and humanitarian efforts. Supporting this approach was the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) that included OCHA, MINUSTAH's military, police and civilian support components and military liaison officers from the US, Canada, the EU and the Caribbean Community to facilitate the prioritization of humanitarian response, coordination between humanitarian and military actors, and centralized strategic planning.

Following the withdrawal of bilateral military operations, MINUSTAH's military component took on a greater role in security and humanitarian efforts. Built on a community-based approach – a practice that pre-dates the earthquake and focuses on fulfilling basic needs of the population – peacekeepers assisted in the establishment of medical facilities and rubbish removal, provided security for food distribution sites and in continuing their successful cooperation with the Haiti National Police (HNP) that began in 2008, sustained a visible presence in internally displaced persons camps known to be affected by gang violence. MINUSTAH military engineers played a critical enabling role by clearing debris, improving drainage and preparing alternative sites for at-risk settlements, extending their work to support humanitarian efforts.

MINUSTAH continues to make important contributions to the stabilization of Haiti: it assisted in reestablishing political order by providing a level of security that



allowed for the holding of elections; assists in building the capacity of the HNP specifically and the security and justice sectors more broadly; and combats the activities and violent acts of gangs.

Brazil's Experience in MINUSTAH

Despite facing enormous operational challenges MINUSTAH has played a vital role in Haiti's disaster relief efforts and in maintaining security and stability in its aftermath. As such, the experience of the Brazilian force command can provide important guidance for peace operations elsewhere, especially at a time when the prevailing global financial crisis exacerbates the existing resource gap in peace operations, putting severe strain on missions' capabilities and capacities to execute their mandated tasks.

Though Brazil has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations since 1948, peacekeeping has become an increasingly important part of its foreign policy, raising the country's profile on the international stage and contributing to modernizing its army. In 2007, Brazil invested in long-term capacity building of its peacekeepers by establishing a peacekeeping center that has trained over 15,000 troops, of which 2,300 are on active duty. Brazil's experience in peacekeeping also has domestic policy benefits: National police now regularly conduct joint exercises with experienced Brazilian peacekeepers at home in urban slums that face similar security challenges, such as urban gang violence, that blue helmets frequently encounter in some operation theaters.

In 2004, Brazil became a major actor in international peacekeeping when it took charge of the military component of the newly established UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – with a strength of 12,000 uniformed personnel, the UN's fourth largest peace operation. With more than 2,000 troops Brazil also constitutes the largest troop contributor to MINUSTAH. As such, it has played a central role in responding both to the immediate post-earthquake recovery, and to longer term assistance.

In a recent Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2011/17), the Security Council stressed the need to improve the communication between the Council, TCCs, the Secretariat and other stakeholders and to ensure that the Council has the benefit of the views of those serving in the field when mandating missions. The statement also underlined the importance of improving the system of consultations among stakeholders.

The Group of Friends of Haiti, which includes five out of the ten main TCCs to MINUSTAH (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay) and two permanent members of the Security Council (the US and France), serves as a positive example of cooperation in mandate planning. The Group supports a unified and decisive mission command structure that is further bolstered by sufficient capacities.

Further consideration should be given to how the Security Council can make better use of TCC knowledge and expertise in peacekeeping in its decision making processes, e.g., in mission planning exercises and mandate renewals.

Guiding Questions

- How can the consultation process between TCCs and the Security Council be improved to fully exploit the knowledge that TCCs can provide?
- How can the experience of TCCs be used to promote innovative approaches to strategic planning, such as the establishment of the Joint Operations Tasking Center in Haiti?
- In what ways can potential new TCCs best benefit from the experience of major TCCs? And in what ways can TCC experiences contribute to enlarging the base of contributing countries?
- What general lessons can be drawn from the experiences of major TCCs that would benefit mission planning processes?



Reflecting on the Experiences of Major TCCs – the Case of Brazil in MINUSTAH Summary of the April 10th, 2012 Panel Discussion

Introduction:	Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations
Chair:	Richard Gowan Associate Director of Crisis Diplomacy and Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation at New York University
Panellists:	Edmond Mulet Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations General Luis Guilherme Paul Cruz Former MINUSTAH Force Commander
Discussant:	Ambassador Gilles Rivard Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

This event focused on the crisis response, recovery, and peacekeeping experiences of MINUSTAH, and what TCCs and the UN peacekeeping architecture can learn from the Brazilian deployment to Haiti. The proceedings were governed by the Chatham House rule.

The event began with a discussion of the unique nature of the MINUSTAH deployment and Brazil's contributions to achieving mission goals and responding to crises on the ground. There was not a traditional conflict in Haiti or a peace agreement to monitor, but the UN deployed a peace operation to the country because the Security Council has no other tool with which to address a failed state. Brazil has been the bedrock of MINUSTAH's armed component, which proved able to quickly respond and adapt to the unique challenges

the mission faced, especially in the wake of the 2010 earthquake. The mission played a crucial role in the wake of the earthquake, as it was the only actor on the ground capable of providing a rapid response to the disaster. The Brazilian contingent took the lead in crisis response and broke new ground in its institution-building assistance.

Reinforcements came from around the world and from many organizations, demonstrating the challenge of integrating many diverse actors in the response. The Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC) facilitated this by basing the leadership of military, police, and other components in the same space, allowing for effective communication and knowledge sharing, along with the opportunity to develop personal relationships among leaders.

MINUSTAH's work revolved around four axes: security and stability, support for the electoral process, support for humanitarian actions, and crisis response. The mission sought to foster public order by working and communicating with the Haitian people and both UN and local police, and by emphasizing to contingent personnel the daily needs of average Haitians. MINUSTAH worked to protect dislocated people living in camps, overcoming some initial resistance to establish community policing in these facilities. Brazilian engineering companies worked year-round to clear streets, collect debris, and work with civilian actors through the JOTC to respond to the earthquake. The mission had a responsibility to assure the elections would happen "no matter what," and provided logistics and security to all 1,500 voting centers. Throughout the experience, MINUSTAH worked under the mindset that the troops are not in charge, but part of a coordinated effort involving many actors.

MINUSTAH demonstrated that TCCs must be adaptable and flexible, and that they can provide



unique knowledge and experience vital for mission success, even when the needs of the mission focus more on institution building than traditional peacekeeping responsibilities. Brazil's excellent training and preparation for its troops, which began six months prior to deployment, prepared them well for their work in Haiti. The Brazilian contingent was well suited for the challenges it faced, with experience operating in dense urban environments and a proven ability to work well with local communities. Its recent support for response to the cholera outbreak further demonstrates the contingent's adaptability. Brazil also serves as a bridgehead for Latin American countries to contribute to MINUSTAH and other peace operations.

A discussion with attendees followed the presentations. It was suggested that TCCs should be further brought in to the mission planning process to assure that mandated goals are feasible and realistic, and that MINUSTAH would benefit from lighter, more mobile forces and better command and control capabilities. Although the future evolution of peace operations is unclear, it was asserted that a mission must always develop an effective partnership with the host government.



Technological Innovations and Peace Operations

Background Paper for the June 13th, 2012 Event for the Thematic Series “Building More Effective UN Peace Operations”

The use of new technological innovations has the potential to greatly enhance the range, area coverage, and accuracy of observations in the field, helping bridge the gap between mandates and capacity. The need for peace operations to have greater access to modern technological capabilities was articulated in the Brahimi Report of 2000, which called for more extensive use of geographic information systems, and later echoed in the 2009 New Horizons report, which outlined a field support strategy that included “better use of technology to support lighter, more agile deployment.” In 2008, the C-34 requested that the Secretariat “develop appropriate modalities for the use of advanced monitoring and surveillance technologies.” However, the incorporation of modern technologies faces a number of operational and conceptual challenges and despite these calls for change, many missions still lack technology that may be necessary to implement their mandates.

Evolution of Surveillance & Monitoring Technology

There are a number of technological surveillance and monitoring tools that have the potential to improve the ability of peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates.

Geographic information systems (GIS) mapping technology allows direct input from users in the field to shared databases, allowing data to be more easily organized, analyzed, and shared with mission headquarters or with relevant actors anywhere in the world. A number of peacekeeping missions have used GIS since 2007, and the cartographic section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has established GIS units in a growing number of missions. UNAMID used GIS to implement the Darfur Mapping Project, providing peacekeepers with accurate topographic information. In response to the 2010

earthquake in Haiti, MINUSTAH utilized GIS to support operations on the ground and made its map data available to other organizations.

High-resolution *satellite imagery* allows missions to observe borders, ceasefire lines, personnel, and vehicles with high accuracy. UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Program (UNOSAT) harnesses commercial satellite imagery for peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other UN uses, and DPKO and the World Health Organization use satellite imagery to provide global coverage of international and administrative boundaries to the international community. Commercial satellite data is usually subject to strict copyright agreements that limit how it is shared outside of a specific unit or area, so detailed agreements must be negotiated on how the images can be used. The wait time for commercial imagery can be over two weeks, however, which may be too long in fast moving crises.

Night vision technology could be of great utility to missions, as many are only able to monitor their surroundings during daylight hours. The UN has a limited number of night vision systems, but they are older generation models and there are far fewer than needed to supply all UN peacekeepers. Ground surveillance *radar* can observe the movements of people up to ten kilometers away and vehicles fifteen kilometers away, day or night. Ground penetrating radar can find hidden bunkers and arms caches, and similar technology can be used for post-violence forensic analysis, including finding hidden graves. UNIFIL, for example, has deployed several radar systems for both air and ground surveillance.

Surveillance and monitoring are largely conducted by mission personnel on the ground, often with technology no more sophisticated than a pair of binoculars. *High-zoom digital cameras, motion detectors, closed-circuit television, and digital video networks* could greatly



enhance capacity. Cameras are often used in UN buildings and perimeters, but have not yet been widely implemented outside of these areas. In Cyprus, remote closed-circuit cameras have been placed along the ceasefire line, decreasing violations by providing video evidence of any transgressions. UNMIK and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo have used cameras extensively for monitoring outside UN facilities. Such initiatives help monitor borders, troop movements, and the safety of protected individuals or groups. Other monitoring aids that can be utilized on the ground include electromagnetic sensors, pressure sensors, and seismic detection.

Aerial reconnaissance could expand surveillance capacity as well. Infrared helicopter-borne devices have been used in the Eastern DRC and Timor-Leste. Even lower-tech aerial monitoring through tethered balloons could be an asset for many missions. *Unmanned aerial vehicles* (UAVs) can expand monitoring capacity of a mission while reducing exposure of personnel and reducing the cost of airborne operations. UAVs have yet to be deployed directly by the UN, and have only been brought to the field by troop contributing countries (TCCs). The US deployed them in support of Bosnian peacekeepers, Germany utilized surveillance UAVs in Kosovo, and the former EUFOR Chad mission used UAVs for aerial photography. UNIFIL forces use UAVs for protection, but the mission's rules of engagement do not provide for their use to achieve other mission objectives. Recently the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations stated that the use of drones in South Sudan would have assisted the government and UNMISS in their efforts to protect civilians. DPKO and the Department of Field Support are currently exploring the feasibility of using UAVs for surveillance and information gathering in peacekeeping operations.

Smartphones can communicate information between the field and headquarters in real time, including for GIS mapping. As phones become ever more present in the developing world, this information sharing can extend beyond mission personnel. Platforms now exist for citizens to provide information from their phones about

abuses, outbreaks of violence, or other developments. This has been used in Kenya, Afghanistan, the DRC, Lebanon, and Gaza to provide crisis mapping, and could quickly alert peacekeeping forces to problems in the field.

Apart from monitoring and surveillance, *nonlethal weaponry* such as high-power microwaves or acoustic waves, foams, glues, or signal jamming could protect peacekeeping forces in a crisis situation. Other technologies that could be of use include electronic systems to manage and track mission vehicles, access-control technology for UN buildings and camps, and license plate recognition systems to track traffic in sensitive areas.

Obstacles to the Adoption of New Technology

A number of factors prevent these technologies from being widely used in peace operations.

The most pressing issue is that the use of sophisticated electronic monitoring and surveillance techniques can be controversial and may be perceived as a form of espionage by host states or various actors on the ground. There are also important concerns about how collected information would be used. It is therefore important that uses of UAVs or other potentially controversial technology are articulated clearly in the mission mandate and the rules of engagement prior to deployment of the mission.

DPKO has recently developed new policy guidelines and standard operating procedures, however there are still a number of operational challenges for the use of monitoring and surveillance technology in peacekeeping. The UN must lease expensive equipment from TCCs, but contingent-owned equipment (COE) standards are currently ill-defined, and the COE manual and Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), the standard list of components of a peacekeeping mission, do not cover a number of important technologies. The UN lacks the requisite equipment to meet the technological demands of many missions, and for the



most expensive items, the use of contingent capacities is essential. Many monitoring technologies, however, have become much cheaper in recent years, and would fall within normal discretionary budgets.

In addition to these challenges, because many missions operate in remote locations, they must contend with intermittent power, poor Internet access, and unreliable telecommunications, presenting further obstacles to the adoption of sophisticated technology.

Guiding Questions

- What are the most urgent technological needs of peace operations? Which missions might benefit most immediately from the provision of night vision, UAVs, or other technology? How would these technologies improve the performance of peacekeepers?
- Where might new technology boost effectiveness while also providing cost savings?
- How can surveillance and monitoring technology be most effectively used while taking into account host state concerns over control of information?
- Could support be fostered for the UN to acquire more of this technology, so that less of a burden is placed on TCCs?
- What procedures exist for updating policy, protocol, the COE manual, and TOEs? How can it be assured that expertise in advanced technology is involved in the process?

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Technological Innovations and Peace Operations Summary of the June 13th, 2012 Panel Discussion

Introduction: **Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski**
Permanent Representative of
Canada to the United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis
Diplomacy and Global Peace
Operations, Center on International
Cooperation at New York University

Panelists: **Walter Dorn**
Professor of Defence Studies, Royal
Military College of Canada

Micah Zenko
Fellow for Conflict Prevention
Council on Foreign Relations

The discussion during this event focused on how available technologies could enhance the capabilities of peace operations, how these technologies could be adopted, and how they could be effectively integrated into the UN's peacekeeping architecture.

Technological advances can enhance the monitoring capabilities of peace operations by allowing unmanned monitoring and surveillance, increasing the range and accuracy of manned monitoring, allowing nighttime observation, enhancing the safety of staff in the field, and recording observations electronically. These technologies include infrared imaging, aerial surveillance systems, radar, acoustic sensors, seismic detectors, night vision, and thermal imaging. Much of this equipment is already very affordable, and monitoring technology is steadily becoming less expensive. The UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping has in the past five years passed progressive resolutions urging member states and the Secretariat to provide more technology to peace operations.

Some of these technologies have already been deployed in the field. Remote video cameras have been used in Nepal to monitor arms caches and in Cyprus to observe the green line for the UNFICYP mission. The use of remote cameras could be up to one hundred times cheaper than manned observation posts, but UNFICYP is the only UN mission to deploy them to date. Ground sensors were used by the US in the Sinai Field Mission in the 1970s. Sophisticated Canadian multisensory reconnaissance vehicles were deployed in the UNMEE mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, helping prevent unauthorized personnel and equipment movement. Overall, however, the UN lacks the equipment, resources, preparation, and training needed for effective and efficient use of monitoring technology.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could help fill the monitoring gap, with small unarmed drones useful for border monitoring, terrain mapping, remote surveillance, tracking movement of equipment and personnel, delivering humanitarian assistance, monitoring weapons depots, and assisting in search and rescue. US drones currently provide threat warnings to AMISOM peacekeepers in Somalia. More advanced drones could perform sophisticated tasks such as transmitting information to refugee groups or acting as impromptu communications satellites, as in Libya, where the government shut down the cellular network but NATO drones were able to retransmit mobile phone signals. UAV operational costs can vary from hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars per hour, but over time these are cheaper than manned surveillance. Support capacity is where most of the costs lie, and specially trained personnel are needed to operate UAV systems. Clear status of forces agreements with rules of use and engagement will be needed to address host state concerns about intentions and motivations, and flyover rights must be negotiated with all relevant states.



The UN is capable of implementing technological advances, but its use of monitoring technology has been ad hoc and unsystematic, and organizational changes are needed before the UN can fully take advantage of these advances. There are several options for how authority for integrating new technology could be allocated. The UN Communication and Information Technology Service could take responsibility, a new UN technology center could be established, or responsibility could be assigned to specific field units within missions. Contingent-owned equipment would be suited for more robust systems, but systems that can be easily shifted from one mission to another could be UN-owned. Hiring contractors may be the best option for systems optimized for specific tasks.

Host states have legitimate privacy concerns regarding monitoring and surveillance, and missions must know when to turn off sensors and what information not to use. Peace operations must clearly articulate what they are looking for, and observation targets should be clearly defined. Cooperative monitoring could be beneficial, with the mission sharing observed data with the host state to help alleviate tensions or confirm events. There is an absence of policies, doctrine, standard operating procedures, and training materials regarding the use of new technology, and these must all be updated. During the discussion session, representatives of troop-contributing countries emphasized that they are not opposed to the use of technological innovations in peace operations.



Protection of Civilians and Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence: Scenario-Based Training in Peacekeeping Operations Background Paper for the December 18th, 2012 Event for the Thematic Series “Building More Effective UN Peace Operations”

Since first appearing in the mandate for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999, the protection of civilians (PoC) has grown to become a core task of multidimensional peacekeeping missions. It is included in the mandate of eight of the UN's sixteen current peacekeeping operations. However, a number of recent events – in environments as diverse as the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Syria – have underscored the critical challenges that missions continue to face in implementing this difficult task.

Peacekeeping operations undertake a number of activities under PoC mandates including monitoring, preventing and responding to incidents, and supporting host countries in strengthening their protection capacities. In their efforts to physically protect, peacekeeping operations also establish the security conditions for developing robust rule of law and security systems. These environments are often very fluid, with peacekeepers operating in highly insecure and rapidly changing situations. In addition, the deployment of a peacekeeping operation can substantially raise expectations of the population while the mission struggles to balance its protection duties – fulfilled with limited resources – against the wide range of additional tasks it is mandated to undertake.

Conflict-related sexual violence has progressively become a more important component of peacekeepers' protection activities. As civilians are increasingly likely to be victims of violent conflict, women and children have come under increasing threat of sexual violence perpetrated by parties to the conflict. In response, a series of Security Council resolutions recognize conflict-related sexual violence as a matter of international peace and security and elaborate ways to prevent and respond to it.¹ The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN Women engaged in efforts to

further strengthen peacekeeping's response to sexual violence. In addition, the mandates of many current peacekeeping operations now include efforts to address sexual violence as a component of the missions' work to protect civilians.

Peacekeeping operations must balance these core roles with the growing expectation that they operate with greater efficiency, highlighting the important role that conceptual development and training play in deploying peacekeepers to missions mandated to protect civilians. In recent years DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have taken important steps to strengthen doctrinal understanding and training provided to military, civilian police and other civilian staff in its missions to ensure that peacekeepers in the field are well informed and sufficiently prepared to take on PoC activities and understand the impact of conflict-related sexual violence.

The Operational Concept on PoC was developed in 2010 and sought to provide clarification and guidance for peacekeeping missions. It divides PoC into three mutually reinforcing tiers: protection through political processes, protection from physical violence, and establishing a protective environment. It also led to the development of a framework for mission-specific strategies, prompting the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to revise their PoC strategies. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) are also preparing PoC strategies. The Secretariat also developed a resources and capabilities matrix to identify resources necessary and available for carrying out PoC activities as well as to highlight possible



protection activities. In addition, the position of PoC Coordination Officer at UN Headquarters was created to support all of these efforts within the UN.

To further strengthen understanding of PoC and sexual violence issues, in 2011 DPKO and DFS developed specialized operational level training materials on the protection of civilians and the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence. The modules were developed in consultation with troop and police contributing countries, field missions, and humanitarian NGOs and other protection actors. The modules are designed to serve five goals:

1. Develop a shared understanding of “protection” and how it differs from other peacekeeping tasks;
2. Establish standards for how peacekeeping operations plan and implement their protection activities;
3. Develop an understanding of roles and responsibilities between civilian, police and military staff on protection issues;
4. Strengthen planning and awareness around protection and vulnerabilities;
5. Identify the challenges facing peacekeeping staff in the field and best practices for prevention and response.
6. Equip peacekeeping staff with tools to respond to protection concerns.

Four initial training modules on broad aspects of PoC, legal dimensions and planning set the basis for more deep discussion on the two subsequent modules: conflict-related sexual violence and the set of 12 detailed scenario-based exercises.

The conflict-related sexual violence training module provides peacekeepers with an overview of the nature of sexual violence in conflict, assessing its impacts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It explains how sexual violence is incorporated into the

mandates of peacekeeping missions and describes key terminology. It also provides an overview of military command mechanisms linked to the protection of civilians with a focus on sexual violence. To further develop key concepts the module includes a number of hypothetical situations for peacekeepers to analyze.

The final module of the training package is a set of scenario-based exercises designed to simulate a wide range of environments. The scenarios take place in a fictional country but are based on real situations that demonstrate challenges confronting peacekeepers in the field. The scenarios are also designed with different levels of complexity, with the most advanced geared towards senior mission leadership. Following from these standard training materials, DPKO and DFS are also developing tactical-level mission-specific training modules and scenarios for MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNOCI and UNMISS, as well as training for infantry battalions.

While a number of steps are still needed to further clarify how peacekeeping operations implement PoC mandates and strengthen their capacity to prevent and respond to threats to civilians and conflict-related sexual violence, including the development of guidance and benchmarks, the development and dissemination of training materials is an important initiative in strengthening the capacity of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians in the field.

Guiding Questions

This peacekeeping thematic series is designed to familiarize member states and peacekeeping stakeholders with these training materials. Participants are encouraged to consider the following questions during the presentations.

- What are the most significant constraints limiting peacekeepers' ability to undertake PoC and respond to sexual violence activities? What are the tools available to senior mission leadership to overcome constraints and strengthen response activities?



-
- What opportunities exist to further strengthen a shared understanding of protection of civilians and prevention and response to sexual violence in peacekeeping contexts? What are the challenges?
 - How can best practices and lessons learned be best captured?
 - How do these training modules differ from similar training resources? Beyond peacekeeping staff, what other stakeholders would benefit from these scenario-based exercises?

Endnotes

¹See Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1960.



Protection of Civilians and Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence: Scenario-Based Training in Peacekeeping Operations Summary of the December 18th, 2012 Panel Discussion

Introduction: **Ambassador Gilles Rivard**
Deputy Permanent
Representative of Canada to the
United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis
Diplomacy and Global
Peace Operations, Center on
International Cooperation at New
York University

Panelists: **Major-General Patrick Cammaert
(ret'd)**
Former Force Commander,
MONUC

Michael Heller Chu
Protection of Civilians
Team Leader, Departments of
Peacekeeping Operations and
Field Support, United Nations

common understanding of what protection of civilians meant and the expectations for UN peacekeepers in planning and implementing PoC strategies. It also sought to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities for protection actors in the field.

The six PoC training modules covered issues including international legal dimensions; protection of civilians in a peacekeeping context; the operational framework; prevention of sexual and gender-based violence; and scenario-based exercises. These modules also established strategic frameworks for planning and managing risks. The scenario-based training exercises developed to assist with pre-deployment training of both military and civilian personnel contain twelve situations ranging from less to more complex. Trainees are challenged to make decisions based on changing information, designed to mimic the fast moving situations that peacekeepers face in the field.

Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence is seen as a part of the larger protection of civilians issue, and in 2010 the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Women developed measures aimed at generating awareness and supporting pre-deployment training. This work built on an inventory of best practices created in 2008. The sexual and gender-based violence training exercises address the need for strong understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. Creative thinking and a sense of the mandate's spirit and expectations should also help guide peacekeepers dealing with sexual violence. Strong mission leadership and the skills and will from member states are also important factors for more effective protection.

During the frank discussion session, the desire to see better protection of civilians was shared, and the panelists reiterated the need for member states to have the will to protect civilians in peacekeeping operations.

This discussion focused on the available training modules and scenario-based exercises for military and civilian peacekeepers on protection of civilians and conflict-related sexual violence.

In 2009, Security Council Resolution 1894 called for adequate protection of civilians training and in 2010, the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping requested the development of modules for this task. In response, the UN Secretariat, in consultations with troop contributing countries (TCCs), police-contributing countries (PCCs), humanitarian actors, and mission personnel, developed protection of civilian modules for pre-deployment and in-mission training. Six modules were rolled out in late 2011 aiming to establish a



The deployment of sexual and gender-based violence experts, and particularly female experts, was encouraged, though it was suggested that lack of resources was not sufficient reason for the failure to protect civilians, and that more could be done by the already-deployed peacekeepers. The development of further training modules for protection of civilians remains on-going, and the Secretariat is in the process of also developing mission-specific scenario exercises for pre-deployment training, with all modules targeted at UN actors.



Annex I: Dates, Venues and Speakers for Panel Discussions

Defending Peacekeeping Mandates: the Use of Force

3 March 2011

Introduction: **Ambassador John McNee**
Former Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis Diplomacy and Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation at New York University

Panellists: **General Maurice Baril (ret'd)**
Former Chief of the Defence Staff For Canada, Former Military Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Former Inspector General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Mona Khalil
Senior Legal Officer in the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs

Reflecting on the Experiences of Major TCCs – the Case of Brazil in MINUSTAH

10 April 2012

Introduction: **Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski**
Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis Diplomacy and Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation at New York University

Panellists: **Edmond Mulet**
Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

General Luis Guilherme Paul Cruz
Former MINUSTAH Force Commander

Discussant: **Ambassador Gilles Rivard**
Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Technological Innovations and Peace Operations

13 June 2012

Introduction: **Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski**
Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis Diplomacy and Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation at New York University

Panellists: **Walter Dorn**
Professor of Defence Studies, Royal Military College of Canada

Micah Zenko
Fellow for Conflict Prevention, Council on Foreign Relations

Protection of Civilians and Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence: Scenario-Based Training in Peacekeeping Operations

18 December 2012

Introduction: **Ambassador Gilles Rivard**
Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Chair: **Richard Gowan**
Associate Director of Crisis Diplomacy and Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation at New York University

Panellists: **Major-General Patrick Cammaert (ret'd)**
Former Force Commander, MONUC

Michael Heller Chu
Protection of Civilians Team Leader, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations



Annex 2: Executive Summary: Building More Effective UN Peace Operations, 2010

Bruce Jones

Director, Center on International Cooperation

UN peace operations have entered a period of strategic uncertainty. This follows considerable growth in size and complexity over the past decade. Record high deployment levels, coupled with demands for new or expanded missions, alongside mounting financial constraints, present a strategic challenge for the UN and its member states.

Navigating this shifting terrain requires cooperation from all peacekeeping stakeholders. As the Secretariat, the Security Council, troop contributors, and the broader UN membership began in 2009 to examine ways forward, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, in cooperation with the Center on International Cooperation, convened a series of thematic panels on building more effective UN peace operations. The five installments of the series brought together member state representatives, UN Secretariat staff, Security Council members, and leading academic and NGO practitioners to explore the challenges facing UN peace operations and potential ways to confront them. This publication, in bringing together the issue papers from the series, provides an overview of the key strategic issues facing UN and non-UN peace operations today.

A shared diagnosis of the problems is an essential starting point for seeking solutions. To this end, observable symptoms of overstretch were distinguished from its causes. The increasingly familiar symptoms of overstretch (strains on troop contributors, rising financial costs, and headquarters strains) are consequences of two sets of underlying challenges, one operational, the other political: first, the scale of missions in logistically constrained environments, the proliferation of tasks mandated to them, and the frequent absence of exit strategies; second, the failure to place UN peacekeeping in the context of political processes,

limited consent from the host country and parties to a conflict, and the stalling and/or reversal of previous reform initiatives.

That a peacekeeping operation can never substitute for an effective political process was a central lesson of the 2000 Brahimi Report. Indeed, striking the appropriate balance between the two is a crucial determinant for a successful peace operation and its ultimate withdrawal. Nevertheless, this concept appears to have fallen from focus in recent years, to the detriment of several deployed UN peacekeeping operations. To perform their political functions effectively, UN peacekeeping operations need: strong political teams and leadership; substantive and logistical support from not only the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS), but also the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and other parts of the UN system; more flexible mechanisms for using budgeted funds for political and other early peacebuilding activities, especially in capacity building; and, appropriately equipped and capable forces. Most centrally, they need political support from member states.

A central political challenge for UN peacekeeping emerges from the principle of consent and how it is applied. Despite reaffirming that consent by the host government, warring parties, and international community is a core principle of UN peacekeeping doctrine, Council mandates have grown increasingly ambitious and peacekeepers have been deployed in theaters where there is often 'no peace to keep.' Full consent need not be a determinant of success of an operation – but its absence adds to the challenge and heightens the likelihood of failure.

The process mentioned above amplifies the importance of political support to mandates. And the absence of full consent as it pertains to an operation deepens the risks posed when UN peace operation mandates are perceived as exclusive. Perceived exclusion from the crafting of mandates for complex operations has contributed to a crisis in confidence and amplified tensions about the purposes of UN peacekeeping and the political consensus needed to support it.



When this process started, the coalition of member states needed to support peacekeeping (those on the Council, those who contribute troops and police, and those who pay for the bulk of the assessed budget) has become increasingly fractured. Insufficient consultation has yielded slow personnel deployment and had a dissuasive impact on potential contributors of valuable specialized assets. At the conclusion of this process, the Security Council had taken steps to deepen “triangular” consultations between the Council, the Secretariat, and TCCs. It had also begun considering ways to maintain this dynamic throughout the mission term – options include mission specific “Friends Groups”; and, agreement among peacekeeping stakeholders on key issues like protection of civilians and the implications of “robust” peacekeeping. The outcomes from 2010’s C-34 discussions are important steps forward in this regard.

Meanwhile, the demands on the Department of Field Support (DFS) – the backbone of UN peace operations – have increased with not only the growing size and complexity of UN peacekeeping, but also the burgeoning number of DPA-led special political missions that it supports. Yet, despite its increasing responsibilities, DFS’s support activities have been governed largely by financial and procurement rules and procedures that were not designed for peace operations, let alone for today’s multifaceted mandates. The consequences have often been slow deployment, operational underperformance, and inefficient use of available resources. In response to these challenges, DFS released the Global Field Support Strategy. The adoption of critical components of that strategy by the General Assembly in June 2010 constitutes a further step forward.

UN peacekeepers are now also expected to implement a range of institution- and capacity-building functions, such as promoting rule of law through reform of the judicial and security sectors. But despite considerable attention and resources, the UN’s track record in implementing these activities has been uneven. This is because the understanding of rule of law support activities remains underdeveloped, and also because of recurrent political, operational, and institutional

challenges. Political challenges to building the rule of law stem from the inter-related issues of consent and sovereignty. Governments may be unwilling to acquiesce to international intervention; justice and security sector reform (SSR) operations may be rebuffed as an infringement on sovereignty. However, the challenge that SSR presents to state sovereignty should not be overstated. Quite deliberately, the majority of UN peace operations are designed to extend, rather than limit, the authority of states.

A related point is that the time-bound character of UN peace operations is in direct tension with the time required to reestablish the rule of law. Recent rule of law-focused missions have demonstrated the importance of initiating security and justice reform as early as possible during the immediate post-conflict phase, but this period does not last long and missions must prioritize handing over elements of their work to more specialized groups or to host governments. These activities have been historically underfunded and their mechanisms for delivery are outdated. One potential solution would be to fund mission-critical tasks from assessed funds, and noncritical tasks from voluntary funds. Defining what is critical depends on an agreed definition of success – still lacking at the UN. The issue of effective rule of law support to member states – within and beyond peacekeeping – is one requiring further discussion and elaboration at the UN.

Since the thematic series commenced, the strategic environment for UN peace operations has continued to evolve, potentially altering the way the UN and its member states utilize peace operations for crisis management. The global financial crisis has had a significant impact on national budgets, leading many member states to seek improved efficiency in peacekeeping and a few to press for drawdown in missions where stability appears to have been achieved. Future decisions on whether to launch large, multidimensional operations will be weighed against their large financial cost. Nonetheless, situations like the upcoming referendum in south Sudan and the ongoing tensions in the Middle East may yet call for heightened



deployments in the future. Peacekeeping remains vital to the maintenance of international peace and security.



Annex 3: Peacekeeping Overstretch: Symptoms, Causes, and Consequences, 2009

United Nations peace operations face an extended and dangerous period of strategic uncertainty. A series of setbacks have coincided with military overstretch and the financial crisis, raising the risk that UN peacekeeping may contract, despite high continuing needs.

An excessive contraction in peacekeeping would have serious consequences for international peace and stability. UN peacekeeping has proved to be a versatile tool for deterring or reversing inter-state conflict, ending civil wars, mitigating humanitarian crises, and extending state authority in areas where state capacity is weak or contested. Not all operations succeed, or succeed in full. But collectively, according to rigorous research, international mediation and peacekeeping have contributed to an 80% decline in total armed conflict since the early 1990s. Although this has not been the work of the UN alone – individual member states, regional organizations and non-governmental actors have played vital roles – the UN has been an indispensable contributor.

Research also suggests that demand for peacekeeping – and specifically for UN peacekeeping – will rise, not fall, in the coming years. To overcome current strains and meet future challenges, both individual operations and the peacekeeping system as a whole require continued political, military and financial commitment by states and institutions.

The good news is that although there are divergent perceptions of the nature and scale of current difficulties, a broad majority of UN member states share a sense of the importance of making peacekeeping work – and work better.

This paper takes as its starting point the notion that a shared diagnosis of the problem is the prerequisite of

shared solutions. To this end, it is necessary to distinguish between the observable symptoms of peacekeeping's current malaise – various forms of overstretch – and its causes. This paper argues that the increasingly familiar symptoms of overstretch – strains on troop contributors, rising financial costs, headquarters strains – are consequences of two sets of underlying challenges, operational and political. Strains are also caused by incomplete (or reversed) reforms – again, both operational (the Secretariat) and political (UNSC).

Shared diagnosis and shared solutions are critical, because peacekeeping is a shared responsibility – the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the PBC all have roles to play. Troop and financial contributors, both in and outside of the Security Council, are essential actors. The Secretariat and member states both have vital responsibilities. Restoring confidence, improving performance and enhancing the capacity of UN peacekeeping will take renewed effort by all concerned actors. If unity of effort is a critical determinant of success on the ground, unity of purpose at headquarters is an essential pre-condition.

This background paper is the independent work of the NYU Center on International Cooperation. It draws in part on the recent CIC report to the DPKO/DFS 'New Horizons' process. The views expressed herein do not necessarily coincide with those of the Government of Canada or of the United Nations Secretariat.


Symptoms of Overstretch

The overall number of UN peacekeeping personnel in the field has grown nearly ten fold over the last seven years. The result is an overstretched system. The principal symptoms of peacekeeping overstretch are three: strain on troop contributors; rapidly rising financial costs; and diffused attention at headquarters, by both the Secretariat and the Security Council.


Troop contributor overstretch. There are over 82,000 military personnel and some 10,300 police currently

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Military Deployments in Global Peace Operations



UN Peacekeeping Expenditures (In \$US millions)



...serving in 18 UN missions worldwide. Deployments of UN peacekeepers slowed significantly in 2008, as it became increasingly difficult to find and deploy personnel for new missions. Traditional large-scale contributors face new constraints on their ability to deploy into UN missions. Even where UN peacekeeping operations have sufficient levels of infantry to meet deployment requirements, it faces a shortage of force enablers, like airlift and field hospitals, and of force multipliers, including helicopters and armored personnel carriers. Without this equipment, UN troops can neither rapidly

respond to protect civilians in vast territories like Darfur and Congo, nor adequately protect themselves from attack, resulting in caveats on what operations troop contributors are willing to undertake.


Headquarters Overstretch. The United Nations is the biggest institutional provider of peacekeepers worldwide, accounting for some 50 percent of global deployments. It manages those peacekeepers with a fraction of the headquarters resources employed by member states or better resourced organizations like NATO. Despite increases in staffing to both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, the ratio of headquarters staff to field personnel is nearly 1:100. By comparison, NATO has a ratio of 1:18, or 4000 headquarters staff to over 74,000 troops. This matters, because it reduces the options available to DPKO for more sustained headquarters engagement in command and control. Although the UN's decentralized command and control arrangement has served it well in many instances, it does have limitations: in its ability to sustain political support for high-risk operations; and in its ability to manage regional dynamics. These are likely to be growing, not receding, challenges for future UN operations.

Strain on mission oversight is not limited to the Secretariat. The crisis in eastern DRC generated tensions among the Security Council, troop contributors, and the Secretariat over timely and adequate reporting. But political attention in the Security Council was also strained. Whereas in the past, the Security Council has had to oversee a handful of peacekeeping operations, only a small number of them in complex or risky environments, now the Security Council has to oversee 18 peacekeeping operations, many of them in highly complex environments, as well as several political missions – to say nothing of managing critical strategic files on its agenda that demand sustained political attention.

Financial Overstretch. The budget for UN peacekeeping reached a record US\$7.3 billion in 2008-2009, a ten percent increase over the previous year and a five-fold increase in just under a decade. This figure significantly



Growth of UN Peacekeeping Deployments and Headquarters Staff: 2005-2008



understates the financial strain, however, as at the same time, many of the UN's largest donors have experienced rapidly rising costs for their participation in UN-mandated NATO and European Union missions, as well as their voluntary contributions for African Union operations. Globally, the net budget for peace operations likely exceeds US\$30 billion.

The impact of the financial crisis will exacerbate these strains, as member states look to reduce national budgets. Their ability and willingness to underwrite UN costs will be measured against competing priorities. There may be several impacts.

First, although UN operations continue to be relatively cheap, member states are likely to question the expense of long-running missions, creating pressure to draw them down. In some cases, the timing may be right; elsewhere, premature downsizing or withdrawal can have disastrous effects, as seen in Timor-Leste in 2006.

Second, as the cost of the military component of peacekeeping missions is relatively fixed (reimbursement scales for troops, police, equipment, prices for fuel and rations), cuts may be made to more "flexible" aspects of budgets, like civilians – but these have significant impacts on performance.

Third, reductions in assessments and voluntary funds risk undermining efforts to secure more predictable, sustainable, and flexible financing for strengthening the capacity of regional organizations, above all the

African Union. As the willingness of countries outside the continent to field troops for African missions has declined, African countries have themselves shouldered the burden – including in the most insecure environments, like Somalia and Darfur. Mounting these missions places a greater strain in terms of financing and capabilities on the AU relative to other organizations.

Causes of Overstretch

If there is increasing awareness of the symptoms of overstretch, there is as yet inadequate shared understanding of its causes. Some of these cases are operational – UN peacekeepers are deploying in large and logistically constrained environments; and they are doing so for longer, in part because of lags in early recovery.

Scale: big missions in big places. Successfully implementing mission mandates is complicated by the nature of the environments into which they deploy. High levels of troops are unable to compensate for the size and logistical difficulty of the environments in DRC, Sudan, and Chad in which they are deployed. There are frequent references to the 'large' mission the UN has deployed in the DR Congo – that now has nearly 17,000 troops. But by comparison, the UN had 17,500 troops deployed in Sierra Leone with a similar mandate in 1999. And whereas in Sierra Leone that translated into a troop-land ratio of 1:1.6, (one soldier for every 1.6 square kilometres of territory), in DRC the equivalent ratio was 1:48. Even taking into account the fact that MONUC concentrates its presence in the east of the country, the difference in density is still striking.

The lack of infrastructure exacerbates the problem of scale. Implementing complex mandates in such environments often leads to an excessive dispersion of forces, reducing the chances of effective responses to military challenges. This is a constant risk in large theaters; one that the UN cannot remedy without greater agility and mobility brought by equipment like helicopters. (At the same time, sophisticated capabilities are not a panacea, as NATO difficulties in Afghanistan demonstrates.)



Exit Strategies: Transitioning to peacebuilding and development.

A viable political framework and security presence are preconditions for the resumption of economic recovery and other development activities. These, in turn, are vital to creating sustainable peace and therefore to the eventual drawdown of UN peacekeepers. The ability of the international community to organize around early support to economic recovery, livelihoods, and essential services, as well as core state-building tasks has proven a significant challenge. The Peacebuilding Commission has begun to address some of these problems – but so far only in late recovery contexts.

Gaps in strategy, financing and capacity weaken international efforts to support early economic, social and political recovery from conflict. Consequently, early efforts to build a functioning government and to jump-start economic activity are often not launched. As a result, local confidence in the political process and in international commitment is not maintained. All this contributes to poor outcomes. International actors have been compelled to stay longer than expected, as in Bosnia, their recovery efforts have faltered, as in Afghanistan, or both, as in Timor-Leste.

The forthcoming SG report on early recovery is intended to address these gaps. Also warranted is a hard look at the success to date of the integrated mission model used by the UN to link its political/security and developmental/humanitarian efforts. While this model has at times and in places served as an effective building block for broader integration of strategy, it has not done so reliably or in an adequately inclusive manner.

Political Process Failures. Scale, duration, strain – all of these matter. But in the end, the performance of peacekeeping has to be judged in the context of wider political engagement. As the Brahimi report emphatically established, peacekeeping cannot substitute for an effective political process.¹

In recent years, though, it has been tasked to do so. During 2008, political processes in central Africa, Lebanon, Sudan, Chad, and Haiti suffered collapse or failure, placing peacekeeping operations in these theatres under severe strain. Credible political process and credible military presence should reinforce one another. But these cases demonstrate that the obverse is also true: a large deployment of UN peacekeepers is alone an insufficient guarantee of generating or maintaining a credible political process.

Political issues not only underpin peacekeeping, but are key to determining the overarching strategy for – and most appropriate form of – UN engagement. Peacekeeping may not always be the best response from the Security Council. In the absence of viable political frameworks, UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed with high expectations, but without real chances of success.

The Security Council has paid insufficient attention to the political dimensions of prevention and to stabilization. Earlier, more robust political engagement by the Security Council, or on its behalf, might prevent tensions from escalating into full-blown crises warranting more robust engagement and investment. Similarly, more sustained engagement once a crisis has reached the Council's agenda would help ensure that settlements are not derailed by local political disputes, or regional complications.

Limited Consent. A more tricky question is that of consent. The Brahimi report made clear while consent was a bedrock principle of UN peacekeeping, it would not always be present in full. UN peacekeeping operations – sometimes with support from other actors – have shown that they can overcome limited consent from non-state actors, including through robust operations (Haiti, Sierra Leone, eastern DRC in 2006.) Indeed, these missions have performed an under-examined but critical function – that of extending state authority, both through civilian and military means. This is a tough

¹“Political process” has a variety of meanings: it may include ongoing contacts between parties to a peace agreement; a democratic process involving elections or the approval of a constitution; or regional and international contacts on the status of a contested territory.



challenge, though, and one that most UN operations are neither mandated nor equipped to handle.

Far, far more complicated is the question of non-consent, or limited consent from the state. Where peacekeeping operations have been deployed without strong consent of the state, their ability to make a positive impact on the ground has been sharply constrained. Such operations may perform roles in helping to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of conflict – but even this function can be frustrated.

The distinction between state and non-state consent is important because, some recent debates notwithstanding, the majority of large-scale UN operations are deliberately designed to extend rather than limit the authority of states. Put differently: the Security Council is normally in the business of strengthening governments rather than changing regimes. This fact, often overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent successes and failures of peacekeeping – and may help guide future deployments.

Incomplete Reforms. To say that UN peacekeeping is facing logistical/management strains as a function of operational overstretch, and that it is facing political/conceptual strains as a function of a mismatch between peacekeeping per se and the underlying political processes it is designed to support, is simply to say that the process of implementing the Brahimi reforms has stalled, or even reversed. Significant elements of the Brahimi agenda were adopted by member states and the Secretariat between 2000 and 2005, but reform slowed after the start of the Iraq war.

In the Secretariat, efforts to enhance personnel quality, logistics, and command and control all suffered. More recent reform efforts, like the establishment of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) and expansion of the Office of Military Affairs, both in DPKO, have yielded cautious optimism. But much work remains to be done in such areas as command and control, rapid deployment, civilian deployment, procurement, and human resources.

The problems are compounded by the perception that the Security Council has also forgotten to observe the “rules” of Brahimi: the need to match politics to peacekeeping, and resources to mandates. Moreover, as the Security Council has authorized missions where the political framework is absent or weak, where consent is in question, and risks are therefore high, it has not commensurately expanded its consultation with non-Council troop contributors and financial contributors – i.e. with other risk takers. The gap between decision-making and risk-taking has widened, eroding the sense of shared responsibility, and shared commitment.

Conclusion

Shared commitment to UN peacekeeping is important because an assessment of future conflict trends suggests rising not falling demand, and increased not decreased complexity. New operations will likely face opposition from hardened and sophisticated ‘spoilers’, sometimes with international backers, and be called upon to play a primary or supporting role in extending the authority of weak or contested governments. Capacity and political factors ensure that much of the upcoming demand will land on the shoulders of the UN.

The challenge ahead, then, is both to manage current strains but also to do so in a way that helps to jump-start necessary and stalled reforms – both operational and political. This paper, and the seminar into which it is designed to feed, aim to contribute to that by providing research and information that can – hopefully – help forge a shared diagnosis of the problem. (The next two seminars and accompanying research papers will delve more deeply into two critical issues touched on but not elaborated here: matching political strategy to peacekeeping operations; and partnership with regional organizations, including on the question of financing.) As argued at the outset, shared analysis is a prerequisite for shared responsibility; and shared responsibility is the sine qua non for more effective, more efficient and more equitable action by UN peacekeeping.





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