A Window of Opportunity for Somalia: Will External Actors’ Peacebuilding Frameworks Help or Hinder the Effort?

Sarah Hearn and Thomas Zimmerman

Executive Summary

We initiated a project to study external actors’ peacebuilding frameworks in Somalia. The purpose is to ascertain whether and how the international community is applying recent international learning on peacebuilding, and is able to forge coherent and effective approaches to helping countries pursue peaceful political settlements.

In this paper, we briefly outline the international learning on peacebuilding and political settlements, and the factors that have shaped peacebuilding and state formation in Somalia. We then outline the major peacebuilding and related security frameworks in Somalia, and our proposed methodology to monitor the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of international frameworks going forward. We will monitor policy performance, rather than individual project performance, because priority should be accorded now to monitoring policies, and their translation into implementation practices aimed at building peace.

From November 2013 to January 2014, we conducted an initial survey of the international peacebuilding frameworks being applied in Somalia. We found three major categories of activity: national “top-down” peacebuilding frameworks aimed at building Somali state legitimacy and capacity; sub-national peacebuilding frameworks aimed at supporting “bottom-up” stabilization and peacebuilding processes; and related security frameworks, which are aimed at shoring up Somali and international security, primarily from the threat posed by al-Shabaab, but also to address problems of criminality.

The overall picture emerging is one where international actors are trying to implement international learning about peacebuilding, but also one where externally-driven donor aid allocations and disbursement timelines...
risk undercutting Somali decision-making and consensus-building on peacebuilding. We found divergent concepts about what “peacebuilding,” “statebuilding” and “stabilization” mean among external actors, which leads to different approaches and practices on the ground. Taking a step back to consider how aid decisions should relate to ongoing Somali political processes seems necessary.

A meta-question that emerged from our initial survey of peacebuilding frameworks relates to the strategic logic that shapes donor practices and decision-making in the country. We found support, both for a centralized aid compact predicated on state sovereignty governed by Mogadishu, and bottom-up investments in peripheral quasi-state formation processes in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. Donors may be hedging their bets across Somali institutions in the absence of a strong Somali consensus, pursuing both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. However, these various investments might not constitute a coherent peacebuilding strategy.

Finally, international actors are countering violent extremism and criminality, with efforts that are separate from those aimed at Somali state formation and peacebuilding. These security initiatives may conflict with peacebuilding.

Accordingly, our future monitoring will focus on: the formulation and implementation of the Somalia peacebuilding compact and external actors’ interaction with Somali political negotiations; varying approaches and practices to peacebuilding and stabilization at the sub-national level; and security frameworks and their impact on peacebuilding at the local and national levels. We will conduct a series of “deep dives” into these areas over the next year. We hope this paper on our research framework will form a strong basis for consultation with major stakeholders.

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Introduction

In war-torn societies, windows of opportunity can open up to building peace. One such window has opened in Somalia, with the removal by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) of the al-Shabaab movement from strategic towns and ports in South-Central Somalia, and the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2012. Numerous prior peacebuilding efforts and attempts at building a centralized Somali national government have failed. The conditions and risks that have sustained the conflict for decades continue to exist: the collapse of the central state and lawlessness in some areas; a fractious society riven by clan politics; widespread poverty, environmental devastation and youth unemployment; a booming war economy that benefits a powerful elite; the emergence of a radical interpretation of Islam, in the form of the al-Shabaab insurgency; and a fragmented international community which has pursued competing objectives.

At this seemingly pivotal moment, how should external actors engage in building peace in the country, and how do they know if their actions are helping or undercutting the prospects for a more durable Somali political settlement?

We initiated a project to conduct strategic monitoring of international peacebuilding and related security frameworks in Somalia to test these questions. Our purpose is to shed light on the extent to which the international community’s policies, strategies and implementation practices appear to support the emergence of a new political settlement in Somalia, and to develop lessons of wider global implication on the international community’s approaches. At this stage, we will not monitor the impact of projects and programs (which in many cases are still under design or in their early days), but rather the efforts of the international community to forge an effective and coherent approach to peacebuilding in the country, which draws on recent international policy learning.

In this paper, we briefly summarize international policy learning on peacebuilding, statebuilding and political settlements, major factors shaping the prospects for peacebuilding in Somalia, and our initial findings on the international frameworks being applied in Somalia. We then explain our qualitative methodological approach to monitoring going forward.

International Learning on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

During the 1990s, a rise in intrastate conflicts generated increased international focus on peacebuilding. A sequential approach to the transition from war to peace that had characterized interstate conflicts did not hold in the complex civil conflicts after the Cold War. Such conflicts did not end in decisive military victories and reconstruction phases, but rather countries were trapped in cycles of conflict, with complex causes that risked flaring into violence as states formed. As international understanding of state formation and conflict grew, the UN and others started to develop peacebuilding as a field in its own right.

The concept was first introduced in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 1992, which defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The UN developed the peacebuilding concept further in the 2000 “Brahimi Report” and the 2004 report of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change,\(^5\) to encapsulate a cyclical view of the causes of conflict and relapse and responses to addressing them.

Concepts of “peacebuilding” and “statebuilding” relate to the historical processes by which a state’s institutions, legitimacy and state-society relations are built. These are often described as the processes by which a state generates legitimacy and consent, through elite deals on the distribution of power, through some degree of political inclusion, and through delivering core state functions targeted to meet citizens’ basic expectations. Peacebuilding has been more widely defined to also encompass processes through which historical grievances and the causes of conflict are addressed and reconciliation is pursued. Peacebuilding and statebuilding processes should contribute to the consolidation of a “political settlement” that forges a common understanding on the distribution of power and rights, and that can prevent violent conflict and enable the pursuit of long-term development.\(^6\)

There are two schools of thought about what constitutes a political settlement. The first describes long-running formal and informal relations and institutions involving political actors, especially elites. The second describes the construction of more formal political agreements and power-sharing arrangements between elites (constitutions, peace agreements and so forth). In fragile states, there is a need to understand the development of political settlements through both lenses, as the formation of relations between elites, punctuated by major political agreements (Jones, Elgin, Esberg, 2012).\(^7\) These processes should not be understood in isolation from the development of wider state-society relations. Recent research on peacebuilding and statebuilding has pointed to inclusion as a major contributing factor in building greater state legitimacy and stability.\(^8\) Exclusionary behavior (particularly of former rebels and militias) has also been identified as a “consistently important” factor in relapses into violent conflict (Call, 2012).\(^9\)

In recent years, international policy exercises have been undertaken to identify what has gone right and wrong when external actors support peacebuilding and statebuilding, ranging from the foundations for the Republic of Korea’s post-conflict success, to recovery from the genocide in Rwanda and resource conflict in Sierra Leone, to more recent experiences in “failed states”’ policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. These exercises have included the 2011 World Bank World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development (WDR 2011), the UN’s 2011 Report of the Secretary-General on Civilian Capacities in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict and the International Dialogue’s New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.\(^10\)

Drawing on academic and practitioners’ learning, these exercises have, in essence, highlighted five priorities for building a state’s legitimacy and peace, latterly framed as “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals” (PSGs) by the International Dialogue. These are: political inclusion, justice, security, building core state administrative functions to generate revenue and deliver basic services, and kick-starting economic regeneration, with a focus on job creation. Cutting across these prerequisites is a need to more effectively develop and transform local and national institutions, so that they can prevent conflict and instability in the long-term, and a need to identify early confidence-building measures which start to restore state-society relations.

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\(^1\) The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is comprised of the g7+ group of fragile states and OECD.
Development donors also recognized that implementation practices had placed too great an emphasis upon “top-down” statebuilding and service delivery models aimed at meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), over supporting the emergence of political settlements. Accordingly, more international emphasis has been placed upon both the need to identify a wider range of actors who have skills to support political and institutional development from countries with recent, relevant experience, and a commitment to align aid to national peacebuilding priorities, defined through mutually agreed “compacts.”

In the related domain of international peace and security, post-9/11 military interventions in Afghanistan, Somalia and beyond have displaced political and armed groups judged to be aligned with international terrorist organizations or otherwise illegitimate. Analysts observed that these interventions have tended to provoke new forms of resistance in the form of insurgency and highly fragmented militias, which new governments must either integrate or defeat (Rubin, 2012). In these cases, the formation of security forces and the extension of state authority across territory have been intensely contested because they are political processes that shape the balance of power. The international community appears to be missing a “toolkit” for Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Because processes are not following formal peace agreements in these environments, there is limited understanding about how to approach co-opting highly fragmented militias into state structures.

In addition, there is a significant gap in international strategic lesson-learning on how counter-terrorism operations have an impact on the causes and effects of terrorism locally, and on the prospects for building local stability and peacebuilding.

**Major Factors Shaping Peacebuilding and State Formation in Somalia**

Somali state formation and conflict have been shaped by the context in which the state was founded, and by its fluid clan social structures, the emergence of a war economy and criminality, a form of violent Islamism, and the objectives and influence of external actors in the country.

The Republic of Somalia was formed on July 1, 1960, composed of former Italian and British Somaliland. Shifting allegiances and divisions between Somalia’s clan and sub-clan structures have shaped a complex environment. Dictator Mohammad Siad Barre took control of the country in a coup d’état in 1969. He believed the only way to govern Somalia was to break the back of clan influence and attempted to enforce the state’s authority through imposing a highly centralized government and a form of socialism. In the context of severe drought and a disastrous conflict with Ethiopia, organized clan resistance to Siad Barre grew. Civil war erupted in 1988, and in 1991, Siad Barre fled Mogadishu.

After the collapse of the central Somali state, violence grew among civilians. Somalis ran to their respective “homelands.” The Darod fled south to Kismayo (South-Central Somalia) and north towards Galkayo and beyond (the future Puntland); the Digil and Mirifle towards Baidoa in the South; the Isaaq to the northwest and Somaliland; and minority clans were dispersed.

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1. Clan in Somalia is neither monolithic nor static. There are many different ways of tracing the lineage of Somali clans, but the main five clans (with the dominant sub-clans in parentheses) are: Hawiye (Abgal, Habargidir, Murursade, Hawadle); Darod (Harti, Ogaden, Marehan); Dir (Isaaq, Gadabursi, Issa, Biyamal); Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn and Digil); Minority clans (Shekhal, Barawan, Banlu, Reer Hamar).
all over as internally displaced persons. Millions of Somali refugees fled to neighboring countries. Mogadishu was largely left to the Hawiye, who themselves experienced bitter intra-clan conflict.

Over the two decades of conflict, Somalia has evolved into a regional collage, with wide variations in governance, institutions, economic opportunity and security. Multiple solutions to state formation and conflict have been pursued since 1991, some succeeding and others failing.

In the north, Somaliland and Puntland enjoy relative security and stability, with basic functioning state institutions and markets and a need for long-term development investment.

In 1991, Somaliland declared its independence (not secession) from Somalia as a revocation of the 1960 voluntary union. Its priority is to achieve recognition of independent statehood. When analysts studied the causal factors in Somaliland’s success in state formation, they found that an absence of foreign aid and intervention was significant (along with secondary education and a widespread desire for safety). The lack of foreign aid meant that actors in Somaliland determined their own political and institutional arrangements, \(^{16}\) (Phillips, 2013), and forced Somaliland authorities to raise revenue. These factors built confidence, institutional capacity and accountability between state and people \(^{17}\) (Eubank, 2012).

In 1998, Puntland was formed as a regional autonomous state following a series of conferences in Gorowe involving the political and traditional leadership of the region. Puntland was an attempt to solve the problem of statelessness without seceding. Puntland’s priority is to achieve a Somali political settlement based on a federal system of government.

The lower half of Somalia, including Mogadishu, is known as South-Central Somalia. It has been afflicted by conflict, lawlessness and some of the worst humanitarian disasters. Since 1991, many transitional federal governments have attempted to re-exert state authority over Somalia. Harper \(^{18}\) (2012) noted that these governments have been the result of nearly twenty international conferences and have lacked popular legitimacy because they were seen to be foreign creations, to be ineffectual, and to have lacked a permanent presence inside Somalia.

In this government vacuum, alternate forms of governance emerged. Warlords and powerful clan leaders, supported by businessmen, divided the country into fiefdoms. \(^{19}\) When Menkhaus \(^{20}\) (2003, 2004, 2009) analyzed the evolution of the conflict in Somalia, he found a dominant driver of the conflict was the emergence of a war economy based on control of diverted aid and illicit goods (such as illegal weapons and other forms of criminality). Many of these warlords and business interests emerged at the expense of traditional clan authority in the South. The growth of a war economy exacerbated tensions and capitalized upon the lawlessness that grew out of the collapse of the Somali central state.

In parallel, a successful class of entrepreneurial actors started to provide services. One report argued that while some business elites had benefited from the war economy, “A strong autonomous business class has emerged that recognises the need for a viable government. Early in the conflict many businesses engaged in illicit activities, which benefitted from a lack of viable government. A move to legitimate productive investments has seen the business class shift in support of a strong
There is a sense of emerging partnership between government and the state, with unconventional public-private partnerships being developed in response to current government constraints.21

Local alternate governance systems also developed through Sharia courts. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) grew as a loose affiliation of these courts and clans in opposition to warlords and criminal business interests. By 2006, the UIC was in control of much of South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu. The UIC provided a degree of security and services to Somalis. Ethiopia and the West judged the UIC to pose a violent Islamist extremist threat, and the West backed the Ethiopian-led offensive in 2006 to push the UIC out of Somalia’s major cities in favor of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Harper (2012) argued, “The USA and its allies...mistakenly equated a homegrown form of political Islam with the internal al-Qaeda franchise...In its original form, the UIC did not represent a new front for violent Islam.”22 Menkhaus (2009)23 found a notable change in the nature of the Somali conflict after the 2006 intervention. Enmity between Somalis and Ethiopian forces, and between Somalis and predatory TFG forces, led to an energized and radicalized insurgency that recruited from radicalized youth and marginalized clans, and that spread across South-Central Somalia in opposition to the TFG and its backers. The extremist al-Shabaab movement grew from the UIC and its downfall. In 2010, al-Shabaab publicly announced its links to al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab’s cells have severely limited the space for humanitarian, civil society and political actors to operate inside South-Central Somalia, while offering basic services of its own in the areas it controls.

External actors continue to influence the conflict and the prospects for peace. Arab countries and Turkey support a centralized, capable state that shares moderate Islamic learnings. Turkey is seeking to innovate in the country through a hybrid, public-private model of engagement, which reflects Turkey’s own experience in state formation.24 Somalia’s Arab allies also seek to counter-balance Ethiopian influence in the region.

Ethiopia, Kenya and other members of the African Union, seek to secure themselves from the threat posed by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, as well as to exert influence in their border lands. AMISOM has been deployed since 2007, and is currently composed of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda, with police contributions from Ghana and Nigeria. AMISOM’s mandate is to stabilize the country, in order to create the conditions for humanitarian support, and to extend the writ of the Somali government and UN. AMISOM and Ethiopian operations have pushed al-Shabaab out of many of the strategic towns and ports in South-Central Somalia (Mogadishu in August 2012, Beletweyn in December 2012, Baidoa in February 2012, and Kismayo in September 2012). At the time of writing, AMISOM continues to claim the remaining towns and ports of South-Central Somalia from al-Shabaab.

Western donors are driven to curtail the threat of al-Qaeda and of criminality, and forced migration from the country. The Security Council shares these security objectives. In 2013, the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was mandated to provide policy advice to the Somali government and AMISOM on peacebuilding and statebuilding. Western countries and the EU have funded AMISOM, UNSOM and UN agencies for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding assistance, as well as other multilateral security and rule of law frameworks. The UK has been strongly associated with efforts to align aid to Somali national peacebuilding, statebuilding and stabilization frameworks, with Prime Minister David Cameron sponsoring two international conferences in London on the subject in 2012 and 2013.
International oil and gas investors are the latest external actors to get involved. The Provisional Draft Constitution does not articulate the resource-sharing arrangements between Mogadishu and the states. Regional entities such as Puntland and Somaliland are issuing concessions for oil activities in their areas. “Wildcat” companies are willing to deal directly with these regional entities, but the larger established companies prefer to deal with the government in Mogadishu. This issue will become more politically charged as explorations go forward.

The Mogadishu-based Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was created on September 9, 2012, with the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud by Parliament, in accordance with the Provisional Federal Constitution. President Hassan Sheikh’s election marked the end of the “transitional” period that commenced in 2004 with the creation of the first Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Many expected a fraudulent election and the reelection of the incumbent Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The election of the relatively unknown civil society actor, Hassan Sheikh, combined with AMISOM’s successful offensive against al-Shabaab, unleashed a burst of optimism amongst Somalis and foreigners alike, and a renewed commitment to invest in peacebuilding and security in the country.

The political tasks before President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud are to negotiate a final constitution, to hold elections in 2016, and to navigate the interests of Somalia’s elites and the country’s external partners towards a successful conclusion in which the country continues to exit violent conflict. Somali elites and external actors are still confronted by the most contentious questions of power: resources and revenues, power-sharing arrangements, state institutions (security, justice, political, and service delivery institutions) and the depth of decentralization and federalism between Mogadishu and the states.

Consensus will be challenging to build. Segregation and division among clans and sub-clans continues. The war economy and corruption thrive and require lawlessness to operate. Confidence needs to be built among Somalia’s political elites and among its many governmental entities. Al-Shabaab remains a force to be reckoned with as it is able to recruit from a marginalized and alienated base of youth, to control rural areas and to conduct deadly terrorist attacks. External actors bring multiple perspectives and interests to the table.

External Actors’ Peacebuilding Frameworks in Somalia

International learning on peacebuilding would point to a need for external actors to focus now on a tightly defined number of measures, which are led and shaped by Somali leaders to:

- Identify early confidence-building measures that start to rebuild trust and dialogue among Somalis, including among the “grassroots”;
- Build Somali elites’ “ownership” of policies and processes aimed at starting to address the causes of conflict;
- Start to build state legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In this regard, security, justice and jobs have been heavily emphasized in the literature;
• Carefully calibrate programs based on the trade-offs between arrangements which bind the most powerful Somali elites in pacts (the constitutional dialogue, formation of new states and so forth) and processes which involve Somalis more inclusively, so as to avoid a relapse into violent conflict;

• Start to support a very long process of institutional development and transformation, which is realistically grounded in the Somali political context, and builds upon existing, not externally-driven, Somali institutions and capacities;

• Identify external actors who may have empathy and the relevant recent experience to support Somalis to define and pursue their own peacebuilding objectives.

From November 2013 to January 2014, we conducted our initial survey of external peacebuilding frameworks through interviews with key actors. We found a wide array of approaches and objectives, which are difficult to piece together. We found three major categories of external actors' activity related to peacebuilding:

1. **National peacebuilding frameworks**: A donor effort to align aid to Somalia’s New Deal Compact and to build a more legitimate and capable central Somali state, and related and overlapping political support to Somalia’s political negotiations;

2. **Sub-national peacebuilding frameworks**: Diplomatic, donor, military and regional efforts to support sub-national entities and “bottom-up” approaches to peacebuilding with a view to building the Somali state’s legitimacy, including: mediation between states and Mogadishu, and between newly forming political entities in South-Central Somalia; civil society efforts to support local and “grassroots” reconciliation processes; and donor and regional support for “bottom-up” stabilization and peacebuilding processes;

3. **Security frameworks**: A range of security efforts in pursuit of counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and counter-insurgency objectives. All have implications for Somali peacebuilding and an eventual political settlement, but are also driven by providers’ national security objectives.

A meta-question which emerged from our initial survey relates to the strategic logic which shapes donor practices and decision-making in the country. Donors support both a centralized aid compact predicated on state sovereignty governed by Mogadishu, and bottom-up investments in state formation in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. Donors may be hedging their bets across Somali institutions in the absence of a strong Somali consensus, pursuing both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. However, it is not clear how these investments form a coherent Somali peacebuilding strategy.
National Peacebuilding Frameworks

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has been strongly focused on building sovereignty and ownership. This should not be surprising given the history of transitional governments with weak popular legitimacy. This assertion of sovereignty has manifested in a clash with Somalia’s neighbors (whom the FGS worries are meddling in Somalia’s internal affairs) and a more assertive stance with development and humanitarian donors on Somali ownership and leadership of policy and programs.

President Hassan Sheikh announced his Six-Pillar Policy upon being elected. The policy committed the government to: (1) stability (security, rule of law and justice), (2) economic recovery, (3) peacebuilding (removing the main drivers of conflict), (4) government capacity for service delivery, (5) international relations (close ties with neighbors and allies), and (6) the unity and integrity of the country. Drafting a permanent constitution, the implementation of federalism, and preparations for elections by 2016 were absent. This omission corresponded with a Somali suspicion that the new administration was not committed to the establishment of a federal state.

The President’s Six-Pillar Policy has been superseded by the Somalia Compact, which emerged from the New Deal for Somalia Donor Conference in Brussels in September 2013. Somalia became a signatory to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States in 2013. The Compact outlines aid priorities under the International Dialogue’s five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs). The first PSG focuses on inclusive political processes, the finalization of the federal constitution by December 2015, and elections in 2016. The other PSGs prioritize security, justice, revenue and services, and economic development.

Adoption of the Somali New Deal Compact in Brussels in 2013 was viewed by many Western donors we encountered as a significant step toward building Somali sovereignty and ownership of peacebuilding priorities. Bilateral donors, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank pledged an approximate €1.8 billion in support of the Compact. The FGS created an Aid Coordination Office in the office of the Prime Minister and a New Deal desk in the Ministry of Finance to manage donor funding. A multi-donor Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was launched to align aid with nationally-agreed programs and Somali budget expenditure cycles. The aim is to build Somalia’s capacity to directly manage the budget support it receives. The approach is to first build FGS capacity in priority-setting and oversight, and eventually, government capacity in public financial management and service delivery.

This assistance will be directed to support the FGS, with some support allocated to the governments in Puntland and Somaliland. At the time of the survey, it was not clear how program funds would be disbursed at the point of service delivery, which mechanisms would be used, and how programs would be designed or monitored to build early confidence and legitimacy between Somalis and the FGS. The FGS’ credibility with donors on public financial management took a serious blow in 2013 when the new Central Bank Governor resigned over allegations of fraud and threats to her safety.

We found a degree of skepticism over the speed at which the Compact was developed to meet the Brussels conference deadline in September 2013, and doubts as to whether the process and donor timelines gave Somalia enough space to negotiate Somali priorities and to identify early confidence building measures.
Puntland, Somaliland and elements of Parliament have voiced concerns that the alignment of resources to Mogadishu provides an adrenaline shot to a centralized form of government. Somaliland negotiated its own special provisions in the Compact. Puntland has voiced concerns that they were insufficiently consulted. Others we spoke with, especially in civil society, worry that the Compact approach is too “top-down” and oriented towards statebuilding. However, there is a lack of data and analysis on how the Compact is perceived by Somalis generally and by elite interest groups specifically (political groups, traditional authorities, warlords, and business interests).

There remain a wide range of fundamental political, institutional and economic questions pertaining to Somalia’s future, which have yet to be addressed formally by Somali leaders through negotiations. These include the form and authorities of the state, revenues (control of natural resources, port customs and other revenues), the future of power-sharing arrangements, and the design of state institutions (political, justice, security and service delivery).

Donor aid allocation and implementation decisions have implications for these negotiations and how power distributed, and thus the development of Somalia’s political settlement. At the time of conducting the survey, donor and Somali aid allocation priorities and implementation tools were still under consideration. It appeared possible in the absence of Somali consensus and strategy on major questions pertaining to the country’s political settlement, that donor implementation practices could either become fragmented, driven by individual donor priorities, or overly focused on more traditional “top-down” statebuilding processes and service delivery-oriented activities.

It is essential to monitor how donors interact with and shape these processes going forward. More clarity should support donor decision-making in Somalia and reveal lessons about how donor practices can continue to improve in supporting peacebuilding in fragile states. Over the course of our research, we will assess two processes. First, the process and influences which led to the signing of the Somali Compact, the ownership of it among Somali elites and its evolving credibility as a peacebuilding tool. To this end, we will explore the extent to which the process has built Somali “ownership” of peacebuilding policies, the extent to which the process has enabled Somali leaders to identify early confidence-building measures, and the extent to which priorities and mechanisms have been developed aimed at starting to build legitimacy of the state and national institutions.

Second, we will assess sample donors’ processes for decision-making on national aid allocation priorities. Donors appear to recognize the limitations of the Compact and the risks of altering power dynamics, but have reasons for proceeding. These may relate to sustaining the pace of momentum towards peace, to donor commitment to sovereignty exercised in Mogadishu, and to accounting to constituencies at home for results.
Sub-National Peacebuilding Frameworks

Many external actors are working at the sub-national level toward a variety of stability and peacebuilding objectives, ultimately with a goal of building peace and the legitimacy of a Somali political settlement alongside the FGS. Efforts delivered at the sub-national level include:

- **AMISOM** is working at the regional level to pursue consolidation of security and the extension of the federal government’s territorial control. Their objective is security, with a view to creating space to extend the writ of the Somali government. They have worked alongside Somali clan-based militias and Somali Security Forces, and encourage reconciliation between clan militias. They are mandated to assist on the ground in the implementation of Somalia’s National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP).

- **The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)** is involved in brokering regional political dialogue. Most prominently, this includes the 2013 agreement to create the Interim Jubba Administration in South-Central Somalia. IGAD is likely to play a role in brokering the emergence of a “South-West State” (although at the time of writing, the boundaries were deeply contested).

- The **UK Stability Fund, the US Government, and the UN** are providing civilian support in key areas recovered from al-Shabaab and other accessible areas, although according to differing uses of the terms “recovery” (a UN approach to providing “needs-based” assistance); and peacebuilding and stabilization (ranging from definitions around politically-driven “effects-based” assistance for government in recovered areas, to community-level service delivery and recovery, to approaches to reconciliation and grievance resolution, and efforts to link to national peacebuilding efforts).

- **Bilateral and multilateral actors** are involved in mediating regional state formation and peacebuilding processes inside regional entities and between regional entities and Mogadishu, in support of the FGS.

- **Civil society organizations** are supporting “bottom-up” community reconciliation processes to address the causes of conflict and to build local institutions and capacities for peace. Building on these community efforts, organizations are encouraging collaboration between communities to enable them to advocate for their interests at the regional and federal level.

Out of AMISOM’s military operations against al-Shabaab, the outlines of Somalia’s future federal states may now be starting to emerge as Somali and external actors seek to fill the void left by the removal of al-Shabaab and to extend the writ of the Somali government. Leaders of coalitions in South-Central Somalia are currently trying to negotiate the formation of future federal states, with varying degrees of recognition. The processes to form new regional entities are contentious because they shape the balance of power between local, regional and national elites.

In 2013, the tensions surrounding federalism and regional authority in Somalia were clearly illustrated when the communities of “Jubbaland” formed a Constitutional Congress to create a new federal state and to elect a president. The FGS insisted that
only it could create new states. This resulted in a 6-month stand-off among the clans, political and militia actors and the FGS, and between the FGS and IGAD, who supported the formation of a new state. The FGS and the nascent “Jubbaland State” came to a compromise agreement in August 2013. The FGS accepted the fact of the Jubbaland initiative. The Jubbaland factions accepted an interim two-year administration status. According to the agreement, a formal Federal Member State would be established according to a constitutional process. The port and airport were recognized as national assets. Within six months the FGS was to take over management of these assets, although revenues would continue to be exclusively invested in Jubba priorities. The Jubba militias would also be integrated into the Somali national forces. (However, eight months after signing, implementation is lagging.)

It is possible that the Jubbaland agreement will provide a model for the formation of other states.

Since the formation of the Interim Jubba Administration, the focus has shifted to the formation of a “South West State” around Baidoa. There is controversy over whether this new state will supersede the Interim Jubba Administration territory or will simply exist alongside it. Other entities are seeking recognition. In the central regions, competing “states” claim the same or overlapping territories – Galmudug, Himan and Heeb, Central Region State, and El Bur State.

These political processes are unfolding in the context of the ongoing presence and threat to peacebuilding of the al-Shabaab movement. Bryden (2013) highlighted, “Al-Shabaab’s residual influence can be explained by three main factors: the determination and discipline of its core leadership (irrespective of divisions between them); the absence of rival authorities […] across much of southern Somalia; and Al-Shabaab’s skill in appropriating and exploiting legitimate local grievances for its own purposes. The jihadists’ territorial ‘footprint’ on the Somali map thus corresponds closely with areas inhabited by disgruntled and disaffected clans.”

There is wide international agreement that investments in sub-national governance are necessary to the long-term stability of Somalia. However, there is disagreement over the importance of order, approach and proportionate investment.

We found a range of definitions for peacebuilding and stabilization among external actors working at the sub-national level. The definition of stabilization was a particular area of contention. We found slightly differing stabilization frameworks owned by the Somali authorities, AMISOM, IGAD, the United Nations, bilateral donors and local power brokers themselves. Some approaches are geared towards political results, and some towards community-level service delivery activities. Some are aligned to security priorities, and some are aligned to the identification of community needs. We did not find evidence of clarity on strategic questions of inclusion, grievance resolution and justice, particularly for disaffected and marginalized communities. Funding is also flowing from multiple external actors and funding mechanisms to the sub-national level. These inconsistencies and coordination challenges pose the risk of approaches and efforts undercutting Somali peacebuilding efforts and one another.

Civil society advocates pointed to Somalia’s turbulent history with strong centralized governments and the deep suspicion this has bred amongst Somalis, as well as Somaliland and Puntland’s relative successes in pursuing peripheral state formation.
processes. Civil society actors argued that external focus and investment in the periphery and in reconciliation was too low. Many donor actors argued that timelines and imperatives in Somalia mitigated against adopting purely “bottom-up” approaches, although there was no strategic agreement among actors on the relative weight of efforts. The diversity of investments may reflect external actors hedging their bets across Somali institutions.

In order to consider the differing approaches to “bottom-up” peacebuilding and stabilization, and which frameworks may have traction and be scalable in the Somalia context, we will conduct analysis of sample external actors’ activities in newly forming regional entities in South-Central Somalia (with comparable clan and security dynamics). We will examine whether efforts to support local reconciliation and institutional development have led to improved local formal and informal governance capacity (institutions, authorities, resources, service delivery), and over time, whether this yields improved local perceptions of Somali state legitimacy. If we find causal linkages between these processes over time, this will suggest the potential to scale up “bottom-up” approaches, tailored to new areas.

**Security Frameworks**

The international community’s optimism has been underpinned by the security gains of the African Union against the al-Shabaab insurgency. AMISOM, Kenya and Ethiopia, and the US Government, with the EU and UN, are the dominant international security actors operating in Somalia today. They are pursuing three objectives:

- An AMISOM objective to expand the Somali government’s writ and to increase the strategic cohesion of fragmented Somali clan militias in ‘recovered areas’ until reconciliation and the formation of a single Somali security force can take place.

- An AMISOM/IGAD and Western international counter-terrorist objective to target and dismantle the al-Shabaab threat in Somalia and the region.

- An internationally coordinated effort to address the threat to commercial shipping lanes posed by piracy off the Horn of Africa. This is pursued through maritime security cooperation (primarily Combined Task Force 151), and support to Somali land-based initiatives.

AMISOM supplies and trains the Somali Armed Forces. The unification and centralized command of a large number of militias relies on reconciliation to advance. The dominant view in the international community is that a unified Somali force is unrealistic in the short term and that other models should be considered. The current objective is to increase the “strategic cohesion” of the disparate militias in Somalia, with the expectation that militia integration will follow longer-term political dialogue.

The partial lifting of the UN arms embargo to equip the Somali Armed Forces gave a flavor of the very long-term challenge to building Somali security institutions. The independent expert Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) recently identified, “a number of issues and concerns over current management of weapons and ammunition stockpiles by the Federal Government of Somalia, which point to high level and systematic abuses in weapons and ammunition management...
and distribution. [There are...] at least two separate clan-based centres of gravity for weapons procurement within the FGS structures. These two interest groups appear to be prosecuting narrow clan agendas, at times working against the development of peace and security in Somalia through the distribution of weapons to parallel security forces and clan militias that are not part of the Somali security forces."^{32}

Significant resources are dedicated to counter-terrorism operations inside Somalia. Operations are primarily carried out by US forces in the form of targeted drone strikes^{33} and Special Forces raids. In October 2013, US Special Forces attempted to capture or kill a top al-Shabaab external operations planner (identified as Ikrimah) in a nighttime raid on Baraawe.^{34} Following the raid, there were reports that al-Shabaab used the event as a propaganda tool and opportunity to arrest suspected “spies”, while increasing its presence in the area.^{35} In this context, it is vital that the international community considers how its counter-terrorism efforts impact peacebuilding efforts.

It is also important to determine the impact that investments in Somali counter-terrorism and counter-piracy institutions have on the development of Somali security and rule of law institutions over the long-term.

In our monitoring, we intend to explore the impact of international security efforts on the formation of Somali security and rule of law institutions and governance, and the prospects for peacebuilding. Because many operations are classified, we will test impact using qualitative analysis, key-informant interviews and open-source data (news reports and datasets on counter-terror activity). We will rank Somali regions according to the intensity of international intervention and will sample a set of regions that are matched along a vector of characteristics relating to security sector coherence/fragmentation, ethnic composition, local clan dynamics and faction dominance. Within these regions, we will use within-case analysis of “hot spots” to unpack and confirm the causal mechanisms linking external security activity with local governance, and the formation of security and rule of law institutions. Notwithstanding the challenges of collecting data on classified operations, there should be discrete observable linkages between military activity and Somali security sector actors, such as financial and weapons transfers to support the formation of new groups. We will conduct across-case analysis of regions to ascertain whether higher levels of military intervention correlates with higher levels of clan militia and social fragmentation in security “hot spots,” or improving security conditions and cohesion of Somali governance institutions.

If fragmentation and perceptions of recourse to safety and security worsen in areas of international security activity, it is likely that government and external actors’ frameworks for SSR, DDR and justice will urgently need to be updated and tailored to the Somali context, and counter-terror planning will need to reflect upon managing the local impact of operations on peacebuilding and security.

A summary of international frameworks and our monitoring approach is outlined in Figure 1. Rather than relying on a single approach, the project will leverage a variety of data sources and analytic techniques, tailored to each specific area of investigation. The limited availability of baseline and ongoing aid project data is a key consideration in developing appropriate research designs and presents the most significant challenge to assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions. There are two particularly salient data gaps. First, data on public perceptions of the state and the peacebuilding process are
weak. While aid organizations are continuing to collect health, nutrition and economic information,\(^\text{i}\) systematic data on the Somali peoples’ political aspirations, confidence in the state and perceptions of security are all extremely limited. Data on aid interventions - where donors are active, how their projects are designed and implemented - also vary substantially across donors.

Accordingly, we will triangulate multiple data sources: key-informant interviews, content analysis of donor and government documents, and quantitative data on aid flows. We will use several analytical techniques to support robust analysis. We outline the primary approach for each area of investigation below. The methodology will be adapted and updated over time, as our focus areas are refined, and as the team assesses data availability and quality.

\(^{\text{i}}\) However, the reliability and quality of these data are unclear. In some cases, organizations that provide relief have also been responsible for collecting data used to assess needs, raising questions of potential bias. See Jesse Driscoll and Nicholai Lidow “Representative Surveys in Insecure Environments: A Case Study of Mogadishu, Somalia” Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology (forthcoming 2014).
## Figure 1: External Actors’ Peacebuilding and Related Frameworks in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Assumptions: Theory Of Peacebuilding</th>
<th>Monitoring Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PROCESSES</td>
<td>– Build the legitimacy and capacity of the FGS through building “ownership” of service delivery.</td>
<td>– The Compact is sufficiently inclusive of Somali priorities and measures to build confidence between Somalis, and ultimately lays the foundations for state legitimacy.</td>
<td>Proposition: The negotiation process for the Somali compact was rushed and did not offer sufficient space for Somalis to negotiate peacebuilding priorities. The Compact is constrained as a peacebuilding framework as there are high levels of Somali division on key questions pertaining to a political settlement, preventing donor alignment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Build the capacity of the FGS in the areas of inclusive politics, justice, police, socio-economic service delivery and public financial management.</td>
<td>– The Compact is “owned” by Somalis.</td>
<td>a. Identify the full range of Somali stakeholders and their relative presence at the negotiating table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– The Compact does not favor one single clan or political group.</td>
<td>b. Unpack the Compact negotiations using “process-tracing”: systematically test the influence of varying Somali elite factional strength on the negotiation agenda and subsequent content and programs of the Compact, while also testing for the influence of other exogenous factors (e.g. donor-driven policies, earmarked funds and donor timelines).</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Donors are aligned to the Compact.</td>
<td>c. Across-case analysis of sample donor programs to assess levels of fragmentation or donor-driven decision making on crucial questions pertaining to Somalia’s future.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– The Compact and €1.8 billion can be delivered through Somali institutions and hybrid mechanisms.</td>
<td>Sample actors: DFID, EU, Nordic donors, Turkey, Qatar, UN, World Bank</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Decisions about aid allocations will not negatively pre-empt Somali political decisions.</td>
<td>If the proposition is correct, propose measures to balance trade-offs between “ownership” and “inclusivity” in revising and implementing the Compact.</td>
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</table>
### Framework: Sub-National Political Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Pursue consolidation of security and governmental territorial control through reconciliation between clan militias and the formation of new political entities.</td>
<td>- Somali authorities in Mogadishu and regional entities are willing to engage in dialogue.</td>
<td>Proposition: “Bottom-up” peacebuilding processes will be essential for state formation and forging a more enduring political settlement in the country. Coherent approaches can be identified which are scalable across South-Central Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pursue state formation processes through compromise between Mogadishu and existing and emerging authorities and local power-brokers.</td>
<td>- External actors are sufficiently familiar with the context to help and not hinder the emergence of political processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Address shared challenges and causes of conflict through existing cultural and social mechanisms and capacities for peace.</td>
<td>- Resources can be aligned to Somali priorities and available to shore up the credibility of new entities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Empower communities to identify immediate recovery priorities and implement projects.</td>
<td>- Political process and dialogue, not projects, will underpin the formation of a Somali political settlement.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Approaches are “scalable” across South-Central Somalia through local institutions and have wider consequences beyond the community level.</td>
<td>a. Within-case analysis of sample actors’ reconciliation programs and frameworks in newly forming regional entities in South-Central Somalia. Periodically measure local formal and informal governance capacity and perceptions of legitimacy. If correct, we should observe temporally sequenced linkages between improvements in local reconciliation and institutional capacity, and between institutional capacity and popular legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacebuilding and statebuilding (state legitimacy) will be underpinned by community level service delivery.</td>
<td>b. Cross-reference findings to learning on political settlements and state formation in Somaliland and Puntland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Security and stability will be generated through community-level service delivery activities.</td>
<td>Sample actors: AMISOM, IGAD, USA, UK Stability Fund, NGOs, UN, Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the proposition is correct, propose scalable approaches in the Somali context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</table>
| SECURITY  | - Increase the strategic cohesion of fragmented Somali clan militias to secure ‘recovered’ areas.  
- Target and dismantle Al-Shabaab and its effects within and beyond Somalia.  
- Target and dismantle criminal networks which pose security threats. | - Unified Somali armed forces requires reconciliation and political dialogue first.  
- Lifting of weapons embargo will not lead to further conflict within Somalia.  
- Counter-terrorism operations targeting and dismantling al-Shabaab will have manageable consequences for peacebuilding.  
- Military operations can dismantle al-Shabaab – the FGS will be inclusive enough of clans and areas ‘recovered’ from al-Shabaab and fill the vacuum in security and justice services provided by al-Shabaab. | Proposition: International security efforts may undermine local peacebuilding and be detrimental to the development of durable governance and security institutions without effective and relevant frameworks for DDR, SSR and justice tailored to the Somali context.  
- Across-case analysis of local security institution fragmentation and perceptions of recourse to safety, security and justice. Rank regions according to intensity of military intervention and counter-terrorism activity. Across-case analysis may show higher levels of militia and social fragmentation in security “hot spots,” which will be verified through observable linkages such as informant data on recourse to security and justice and the impact of financial and weapons transfers to support (or incentivize) the formation of ‘pro-government’ or ‘anti-al-Shabaab’ militia.  
If the proposition is correct, donor SSR, DDR and justice frameworks need to be updated and tailored to the Somali context, and CT and AMISOM efforts synced with implications for the sustainability of the Somali peacebuilding endeavors. |
Conclusion

Supporting transition in Somalia will not be quick or easy. When the World Bank surveyed the timelines for countries that successfully transitioned from conflict in the latter half of the twentieth century, it found that it took the 20 fastest countries in the world, “[…] 17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality, and 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control.”

Today, there is a great deal of optimism about the potential to build a lasting peace in Somalia and a wide range of external actors are investing in efforts to support the Somali people. However, the diversity of actors, objectives and assumptions has resulted in a diverse array of frameworks to secure the country and to build peace. In this environment there is a risk that external actors will implement initiatives that contradict one another’s efforts, and/or may ultimately over-dominate the space needed for a Somali-brokered political settlement.

Somalia’s own experience and international learning would underline the need for Somali leadership and ownership to advance first and foremost, coupled with a healthy dose of realism about how long Somali society will take to build peace. The political environment in Somalia is extremely fluid and there are a wide variety of competing interests that leaders must broker to avoid a relapse into violent conflict.

Through our survey, we found ambition and determination to address the challenges but clear limitations on external actors, who are still adapting to the new fragile states policies and learning to which donors have committed. The overall picture emerging is one where international actors are trying to deliver on international learning, and trying to engage with the complexities of the Somali context, but also one where donor aid allocation decisions and timelines risk making de facto decisions for Somalis. Taking a step back to consider how these decisions relate to ongoing Somali political dialogue seems necessary. In this regard, we hope our research will contribute, both to donor decision-making in Somalia and to the wider international community as it grapples with applying international learning across countries.
References

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6. For example, see the Center on International Cooperation’s review of donor support to political settlements, Elgin-Cossart, M., Jones, B.D., Development in the Shadow of Violence (CIC, New York University, 2011) and for a formal donor perspective, see DFID’s Building Peaceful and Stable Societies: A DFID Practice Paper (London, 2011).

7. Elgin-Cossart, M., Jones, B.D., Esberg, J. Pathways to Change: Baseline Study to Identify Theories of Change in Political Settlements and Confidence Building (Center on International Cooperation, New York University, July 2012).


9. Charles Call used quantitative and qualitative methods to identify causes of relapse into violent conflict in 15 post-war case studies. He found exclusionary behavior was the most important factor in 11 of 15 cases. Call, C. Why Peace Fails: the Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence (Georgetown University Press, 2012).


12. While limited analysis exists on the strategic lessons, on the need for a regional, comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in the Horn of Africa, see Schwartz, M. Shetret L, Millar A, Rethinking Counterterrorism Assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy (Center for Global Counterterrorism 2013); for an analysis of the counterproductive effects on peacebuilding and statebuilding of the CIA’s early counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, see Rashid., A. Descent into Chaos (Viking, USA, 2008); later US/COMISAF’s own 2009 review of security strategy recognized that the roll-out of counter-terrorism efforts had, alongside other flaws, undermined popular consent for the mission in Afghanistan. For analysis of the negative ramifications of counter-terrorist policy in Somalia, see for example, Menkhaus, K. “Somalia: They Created a Desert and Called it Peace(building),” Review of African Political Economy (Vol. 36, Issue 120, 2009), and Harper, M. Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State (Zed Books, London, 2012).


15. Harper, Ibid.


Harper, Ibid.

Harper, Ibid.


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For a recent review, see Murphy, T. Woods, A., “Turkey’s International Development Framework, Case Study: Somalia,” (Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University, 2014).


Hearn, S. Zimmerman, T. with Oppenheim, B. Ibid.

Bryden, Ibid.

UNSC Resolution 2111 (2013): The FGS is permitted to buy its own weapons to strengthen and build its armed forces, and foreign governments that provide military assistance to Somalia no longer require prior authorization from the UN. Instead, the FGS is required to notify the UN Security Council, although this practice has not always been respected.


