INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

SARAH HEARN
In 2015, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding commissioned the NYU Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) with the production of the Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

This work is published under the responsibility of CIC. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

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The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict and insecurity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community.

CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict insecurity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections between politics, security, development and human rights and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict.

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The opinions and findings reflected in this independent review remain those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the IDPS membership.

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism (AU)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CABRI</td>
<td>Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common African Position on the Post-2015 Agenda (AU)</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Center on International Cooperation (New York University)</td>
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<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean Countries</td>
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<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (World Bank)</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System</td>
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<td>CSPPS</td>
<td>Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>DEPAC</td>
<td>Development Partners Committee (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK government)</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FfD</td>
<td>Financing for development</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly (UN)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>HIC</td>
<td>High-Income Country</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank)</td>
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<td>IDPS</td>
<td>International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network for Conflict and Fragility (OECD DAC)</td>
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<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicator</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low-Income Country</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Mutual Accountability Framework (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>MDBS</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Budget Support Partners (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MIC</td>
<td>Middle-Income Country</td>
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<td>MINTs</td>
<td>Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey</td>
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<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MPTF</td>
<td>Multi-partner Trust Fund</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AU)</td>
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<td>NYU</td>
<td>New York University</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission (UN)</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund (UN)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office (UN)</td>
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<td>PIU</td>
<td>Project implementation unit</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>SRRFF</td>
<td>Somalia Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Facility</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Strategic Development Plan (Timor-Leste)</td>
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<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
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<td>SFF</td>
<td>Special Financing Facility (Somalia)</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Service Level Agreement (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>State and Peace-building Fund (World Bank)</td>
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<td>TIWB</td>
<td>Tax Inspectors Without Borders (OECD, UNDP)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
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<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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GLOSSARY

C34  Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (UN)

CONNEX  Initiative to provide assistance in the use of natural resources (G7)

COP 21  2015 UN Climate Change Conference (Paris)

FOCUS   New Deal Principles: Fragility assessment, One vision-one plan, Compacts, Use PSGs to monitor results, Support political leadership and dialogue

G7  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, EU

g7+  Voluntary association of 20 countries affected by conflict, fragility and/or in transition

G20  Group of the 20 major economies: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, People’s Republic of China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UK, USA, EU

G77  Group of 77 developing countries (UN)

Global Compact  Voluntary initiative based on corporate Chief Executive Officer (CEO) commitments to support UN goals (UN)

PSGs  Five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals: (1) Legitimate Politics; (2) Security; (3) Justice; (4) Economic Foundations; (5) Revenue and Services.

TRUST   New Deal Principles: Transparency, Risk-sharing, Use country systems, Strengthen capacities, Timely & predictable aid
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAIN MESSAGES

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States rests upon the mutual commitment of national and international partners to country-owned and country-led exits from fragility. Externally-imposed solutions do not work. In 2011, at the Busan Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the New Deal was launched with a powerful message: 1.5 billion of the world’s poorest people lived in fragile situations. Without partnerships for first building peace, resilience and institutions, the eradication of poverty was not possible. The Millennium Development Goals failed to address this.

The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) now recognize in SDG 16 that achieving peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions is fundamental for leaving no-one behind in any country. The SDGs agenda will, however, fail the world’s poorest people by 2030 without concerted action to apply the partnership principles of the New Deal. Ending conflict, building institutions and resilience, and delivering basic services and growth could reduce the number of people in absolute poverty from 1.5 billion now to 350 million by 2030. It could also help societies manage new risks. Retreat from the New Deal principles should be inconceivable.

As an alliance, the g7+ group of countries has the opportunity to make a unique contribution to the sustainable development agenda as a leading coalition for leaving no-one behind. National leadership and ownership of policies and plans must be respected. Implementation of the New Deal so far has not been easy, reflecting a need for political leaders to recommit to the principles of the New Deal. This is especially true for political processes that bind all relevant actors into a shared vision for “what” needs to be achieved and “how.”

International partners could do much more to deliver their side of the New Deal bargain. The g7+ needs coherent, predictable and timely assistance to develop national capacities and fill finance gaps. Yet, the fragmentation of aid and development partners across the SDGs, and growing pressures on humanitarian aid, could make matters worse in the SDGs era. All international governmental and private sector partners need to rally to the institutional development priorities of the g7+.

This is why partners should commit to a New Deal for the New Deal. There must be a Ministerial Compact that recognizes the urgency of re-engaging on the New Deal principles for achieving the SDGs. The Compact should provide the basis for a new SDGs generation of strategy, planning, programming and monitoring, as well as global and regional partnerships and advocacy. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding could re-position itself as a multi-stakeholder and country-focused partnership for leaving no-one behind under the UN pledge of SDG 17 to “Partnerships for the SDGs.”

WHAT IS THE NEW DEAL?

The New Deal was negotiated by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS). The IDPS is composed of the g7+ group of self-identified countries in fragile, conflict-affected and transitional situations; the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF); and now includes the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). The IDPS is unique because it is the only international multi-constituency platform for peacebuilding and statebuilding, and it is country-focused.
The New Deal principles rest on three pillars: (1) Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) recognize that politics, security, justice, institutions and economics are the foundations for development; (2) FOCUS principles are about politics: identify the causes of fragility; support nationally-owned and nationally-led plans; achieve mutual accountability for results through compacts; (3) TRUST principles commit to aid effectiveness and national capacity development.

**NINE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW**

The review assesses the ways that the New Deal has contributed to behavior change in partnerships. It also identifies opportunities for strengthening the New Deal. The review is not an in-depth evaluation of policy and programmatic efforts or of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

**AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL:**

1. **The g7+ has become an increasingly influential constituency on the world stage.** Supported by the IDPS, members of the g7+ have advocated for their needs in UN negotiations on Financing for Development (FFD) and the new SDGs. The g7+ also informed UN panel reviews on Peace Operations and Peacebuilding in 2015. The g7+ are building partnerships through the G20, international financial institutions (IFIs), southern actors and regional organizations, have agreed a Fragile-to-Fragile cooperation framework, and are developing tools to support national actors.

2. **Increasing global influence will require widening the dialogue about international coherence and approaches.** Civil society has engaged with the concepts on the global and national levels, and contributed analysis and lessons to New Deal implementation. The New Deal principles have also contributed to informing multilateral and donor countries’ national security and aid strategies. However, the New Deal has not appealed to actors in crisis situations outside the IDPS membership. Many influential regional actors and middle-income countries have yet to be engaged in dialogue with the g7+. The New Deal is often seen as too technical, bureaucratic, inflexible and donor-dominated.

**AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL:**

Applying the New Deal principles has proven to be complex. Eight g7+ pilot countries have officially started implementation. Twenty countries are members of the g7+, many of whom are taking forward aspects of the New Deal. Actors are learning by doing, but it is too early to judge the impact on fragility. Expectations have been partially met:

3. **Significant resources have not been directed to the PSGs as a result of the New Deal.** The PSGs have enjoyed some uptake in national plans and programs and monitoring frameworks. But only in the case of Somalia have the PSGs been used to define national priorities and align budgets. There is no evidence that international actors have increased their aid allocations towards the PSGs.

4. **g7+ Ministries of Finance and Planning are the major champions of the New Deal, thus progress is most evident in their areas.** Many countries had pre-existing development and peace strategies and aid agreements and the New Deal has been understood as one of multiple frameworks. Actors have drawn on the New Deal as it seems most relevant to: inform national plans
(Liberia); conduct assessment and monitoring (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]); and empower government and improve aid effectiveness (Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste).

5. Center and whole of government ownership of the New Deal by g7+ countries and international partners can quickly change partners’ business methods. Somalia’s experience in aligning national and international priorities and budgets through a New Deal Compact suggests that the New Deal may have strong resonance where it is the “only game in town.”

6. Political processes have been missing to identify “what” needs to happen and “how.” The New Deal’s implementation has been dominated by technical responses. Normative commitments to inclusivity are proving difficult to translate into practice. The New Deal could become more overtly political and inclusive over time. Opportunities include drawing on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum to empower national actors to conduct fragility assessments; convening national dialogue to agree on priorities in the SDGs era; building synergies with relevant political and gender-sensitive initiatives such as national action plans for women, peace and security and the African Peer Review Mechanism; and using compacts to define a discrete set of priority results and mutual accountability between all partners.

7. The New Deal principles are not surrogates for preventive diplomacy and political dialogue in crisis situations. Failure to involve all necessary national and international political, security, development, humanitarian and social actors in dialogue and prioritization can contribute to crisis. This was demonstrated in South Sudan. The g7+ Fragile-to-Fragile and preventive diplomacy initiatives offer new opportunities in this regard.

8. The 2008 financial crisis precipitated reduced commitment to aid effectiveness. Humanitarian resources are being directed to growing crises in the Middle East. Many g7+ countries are vulnerable to low commodity prices, constraining growth and revenues. But aid to the g7+ does not appear to be counter-cyclical when they face shocks and crisis. Building self-reliance and preventing crisis requires more aid for fragile situations and urgent efforts to make better use of peacebuilding, development and humanitarian resources to build self-reliance and resilience in the long-term. Actors must introduce smarter aid modalities that build national capacities.

9. The core challenge for the IDPS is to expand its traction and results within its own membership and beyond. The complexity of both the IDPS membership and the New Deal principles makes attribution of achievements difficult. This in turn fuels skepticism. Actors outside the IDPS reported low levels of awareness of it. The absence of regional actors, middle-income countries and the private sector, and low levels of participation of political, justice, security, humanitarian and development actors constrains IDPS impact.

**MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS**

If the New Deal did not already exist, it would need to be invented. Making historic advances against fragility and poverty will require accelerating the pace of institutional development and resilience in g7+ countries by 2020. This is the significance of the New Deal and the IDPS in the SDG era: they offer a set of principles for leaving no-one behind under the pledge of SDG 17 to “Partnerships for the Goals.”
Strengthening the New Deal for the SDGs era will require actors to address three main groups of gaps and challenges:

1) Build whole-of-government (g7+ and development partner) and social ownership of the concepts at the country level to galvanize agreement and action on “what” needs to be achieved and “how”.

2) Involve a wider range of regional and international public and private actors to improve international coherence.

3) Make more effective use of limited resources and smarter aid measures to build resilience and institutions.

This is why partners need to agree a “New Deal for the New Deal.” The IDPS will host a Ministerial Level meeting in Stockholm in April 2016. This forum offers an opportunity to re-engage high level actors in the New Deal for the SDGs era. A Ministerial-level compact could form the basis for a new SDGs generation of strategies, plans and programming, and global and regional advocacy. Pragmatism is required. Building support and coherence will take time and almost everything is context-specific. The following opportunities could strengthen New Deal implementation and the IDPS. Detailed options and recommendations are provided in the review.

1. Strengthen operational effectiveness and political relevance

• The SDGs and UN commitments to sustaining the peace are universal. The IDPS makes a crucial contribution to these aspirations through its multi-stakeholder and country-focused approach to leaving no-one behind. The IDPS could reposition itself within the global architecture under SDG 17 as a multi-stakeholder and country-focused partnership for leaving no-one behind on the SDGs.

• The g7+ could commit to leading an expanded dialogue with international actors under SDG 17. It will be crucial for the g7+ to engage with the UN, neighboring countries, the G20, the African Union, BRICS and MINTs and middle-income countries.

• The g7+ could make a political commitment to aligning the SDGs, the PSGs and national plans through nationally-owned and nationally-led processes to identify “what” needs to happen and “how”. The g7+ are already agreeing a common set of SDG goals and targets against which to measure collective progress. The g7+ could take the opportunity of the SDGs launch to convene national dialogues on priorities. These could create a new generation of strategies, policies and programs for leaving no-one behind.

• All partners could commit to using compacts as the means to advance mutual accountability among states, society and partners for priority results in the SDG era. Compacts will also foster monitoring and evaluation of impacts at the country level.

2. Make better use of resources

• The g7+, the OECD 2015 States of Fragility Report and the 2016 UN High Level Panel Report on Humanitarian Financing have stated that it will be imperative for the international community to: a) increase the overall proportion of funding to fragile situations; b) make better collective use of all humanitarian, development and peacebuilding resources to build national capacities and institutions; and c) shrink humanitarian needs and generate foreign direct investment and domestic revenues over the long term.
• INCAF could commit to increasing aid to fragile situations, introducing smarter aid modalities that assist countries to build institutions and resilience, and raising domestic revenues and private investment. Partners could institute a traffic light system to measure innovation.

3. Strengthen southern capacity and knowledge

• Commit to a plan to build the capacities of the g7+ secretariat and coalition. Goal: to advance fragile-to-fragile cooperation, and south-south and triangular and multilateral partnerships and advocacy.

• Commit to a plan to strengthen the capacities of southern civil society organizations, think tanks, research institutes and universities. Goal: to generate knowledge that contributes to building peaceful societies. Accelerate southern knowledge development on when and how inclusivity advances peace at the national and subnational levels.

• Commit to a plan to develop southern civil society capacities to contribute to building peaceful and inclusive societies.

4. Improve the organizational impact of the IDPS

• Expand the international dialogue to a wider range of middle-income countries, rising powers and international fora. These could include the G20, the BRICS, MINTs, African Union, UN and neighbors of the g7+, led by the g7+.

• Push implementation down to the country level through national dialogues. Identify champions to drive forward national dialogue. Promote whole of government and society’s ownership by expanding the network of actors involved.

• Build upon what is unique about the IDPS’ multi-stakeholder approach and country focus by inviting civil society and the private sector to co-chair the IDPS, or thematic working groups. Build new partnerships through the World Economic Forum or UN Global Compact.

• Be flexible. Create time-bound working groups and virtual groups to trouble shoot specific challenges and thematic priorities.

• Set time-bound objectives and results for the g7+, International Network for Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) secretariats and the IDPS, and conduct annual monitoring and evaluation. The IDPS secretariat could be closed, ring-fenced in a recognized ‘aid policy hub’, or transferred to the South, potentially to an entity in Africa, to provide more direct interaction with southern actors. The IDPS secretariat should provide logistical and administrative support to the IDPS. However, the g7+ should take increasing responsibility for leading the development of policies and guidance.
INFOGRAPHIC | THE NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile Situations

The New Deal principles are mutual commitments to country-owned and led plans to exit fragility and end poverty between the:

- G7+ Group of 20 self-identified fragile, conflict-affected and transitional countries
- CSOs: Civil Society Platforms for Peacebuilding and Stabilization
- INCG: International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OFCO)

Who are members of the:

IDPS: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding:

- Universal Goals
- UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
- UN Norms for Sustaining the Peace

The New Deal Principles:

- Prioritize Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
- Conduct National Fragility Assessments
- Support Country-led and Conflict-affected Peace
- Agree Compacts between State, Society & Partners
- Align Finance to National Priorities
- Build National Capacities and Institutions
- Monitor and Evaluate Results

IDPS

The New Deal for the New Deal in the SDGs Era

- One New Deal, One SDG Agenda.
- It needs to widen dialogue with more partners in the SDGs era.
- g7+ Ministries of Finance and Planning are major champions of the New Deal, thus most progress is in their area.
- g7+ Ministries of Finance and Planning are major champions of the New Deal, thus most progress is in their area.
- When entire national and international governments own the principles, partnerships change quickly for the better.
- But aid has not been directed to peacebuilding and statebuilding.
- But aid has not been directed to peacebuilding and statebuilding.
- Political leaders agree to ensure that 20% of all aid goes to peacebuilding.
- And dialogue needs to include all actors.

A New Deal for the New Deal in the SDGs Era

1. Strengthen partnerships and operational effectiveness of the New Deal
2. Use smarter aid to shrink crisis and build institutions and capacity
3. Invest in knowledge and research in developing countries for building peaceful and inclusive societies
4. Strengthen organizational impact of the IDPS

Leave No-One Behind

Priorities 2016 and beyond

Through partnerships for building peace, resilience and institutions, the world could reduce the number of people in extreme poverty from 1.5 billion now to 350 million by 2030.

This is why partners should commit to a New Deal for the New Deal and a Ministerial Compact that recognizes the urgency of re-energizing on the New Deal principles for achieving the SDGs. Partners should commit to:

- Strengthen partnerships and operational effectiveness of the New Deal
- Use smarter aid to shrink crisis and build institutions and capacity
- Invest in knowledge and research in developing countries for building peaceful and inclusive societies
- Strengthen organizational impact of the IDPS

Expand National Dialogue
Expand International Dialogue
Expand National Dialogue
Expand International Dialogue
1. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NEW DEAL

The independent review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the New Deal) was commissioned by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS). The IDPS is composed of the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). The IDPS developed the New Deal framework, with the g7+ in the driving seat.

The New Deal’s trial implementation period in eight pilot countries, and the mandate of the IDPS, came to an end in December 2015. In this context, the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) was commissioned to take stock of lessons learned from the New Deal and the IDPS since 2011. CIC was also tasked to identify forward-looking options and recommendations to strengthen the New Deal.

The end of the pilot and mandate periods coincides with shifts in international commitments and norms for peacebuilding and statebuilding. A new Financing for Development (FfD) framework was agreed in July 2015, and new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were launched in September 2015. In parallel, the UN completed multiple independent panel reviews of UN peacebuilding; peace operations; women, peace, and security; and humanitarian norms and policies in 2015 and 2016. At this historic juncture in international norms and priorities, IDPS partners have a window of opportunity to build on this momentum.

The review assesses evidence of how the New Deal has and has not influenced behavior change and priorities in partnerships. The review is an opportunity for all stakeholders to reflect on lessons and future opportunities and priorities. The review is not an in-depth evaluation of the IDPS constituencies’ policies and programs, or of peacebuilding and statebuilding. These are beyond the scope of the Terms of Reference.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

Part two of this report summarizes what the New Deal is, and the theory behind it. Part three explains the scope and methodology of the review. Part four outlines findings and lessons about the New Deal’s effect on international norms and on ways of working at the country level, and the contribution of the IDPS. Part five summarizes conclusions, options and recommendations. The Terms of Reference, research questions, a history of the New Deal, bibliography and interviewees are in Annexes A-E.
2. WHAT IS THE NEW DEAL? NATIONALLY-OWNED PATHWAYS OUT OF FRAGILITY

The premise of the New Deal is that 1.5 billion people in fragile countries were being left behind by supply-driven aid geared toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). g7+ Special Envoy Emilia Pires summarized the need for a new way of working to address this immense challenge: “For too long the world had dictated our development priorities without ever asking us. We agreed, however, that the MDGs set out in 2000 are absolutely imperative ... But there was a vital missing link: to achieve our development goals we first needed to stop conflict and crisis and then build a functioning state.”

As the New Deal was being developed between 2008 and 2011 by the IDPS, many policy-makers and experts recognized that the concentration of most of the world's poorest people in fragile situations meant there was no pathway to a new phase of poverty reduction without national strategies to deal with the effects of armed conflict and fragility. Growing evidence indicated that the resilience of a country's political settlement determined its capacity to achieve peace and development. The World Bank 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development is the most comprehensive document synthesizing existing knowledge in this area. With a relatively high degree of confidence, research demonstrated that:

1. *Institutional capacity and accountability* are significantly related to the risks of conflict.

2. *National ownership* is indispensable to building and sustaining institutions and development. Externally-imposed Western institutional models and initiatives had delivered low program pay-offs because they overlooked the processes by which leaders and citizens achieve consent on peace and institutions.

3. *Successful exits from violence start with deals between leaders* (for example, peace agreements or constitutions or informal mutual agreements) and successful strategies to manage “spoilers.”
4. *Inclusion matters, but the findings on when and how are not conclusive.* Recent studies have identified exclusion, particularly of former rebels, as a significant factor in relapses into violent conflict. Others have found empirical evidence pointing to broader economic and institutional inclusion as an important factor in escaping conflict and poverty. Agreements are “inclusive enough” when they include the actors necessary to implement the first stages of institution and confidence-building. This need not necessarily be *all* actors.

5. *Trust between leaders appears key to the cessation of violence. But the escape from fragility requires that society as a whole develops confidence* in state institutions and arrangements for security, justice and political accountability. Conversely, members of society who are skeptical about state competence and legitimacy respond by means of “popular evasion and dissimulation,” blocking the emergence of strong state institutions. Lack of popular confidence in political institutions can also heighten the risk of relapse into conflict.

6. *Iteration.* The institution-building trajectories of successful political settlements are not linear. At the historical level, countries that have achieved a successful exit from fragility have gone through multiple transitions, with progressively inclusive outcomes in different loops of reform. At an organizational level, the development of capability is also nonlinear and takes a minimum of a generation.

7. *Durable developmental outcomes require progress in building political, security, justice and economic institutions.* The sequence of reforms has varied significantly in different country contexts, but institutional development in these areas are significantly related to the prevention of conflict or crisis.

Beyond these insights on the significance of institutions, inclusivity and nationally-owned processes and plans, there was a major gap in evidence and knowledge about *how* peace and capable and inclusive institutions emerge. This gap in turn constrained operational transformation. The development and security landscape was dominated by approaches predicated on inflexible objectives. Development actors tended to focus on capacity gaps and services, but circumvented national politics and justice and security institutions. Security and political actors took short-term and externally-driven training approaches to supporting institutions, and external actors generally worked to ahistorical linear visions of change that failed to account for the inevitable ups and downs of reform. This entrenched risk aversion and premature disillusionment when programs did not go as intended. The problem – at least in part –reflected a murky understanding of *how* peace and institutions can be built, and what role external actors play to ensure that ownership ultimately resides in the national actors that drive processes, and must live with the consequences of decisions.

To this end, the New Deal packages together a set of principles that aim to achieve change in how business is done. A paper by the Brookings institution summarizes the New Deal’s principles in a graphic (figure 2.2). Five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) are defined as interim goals toward long-term development and transformation. They are the basis for dialogue among national and external partners about priorities. The TRUST and FOCUS principles are the framework for New Deal implementation. The FOCUS principles emphasize working politically toward unified objectives: identifying the root causes of fragility through fragility assessments; agreeing priorities through nationally-owned and nationally-led single “one-vision, one-plan” documents; and mutual accountability for shared results and commitments through partnership compacts. The TRUST principles revolve around aid effectiveness for statebuilding. Partners commit to transparency, predictability, harmonization, increasing use of country systems and strengthening national capacities, and risk tolerance.
The New Deal aims for a fundamental change in the way that partners do business. Its goal is to orient everything they do toward nationally-owned and nationally-led plans for peace- and statebuilding. The IDPS describes the overall goal of the New Deal as, “Change in “what” is done and change in “how” things are done to support countries’ transitions from conflict and fragility, and the building of peaceful states and societies. In practice, this means three main things: i) focus on the right priorities; ii) transitions from fragility must be country-owned and led; iii) resources must be used effectively and build local capacities and systems.”

At its 2011 launch at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the New Deal was seen by many as filling an urgent need to better collectively address conflict, institution-building and development in fragile situations. The New Deal represented the accumulation of policy knowledge about peacebuilding and statebuilding, and successive aid effectiveness commitments to building national ownership and country systems made through the OECD and the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The significance of the New Deal is that it is the first set of internationally agreed principles shaped by fragile countries themselves. Previous development principles and statebuilding policies were owned by the OECD, and peacebuilding principles were developed by the UN. Box 2.1 and Annex B summarize the history and membership of the IDPS and the New Deal in more detail.
Box 2.1: History of the IDPS and the New Deal

In 2008, the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra recognized that existing development approaches were not helping to advance peacebuilding, statebuilding and development. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) was mandated to advance dialogue on solutions in advance of the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011.

The g7+ was established to advocate for the needs of self-identified fragile and conflict-affected situations. The OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) convened donor actors. The IDPS first met in 2010 in Dili. The first iteration of peacebuilding and statebuilding goals were laid out in the Dili Declaration. In 2011, the Monrovia Roadmap advanced the five PSGs and the key elements of a “new aid deal” that would be taken to Busan for adoption. The Dili and Monrovia declarations were powerful assertions of national ownership and demands for greater aid effectiveness. These elements were translated into the New Deal principles.

In parallel, the OECD’s INCAF members recognized that fragile and conflict-affected states had been poorly served by projects that bypassed national institutions in order to avoid risk. The OECD’s 2007 Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations had set out ten commitments to achieving aid effectiveness and adapting donor approaches to fragile states, but a review in 2011 acknowledged that the OECD was off track or making moderate progress in all but one area. In 2011, the OECD built upon the OECD principles and the work of the g7+, issuing guidance on statebuilding. In 2012, it would develop this thinking further via guidance on supporting post-conflict transitions.

Also in 2011, the World Bank World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development recognized the interlinkages between politics, security and development, the long timeframes needed for institution building, and the need for “best fit” rather than prescriptive aid practices in fragile situations. Throughout the process to develop the New Deal, civil society actors made important contributions, and in 2011, the Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) was formed to engage in the IDPS.

The momentum in development learning and policy consensus within the IDPS constituencies culminated in 2011 with the launch of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. Adoption of the New Deal was hailed as a great success. One expert noted that, “Experts and practitioners now agree on the importance of politics, conflict sensitivity, and good governance as keys to achieving longer-term development goals in conflict-affected and fragile states.”
3. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW

The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the review ask four questions:

1. What impact has the New Deal had in shaping global norms and ideas about how to engage in fragile and conflict-affected situations? And more generally, in peacebuilding and statebuilding?

2. Has the New Deal changed the ways development partners and fragile states governments are doing business? What difference, if any, is this beginning to make in addressing conflict and fragility issues in these contexts?

3. What contribution has the International Dialogue been to the above, if any?

4. What have been the main gaps and weaknesses with the New Deal and International Dialogue? How could both change to give a renewed boost to the New Deal and make it relevant to recurrent and emerging crises and new forms of fragility?

The ToRs request that the review mainly focuses on identifying lessons about the relevance and effectiveness of the New Deal, as well as identifying forward-looking options and recommendations to strengthen the New Deal and the IDPS. In order to identify lessons, the review explores the four questions on a global level, and through case studies. Desk studies were undertaken for Afghanistan, Central African Republic and South Sudan, and field studies were undertaken in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor-Leste. A ‘control’ field study in Mali also compared how actors work on peacebuilding and statebuilding outside the New Deal context.

Field research was undertaken over September and October 2015, which involved multi-stakeholder meetings, standardized interviews and reviews of relevant documentation. The independent review field teams consulted with the g7+ focal points, and a sample of stakeholders within and outside the IDPS framework. These included ministers and directors of finance, planning, foreign, justice, defense, national politicians and journalists, and bilateral and multilateral members of the INCAF, wider international actors, northern and southern civil society organizations, private sector actors and independent experts. Subnational field visits were conducted to interact with community stakeholders.

The country studies analyzed fragility in each context, the permeation and awareness of the New Deal within pilot contexts, the expectations of the New Deal among different stakeholder groups, evidence of behavior change among actors, whether or not this change can be attributed to the New Deal, and actors' solutions and lessons for giving the New Deal a boost. Research questions are in Annex C.

In order to distill comparable findings and lessons across countries, the researchers drew on a set of common hypotheses. These aim to go deeper than a description of New Deal-related activities by identifying causes of progress and challenges in using the New Deal framework. These hypotheses were based on the IDPS’ 2014 New Deal Monitoring Report and existing literature on the New Deal. The hypotheses are listed in Table 3.1. The first hypothesis tests the impact of the New Deal on global norms and priorities. The second hypothesis tests the impact and uptake of the PSGs. The third hypothesis tests the causes of progress and challenges in implementation of the New Deal TRUST and FOCUS principles. The final hypothesis tests the impact of the IDPS.
### Table 3.1: Hypotheses and Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The g7+ is growing as a more influential group that can advocate for</td>
<td>a. Review of global policy and normative documents, interview data</td>
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<td>the needs of fragile situations in regional and global negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>and institutions beyond the IDPS membership.</td>
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<td>2. The IDPS and New Deal’s articulation of the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) has influenced IDPS actors to</td>
<td>a. National plans and programs, interview data</td>
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<td>commit to supporting these areas.</td>
<td>b. Official development assistance (ODA) and national budget data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The New Deal and International Dialogue have caused the PSGs to</td>
<td>c. Interview and aid data</td>
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<tr>
<td>be explicitly included in national peacebuilding and statebuilding</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and/or development plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. The New Deal and International Dialogue have caused actors to</td>
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<td>channel more domestic and aid budgets to support the PSGs</td>
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<td>c. Influence of the PSGs has been largely confined to the members of</td>
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<tr>
<td>the IDPS</td>
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<td>3. The New Deal pilots have so far achieved partial implementation at the</td>
<td>a. Case study interviews and process analysis</td>
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<td>national level, and there are unmet expectations on all sides. A lack</td>
<td>b. Case study interviews and process analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>of political will to implement the TRUST and FOCUS principles, rather</td>
<td>c. Case study interviews and process analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>than technical factors, is the most important factor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Broad-based political ownership at the center of government and</td>
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<td>across ministries has been the most important factor in explaining</td>
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<tr>
<td>progress toward implementing the TRUST and FOCUS principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Managing national political processes, interests, and participation</td>
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<td>has been the greatest obstacle to implementing the FOCUS principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Lack of donor behavior change has been the greatest obstacle to</td>
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<tr>
<td>implementing the TRUST principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The International Dialogue has experienced political commitment gaps,</td>
<td>a. Case study interviews and surveys with actors outside the New Deal/IDPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defined as: lack of traction and lack of access to, and influence over,</td>
<td>network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political decision-makers in global and national arenas.</td>
<td>b. Review of the relevance of New Deal and IDPS structures</td>
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Global data was collected through an initial literature review, country desk reviews, interviews with representatives of capitals and headquarters, and interviews with experts. Desk-based analysis has compared findings across countries. An initial conversation with the IDPS leadership, who gave guidance on the review, took place on 26 September 2015 in New York. Interviews with stakeholders in headquarters and capitals took place over October and November 2015. Consultations on preliminary findings were held in the first week of November 2015 in Paris at meetings of the IDPS, the INCAF and workshops with the members of the g7+, CSPPS and INCAF.
During the course of the review, we found significant data deficits on the New Deal and IDPS. Only one implementation survey has been conducted since the New Deal was launched. There is no systematic and comparable multi-partner monitoring of the New Deal at the country level. We did not find in-depth global or country-level independent evaluations of New Deal policy and programmatic initiatives, or of behavior change. Nor did we find an agreed method for measuring impact of the New Deal and the IDPS. It was reported to us that initial efforts by the IDPS secretariat to develop a methodology for annual monitoring of the New Deal were not accepted by all of the membership. A lack of data and evidence on impact therefore constrains the review to the data that we were able to gather during the short review period.

As we discuss later in this review, the New Deal and IDPS are subject to skepticism, including from within some of its own membership, for a lack of tangible results. Questions also extend to the challenges of attributing change to the New Deal and IDPS. Going forward, we recommend to the IDPS more systematic monitoring and evaluation of concrete and time-bound objectives and intended results.

4. MAIN FINDINGS AND LESSONS OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW

I. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW DEAL ON THE NORMATIVE ENVIRONMENT

Lesson One: The g7+ is an increasingly influential constituency on the world stage

Our first hypothesis, that the g7+ is growing as a more influential group that can advocate for the needs of fragile situations beyond the IDPS membership, was largely confirmed. Supported by the IDPS membership, the advocacy of the g7+ membership has contributed to framing universal development, peacebuilding and statebuilding norms and policies. Diverse g7+ members have played important roles in normative negotiations at different points. In particular, there is strong evidence of diplomatic and finance representatives of Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and the g7+ Secretariat, as well as Small Island Developing States, contributing to negotiations at crucial moments. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (launched in September 2015) and Financing for Development framework (July 2015) now incorporate specific needs of fragile situations. A number of the New Deal principles (e.g., the PSGs, compacts and coherence behind nationally-owned and nationally-led plans) have also informed UN independent panel reviews of peace operations and peacekeeping this year. Attribution is difficult, however: with the exception of the PSGs, these concepts were adopted by, but predate the New Deal.

The SDGs negotiations were some of the most inclusive the world has known. The 2030 Agenda marks a normative shift in development, from defining North-South aid priorities, to universal and interconnected commitments to social, economic and
environmental development. A main strength of the SDGs is that developing countries and civil society played a major role in defining them, in marked contrast to the MDGs.

A key objective of the IDPS, and g7+ members specifically, was to influence the SDGs negotiations toward agreeing on goals that addressed not only the symptoms of poverty, but also the causes. In fragile and conflict-affected situations, this requires building resilience, state institutions and peaceful and inclusive societies as prerequisites for long-term development. The most concrete normative shift in the SDGs in this regard is the inclusion of an SDG for peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all and accountable, inclusive and effective institutions (SDG 16). This goal is a major breakthrough because it enshrines in universal development norms that building peace, justice, quality state institutions and inclusion are central components of development.

Various members of the g7+ built negotiating coalitions with the African Union, least developed countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). These revolved around two main advocacy messages: 1.) there is no development without peace and no peace without development; and 2.) “leaving no-one behind” on poverty was a global normative end in itself, and must be enabled through a goal for building peace and institutions. Through the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda, the African Union’s Common African Position, and the UN Open Working Group on the SDGs, g7+ representatives worked closely with the AU, LDCs and SIDS to advocate for the framing of a goal for peace that would be acceptable across the G77. The success of the g7+ members’ strategy was in negotiating through multiple avenues to shape a universal agenda, rather than as a single g7+ bloc.

The 2030 Agenda also recognizes the need to address on a universal level the factors which give rise to violence, insecurity and injustice, such as inequality, corruption and illicit financial and arms flows. In this regard, the Agenda calls for a greater collective effort to resolve and prevent conflict and to support post-conflict countries, including through ensuring that women have a role in building peace. The Agenda also underlines the need to promote respect for the international rule of law and for global governance reform. This is important. Many G77 countries objected to a goal specifically dedicated to conflict or to a category of “fragile states.” They underlined that fragility is a universal phenomenon that varies by degree across context. These same countries underlined that weaknesses inherent to the international peace and security system and global governance institutions (the UN Security Council, non-proliferation, respect for the international rule of law, low representation of developing countries in global governance and so forth) posed greater impediments to global peace and to poverty eradication.

The eventual universal framing of SDG 16 is a collective effort that was significantly influenced by a wide range of countries as well as global knowledge and policy initiatives. But without the ownership and efforts of g7+ members and the African Union, it is unlikely that there would have either been a sufficient constituency within the G77 to put a goal on the table, or to undertake the depth and complexity of negotiations that it took to frame and agree. Box 4.1 explains in more detail international resistance to the inclusion of a goal dedicated to conflict and conflict-affected countries. It clarifies the logic behind how Goal 16 is now framed as a universal set of objectives for building peaceful and inclusive societies everywhere.
Box 4.1: The Universal Normative Framing of Sustainable Development Goal 16

Although numerous institutions and experts have contributed to global recognition that peace is essential for development, SDGs for peacebuilding and statebuilding had no natural political constituency in New York when the SDG negotiations started. Two political factors compounded the problem. First, the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 Agenda made an immediate error by proposing “peace and security” as one of four dimensions of development. This language invoked the interventionist terminology of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, immediately raising alarm bells that issues of development and poverty were at risk of subordination to the Security Council. Second, the credibility of the New Deal itself was undermined by the nature of its launch in New York. The leaders of the g7+ were always impressive and credible advocates of the New Deal, but the initiative was perceived by the G77 to be controlled by the OECD, many of whom lobbied hard for the New Deal in 2011 and 2012, before many g7+ diplomats in New York had heard of the initiative.

Through the negotiations, the framing of SDG 16 was oriented toward a universal and developmental articulation of the links between peaceful societies, justice, institutions and development. It addresses the concerns of many G77 countries, who do not wish to see development driven by foreign national security objectives. For many G77 countries, there is a clear normative and operational divide between criminal violence and fragility, which affects all countries universally, and armed conflict and transitions. The former is an issue for national and international criminal justice and development systems. The latter may also involve the Security Council. Thus, while the UN can and should be a forum for universal commitment and lesson sharing on reducing violence and building peaceful societies, some Member States will remain cautious about conflating development issues around institutions, justice and governance, with issues of international conflict and security.

The negotiations were complex, but three main perspectives shaped the universal framing of SDG 16:

- The 2013 High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda was co-chaired by the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and included then Timor-Leste Minister of Finance H.E. Emilia Pires. The Panel proposed five structural transformations to enable universal, sustainable development, including to leave no-one behind on poverty, and to build peace and open, effective and accountable institutions for all.

- The 2014 Common African Position (CAP) of the African Union was crucial in shifting international support toward the inclusion and framing of SDG 16. The CAP, coordinated by Liberia, advocated for a dedicated goal on peace as an enabler of development – a point upon which the AU ultimately insisted in the closing days of the SDG negotiations.

- The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) placed a heavy emphasis on universal citizen empowerment, security and access to justice. CELAC also advocated for addressing the externally-driven impediments to achieving peace that require global action and more effective and participatory global governance, such as illicit financial flows, the illegal arms trade, human trafficking and drug trafficking. An emphasis in SDG 16 on universal access to justice, and on citizen participation, empowerment and respect for the international rule of law and reforms in global governance, allayed concerns that a goal on peaceful societies would be instrumentalized to subordinate aid to Western national security objectives.
The Addis Ababa Third International Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015 was sequenced as a precursor to the launch of the 2030 Agenda in September 2015. It was hoped that the Conference would fill gaps in international agreement on the ‘means of implementation’ for the SDGs. The IDPS mobilized to address the gap on the needs of fragile situations in early drafts of the outcome document, lobbying member states, holding high level events in Addis and Dili. The g7+ produced an early information note for negotiators on the g7+, its principles and objectives. The g7+ also emphasized the need for breadth in financing for development efforts, beyond official development assistance (ODA) alone. They emphasized support for domestic tax resource mobilization, improving global monitoring of all financial flows in order to “leave no fragile state behind”. They introduced a tracking system for expenditure on peacebuilding and statebuilding, and further advocated mainstreaming the principles of the New Deal in conflict-affected countries; improving access to climate finance; and developing and engaging the private sector in fragile states.

The final Addis Ababa Outcome document recognizes “the principles of the g7+”; takes note that countries in conflict and post-conflict situations need special attention; recognizes the development challenge posed by conflict, which not only impedes but can reverse decades of development gains; recognizes that peaceful and inclusive societies is a “cross-cutting” issue; and recognizes that there are ODA, foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic financing gaps for peacebuilding and for development in LDCs.

This marks a shift from the Monterrey Consensus, which gave no recognition to fragility and vulnerability, and which predominately focused on ODA levels. Although references are diluted, the text provides recognition of the need to make headway on addressing financing gaps in vulnerable and low-income situations, the need to grow FDI and the need to engage the private sector. The IDPS has emphasized that the Addis Tax Initiative was an important outcome. Sierra Leone, Liberia, the US, UK, Germany and the Netherlands have so far signed the agreement, committing to investing more ODA in domestic resource mobilization. Initiatives of this nature will be crucial for financing development in g7+ countries, as data suggests that international investment in developing domestic resource mobilization in fragile situations has actually been declining.

References to the g7+ in the Addis Ababa Outcome document did, however, receive international opposition. Cultural differences between the development community and the UN account for some of this divergence. Traditionally, the development community has tended to be country-focused and the UN community has tended to be process-oriented toward achieving universal agreement and legitimacy on norms. The New Deal's country focus makes it harder to reflect in UN normative processes, which suggests that the IDPS may continue to be an important international platform for supporting the g7+.

Lesson Two: Increasing influence over international responses to crisis and to peacebuilding and statebuilding will require broadening the dialogue about international coherence and approaches for sustaining the peace

Our hypothesis is largely confirmed that the absence of non-traditional development partners and political and security actors from the IDPS is among the most important factors in constraining influence of the New Deal. The New Deal experienced political missteps on the global level when it was launched in 2011. Box 4.1 explained these in more detail. The g7+ Permanent Missions to the UN in New York are small and many of the g7+ diplomats and foreign ministries had not yet heard of the New Deal when it was launched in 2011. INCAF Permanent Missions in New York lobbied early in 2011 and 2012 for incorporation of the New Deal principles into C34 peacekeeping negotiations and Security Council resolutions. The G77 therefore perceived the New Deal initiative to be owned and driven by the OECD and objected to being lobbied to adopt it because the UN does not defer to the
OECD. Explicit references to the New Deal are thus low across UN normative frameworks and reviews. Direct reference to the New Deal as a brand, and to making development commitments to fragile states specifically, remains controversial among the G77.\(^3\)

There is, however, evidence of growing consistency and convergence between the principles of the New Deal and wider international thinking about peacebuilding and statebuilding at multiple levels. Multiple UN panel reviews in 2015 and 2016 were commissioned in recognition that the UN is reaching a breaking point for achieving its mandates in peace operations, sustaining the peace and financing humanitarian needs. The 2015 report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, underscored the primacy of national politics in defining solutions to conflict, and underlined the need for inclusive partnerships for building and sustaining peace and institutions. The June 2015 report of the Advisory Group of Experts on UN peacebuilding, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, underlined the need for coherence across development, political and security actors to support nationally-owned and led plans for peacebuilding. It called for greater international coherence and attention on sustaining the peace. Both reports recognized the low investment of ODA in the political, security and justice dimensions of the PSGs and called for greater focus in these priority areas.\(^3\) The *High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing* in 2016 recognized the need to invest more in reducing fragility and fragile situations, and in building country systems and institutions, in order to shrink humanitarian needs in the long-term.

A number of major bilateral donor actors have adopted aspects of the New Deal in their policy frameworks and national strategies. For example, the USA now draws on the PSGs to define priorities for building conflict prevention capacity in its new National Security Strategy.\(^3\) This is a significant achievement for the thinking behind the New Deal, and US leadership in supporting these priorities has the potential to significantly influence international approaches to prioritization in a range of fragile situations. The UK prioritizes fragile states and a “whole of government” political, security and development approach to addressing fragility in its new National Security Strategy. The UK’s new Aid Strategy is aligned with the National Security Strategy. It commits to overarching objectives of “leaving no-one behind” on poverty and earmarks half of ODA for fragile states. The UK is waiting for the review of the New Deal in order to decide how much to draw on the framework in the future.\(^3\) Sweden integrated the New Deal principles into its country strategies in g7+ countries, and has adopted a whole of government approach, committing to making all assistance conflict- and gender-sensitive. Switzerland integrated the principles of the New Deal into its Fragile States Strategy, committed half of its aid to fragile states, and undertook reforms of the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation to make it ‘fit for purpose’ in fragile states.

The multilateral development system constitutes major investors in many fragile situations, most especially “aid orphans.” Their uptake of the New Deal is therefore essential, and higher policy and operational priority is being accorded to fragility, conflict and violence. The African Development Bank (AfDB) created a dedicated Transition Support Facility to assist underfunded fragile countries, and in 2014 it adopted a Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa. The World Bank President meets twice a year with g7+ finance ministers as a matter of priority. A Post-Conflict Performance Indicators Framework (PCPI) has replaced the CPIA scores, and informs exceptional IDA allocations to fragile countries (although the PCPI predates the New Deal).\(^3\) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) introduced a new Staff Handbook on Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States in 2012 and an Operational Plan in 2013. The EU developed a Staff Handbook on Operating in Situations of Fragility and Conflict, which offers tools and guidance developed by staff for achieving the behavior change and objectives envisaged in the New Deal.\(^3\)
The strongest evidence of risk tolerance and use of country systems since the New Deal was launched is to be found in AfDB, EU and World Bank initiatives. (The review turns to this later when looking at country-level implementation). The UN Development Group is a signatory to the New Deal, and since 2013, UNDP has hosted a “New Deal Support Facility” to support implementation of the New Deal principles in g7+ pilot and non-pilot countries, facilitate the participation of g7+ representatives in international policy processes, and support the capacity of the g7+ Secretariat in Timor-Leste. UNDP has pursued efforts to ‘mainstream’ New Deal principles across their country offices. The UN Peacebuilding Fund allocates resources to nationally-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding plans, and membership of the g7+/New Deal is considered as an important indicator of a country’s commitment to peacebuilding.37

Among Southern governmental actors at the country level, despite divisions about the New Deal at the normative level in New York, g7+ countries report no significant problems in encouraging non-traditional donors to support their national priorities. In Sierra Leone, for example, donors and government do not see a difference between OECD and non-OECD donors funding support to the PSGs, because the Agenda for Prosperity is encompassing of all donors.38 In Somalia, there are differences across the modalities and priorities that each development partner (OECD or non-OECD) pursues, but there is no evidence of non-OECD donors rejecting the country’s New Deal Compact framework. In fact, Gulf States and China are some the largest budget support donors to the Federal Government of Somalia,39 and rising power Turkey will host in 2016 the Somalia High Level Partnership Forum at Presidential level on the Somalia New Deal Compact. As one Somali official noted on the alignment of rising powers to the New Deal principles, “they’re already there, already on board with the principles!”40

The divergence between New York and country level implementation is partly because Southern actors dispute the validity of aid frameworks and templates. On a point of principle, southern actors’ support is demand-driven and tailored to context and requests. They object on a normative basis to supply-driven frameworks, especially those which appear to be defined by the OECD. SDG 17 on the means of implementation reinforces this, including a target to, “Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development.” But it is perfectly consistent with southern principles that countries will support areas of demand identified by the g7+. The g7+’s direct dialogue with China in the Presidency of the G20 and the African Union on achieving the SDGs in g7+ countries is therefore very encouraging.

Participants in the CSPPS reported similar experiences. They have also achieved some progress in improving understanding and uptake of the principles of the New Deal actors in Southern civil society networks, which have proved helpful in informing civil society engagement with governments within and beyond g7+ countries.41

At the level of international responses to specific crises and peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, the New Deal has struggled to achieve an impact outside the IDPS’ immediate sphere of influence. The New Deal is not well known outside the immediate aid community, either at the global or country levels. When it is known, it is usually understood to be a framework for development agencies.

We looked at Mali as a case study of a country outside the g7+ that had experienced crisis. We found that more than half of respondents in Mali had never heard of the New Deal. Others knew of its existence, but not much more. Despite efforts of the g7+ and the DAC Chair in 2013 to encourage Mali to sign up to the New Deal, it did not do so for three main reasons. First, timing and politics were crucial. As one senior leader observed, “Mali did not have time. It was crisis. The president was trying to save his function.”42 Second, fragility was a problematic concept on the political level. Leaders did not want to be branded a fragile state,
arguing that Mali has a functioning state. This assessment was contested by non-state respondents in our study, but nevertheless Malian leaders were not attracted to the fundamental concepts of the New Deal. Thirdly, donors also contested the depth of Mali’s fragility and the utility of the New Deal ‘template’ design. The DAC’s visit to Mali in 2013 to discuss the New Deal was met with resistance. Many donors argued that the country was exiting fragility, and that the New Deal ‘template’ would “…add constraints and limit donor flexibility.”

Some donors have since reported changing their assessment, recognizing that Mali has fragilities, but they respect the government’s decision to not want to be branded as “fragile.” Our study found that the majority of assistance to Mali is focused on traditional development sectors, although efforts have intensified to support statebuilding. We also found that peacebuilding and statebuilding concepts are not well incorporated in most policies and programs in the country, and we found little evidence for space for dialogue about priorities around building peace.

Uptake at the international level, as in the case of Mali, suggests that future efforts need to tailor communications, advocacy and political dialogue tracks on the principles of the New Deal to the precise audience. This is in lieu of encouraging countries and organizations to sign up to the New Deal as a template, or to join the g7+.

The growing convergence on global normative priorities can be built upon in the future to expand dialogue and coherence across a wider range of international peace, security, humanitarian and development actors. Experience from 2011 through to the SDG negotiations suggests that g7+ diplomatic, political and finance actors are best placed to be in the driving seat to overcome skepticism and achieve consensus in the G77, African Union, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, G20, South-South fora and with the BRICS, MINTs and other middle-income countries and regional actors. Dialogue led by the g7+ could be expanded to a wider range of partners under the UN pledge to SDG 17 “Partnerships for the Goals.” CSPPS efforts to build social understanding of the New Deal will also prove crucial for building momentum.

The IDPS could also advance its influence by engaging a wider range of actors beyond the immediate focal points for the Dialogue. The IDPS could also do more to extend influence by including security ministries, justice ministries, parliamentarians, executive offices, civil society constellations and the private sector in dialogue. We return to these findings in later sections.

II. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW DEAL ON WAYS OF WORKING AT COUNTRY LEVEL

HAS THE NEW DEAL CHANGED THE WAYS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS AND FRAGILE STATES GOVERNMENTS ARE DOING BUSINESS? WHAT DIFFERENCE, IF ANY, IS THIS BEGINNING TO MAKE IN ADDRESSING CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY ISSUES IN THESE CONTEXTS?

The IDPS New Deal Monitoring Report of 2014 surveyed country level implementation of the TRUST and FOCUS principles (not the PSGs). It found that implementation on the ground needed to intensify if the principles of the New Deal and its goals
of change in “what” and “how” things are done was to be achieved. At the macro level the monitoring report suggested that an overly technical approach had been taken to applying the principles of the New Deal. This approach came at the expense of deepening political dialogue and prioritization around a common understanding of the causes of fragility and potential opportunities and modalities to build resilience. The monitoring report found progress in developing fragility assessments and compacts in some countries, and some improvements in aid predictability and transparency. There was poor progress on monitoring the PSGs, and on use of country systems and building national capacities. It identified risk as an important constraining factor on innovation, and urged progress on jointly assessing and sharing risk. Box 4.2 summarizes the monitoring report’s main findings on progress. Green indicates that commitments are on track, amber indicates some progress, and red indicates that commitments are off track.

**Box 4.2: Main Findings of the New Deal Monitoring Report 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOCUS Principles</th>
<th>TRUST Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRAGILITY ASSESSMENTS</td>
<td>TRANSPARENCY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE VISION/ONE PLAN</td>
<td>RISK SHARING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPACTS</td>
<td>USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE OF PSGS TO MONITOR</td>
<td>STRENGTHENING CAPACITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TIMELY/PREDICTABLE AID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The IDPS 2014 monitoring report recommended five main groups of improvements: (i) Orient political dialogue, country plans, implementation modalities, monitoring and mutual accountability toward the PSGs; (ii) Agree on a smaller set of measurable priorities within compacts to deliver visible results and build confidence and greater tolerance for risk; (iii) Build whole of government ownership within the g7+ and OECD for implementing the New Deal, by extending the principles across Ministries in the g7+ and beyond bilateral aid agencies in the OECD; (iv) Make headway on using country systems by taking an incremental approach to increasing the use of instruments that build country systems over time; and (v) Orient New Deal implementation away from global dialogue to country level implementation.

Our review of New Deal implementation in case study countries in 2015 does not reveal significant changes in the status of New Deal-related activities since the 2014 monitoring report. Box 4.3 highlights that the majority of energies at the activity level across countries has thus far gone into developing fragility assessments and associated indicators, and in some cases, compacts. The PSGs have been drawn upon, but have generally not changed priorities, and new initiatives to strengthen the use of country systems and develop national capacities are lacking. Implementation is context specific, and actors are learning by doing.
Box 4.3: Implementation “State of Play” across g7+ Countries

Since 2012, seven “official” pilot countries started to roll out the New Deal: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste. In addition, Somalia, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau and Togo took up implementation. Somalia has an agreed compact and government-donor working groups on the PSGs. South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia and Comoros have conducted fragility assessments. Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Somalia have compacts (Afghanistan’s already existed), and compacts are under consideration in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Timor-Leste. Central African Republic and South Sudan’s processes were interrupted by political and security setbacks. Fragility assessments are foreseen in Afghanistan and Togo in 2015 and 2016. Guinea is the planning stages for a fragility assessment. Chad has discussed the PSGs as part of the national planning process. Yemen has an ongoing national dialogue, but is currently in a crisis situation. Burundi is in crisis. New Deal implementation is not currently being discussed in Burundi, DRC, South Sudan or Yemen.

Interactive implementation map available at IDPS: http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/implementation-progress/

Lesson Three: The PSGs have enjoyed some uptake in national plans and programs, but significant resources have not been redirected to these areas

We find that the PSGs have influenced dialogue, planning and monitoring frameworks across a range of countries to some degree. For example, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the PSGs and associated indicators are reflected in monitoring and mutual accountability frameworks for national development strategies. In others, such as DRC and Afghanistan, the PSGs have or will be used as a diagnostic and assessment tool. In Liberia’, a New Deal Dashboard monitors the alignment of donor support to the PSGs. The PSGs have also been reflected in new donor strategies, such as the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) strategy for Sierra Leone. Progress in these areas has been led by Ministries of Finance and Planning and are detailed further below.

PSG monitoring will be a long-term endeavor. In many cases, and as the 2015 OECD States of Fragility Report noted, reliable data is not currently collected on national PSG indicators or new SDG target areas. Significant investments will need to be made in developing g7+ statistical capacity, and in working with national statistics offices and policy-makers to supplement SDG data collection with relevant PSG indicators not covered by the SDGs.47

With the exception of Somalia, where a New Deal compact is explicitly based on all five PSGs and government/donor working groups are aligned to each PSG, there is limited evidence that the PSGs have significantly shifted national or donor prioritization. Domestic budget allocation data is difficult to obtain and compare. At the aggregate level, we find limited change in OECD aid allocations as a result of the New Deal. A quantitative review of aid alignment to the PSGs across developing countries reveals that since 2011, there may have been a slight (6 per cent) increase in alignment of aid to the PSGs overall in New Deal participating countries, but continued low investment in areas of politics, security and justice. There appears to be limited difference in investment patterns across New Deal participants, the wider group of fragile states in the OECD’s fragile states list, and the total group of developing countries. Differences are within the range of 1-2 per cent in core areas of politics, security, justice and developing core state
functions and country systems, meaning that aid flows remain largely insensitive to the specific priorities of g7+ countries. Allocations to politics and security even appear to be stagnant or declining. This aggregate data suggests limited realignment of aid to the PSGs since 2011 as a result of the New Deal. Table 4.1 summarizes aid flows to the PSGs and non-PSG areas.

Table 4.1: Aid Alignment to the PSGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20 g7+ Countries</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committed Aid</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Politics</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Foundations</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues and services</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-PSG areas</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-PSG areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>50 Countries on the OECD 2015 Fragile States List</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committed Aid</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Politics</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Foundations</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues and services</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-PSG areas</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-PSG areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Developing Countries (163 countries)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committed Aid</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Politics</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Foundations</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues and services</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-PSG areas
In a similar exercise for the United Nations, the Institute for Economics and Peace found even lower levels of allocations to peacebuilding categories, at around 17 per cent of ODA, and almost 50 per cent of peacebuilding expenditures going to Afghanistan and Iraq alone between 2003 and 2012. This suggests a hollowing of aid commitments to g7+ countries despite adoption of the New Deal.\textsuperscript{48} Our data draws on a generous interpretation of alignment to the PSGs based on the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS).\textsuperscript{49} The CRS does not disaggregate data by PSG, which means all attempts at aid calculations are estimates at best based on pre-existing aid categories. The OECD States of Fragility Report 2015 noted that there is no agreed framework for tracking aid to the PSGs. The absence of an agreed framework reduces the scope for improving donor accountability for alignment to national priorities for peacebuilding and statebuilding in g7+ countries. The OECD recommended more granular aid reporting codes for the PSGs and reform of international systems to more accurately and transparently reflect ODA, non-ODA, and peace and security spending. As we note below, tracking aid to make the best use of available resources will become increasingly crucial in g7+ countries given growing pressures on aid and humanitarian budgets.

**Lesson Four: g7+ Ministries of Finance and Planning are the Major Champions of the New Deal, Thus Most Progress in New Deal Implementation is Evident in Their Aid and Budget Effectiveness Mandate Areas**

g7+ Ministries of Finance and Planning have been the main champions of the New Deal, and therefore progress in New Deal implementation is most evident in their mandate areas in pilot countries. The New Deal has not generally been rolled out as a template, with all elements of the PSGs and TRUST and FOCUS principles being implemented equally. In pilot countries, implementation is a mixed picture because the New Deal has been received as one of multiple political, security and development frameworks. Many New Deal pilot countries already had peace agreements, ‘one vision/one plan’ documents and aid effectiveness agreements, and some had compacts. The terminology and presentation of the ‘New Deal’ itself has in some ways proved challenging because it has led some actors in the field to challenge just how “new” the New Deal was, and to challenge the utility of the framework as a new blueprint.

Instead, actors have drawn more flexibly on elements of the framework and tailored them to context. Experience in Sierra Leone and Liberia reveals how Ministries of Finance and Planning have drawn on the New Deal to assert national ownership over existing plans and budgets, and to align aid and monitoring through mutual accountability frameworks.
Box 4.4: The New Deal in Liberia: Improving Aid Transparency

In Liberia, the New Deal has...

**Supported greater country ownership of Liberia’s development agenda**

The New Deal has supported greater country ownership of the development agenda through promoting adherence to country policies such as the Agenda for Transformation (PRS II), which specifies socio-economic development priorities, and the National Aid Policy, which mandates increased use of country systems through budget support.

**PSGs have been explicitly included in national implementation plans and monitoring frameworks**

Liberia completed its “one vision/one plan” though the comprehensive National Vision (Liberia RISING) process in 2012, which examined national peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. The goals were also included in the Agenda for Transformation (PRSII), a medium-term implementation document of the Vision. The New Deal principles also contributed to more inclusive processes of political dialogue, exemplified in local and diaspora consultation on the National Policy on Decentralization and Local Governance, the constitutional review, and the National Vision, although it is difficult to attribute all dialogue to the New Deal per se.

**The New Deal principles have contributed to improving transparency of aid flows to the PSGs**

Since 2013, Liberia has used PSGs to monitor interventions via the New Deal Dashboard. The Dashboard is an annex to the aid management platform, and donor and government projects are aligned to goals from both the Agenda for Transformation (PRS II) and PSGs. Within the donor community, there is understanding, communication on and explicit inclusion of fragility in programming. Donors are now seeking strategic coordination for stronger alignment regarding peacebuilding and statebuilding.

**Looking forward**

Liberia will enter an electoral period and thus significant new initiatives related to the New Deal are unlikely in the near term. In the longer term, Liberia can take a more explicit approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Concrete examples include: Restarting dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and including all sectors and national actors; borrowing essential elements from the New Deal but not expecting to put everything under the New Deal umbrella; developing a shared Liberian perspective on fragility and the “Liberian Way” for identifying and implementing solutions.

**Source:** Diasmer Bloe, Liberia Case Study for the IDPS, October 2015
In Sierra Leone, the PSGs are linked to the “one vision/one plan” Agenda For Prosperity through the Mutual Accountability Framework. The Agenda has a strong focus on economic foundations over other PSGs, and donor funding follows suit. Some donors have explicitly drawn on the PSGs for their country strategies, including the AfDB. Government and donor respondents reported a practice of budget and aid alignment toward the Agenda for Prosperity, which is linked to the PSGs, but systematic data on alignment of finances and programs to the PSGs specifically is hard to obtain. Sierra Leone reports using the Mutual Accountability Framework to track progress against indicators of aid effectiveness, country-level PSG and pre-existing development indicators in support of the country’s Agenda for Prosperity.50

In Sierra Leone, ownership of the New Deal is growing beyond the Ministry of Finance. The Minister of Finance and President have made several statements to Parliament on the New Deal, building national political understanding and ownership of the principles. Some actors have argued that the Ebola outbreak in 2014 expedited uptake of the New Deal principles in the health and local government sectors, and national authorities asserted New Deal principles to coordinate the Ebola strategy response. Since then, the Ebola experience has led some actors to call for a re-prioritizing of the Agenda For Prosperity (Sierra Leone’s One Vision – One Plan document) to include more explicit peacebuilding and statebuilding principles.51

**Box 4.5: The New Deal in Sierra Leone: Nationally-Owned and Led Development**

*In Sierra Leone the New Deal has...*

**Led some development partners to change their internal priorities**

The African Development Bank in Sierra Leone and in other countries has mainstreamed the use of the Peace and State-building goals, according to the AfDB country principal economist: “The PSGs have become more prominent. Even in the way we work internally in the bank, we apply the fragility lens.” For the Country Strategy Paper (2013-2017): “We looked at the five peace and state-building goals to see where the country was on the transition spectrum [...] Headquarters encouraged us to apply the fragility lens in all Country Strategy Papers. It is the general practice in the bank for all fragile states.”

**Given an impetus for a new normative framework to deal with crises such as Ebola**

“When Ebola broke out, the three countries affected were all New Deal countries. We tried to make sure that the New Deal principles were embedded in all the meetings we had and in the documents we prepared,” states Abie Kamara, Deputy Director of the Development Assistance Coordination Office in the Ministry of Finance. The country director of the World Bank in Sierra Leone notes how DEPAC – a coordination forum as envisioned in the Mutual Accountability Framework – played an important role in the Ebola crisis: “Ebola presented an aberration but also an opportunity. DEPAC became a way to coordinate the strategy for Ebola.” In the background: “The DEPAC principle became the rallying force, [even to] mobilize resources for the Ebola response and accountability.”
Empowered Government to take stronger control and clarify respective responsibilities

On July 3, 2015, Sierra Leone President Ernest Bai Koroma launched the Service Level Agreement (SLA) after Ebola had exposed gaps. Koroma said: “One question I have always asked myself is with so much investment and so many players in the health sector, why is it that we are still struggling to get the desired health outcomes for our people? The lack of coordination and misalignment with priorities of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation is one of the main reasons we are not making significant progress […] The Service Level Agreement we are launching today should help resolve these issues [and is] consonant with […] the New Deal.” Abdul Kareem Jalloh, director of the local NGO Medical Research Centre applauded the effort: “To me the Service Level Agreement really comes in handy. […] Above all the SLA ensures that NGOs that may be laid back will [have to] ensure that the resources that come are really delivered. […] But it is also a wake-up call for the Ministry. Because if you say you are going to monitor us and call the President to come, you will really have to do it.”

Supported the norm and practice of Government-led development

The New Deal is making a difference in clarifying roles and responsibilities of donors, government and civil society. In Sierra Leone, one Donor changed their evaluation of aid aligning due to the New Deal: “When I first heard about the New Deal, my first thought was: is it actually possible for Donors to align their resources to that of the Government? […] But over time I learned that you cannot impose, it should be demand driven. […] Before each had their own activities, now we align more with Government priorities.”

Looking forward

Sierra Leone can continue to strengthen its coordination and aid management institutions. Center of government and development partners can empower aid coordination institutions by investing more authority in them. Civil society engagement can be strengthened by achieving accommodation between civil society leaders. Donors can recommit to the New Deal, as some are perceived to not be supportive. All actors can seek renewed agreement on the Agenda for Prosperity as the country recovers from Ebola and there is a drop in commodity prices.

Source: Kars de Bruijne and Clionadh Raleigh, Sierra Leone case study for the IDPS, October 2015

Timor-Leste has conducted two fragility assessments; the first in 2012 over a two-month period and the second, which is currently being finalized, in 2015, over a six-month period. Both were led by the Development Partnership Management Unit (DPMU) in the Ministry of Finance (MoF), with support from the g7+ Secretariat. For the second fragility assessment, a peacebuilding NGO was commissioned to conduct community consultations in the 13 municipalities, facilitated by line-ministries, and funded by the government. Actors reported some limitations on the exercise, chiefly that there was not much time for municipal level and political dialogue. The PSGs are mentioned in government budget documents, but the fragility assessment was finalized after the launch of the country’s Strategic Development Plan (SDP) and the fragility assessment findings or New Deal principles are yet to be incorporated into the SDP.}\textsuperscript{52}
Development partners have aligned their assistance to the SDP, but reference to the New Deal principles is low. One exception is the German technical cooperation agency, GIZ, which uses the PSGs in design and monitoring of programs. Aid levels to Timor-Leste, however, have remained constant in the last five years. Although difficult to attribute, Timor-Leste's leadership of the New Deal may be a contributing factor in sustaining support for the country.

In addition, the New Deal principles have been "highly successful in normalizing the principle that development partners use country systems in Timor Leste." A number of partners reported political and organizational constraints on using country systems or more flexible modalities. However, two of Timor-Leste's largest donors, the EU and Australia, have worked together with the Ministry of Finance to establish an innovative budget support program within the Ministry of Finance. The program aims to build the Ministry's public financial management (PFM) capacities. Funding is provided directly to the Ministry of Finance in predictable tranches based on delivery against a small number of key performance indicators (KPIs.) These KPIs are independently verified and are based on the Ministry of Finance's five-year strategic plan. The program is seen by actors to be demonstrating that systems of mutual accountability can be successfully applied to strengthening and using country systems.

The SDP is not sequenced but has been costed by the Ministry of Finance which produced an SDP Matrix intended to guide the allocation of resources. However, this matrix did not enjoy significant support from other ministries. The Ministry of Finance continues to explore opportunities for improved coordination and prioritization in line with FOCUS and TRUST principles. Actors observed that a Compact may be a useful instrument with which to prioritize results and the allocation of resources and roles and responsibilities toward achieving the SDP in the future. Box 4.6 summarizes experience in Timor-Leste in greater detail.

**Box 4.6: The New Deal in Timor-Leste: Changing the Way Government and Partners Work**

*In Timor-Leste the New Deal has...*

**Provided a framework** for government, development partners and civil society to use when considering issues of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Two fragility assessments have been undertaken and completed by the government and development partners, including civil society. These processes have enabled stakeholders to better understand the risks and challenges the country faced and to design and own potential solutions.

**Supported a fundamental shift in the way government and development partners work.** The New Deal has increased the government's confidence to lead well-planned peacebuilding, statebuilding and development processes, hence moving away from the traditional and sometimes ad-hoc aid modalities. As a result, development partners have sought to adapt a number of practices and procedures to align with government systems whenever possible.

**Encouraged development partners to use and strengthen Timor-Leste's country systems.** The New Deal has been highly successful in normalizing the principle that development partners should use country systems in Timor-Leste. This is evidenced by the successful establishment of an innovative budget support program between Ministry of Finance and two
major development partners (European Union and Australia), supporting public financial management reforms. Furthermore, over the next years some development partners, including the European Union and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), are planning to significantly scale-up their use of country systems through budget support programs.

**Faced a number of challenges** including managing stakeholder expectations on what the New Deal should achieve, providing opportunities for civil society engagement and a lack of awareness amongst national stakeholders. In response to these challenges the Ministry of Finance and g7+ Secretariat have undertaken information sessions at the district level. The Ministry of Finance and the g7+ Secretariat have also provided briefings and presentations to Ministries, state institutions, media, academia, faith organizations, private sector, civil society and development partners forums.

**Looking forward** New Deal implementation can be strengthened by: better prioritizing objectives under the next phase of implementation; increasing coordination among all stakeholders at all levels; strengthening partnerships; identifying opportunities for further innovation and reform; and continuing to monitor fragility and risks to build on achievements.

*Source: Cameron Reid, Case Study of the New Deal in Timor-Leste for the IDPS, January 2016*

DRC illustrates the challenges of aligning the New Deal principles with political processes, peace agreements, development plans and finances and programs. The New Deal did not gain significant political traction across government or external actors because the value added and originality of the New Deal versus existing peace, security and development frameworks was brought into question. Actors outside aid effectiveness circles moreover have a low awareness of it. Progress is only likely to be achieved where there is sufficient high-level political interest and ownership of the concepts. The Ministry of Planning was able to draw on the PSGs, alongside the fragility assessment, as diagnostic and monitoring tools. An exercise to diagnose and consolidate fragility issues was successfully achieved and led to the production of a fragility matrix. DRC also drew on the PSGs as the context for its MDG reporting. However, the low political uptake of the concepts constrains the potential impact.

Box 4.7 below analyzes the experience and future opportunities in DRC in further detail. Political and security conditions permitting, the launch of the SDGs may open a window of opportunity to consider consolidating multiple frameworks and programs into “one vision, one plan” that aligns peace agreements, development plans and finances. Elevating national planning and prioritization of efforts to build resilience to the level of a Presidential high representative is likely to have the most significant impact on integrating New Deal principles into plans and operations in the DRC, combined with renewed commitment of external actors to New Deal principles in the country.
Box 4.7: The New Deal in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The New Deal’s relevance in DRC

The main assumptions for New Deal implementation include sufficient influence by the lead Ministry (Finance and Planning) within a particular Government; political and socio-economic receptivity to the New Deal’s concepts; that actors perceive a “value-added” of the New Deal to existing peace- and statebuilding processes that convince political decision-makers and donors of its use; and interest in building upon the “one vision/one plan” principle. These assumed conditions were not in place in DRC, which constrained the New Deal’s relevance and effectiveness.

In particular, the “newness” and value-added of the New Deal was questioned at high political levels in the DRC, and many leaders objected to the “fragile state” branding. Thus donors adopted a “wait and see” position. The lack of a national or international political constituency constrained the prospects for domesticating the New Deal.

The PSGs were drawn upon to conduct a fragility assessment and to diagnose key fragility issues, which were consolidated into a fragility matrix. The process enjoyed civil society participation. The analysis is drawn upon by the Ministry of Planning as a baseline and context for reporting on progress against the MDGs, and similarly can be drawn upon for the SDGs.

Further steps to integrate the fragility analysis and wider New Deal principles into national development strategies, including peace- and statebuilding and reconstruction and stabilization strategies, did not prove possible. There were technical hurdles to this, including the number and complexity of pre-existing development, reconstruction and peace- and statebuilding and stabilization frameworks in the country. But political hurdles were also key. The regional and geopolitical nature of the reigniting of the conflict in Eastern DRC by the M23 did not lend itself to a response by the smaller New Deal community, and national political attention was dedicated to negotiations around the 2013 Addis Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC. The outcomes of the Addis Framework did however, recognize the need to build Congolese institutions, and to improve donor coordination.

Looking forward

The launch of the SDGs opens a window of opportunity to consider consolidating multiple frameworks and programs into “one vision/one plan” for aligning peace agreements, development plans and finances. Elevating national planning and prioritization of efforts to address fragility and build resilience to the level of a Presidential high representative is likely to have the most significant impact on integrating the New Deal principles into plans and operations in the DRC, combined with renewed donor commitment to the New Deal principles in the country.

Source: Prof. Mbaya Kankwenda, DRC case study for the IDPS, October 2015, and interviews with DRC interlocutors
Similarly, Afghanistan was well advanced in defining political processes and national priorities before the launch of the New Deal. The Afghan Government sees the New Deal as complementary to existing plans and policies and aims to “localize” New Deal principles to make them relevant to the context. The Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy laid out priority plans from 2006 for improving security, governance, social and economic development. In 2012, at the Tokyo conference for Afghanistan, the Afghan government launched its second strategy, Toward Self-Reliance and the successor to the Afghanistan Compact, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The strategy prioritizes 22 National Priority Programs, and aims to reduce Afghan aid dependency to the level of other developing countries by 2025. There is no explicit reference to the PSGs in Afghanistan’s national plans. Instead, the Ministry of Finance proposes to lead a fragility assessment in 2016 based on the PSGs, which would inform Afghanistan’s pre-existing planning, implementation and monitoring processes.

Box 4.8 highlights a major reason for Afghanistan’s interest in the New Deal: it is an important platform to empower the country in its advocacy for national ownership and aid effectiveness, and an avenue to expand international cooperation. Ownership of the New Deal in Afghanistan, however, does not yet extend beyond the Ministry of Finance. Making it more relevant on the political level would require greater engagement of regional actors in resolving the causes of conflict and supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding in the country.

**Box 4.8: Afghanistan: “Localizing” the New Deal**

**Why does Afghanistan need the New Deal?**

The New Deal is not relevant to Afghanistan as a new template. Rather, the principles empower Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance to sustain focus on its priorities. The New Deal is relevant in Afghanistan in several key ways:

- Providing the Government with an international platform to influence global development policy toward building national ownership, institutions and reduction of aid dependency;
- Increasing transparency and accountability of development policy in Afghanistan;
- Sharing lessons, expertise, and resources with other countries facing similar challenges;
- Attracting resources to address Afghanistan’s challenges and priorities, including resources from donors that will be allocated to the newly-endorsed Sustainable Development Fund;
- Undertaking regular monitoring and assessments of Afghanistan’s progress in the PSG areas;
- Providing concrete recommendations to inform the National Priority Plans revision process;
- Enshrining an important role for civil society actors in the development process and providing them with a forum to participate in the dialogue on aid effectiveness, highlighting critical areas needing support, and influencing Government and donor activities.
Looking forward

It is central to Afghanistan to engage regional actors in building peace in the country, and to build self-reliance through initiatives aimed at growth, revenue generation and institutional development.


The New Deal is unlikely, however, to have a significant deeper impact on peacebuilding and statebuilding without building whole of government ownership in g7+ governments and partners and wider social ownership. The New Deal has not generally translated into national dialogues on peacebuilding and statebuilding at the country level. We return to this finding in Section V on conclusions and recommendations.

Lesson Five: Center and Whole of Government Ownership of the New Deal Can Change Partners’ Ways of Doing Business Quickly

Across case study countries, we have found strong evidence to validate our hypothesis that broad-based political ownership at the center of government and across ministries has been the most important factor in explaining progress or challenges toward implementing the PSGs and TRUST and FOCUS principles. As g7+ General Secretary Helder da Costa noted, “To achieve change on the ground, the New Deal must change mindsets and shift priorities at the highest levels.”

Experience in Somalia reveals that change can start to happen quickly where there is broad-based political ownership of the New Deal. The new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) saw the New Deal precisely as an opportunity to press the reset button on relations between government and donors in Somalia. The President of Somalia and the Prime Minister’s Office took early ownership of the New Deal as a means to assert national ownership over priorities in politics, security, justice, building governance capacity and asserting authority over the use of aid. Because there was no pre-existing Somali framework or agreed strategy with donors, and because the FGS needed to assert its fledgling authority, the New Deal’s principles have had strong resonance as the “only game in town.”

The Somalia New Deal Compact is the government-donor framework for prioritization, sequencing, aid effectiveness and coordination, and the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility is the major governance mechanism through which to coordinate aid around the compact. The Somalia New Deal Compact is designed exclusively around the PSGs, and government/donor working groups have been established for each PSG, involving multiple ministries and international partners. These structures have led to a tangible shift in the relationship between the government and international community. As one Somali official noted, “Now there is a more organized relationship between the international community and the government; there is a forum to talk. Before, things were confused – everyone was talking to whomever.”

The Somalia Compact and PSGs have also served as an important platform to expedite a shift in government and donor planning and programming, from an exclusive focus on humanitarian action to a wider focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding. Donors have committed to aligning their aid programs to the Compact and PSGs, and a Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
(SDRF) provides a governance structure for overseeing aid alignment to the compact. Although as one Somali official noted, “The pie is still divided outside Somalia,” there appears to be tangible evidence of improving alignment to national priorities. Total donor funding to windows in the SDRF grew from 8 per cent to 31 per cent between 2014 and 2015. The first aid mapping report for Somalia in 2015 estimated higher-than-average investments in politics and security, suggesting that donors may have focused more efforts in these priority areas as a result of the PSGs and Compact. However, investment in justice remained low despite its significance in the Somali context and compact, in part because such investment frequently falls through a gap in the international architecture between development and security actors.59

Table 4.2: Aid Allocations to the PSGs in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSG</th>
<th>Percentage of Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Politics</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>13% (reflects ODA-eligible finance only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic foundations</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue and services</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sagal Abshir (2015), Case Study of the New Deal in Somalia for the IDPS, December

Somali authorities have raised concerns that they hoped for a greater use of country systems much faster as a result of the New Deal, whereas the international community hoped for further progress on putting in place public financial management systems. We return to this point below when reviewing impact of the TRUST aid effectiveness principles.

Notwithstanding the evident progress to date, a common criticism of the process to develop the Somalia Compact is that consultation – and adherence to FOCUS principles – was low. The authorities opted not to conduct a fragility assessment as they argued that multiple conflict and political economy assessments of Somalia already existed. Compact development was also rushed to meet timelines for the 2013 Brussels Conference for Somalia. Only symbolic consultations were undertaken with civil society, parliament and sub-national political authorities. The only real political negotiation occurred around the inclusion of the Somaliland Special Arrangement within the compact.

A CIC study from the time of the Somalia Compact development noted that although the overall picture emerging was one where international actors were trying to achieve the principles of the New Deal, externally-driven political and donor aid allocations and disbursement timelines risked undercutting Somali political decision-making and consensus-building on how to achieve peace. External actors had provided support for both a centralized aid compact predicated on state sovereignty governed by Mogadishu and bottom-up investments in peripheral quasi-state formation, without a clear and common political strategy. International security and stabilization actors were also aiming to counter violent extremism and piracy with efforts that are separate from those aimed at Somali state formation and peacebuilding. Thus it was not clear whether and how they would enable or undercut nationally-driven processes. Resolving these difficulties was made more difficult by the fact that a number of new states were emerging in South-Central Somalia, while the security situation made it difficult to access large parts of the South-Central part of the country. The process therefore had natural limitations.
The limited process resulted in an unwieldy Compact. The priorities are so broad that almost any aid program can be characterized as supporting the PSGs. The lack of assessment and consultation avoided the difficult conversations that needed to happen about priorities and trade-offs in how to address conflict and start to build state legitimacy and state/society relations after decades of war. As one Somali official noted, “The Compact is too big. It was a mistake to make it too overambitious, but understandable – it is difficult to make trade-offs when the country is so fragile.” (This experience was also borne out through development of the large and ambitious Afghanistan Compact (2006), which pre-dated the New Deal.)

The Somalia compact expires in 2016, and although it remains unclear whether it will be replaced by a new compact or a national development plan, a wide range of actors want a framework that includes prioritized political, justice and security goals, as well as wider development goals. Developing the successor to the Compact will offer opportunities to address some of the main challenges to date by aligning the process with Somalia politics and identifying a more discrete number of priorities. Renegotiating the Compact would offer the added benefit of continuing to pursue mutual accountability for prioritized results. Without this, making progress in Somalia among multiple actors and in the context of low levels of national capacity will prove more challenging.

Box 4.9: The New Deal is Helping to Transform Ways of Doing Business in Somalia

In Somalia the New Deal has ...

Launched a Compact which has become the primary framework for aid coordination between development partners and Somalis:

- Government official: “The Compact framework is broadly owned and accepted. Donors are quoting it and lining up behind it.”

- Government official: “Now there is a more organized relationship between the international community and the government; there is a forum to talk. Before, things were confused – everyone was talking to whomever.”

Has led to new funding mechanisms and coordination structures:

- The Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) has been launched, and its multi-partner trust funds have been established. The World Bank Multi Partner Fund (WB MPF) became operational in August 2014 with its first grant to support recurrent costs in the federal institutions. The UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF) had its initial funding pipeline endorsed in August 2014. The African Development Bank Fund, also based on the Compact, is in the process of being operationalized and makes explicit reference to the New Deal and PSGs.

- Aid channeled to the SDRF funding windows increased in 2015 to 31 per cent (USD $ 218 million) of total aid for development, from 2014 donor projections of 8 per cent.

- PSG working groups and an SDRF Steering Committee (co-chaired by government and donors) meet regularly, with representation from existing and emerging regional states. There have been three High Level Partnership Forums held since the launch of the Compact, with the fourth one scheduled for Istanbul in February 2016.
Has shifted the relationship between donors and the government:

- Government official: “We now have a platform to start questioning things, e.g., the role of NGOs, or pushing for use of country systems. A powerful node of accountability – gave us something to point to.”

- Donor: “Before the New Deal, there wasn't even a symbolic engagement with the government.”

Struggled with different expectations, partial implementation, and obstacles such as overambitious priorities, lack of government capacity, civil society exclusion, and donor un-readiness for the new commitments.

- Civil society member: “Funding has been committed – where is it? What impact has it had on lives of Somali people?”

- Government official: “The Compact is TOO BIG. It was a mistake to make it too overambitious, but understandable – it is difficult to make trade-offs when the country is so fragile.”

- Government official: “The Compact was supposed to have made things demand-driven. But it's still supply-driven.”

- Government official: “The pie is still divided outside Somalia.”

- Government official: “Lack of capacity is a big problem – a signature on a form can take weeks.”

- Independent actor: “International institutions just don't have the tools to engage, and probably the political will to develop the tools they need to engage.”

- Civil society member: “Country owned and country-led is not the same as government-owned and government-led.”

Looking forward

The New Deal has both supporters and detractors. An opportunity to make adjustments to address some of the obstacles and weaknesses in process and priorities is the upcoming process to develop the successor Compact (or national development plan) that will replace the current Compact expiring in 2016. The Federal Government of Somalia is also conducting its own review of the Compact, which will be an important contribution to the exercise.

Source: Sagal Abshir (2015), Case Study of the New Deal in Somalia for the IDPS, December
When the New Deal is the “only game in town” it may have strongest resonance among a wide range of actors. This suggests that the New Deal may also be highly relevant in situations such as Central African Republic (CAR), which will hold post-crisis elections in February 2016; or Yemen, as and when geopolitical conditions become more permissive to exiting conflict; or Small Island Developing States that are seeking partnerships to identify priorities and means to mitigate crisis brought on by climate change. We discuss CAR further below.

**Lesson Six: A Key Weakness of New Deal Implementation is that Political Processes have been Missing to Identify ‘What’ Needs to be Achieved and ‘How’**

Our hypothesis is confirmed that managing national political processes, interests and participation has been the greatest obstacle to implementing FOCUS principles. The PSGs point to likely priority areas, and fragility assessments and compacts are proposed as means to prioritize, but the principles are rarely adopted as a basis for informing political dialogue or defining national political priorities. In turn, donors do not align funds to priorities, making it difficult for governments to set priorities with reference to the resource envelope.

The New Deal has been the subject of skepticism for being overly technical, for missing parliamentary and political processes, and for failing to consult with civil society at national or subnational levels. A frequent critique of New Deal implementation is that it has not resulted in political assessment and dialogue about national priorities and processes to address the root causes of conflict and fragility or to build institutions and state legitimacy. Actors frequently reported that fragility assessments were too technical and not driven by political actors. Civil society has emphasized that limited inclusivity of processes has driven New Deal implementation heavily toward technical statebuilding processes at the expense of a deeper consideration of the political, social and economic means to restore trust between state and society, including a lack of sufficient focus on gender mainstreaming and women’s participation.

Thus, while fragility assessments and compacts have been a major area of progress in New Deal implementation, they have yet to achieve outcomes in building national ownership and consensus around political priorities in all cases.

As Somalia experienced, without an explicit, national process to identify causes of problems and solutions, it is difficult to identify and agree on the main results for compacts that could advance exits out of fragility. However, it is likely that political actors will be least comfortable with exposing all conflict and fragility dynamics in crisis or in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Fragility assessments also have little value if they are undertaken by consultants or international experts because trust in, and political ownership of the conclusions will inevitably be low.

These challenges are not unique to the New Deal. UN normative reviews this year have made similar critiques of broader international efforts. The report of the UN Advisory Group of Experts on *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace* emphasized that international efforts had focused almost exclusively on supporting government ownership at the expense of supporting the emergence of national and subnational ownership of plans and processes that sustain peace for the long term. The report did not make explicit examples, but emphasized that the problem is most acute when government is part of the conflict problem. In these situations, the report noted that the UN had contributed to making matters worse.

The UN Global Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice and Securing the Peace, noted that the inclusion of women in peace and security processes remained at the
level of “firsts” rather than standard practice. It concluded that the exclusion of women from peace processes and peacebuilding undermined their sustainability, particularly at the community and societal level.

For the first time, the Sustainable Development Goals have placed significant normative emphasis on addressing inequality, inclusivity and participation of vulnerable and marginalized groups and women as essential means to build resilience and peace and achieve sustainable development. The challenge in translating these global norms for equality and peaceful and inclusive societies into practice is that political actors have to manage tradeoffs about how and when inclusivity practically contributes to restoring trust between state and society and to long-term development. For example, inclusivity per se can make peace deals and processes harder to achieve, and less focused on addressing immediate causes of conflict among power brokers.

Recent research suggests that a helpful lens would be to clarify when and how inclusivity contributes to sustained peacebuilding and statebuilding. Research on 40 case studies of peacebuilding processes has found that there are many types of inclusion that are more important in different circumstances; not only a seat at the table to negotiate formal processes, but also inclusion at the community level in service delivery design, inclusion in sectoral dialogue and so on. The evidence also suggested that the quality, not quantity, of inclusion is important for peacebuilding. Inclusion that achieves influence not only relates to normative prescriptions for the inclusion of women and minorities, but also the inclusion of political opposition, spoilers and so on. When contributions are respected and seen as meaningful by governments, they have a higher impact. Civil society can undermine its own advocacy efforts when it is polarized or is seen to contain “spoilers” (rather than conveying independent social voices legitimized by citizen participation). In addition, governments must be able to see the strategic benefit of inclusivity. If they see it as contributing to building governmental or state legitimacy (as perceived by citizens), governments are more likely to be attracted to more inclusive processes.

When leaders do not hone in on political priorities, the tendency is to fall back on pre-existing development assumptions that may be flawed. For example, prioritization in development processes to date has often assumed that centralized statebuilding for delivering basic services almost automatically translates into legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and building peace. While states clearly need to be capable and effective, in fact the precise relations between state services and legitimacy and peace may not be so linear.

Multi-year panel research by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) offers some insights. SLRC found that there was no linear relationship between state services and perceived legitimacy. Communities’ perceptions of the state did not seem to improve if government, rather than NGOs, provided services. But poor services contribute to poor perceptions of the state, and inclusive participation and mechanisms to raise and have grievances addressed by government at the subnational level does have a positive effect on perceptions of the state. The study may not yet measure perceptions along a sufficiently long time-frame to assess the payoffs from investment in government systems versus non-state actors, but these initial findings are important because they point actors toward not only focusing on service delivery performance, but also a deeper effort to identify what expectations are of the state, and the process for how they could be met in different ways at the national, subnational and community levels.

The Liberian New Deal experience may support these insights. In 2012, Liberia’s “one vision, one plan” process – Liberia RISING – identified national peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, which were included in the Agenda for Transformation (PRSII). Since
2013, Liberia has monitored donor programs’ alignment to its priorities via its New Deal Dashboard. The dashboard exercise revealed that most projects and programs are not designed through the lens of achieving peacebuilding results. Respondents in Liberia offered the example of justice. Building sub-national justice infrastructure does not lead to peacebuilding results. State legitimacy may be better achieved through integrating justice infrastructure, access to justice and community engagement initiatives at the subnational level.

Crisis situations also reveal the importance of involving communities in building legitimacy and government capacity. Government responses to Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were undermined by a lack of trust in the government response. In Liberia, society responded negatively to early use of international military to respond to the outbreak. In Sierra Leone, civil society and customary authorities were ultimately included in coordination task forces because they realized the way in which Ebola was being handled was aggravating conflict and tension at the local level. In Guinea, civil society did not see the response to be inclusive, which aggravated relations.

The New Deal itself cannot create political will or interest in change where there is none on the part of the g7+, international partners or civil society. As g7+ General Secretary Helder da Costa noted, the New Deal has “too often been seen as a technocratic exercise, something that needs to be ‘implemented’ by one or two ministries and their local donors. We need to bring the politics back in. This means building momentum and commitment to change at all levels of society, from the grassroots to the president.”

There are a range of practical opportunities to bring politics back in to the New Deal when actors are on board. First, the launch of the SDGs offers an opportunity to align the SDGs, PSGs and national plans and to instigate national dialogues about priorities that can be enshrined in compacts between state, society and international partners. These processes can be more closely connected with gender-sensitive and political and security initiatives such as national action plans for women, peace and security, dialogue with the UN Peacebuilding Commission where relevant, and regional initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism.

Second, the g7+ has developed a range of tools to empower g7+ actors that can be better utilized. For example, the Fragility Spectrum may be a helpful tool for informing the design and process for doing future fragility assessments. The aim is to reflect the diversity of g7+ contexts (some are in crisis, others are many years along from crisis) by framing potential indicators for each PSG along a spectrum from crisis through to resilience. By presenting potential indicators along a spectrum, this approach can help countries identify and measure change in their strengths over time. It also avoids a standardized approach to measuring and ranking fragile states against uniform indicators. Fragile states themselves have generally objected to such approaches as an external imposition, and have not found them helpful for managing change. As we note below, fragile-to-fragile cooperation initiatives are likely to enjoy uptake over time because actors have relevant experience and empathy for the difficulties of managing assessment and reform in fragile situations.

Third, translating normative commitments to inclusivity into practice will require more southern-owned and led knowledge from civil society, think tanks, institutes, universities and experienced politicians and elders. The IDPS could collectively invest in developing southern-owned and led research and knowledge and research programs that empower actors at the national and subnational level in design of assessments, processes and priorities. Major gaps in knowledge include when and how inclusivity contributes to peacebuilding and statebuilding; deeper practice and experience in how and when gender analysis and mainstreaming and women’s participation contribute to accelerating peacebuilding and statebuilding; under what conditions
different types of arrangements for inclusivity are likely to be conducive to peacebuilding and statebuilding; and southern-owned and led tools that assist national actors to identify what needs to happen and how to strengthen legitimacy and state-society relations at national, subnational, local government and community levels.

Lesson Seven: The New Deal Principles are not a Surrogate for Preventive Diplomacy and Political Dialogue; the g7+ is Growing as a Body that can Assist in this Regard

Crisis situations require a political and flexible response. In these situations, a greater focus on politics and security, and the inclusion of political and security actors, is a must. New Deal experience in South Sudan offers important insights. International engagement in South Sudan from 2005 onwards focused heavily on development processes, especially around building country systems for statebuilding. As one interviewee observed, “The international community handed South Sudan to development actors as a development project, not a political process. This flew in the face of what we know about working in fragile states.”

The primary vehicle for dialogue between government and donors was the oversight mechanism for the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. But this was oriented to the Paris Principles for aid effectiveness and divorced from political engagement. Limited international attention was focused on political and ethnic tensions, and how the use of resources might play into these.

At independence in 2011, a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission (UNMISS) was mandated with assisting South Sudan to extend state authority. Simultaneously, South Sudan signed up to the New Deal. When the New Deal and UNMISS were launched in South Sudan, some observers argue that they contributed to compounding the existing problem by reinforcing the strong focus on statebuilding and aid effectiveness at the expense of identifying the causes of conflict and fragility and measures to resolve them. The g7+ members (from South Sudan and outside) and civil society assisted with an initial fragility assessment, which suggested that conflict could emerge. However, the findings of the assessment were not adopted at the political level. South Sudanese civil society noted that political dialogue structures of the New Deal were premised entirely on improving state/donor relations, not state/society relations. The lack of a politically-led process to agree “what” needed to happen and “how” contributed to growing division between government and opposition, and a flawed international dialogue.

In South Sudan, political dialogue and engagement by political actors was lacking. The New Deal was interpreted wholly as a prescriptive and technical aid effectiveness paradigm by the international community, and the international response did not incorporate “whole of government” approaches through engaging South Sudanese and international actors in political, security and justice spheres, as well as civil society and the advice of the g7+ focal point participants themselves. Two major lessons from South Sudan are that the New Deal cannot be interpreted solely as a technical aid effectiveness framework, and that it must involve the full range of political, security and justice actors to achieve traction. Despite these lessons, the New Deal cannot shoulder responsibility entirely for events in South Sudan. Willingness on the part of South Sudanese leaders to resolve political division, and low levels of engagement by preventive diplomacy and security actors, were key factors leading into the eruption of violence.

The application of the New Deal in Central African Republic (CAR) is a potentially interesting model from which to learn in the future. Violence is prevalent in CAR. Politicians of late have used religious and ethnic identity to strengthen their positions of power, and the result of this turn to ethnocentric politics was witnessed in the aftermath of the March 2013 coup when several influential sectarian paramilitary groups were active – both Seleka and the anti-balaka. CAR also has armed groups that operate in
regions that have strong ties to its neighboring countries. The Lord’s Resistance Army, for example, has been active in the country’s remote southeast since at least 2008. The presence of the government outside of Bangui is not well-established. Toward the end of the Bozizé regime, analysts referred to the government of CAR as a “phantom state.”

CAR’s most immediate needs are to broker political compromise; increase the number of UN forces; secure the territory; advance the restoration of the State authority; increase the volume of humanitarian and development aid in response to humanitarian crisis and economic needs; receive international technical assistance to rebuild the Republican Army; and assistance to the Government to pay salaries regularly. The g7+ (Timor-Leste) is putting in place some of this needed assistance, including a high level delegation to share Timor-Leste’s experience in reconciliation, and has contributed $1 million to the organization of elections in the country.

As elections in 2016 approach, members of the UN and the Security Council are considering whether and what form of compact may be useful with the newly elected authorities of the country. It may be desirable for the IDPS to assist CAR and international actors to conduct a fragility assessment and to draw on the New Deal and IDPS’ experience and lessons to date to assist in crafting a compact.

The g7+ has developed a number of frameworks that may be helpful in these regards. Through the g7+ Fragile-to-fragile Cooperation Framework, the g7+ is emerging as a group that can assist in helping to support political processes. It is based on the premise that g7+ countries can bring more relevant experiences to bear than “traditional donors.” This fact was also emphasized by the UN’s independent review of Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict. The g7+ has been active in CAR and DRC in preventive diplomacy, and Timor-Leste has provided urgent assistance for funding elections in Guinea-Bissau and CAR, involving rapid contributions of $1 million. Box 4.10 highlights the growing role of fragile-to-fragile cooperation in CAR. It is possible that fragile-to-fragile cooperation will become increasingly significant in enabling countries’ transitions from fragility in CAR and beyond. The g7+ may also be well placed to increasingly assist national actors with crises in Burundi, South Sudan and Yemen, among other countries. We return to the need to build the g7+ secretariat and coalition capacity in the final section on conclusions and recommendations.
Lesson Eight: The 2008 Financial Crisis Precipitated Reduced Commitment to Aid Effectiveness and Aid is Under Increasing Pressure from Humanitarian Crises, Which Must Force Urgent New Thinking on Aid Modalities, Aid Tracking and More Effective Use of Resources

The TRUST principles for aid effectiveness were a major reason for the g7+ to participate in developing the New Deal in the first place. Through our review, we find our hypothesis confirmed that a broad-based lack of donor behavior change has been the greatest obstacle to implementing TRUST principles. Several respondents from donor headquarters reported that the political context for aid shifted significantly in the period after the New Deal was launched. The 2008 financial crisis precipitated domestic debate in OECD countries about the case for aid and a stronger focus on reporting on results to sustain the case. Some aid agencies were merged into foreign ministries (such as Australia and Canada) and a wide range of organizations have become more sensitive to risks, especially to the risks of using country systems. Most recently, in its Aid Strategy, the UK committed to phasing out direct budget support, which is a significant shift since the MDG era.82

Figure 4.1 offers an insight into donor investment trends. The 2014 New Deal Monitoring report found that tolerance for risk of using country systems appeared to be level or declining.

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Box 4.10: Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation in Response to Crisis in Central African Republic

The g7+ has made a significant effort to help improve security and support the political process in CAR. At the 2015 Spring Meetings of the World Bank and IMF, a closed-door meeting of high-level representatives from the g7+ and CAR rallied for extraordinary support to CAR. A g7+ delegation visited CAR in February 2015 and held discussions with actors from different parties to the conflict about how the g7+ could assist preparations for Bangui Forum (a reconciliation dialogue involving state and non-state actors). The parties in CAR said that the negotiations were “their last hope for a constructive peaceful reconciliation dialogue.”81 Timor-Leste’s Minister of Planning was asked to lead a further high-level delegation to CAR to share Timor-Leste’s experience in reconciliation, and to aid the peace process in CAR. Timor-Leste announced in late October that it would be donating $1 million to support severely under-funded elections in CAR. The g7+ and CSPPS could also consider assisting the newly elected CAR authorities and civil society to draw on IDPS experience in the framing of a proposed compact for the country.

Source: Alison Burt (2015), Desk Study of the New Deal in Central African Republic, October
Partners in Liberia and Sierra Leone have made important progress on improving aid effectiveness aligned to national peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives, emphasizing the capacity development, transparency, predictability and harmonization necessary to enable the New Deal:

• The Liberia Use of Country Systems Inventory assessed donor alignment to the national planning and budgeting cycle and provided guidance on intermediate steps to increase the use of country systems over time.\(^83\) The New Deal Dashboard monitors donor programs for their relevance and impact on the PSGs.

• The Sierra Leone Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) Dashboard uses indicators to track progress on aid effectiveness from the Paris Principles and Busan, and indicators drawn from the Agenda for Prosperity and the PSGs. Only Sierra Leone and Afghanistan have received concrete commitments from donors on percentages of aid that will be disbursed through national systems.\(^84\) A group of multi-donor budget support partners (MDBS), who provide around 70 per cent of all ODA to Sierra Leone, committed to aligning their strategies with government. They further committed to providing more timely and transparent annual aid reporting through the MAF.\(^85\)

• Similarly, multilateral pool and trust funds have been commonly used as a vehicle to harmonize assistance to government priorities, build country systems, and pool risk for contributors.\(^86\) The Somalia Reconstruction and Development Facility (SDFR) was designed to align donor funds under the Somalia New Deal Compact. The Fund has three financing windows, managed by the World Bank, UN and the AfDB, which fund joint programs and pooled funds. Joint oversight is achieved by the Government and development partners through a High Level Partnership Forum, a Steering Committee and PSG working groups.

Some steps have also been taken to increase risk tolerance and support for building and using country systems as a result of the New Deal. For example, through the review we have identified three main examples of new commitments from traditional donors to build and use country systems directly connected with the New Deal:
• In Timor-Leste, the EU and Australia provide predictable tranches of budget support to the MoF to build public financial management capacity, which is tied to a discrete number of key performance indicators (KPIs).87

• The Liberia Health Sector Pool Fund, and the Ebola Response Trust Fund, which pay health worker salaries.88 The EU also increased budget support to Liberia in response to the state’s financing and capacity development needs.

• The Somalia Special Finance Facility (SFF) and the Somalia Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Facility (SRCRFF). The SFF was established by Norway to provide urgent assistance to the Government. The Facility is a special account on-treasury in the Ministry of Finance. The facility is reimbursed for recurring staff and project costs upon approval of satisfactory receipts and reports. The Facility was short-lived, but it delivered early payoffs in injecting cash for personnel into a fledgling administration, and in demonstrating that risk-tolerant facilities could be managed in Somalia. This resulted in the World Bank contributing on-treasury assistance in 2015 through the new Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Facility.89

In addition, the AfDB Transition Support Facility, the World Bank State and Peacebuilding Fund and the UN Peacebuilding Fund are able to disburse more risk-tolerant, flexible and timely funds for peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives.

Although not directly connected with the New Deal, the EU State Building Contract is also a new risk-tolerant instrument to capitalize governments in crisis or emerging from conflict. The instrument provides budget support for two years or until longer-term successor arrangements can be negotiated. It has been drawn upon in Mali and South Sudan as well as in response to the Arab Spring, and provided a surge in financial assistance to the Liberian state during the Ebola crisis.90

As an ODI report on the use of country systems recently noted, “The political economy of fragile states is unlikely to be conducive to the use of country systems. Donors thus face a trade-off between the fiduciary risk of using country systems and the risk of undermining the state by bypassing country systems.”91 As the OECD’s States of Fragility 2015 noted, tolerance for risk and for using country systems has in great measure been contingent upon high level political will in donor countries. Among the g7+ countries, Afghanistan (through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund - ARTF) and Sierra Leone’s experiences in receiving budget support, for example, were in great measure the results of initial top-level political commitment from national leaders in donor countries. In many contexts, bilateral political appetite for risk is lower. We found that in many contexts during our review, there appears to have been insufficient communication between donors and g7+ governments on steps that might be taken toward building and increasing use of country systems.

Similarly, we find aid predictability to g7+ countries to be a significant risk. Although many countries have committed more aid to fragile states in the SDG era, the allocations may be increasingly driven toward geopolitical priorities. This trend is not new: the OECD found in 2015 that when aid to Afghanistan and Iraq is discounted from total aid flows to fragile states, investment across fragile states is much lower than believed, whereas many g7+ countries continue to be “aid orphans,” including Chad, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Togo.92 However, it is possible that the trend will intensify in the SDG era in response to the UN Security Council’s failure to address an intensification of internationalized conflicts.93

In the European Union, at least some ODA is being diverted in response to emergency refugee needs in Europe, and the UN humanitarian system has reached an all time high of $25 billion in appeals in 2015, from $3 billion at the start of the MDG era.94 Despite this explosion in humanitarian needs and finance, the 2016 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing estimated that
there remains a $15 billion shortfall in funding for global humanitarian needs. Although 2015 ODA statistics were not available at the time of publication, these humanitarian trends are likely to result in short- and long-term financial short-falls in at least some g7+ and other fragile countries. The High Level Panel argued forcefully for greater investment in fragile states, and in peacebuilding and development to shrink humanitarian need in the long term. It also argued for making more coordinated and sustainable use of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding aid to build self-reliance, resilience, country systems and ultimately reduce dependency on humanitarian aid. 95 With the exception of the Somalia Compact, humanitarian actors have, however, been missing from New Deal dialogue and there is a clear imperative to include humanitarian actors in development and peacebuilding planning and implementation.

Compounding the aid challenge, commodity prices are also at a sixteen-year low. If the trend continues, many g7+ countries will be challenged to duplicate the export-led growth models of middle-income countries, particularly because demand for commodities in China is currently declining. 96 Many g7+ countries are dependent on revenues from the extractive industries. A protracted slump in the commodities market may make it more difficult for the g7+ to attract new FDI and to raise domestic resources from extractive industries. FDI to fragile countries is already very low, at 6 per cent of total FDI to developing countries. 97 This problem is exacerbated in the Ebola-affected countries where mining and exports were disrupted. International investors pulled out or declared bankruptcy in Sierra Leone, for instance. Recovery time will be significant. 98

These findings have four main corollaries for the IDPS. First, there is a need for more creativity in applying the TRUST principles. A recent ODI report on building and using Country Systems offers a conceptual basis for making progress. 99 Two main sets of principles from this report might be drawn upon. First, the report clarifies the many ways that donors can make better use of country public financial management systems. Use of country systems is not a binary decision between whether or not to provide budget support. Even when donors are not able or willing to put money ‘on treasury,’ a range of other measures can be taken to use country systems. Table 4.3 outlines the options proposed by the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative:

Table 4.3: Multiple Avenues to Use and Build Country Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On Plan</td>
<td>Aid is integrated into spending agencies’ strategic planning and supporting documentation for policy intentions behind the budget submissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Budget</td>
<td>Aid is integrated into budgeting processes and is reflected in the documentation submitted with the budget to the legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Parliament</td>
<td>Aid is included in the revenue and appropriations approved by parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Treasury</td>
<td>Aid is disbursed into the government’s main revenue funds and is managed through the government’s systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Procurement</td>
<td>Procurement using aid funds follows the government’s standard procurement procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Account</td>
<td>Aid is recorded and accounted for in the government’s accounting system, in line with the government’s classification system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Audit</td>
<td>Aid is audited by the government’s auditing system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Report</td>
<td>Aid is included in ex-post reports by the government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, aid programs can be better designed to enable institutional development and to achieve the results that donors need to justify risks. In lieu of technical assistance and project implementation unit (PIU) modalities, which are largely discredited as means to develop national institutions, ODI’s study recommended that governments and partners design programs that identify where country systems can be used and incorporated into program design. This serves to make risks manageable and acceptable. One such example is the Department for International Development (DFID)’s funding for girls’ education in South Sudan. Direct secondary school capitation grants funded by DFID mirrored the government’s primary school capitation grants, and were reported in the government systems. Schools saw no difference in their reporting requirements on the use of budgets. Similarly, the study recommended identifying “islands of excellence” for using country systems, building the parts of the system that work best rather than requiring blanket standards across the whole system before country systems can be used.101

Second, the UN has proposed that humanitarian, peacebuilding and development assistance can be better integrated for building resilience, reducing humanitarian needs and leaving no-one behind in the SDGs era. The Addis Ababa Financing for Development outcome document commits to spending $300 per capita on social protection and resilience in developing countries in the SDGs era. Filling the gap between ambition and reality will be a significant challenge in g7+ countries. At present, this would constitute 44 per cent of GDP in DRC, 25 per cent of GDP in Guinea, 16 per cent of GDP in South Sudan, 23 per cent of GDP in Togo, and 32 per cent of GDP in Central African Republic.102 Proposed solutions have included to draw upon development, peacebuilding and humanitarian pooled funds and shared multi-year planning, monitoring and evaluation to build resilience;103 to make greater use of aid modalities such as cash transfers that are appearing to deliver high payoffs in building community and household resilience; and to expand the provision of insurance and other social protection measures to prepare communities to withstand the effects of crisis and climate change.104

Third, managing financial risks to the g7+ may require greater efforts by the multilateral system to provide counter-cyclical aid to meet shortfalls for development finance. A range of multilateral and pooled global funds and initiatives are emerging in support of the SDGs and COP 21 agenda that the g7+ has limited capacity to draw upon. The IDPS could advocate to create g7+ windows within existing international initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the G7 CONNEX Initiative on the use of natural resources for poverty reduction, the Least Developed Countries Fund for climate change, and Tax Inspectors without Borders. All of these initiatives are aimed at reducing fragility and developing domestic revenues.105

Fourth, the OECD 2015 States of Fragility report highlighted the need to increase the use of smarter aid modalities that build self-reliance in fragile countries. Pooled funds have been frequently highlighted as a means to achieve greater aid effectiveness. The report also called for ‘beyond ODA’ modalities, such as risk guarantees, which can help to attract FDI to fragile states, and intensified efforts to support domestic revenue generation.106

The INCAF, along with the wider IDPS membership, could develop and test a new package of smart aid instruments and modalities that contribute to helping governments and societies reduce fragility and build self-reliance, and that make more effective long-term use of existing humanitarian, peacebuilding and development resources. Partners could introduce a traffic light system for monitoring innovation against TRUST principles in g7+ countries.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING AND STRUCTURAL OPTIONS

WHAT, IF ANY, HAS BEEN THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING BEEN TO THE ABOVE?

Lesson Nine: The IDPS Does Not Yet Have Sufficient Traction Beyond its Immediate Sphere of Influence

We find that our hypothesis is broadly correct that New Deal implementation is constrained by low levels of awareness and participation of actors outside the IDPS membership. But we also find that the New Deal is constrained by these same factors among the IDPS’ membership too.

At the country level, ownership of the New Deal has not yet reached significantly beyond g7+, INCAF and CSPPS focal points. Low knowledge and awareness of the New Deal and its value added are important factors in explaining its mixed uptake. In all our case studies, respondents beyond the focal points and Ministries of Finance and Planning frequently report that they are aware of peacebuilding and statebuilding and the principles of aid effectiveness, although they usually do not attribute this to the New Deal itself. Less than half of all respondents, and only 15 per cent of respondents in one case, reported awareness of the New Deal or the IDPS. Low levels of whole of government ownership – by the full range of interested ministries, parliamentarians and local government actors – constrained uptake of New Deal principles.

CSPPS focal points were important sources of knowledge and commitment to the New Deal. However, actors outside immediate peacebuilding civil society circles – such as private sector leaders and journalists or community leaders – had generally not heard of the New Deal. This underlines the importance of expanding future understanding and ownership across societies in order for the New Deal to gain traction.

“Lead donors” for the New Deal were not all on board with the concept in countries, suggesting some disconnects between INCAF, the field and perhaps evolving political priorities in capitals since the New Deal was launched. In some instances, lead donors had stepped back from the New Deal either because it was not being driven by national actors or because it was seen as a past exercise. In Somalia, actors had opted instead for a lead donor counterpart to the government in each PSG area and associated working group. This had also produced benefits for including a wider set of relevant international actors beyond development agencies, such as diplomats, political advisers, security and military officials and justice and rule of law experts.

The g7+ focal points were important in sustaining the g7+ and IDPS dialogue and made important contributions in their mandate areas. But they were not all in a position to decide whether and how to implement the New Deal, which requires ministerial-level buy-in.
Where actors are aware of the New Deal, their knowledge of the IDPS is limited. A number of respondents report using the Google search engine as a primary means to find out about the New Deal and the IDPS. They do not report receiving implementation assistance from the IDPS or much awareness of what it is.

In Somalia, actors had not heard of the IDPS at the time of conducting filed research, although the recent visit of IDPS ministers was welcome and built the profile of the IDPS in the country. Similarly, g7+ visits to Somalia, South Sudan, DRC and CAR were reported to have helped to build the political profile and relevance of the New Deal and IDPS.

Figure 4.2 outlines the IDPS’ current structures and working arrangements. The IDPS is co-chaired by rotating Ministers from the g7+ and INCAF. The g7+, INCAF and the CSPPS have their own secretariats, and an IDPS secretariat hosted by the OECD facilitates the co-chairs of the IDPS and the IDPS working groups. An annual Ministerial level meeting is intended to sustain political support for the New Deal. Working groups are intended to drive forward political tracks and implementation.

In addition, the UNDP New Deal Support Facility finances seed support for advisors to work for the g7+ secretariat and national governments, and finances logistical needs. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) supports capacity development of the g7+ secretariat, financed by donors.

Respondents during our research reported a number of weaknesses with the structures. Country level experience to date suggests that the coalitions needed to agree on policies and structures may be different from the coalitions needed to drive forward application of the principles.

As an outward looking structure to influence actors beyond the aid effectiveness community:

A major hurdle with the structure is that it does not involve actors involved in implementation beyond the immediate aid effectiveness constituency that initiated the IDPS and the New Deal. Given that the New Deal has not permeated far beyond New Deal focal points in many g7+, INCAF and CSPPS members, IDPS structures are likely to require greater involvement of a wider range of actors. A first meeting of justice ministers was hosted by Sierra Leone in 2014, and a first meeting of the private sector was hosted in Sierra Leone in 2015. These were important steps toward building whole of government and wider ownership of New Deal principles, and can be built upon going forward through national dialogues with an expanded set of actors. The IDPS can also expand its dialogue to include a wider range of private and public international actors. The absence of the private sector and regional actors, non-traditional donors and rising powers was an important gap in the dialogue.

As an inward looking structure:

Some respondents reported that the IDPS’ structures and interaction were too rigid to enable dynamism in communications and interaction among the membership. Communication and follow-up among stakeholders between meetings was low, and actors reported that it was too difficult to achieve agreement on outputs during meetings because these were held too infrequently and agendas were thus overloaded. There had also been a high turnover among INCAF focal points compared to the relative stability of g7+ counterparts, which had slowed progress. Because interaction was fairly infrequent, some actors reported an over-reliance on consultants to produce outputs, such as guidance and tools, which had diminished the g7+’s ownership and empowerment. This finding was also pertinent to the PSG indicators working group, where respondents argued that the g7+ had not had sufficient
Some respondents also reported confusion about the respective roles, responsibilities and resources of the IDPS constituency secretariats, the IDPS secretariat, the UNDP New Deal Support Facility, and the membership of the IDPS. The support provided was appreciated, but roles and responsibilities and objectives could be further clarified, and the transaction costs of coordination could be reduced.

Many respondents reported favorably on the work of the co-chairs of the IDPS and the Implementation Working Group, which had helped to advanced structures and generate momentum. An important constraint, however, on current structures is that they do not involve the actors involved directly in implementation. Too much of the burden may have therefore been placed on IDPS focal points and the IDPS secretariat. After all, IDPS focal points and the secretariat can only achieve as much as the membership on the ground is able and willing to advance. Repeated consensus is that applying New Deal principles, and the IDPS itself, must...
focus much more on the country level. Building whole of government ownership will require efforts to push dialogue and working groups down to the national level. Many respondents also reported favorably on the use of results-oriented ad hoc and informal virtual groups as a preferred means to make progress in discrete priority areas or to troubleshoot challenges.

Respondents also appreciated the ministerial-level engagement of the IDPS co-chairs, which had driven energy into the IDPS. However, many respondents also noted that the level of wider participation of some members of the INCAF in the IDPS Ministerial level meetings was declining. This sent a weak signal about INCAF’s general commitment to the New Deal beyond a few key actors. Many INCAF respondents reported that the reason for being at the table was to hold dialogue with the g7+. A dynamic dialogue with the g7+ on salient issues would help to re-engage senior leaders.

**STRUCTURAL OPTIONS FOR THE IDPS**

Form must follow function. The IDPS can only make final decisions on structures once it has agreed on its future objectives. Under any scenario, constituency secretariats (g7+, INCAF and CSPPS) need to articulate their time-bound medium-term objectives, plans and priorities for collaboration that reflect a realistic assessment of commitment and available resources.

**There are two main structural options for the future:**

1. Replace the IDPS with a new global forum through the UN, or via multiple fora, such as the African Union, the UN, the G20, the G7, and the World Bank and IMF meetings. The benefit of this option is that the g7+, INCAF and CSPPS constituencies can expand influence outside the aid effectiveness community and contribute to improving international coherence for peacebuilding and statebuilding. The risk is that without the IDPS speaking to common messages, the voices of the g7+ and CSPPS in particular may be “drowned out” by wider geopolitical considerations (chiefly by attention to the middle east, to the refugee crisis and to violent extremism).

2. Update and transform the IDPS for the SDG era. Depending on political appetite among the members, the main opportunities are as follows:

   a. *Expand the international dialogue* to a wider range of middle-income countries, rising powers and international fora, including the G20, the BRICS, MINTs, African Union, UN and neighbors of the g7+, led by the g7+.

   b. *Build upon what is unique about the IDPS’ multi-stakeholder approach and country focus* by inviting civil society and the private sector to co-chair the IDPS, or to co-chair thematic working groups.

   c. *Push implementation down to the country level through national dialogues.* Identify champions to drive forward national dialogue in g7+ countries. Use the opportunity of the launch of the SDGs to pull together a wider group of national actors behind the New Deal principles. National New Deal structures should be designed by country leadership and partners and should be tailored to each context. Promote whole of government and society’s ownership by expanding the network of actors involved in the New Deal principles and implementation to include justice, security, political, humanitarian, social and private sector actors as well as existing IDPS focal points.
d. Be flexible. Create time-bound working groups and virtual groups to tackle specific thematic priorities and troubleshoot challenges.

e. Set time-bound objectives and results for the g7+, INCAF and CSPPS secretariats and the IDPS and conduct regular monitoring and evaluation of the IDPS’ results and lessons learned.

The IDPS secretariat’s location, governance and purpose have become a source of dispute. Its location hosted by the OECD had been perceived by some to blur the boundaries between the priorities of the OECD and the priorities of the wider membership of the IDPS. As noted above, the IDPS’ close association with the OECD has also contributed to political challenges in building influence outside the aid effectiveness community, especially at the UN and among the G77. In addition, some actors have reported expecting the IDPS secretariat to be involved in implementation, while others expected the IDPS secretariat to only provide administrative and technical support to the constituency secretariats.

In 2014, the IDPS developed an options paper for reformed secretariat governance. It considered three options: (i) an autonomous secretariat with no overhead support from the OECD, which would be governed by an MoU and funded by voluntary contributions; (ii) a dedicated secretariat with autonomy but overhead and secretariat services provided by the OECD; and (iii) to split secretariat functions between the g7+, INCAF and CSPPS secretariats, overseen by the annual IDPS global meetings and the IDPS steering group. Stakeholders selected option (ii) as an interim solution, which would be subject to the independent review of the New Deal in 2015.

Decisions on the IDPS secretariat can only follow decisions on the IDPS’ future priorities. However, respondents broadly favored one of three options in the future:

a. Retain a joint IDPS secretariat housed by a recognized ‘aid policy hub’ such as the OECD in Paris or the UN in New York. The advantage of retaining the secretariat in the OECD is that the OECD has capacity to house the secretariat, and it will be more naturally connected with evolving policies on development effectiveness for the SDG era. New York is, frankly, a less desirable time zone in which to work with many g7+ countries, which needs to be taken into serious account. The secretariat should be ring-fenced to avoid confusion with the INCAF secretariat, and appointments should be made by the g7+, INCAF and CSPPS. The secretariat should provide administrative and technical support to the IDPS secretariats and Co-Chairs.

b. Retain a joint IDPS secretariat that serves the IDPS co-chairs and secretariats housed by an alternative organization that aids the extension of the IDPS’ reach outside the aid effectiveness community. Moving the secretariat to the South, potentially to Africa, would be a powerful indication of the IDPS’ commitment to nationally-owned and led plans. It would also promote stronger coherence with other international initiatives, such as those of the African Union, and would enable the majority of the g7+ and CSPPS membership to participate more easily in the dialogue. We also recommend below that the IDPS could re-position itself as a multi-stakeholder partnership for leaving no-one behind on the SDGs under SDG 17 for “Partnership for the Goals.” Moving the secretariat South could assist in this re-positioning. The secretariat should be ring-fenced to sustain independence, and appointments should be made by the g7+, INCAF and CSPPS. The AfDB, UN, World Bank and AU would be potential options to house the secretariat, subject to discussions about feasibility and desirability.
c. Close the IDPS secretariat and divert resources to the g7+, INCAF and CSPPS secretariats to sustain the IDPS. Those who favored this option argued that there are finite resources for the IDPS, which could be put to best use by strengthening the IDPS constituencies’ capacities over the long term. To be feasible, the three secretariats would need to agree on mutual roles, responsibilities and objectives. The value of splitting IDPS secretariat functions across secretariats is that it reflects the nature of the dialogue as a membership-based process. The downside is that it has no unified budget, and relies entirely on all secretariats having sufficient capacity to advance shared priorities. It also risks undercutting joint prioritization and follow-up by the IDPS co-chairs.

In considering the feasibility and desirability of options, stakeholders will need to clarify their expectations and objectives for the IDPS secretariat. We propose below to strengthen the organizational capacities of the g7+ secretariat and coalition for advancing global and regional advocacy, for fragile-to-fragile cooperation and for developing tools to support national actors. We also propose to invest more in southern civil society capacity and southern knowledge development. We have also highlighted above that the IDPS secretariat cannot reasonably be expected to implement the New Deal, which is the responsibility of the IDPS membership. Given finite resources and the need to generate momentum from the ground up, we propose to slim down the role of the IDPS secretariat to providing technical and logistical support to the constituencies of the IDPS. We also propose scaling up the role and investment in southern capacity of the g7+ and southern actors. The resources, procurement, logistical and security and travel capacities, research and knowledge capacities, and flexibility and location of the host organization should all be taken into account in this regard when deciding on location for the secretariat.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

WHAT HAVE THE MAIN GAPS AND WEAKNESSES BEEN WITH THE NEW DEAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE?
HOW COULD BOTH CHANGE TO GIVE A RENEWED BOOST TO THE NEW DEAL AND MAKE IT RELEVANT TO RECURRENT AND EMERGING CRISSES AND NEW FORMS OF FRAGILITY?

If the New Deal did not already exist, it would need to be invented. The SDGs constitute international agreement on “what” should be achieved at the universal level. The New Deal offers a set of partnership principles for leaving no-one behind in the SDGs under the pledge of SDG 17 “Partnership for the Goals.”

If fragile countries can make headway on building peace, institutions, resilience and delivering services and growth as envisaged in the SDGs, the number of people in absolute poverty could be reduced from 1.5 billion now to 350 million by 2030. This historic advance against fragility and poverty will require accelerating the pace of institutional development by 2020.108

The SDGs also commit to an economic, social, environmental and people-centered development agenda that aspires to leave no-one behind in any country, placing a heavy emphasis on inclusivity, equality and empowerment as fundamental elements of development and resilience. Many countries will experience rapid changes in the next 15 years. A growth in the youth population,
urbanization, women’s education and empowerment, economic growth and faster uptake of new energy, communications and other technologies will offer new opportunities for harnessing change for peace, resilience and poverty eradication.

But these processes also bring new pressures on institutions to be inclusive and effective. Countries with weaker institutions will find it harder to manage the effects of natural disasters and potentially of climate change, not least the Pacific island members of the g7+. Harnessing opportunities and managing risks will require national ownership of efforts to address fragility and its causes. Retreat from the New Deal principles, and the challenges now highlighted by it, should be inconceivable. However, significant efforts will be needed to increase the New Deal’s traction and relevance in the SDGs era.

**As an alliance, the g7+ group of countries in fragile, conflict-affected and transition situations has the opportunity to make a unique contribution to the sustainable development agenda as a leading coalition for leaving no-one behind.** National leadership and ownership of policies and plans must be respected. Implementation of the New Deal so far has not been easy, reflecting a need for political leaders to recommit to its principles, especially to political processes that bind all relevant governmental, civil society, private sector and international actors into a shared vision for “what” needs to be achieved and “how” at the national level. The leading role played by the President in Somalia, the statements about the New Deal made by Sierra Leone’s President and the Minister of Finance to Parliament, and Liberia’s President and Minister of Finance have all, for example, built national momentum. The g7+ fragility spectrum and the g7+ fragile-to-fragile cooperation framework may prove increasingly influential in helping actors to design processes, and should be supported.

**International partners could do much more to deliver their side of the New Deal bargain.** The g7+ needs coherent, predictable and timely assistance to develop national capacities and fill finance gaps. Yet the fragmentation of aid and development partners across the SDGs, and growing pressures on humanitarian aid, could make matters worse in the SDGs era. All international governmental and private sector partners are needed to rally to the institutional development priorities of the g7+, making more effective use of limited resources and smarter aid measures to help build resilience and institutions.

**The IDPS needs to involve a wider range of regional and international public and private actors to improve international coherence.** Fragility is increasingly recognized as a universal phenomenon through the SDGs framework, the OECD and the 2016 *High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing*, and work is underway to define, monitor, reduce and prevent fragility on a universal level via the OECD and the UN humanitarian system, as well as through the UN’s negotiations on measures to sustain peace on the universal level. The IDPS could be more clearly situated within the global architecture. The IDPS makes a crucial contribution to universal aspirations through its multi-stakeholder and country-focused partnership approach to leaving no-one behind. On this basis, the IDPS could engage with a wider range of middle-income countries, non-traditional donors, rising powers, regional organizations, neighboring countries to the g7+ and the private sector to galvanize partnerships.

**This is why partners should commit to a new deal for the New Deal**, and a Ministerial Compact that recognizes the urgency of re-engaging on New Deal principles for achieving the SDGs. The Compact should provide the basis for a new SDGs generation of strategy, planning, programming and monitoring, as well as global and regional partnerships and advocacy. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding could re-position itself as a multi-stakeholder and country-focused partnership for leaving no-one behind on the SDGs under the UN pledge of SDG 17 to “Partnerships for the SDGs.” This would constitute a major partnership platform that contributes to achievement of the SDGs, and to sustaining the peace on a universal level.
The following specific recommendations are proposed to the members of the IDPS. Constituency secretariats (g7+, INCAF and CSPPS) would need to articulate their time-bound medium-term objectives and plans and priorities for collaboration that reflect a realistic assessment of available resources:

1. **Strengthen operational effectiveness and political relevance.**

The SDGs and UN commitments to sustaining the peace and to development are universal. The IDPS makes a crucial contribution to these aspirations through its multi-stakeholder and country-focused approach. The IDPS could re-position and re-communicate itself within the global architecture as a multi-stakeholder and country-focused partnership for leaving no-one behind on the SDGs under the pledge of SDG 17 for “Partnerships for the Goals.”

The g7+ could commit to leading an expanded dialogue with international actors under SDG 17. It will be crucial for the g7+ to engage with the UN, neighboring countries, the G20, the African Union, BRICS and MINTs and middle-income countries.

The g7+ could make a political commitment to aligning the SDGs, the PSGs and national plans through nationally-owned and led processes to identify “what” needs to happen and “how”. The g7+ are already agreeing on a common set of SDG goals and targets against which to measure collective progress. The g7+ could take the opportunity of the launch of the SDGs to convene national dialogues on priorities.

All partners could commit to using compacts as the means to advance mutual accountability among states, society and partners for priority results in the SDG era, and to mutual accountable for results and monitoring and evaluating operational impact at the country level.

IDPS actors can decide whether to focus resources and attention in a few or all g7+ countries in the medium-term. On this basis, the IDPS can develop mutually accountable results and a method for monitoring and evaluating operational impact. Skeptics will only be persuaded by the New Deal if they can understand its impact.

2. **Make better use of resources**

National capacities and current pressures on ODA and on commodities markets risk constraining SDG ambitions. The g7+, the OECD 2015 States of Fragility Report and the 2016 UN High Level Panel Report on Humanitarian Financing have all stated that it will be imperative for the international community to increase the overall proportion of funding to fragile situations. This increase should be combined with making better collective use of all humanitarian, development and peacebuilding resources to build national capacities and institutions, and to shrink humanitarian needs and generate foreign direct investment and domestic revenues over the long-term.

INCAF could commit to increasing the proportion of aid to fragile situations, and to introducing smarter aid modalities that assist countries to build institutions and resilience, and to raise domestic revenues and private investment. Partners could institute a traffic light system to measure innovation. For example, they could:
• institute a formal system for tracking annual SDG and PSG aid allocations;

• commit to aligning development, humanitarian and peacebuilding finance through compacts and pooled funds;

• introduce smarter aid modalities that are underutilized in fragile states such as risk guarantees, equity investments, and Islamic finance modalities, and support for domestic resource mobilization;

• create g7+ windows in multilateral funds, such as the Least Developed Country Fund for Climate Change or the CONNEX initiative for natural resources management, to leverage new finances into g7+ countries because they have the least capacity to draw on these mechanisms.

3. Strengthen southern capacity and knowledge

Commit to a plan to build the capacities of the g7+ secretariat and coalition to advance fragile-to-fragile cooperation, and south-south and multilateral partnerships and advocacy. The g7+ secretariat has advanced work on the “do no harm” principle, on natural resources management, on fragile-to-fragile cooperation, and a fragility spectrum for guiding and measuring change towards resilience. The g7+ are also working with the African Union to incorporate PSGs indicators into Africa-wide monitoring of the SDGs and the Agenda 2063 of the African Union. The g7+ could develop plans for scaling up capacities and initiatives over the medium to long term, and associated resource requirements. Medium-term focus areas could include building whole of government and society’s awareness and buy-in to the New Deal; conducting outreach and dialogue with a wider range of partners; supporting national fragility assessments and prioritization exercises; monitoring progress against SDG goals and targets; and building personnel, logistical and communications capacities of the g7+. The g7+ have a charter to draw upon to identify potential common resources and support may be required from the wider IDPS membership.

Commit to a plan to strengthen the capacities of southern civil society organizations, think tanks, research institutes and universities to generate knowledge that contributes to building peaceful societies. Advance understanding and knowledge on when and how inclusivity advances peaceful societies. Successive actors have called for greater knowledge generation in the South, that is tailored to the needs of the South, and that avoids some of the inherent cultural and political bias in Western knowledge organizations.109

The CSPPS, and southern civil society more widely, has contributed to international understanding of the links between peacebuilding and development, and to the SDGs negotiations and implementation debate. Civil society can now commit to a plan to develop southern civil society capacities to contribute to building peaceful societies, and to continue to advocate for the New Deal principles and whole of government and society approaches at the national and subnational levels.

4. Improve organizational and coalition impact.

The New Deal principles are comprehensive but technical, and have been perceived to be OECD donor-dominated. Reconsider the communications and “branding” of the g7+ and the New Deal toward a partnership for leaving no-one behind in the SDGs under the pledge of SDG 17 to “partnerships for the goals”. Boil the New Deal down to a few essential political messages for a wide audience: actors interested in the SDGs and in sustaining the peace. Expand the international dialogue to a wider range of middle-income countries, rising powers and international fora, including the G20, the BRICS, MINTs, African Union, UN and neighbors of the g7+, led by the g7+.
Push implementation down to the country level through national dialogues. Identify champions to drive forward national dialogue. Promote whole of government and society’s ownership by expanding the network of actors involved. National actors should design and lead structures to drive forward awareness and implementation with partners. g7+ national leaders could be asked to lead a process to design national structures which are tailored to each context. It is possible that g7+ members will advance at different paces depending on the context. Many of the countries studied in this review could be well placed to advance structures and dialogue now. Countries currently in crisis, such as Burundi, may require different assistance from the IDPS, such as support through preventive diplomacy, until conditions change.

Build upon what is unique about the IDPS’ multi-stakeholder approach and country focus by inviting civil society and the private sector to co-chair thematic working groups of the IDPS. Build partnerships through the World Economic Forum or UN Global Compact.

Be flexible. Create time-bound working groups and virtual groups to troubleshoot specific challenges and thematic priorities.

Set time-bound objectives and results for the g7+, INCAF, CSPPS secretariats and the IDPS, and conduct annual monitoring and evaluation. Transform the IDPS Secretariat. The IDPS secretariat should provide logistical and administrative support to the IDPS. However, the g7+ should take increasing responsibility for leading the development of policies and guidance and international collaboration, in the spirit in which the New Deal was always intended.
ENDNOTES


11 World Bank WDR 2011, Ibid.

12 Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock (2004), Ibid.

13 Fearon 2010 for WDR 2011 Ibid.

14 Summarized from da Costa, Helder, g7+ Secretary General, “New Deal needs time and political commitment to flourish”, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/apr/07/new-deal-for-fragile-states-needs-time-political-commitment,


16 g7+ Dili declaration, April 2010: http://www.g7plus.org/sites/default/files/basic-page-downloads/Dili-Declaration.pdf,

17 OECD (2011), ‘2011 Report on International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t we Do Better?”, available at http://www.fsprinciples.org. The Ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations are: (1) Take context as the starting point and drop externally-driven blueprints; (2) Do no harm to the
prospects for conflict resolution and rebuilding institutions; (3) Focus on statebuilding as the central objective; (4) Prioritize conflict prevention; (5) Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives and promote joint strategies; (6) Promote non-discrimination as the basis for stable and inclusive societies; (7) Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts; (8) Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors that reduce government transaction costs; (9) Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; and (10) Avoid pockets of exclusion.


18Interview with IDPS respondent, January 2016.

19The IDPS’ assistance is provided through support to ODI to support the g7+ secretariat, the UNDP New Deal Support Facility and the IDPS secretariat. Conducting evaluations of projects and programs was beyond the scope of this review.

20Including the 2005 UN World Summit, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the IDPS, and the World Bank 2011 World Development Report,


24g7+, “Financing for Development – g7+ information note”, available at: http://www.g7plus.org/en/resources/financing-development-g7+information-note,

25For a brief analysis of framing peace during the FFD negotiations, see QUNO and NYU CIC informal stakeholder meeting summary, “Funding for Peace: Lessons Learned”, June 2015, available at: http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/quno_cic_ffd_meeting_note_final_june_2_2015.pdf,

26IDPS statement (2015), “Countries reach historic agreement to generate financing for new sustainable development agenda”


28For example, see for a comparison of the approaches of development and UN actors, Ashraf Ghani and Lockhart, Clare (2008) Fixing Failed States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

29Slotin and Elgin-Cossart (2013), Ibid.


32Interview with DFID, October 2015


35The UNDP “New Deal Support Facility” has managed a total of US $7 million, and is supported by INCAF members including Australia, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The UN Peacebuilding Fund Application Guidelines are available at: http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/introduction/;

36Findings drawn from Kars de Bruijne and Clionadh Raleigh, Case Study of the New Deal in Sierra Leone, October 2015,


38Quoted from Sagal Abshir, Case Study on Somalia for the IDPS, 2015.


40Quoted from, Francois Lenfant, Case Study on Mali for the IDPS, 2015.

41Lenfant, Ibid.

Francois Lenfant (2015), Case Study on Mali for the IDPS.


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*g7+ Note on the Fragility Spectrum, Available at: http://www.g7plus.org/sites/default/files/resources/g7%20English%20FS%20Note%20Design.pdf.*


*Interview with international official.*

*Interviews with g7+ and civil society focal points.*


Congressional Reporting Services, 2015, p. 6.

79 Available at: http://civcapreview.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CteGrhj1XFs=.
81 Diasmer Bloe (2015), *ibid*.
84 Cameron Reid (2016), *ibid*.
85 Diasmer Bloe (2015), *ibid*.
86 Sagal Abshir (2015), *ibid*.
87 OECD (2015) *ibid*.
88 Tom Hart et al (2015), *ibid*.
89 Diasmer Bloe (2015), *ibid*.
90 Sagal Abshir (2015), *ibid*.
91 OECD (2015) *ibid*.
92 Tom Hart et al (2015), *ibid*.
97 We are grateful to Lisa Denney, ODI, for this observation.
100 Diasmer Bloe (2015), *ibid*.
104 We are grateful to Marcus Manuel, ODI, for these suggestions.
105 NYU CIC (2015) *ibid*.
106 This attribution challenge was also highlighted by Hughes et al (2014), Hingorani (2015), McCandless (2013), Wall and Fairhurst (2014).
107 We are grateful to Marcus Manuel, ODI, for these suggestions.
ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE REVIEW

TAKING THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEXT LEVEL: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NEW DEAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING

1. BACKGROUND

Development effectiveness in fragile states has been a concern of national and international partners for a long time. One important reason was the recognition that despite some progress, most Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) had persistently been off track regarding meeting the MDGs. Several initiatives were developed to address obstacles to effective engagement in such contexts. These included the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (Fragile States Principles), adopted in 2007, which OECD-DAC members committed to follow when engaging in fragile states.

While comprehensive, aimed at promoting “whole-of-government” approaches by development partners and based on the best knowledge and experience available at the time, the Fragile States Principles were not the result of a jointly-owned effort with concerned partner countries. At the 3rd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana in 2008, a number of fragile states called for a dialogue in which they could have an equal voice with development partners in establishing peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (the International Dialogue) was thus created in 2008, comprising a group of fragile states (later adopting the name “g7+”), civil society representatives and development partners. The g7+ was given a mandate to develop a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives and an action plan for effective engagement in fragile states.

Under the leadership of the g7+ and through a consultative process that included fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners and civil society organizations, priorities were identified for addressing impediments to effective cooperation in fragile states. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the result of this process, was launched at the 4th High Level Forum in Busan, Korea in 2011. Since then, the New Deal has received strong support. Over 40 countries and organizations signed up and committed to its implementation, including the UN Development Group following the strong encouragement by the UN Secretary-General. This was particularly important in broadening the ownership of the New Deal beyond OECD donors and recipient countries.

Through the New Deal, development partners committed themselves to supporting country-owned, country-led transitions out of fragility, upholding and adopting aid effectiveness in fragile states as a way of channeling aid (TRUST). Fragile states governments in turn committed themselves to consultative, inclusive planning processes which were contextually defined (FOCUS). Both parties committed themselves to pursuing five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals (PSGs) as interim objectives to guide development efforts in countries affected by conflict and fragility:

1. **Inclusive Politics** - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;

2. **Security** - Establish and strengthen people’s security;

3. **Justice** - Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice;
4. Economic Foundations - Generate employment and improve livelihoods; and

5. Revenues and Services - Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

Together, all members of the International Dialogue (development partners, g7+ governments and civil society organizations) agreed to a set of indicators for measuring progress on the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.

Since its launch, the New Deal has been implemented in seven pilot countries and has been used to guide international and national efforts to improve cooperation in fragile contexts. A New Deal Monitoring Report was concluded in 2014, based on a survey of g7+ countries and INCAF donor agencies, focusing in particular on the FOCUS and TRUST principles. This report found that the results of New Deal implementation so far have been mixed.

The report calls for three improvements:

1) Orienting political dialogue, country plans and implementation modalities toward the PSGs;

2) Agreeing on a few desired results for building core national capacities for the immediate and short term; and

3) Linking desired results to new approaches for identifying and managing risk jointly on the ground.

The report also emphasizes the need to integrate the New Deal into peacebuilding processes at the early stages; to plan for peace before the conflict ends; to build the PSGs into peace agreements, giving sufficient attention to PSG 1 (Legitimate Politics) in the immediate post-conflict period; clear prioritization of post-conflict interventions; and stronger co-operation with non-State actors who have been undertaking vital support roles during the conflict.

The conclusions of the New Deal Monitoring Report have been endorsed by all members of the International Dialogue. The report provides evidence that the Dialogue has been able to collectively monitor progress on New Deal implementation and come up with a potentially powerful tool for potentially holding members to account.

The International Dialogue crafted and then championed the New Deal until it was finally endorsed in Busan. The New Deal document itself explicitly recognized the role of the Dialogue in supporting members to implement, monitor and report on the delivery of their commitments. Yet transforming itself from an advocacy platform into one that supports and monitors implementation has been challenging for the International Dialogue. Between 2012 and 2014, the Dialogue commissioned two member-led reviews. The goals were to rethink its ambition, mandate, governance structure and working arrangements. The reviews concluded that a balance needed to be struck between the Dialogue as a global forum for mutual accountability and standard setting, and the Dialogue as a vehicle for supporting country-level New Deal implementation.

This review will explore these issues in some depth. It will examine in particular how the Dialogue’s own ways of working and internal challenges have shaped progress on New Deal implementation, identified in the observations of the New Deal Monitoring report, and identify how the Dialogue and New Deal might be adapted to take fuller account of the broader changes which have taken place in their institutional operating environments.
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REVIEW

With the New Deal coming to the end of its trial period in pilot countries and the International Dialogue soon coming to the end of its mandate period, 2015 was a year of reflection and assessment to take stock of what was achieved, as well as how to take the New Deal agenda forward, including the role performed by International Dialogue as a forum.

3. OBJECTIVES

The Review has four main objectives:

1. To identify and analyze how the New Deal has shaped global ideas, norms, policy and practice guidance about how to engage in fragile and conflict affected environments and support transitions out of conflict and fragility (Normative environment).

2. To identify and analyze how far the New Deal framework for peacebuilding and statebuilding has been implemented at a country level in pilot countries, and how the New Deal principles more broadly speaking have shaped development practice, government and civil society action in both New Deal pilot and non-pilot countries (New Deal implementation).

3. To assess the relative contribution of the International Dialogue to the above, and identify its strengths and weaknesses in shaping global policy thinking and donor and government practice at a country level (International Dialogue).

4. To identify obstacles to progress, distill lessons learned, and make recommendations about what is needed to take the New Deal to the next level as a global practice standard for engagement in fragile states (Recommendations).

The objectives are listed in order of priority and cover both the New Deal and the Dialogue. Two thirds of the Review will be devoted to looking back and charting the past impact of the New Deal in terms of spearheading new ways of working among development partners and country governments. One third will be spent looking forward and recommending the design of new structures and frameworks to take the New Deal to the next level in the post-2015 context.

4. SCOPE OF THE WORK (HOW THE OBJECTIVES WILL BE ACHIEVED)

The Review should first provide a clear account of what the New Deal and Dialogue have achieved so far. The conclusions of the New Deal Monitoring Report (2014), universally endorsed by the three constituencies of the International Dialogue, provide a useful starting point. But the Review will add an additional focus by examining support for the achievement of the PSGs. Unlike the Monitoring report, this Review will also look at the extent to which the New Deal has shaped the normative environment and influenced strategies and approaches to engagement in FCAS. This will mean looking at the New Deal beyond its implementation as a template of tools. Second, the review will look at the contribution of the International Dialogue, notably the results of its outputs and its working practices. Third, it will identify where blockages lie, and suggest changes to the New Deal and to the International Dialogue to make them both fit for the purpose of inducing radical shifts in the way development partners and FCAS governments address peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges.
i. Normative Environment

This section will analyze and describe the extent to which the New Deal has made an impact at the global level in shaping norms and ideas about how to engage in fragile and conflict-affected environments and how to promote peacebuilding and statebuilding. It will explore the current narratives in the areas listed below, ascertain where progress has been made, and identify where challenges remain. This section of the Review will look in particular at the New Deal’s influence in shaping the post-2015 discussions, the multilateral peacebuilding architecture, global approaches to crisis (conflict resurgence) and shocks (e.g., epidemics such as the Ebola outbreak, which killed some 9,000 people in three g7+ countries).

ii. New Deal implementation at country level: from template to integrated, tailor-made approaches

Given the centrality of the FOCUS, TRUST and PSGs to the founding principles of the International Dialogue, the Review will assess progress on all three pillars. It will not duplicate, but will draw heavily on and complement the findings of the New Deal Monitoring Report of 2014 through focusing more squarely on support to and implementation of the PSGs and updating the data to include more recent experience. It will similarly identify where there continue to be gaps and make recommendations about how these might be overcome. The current New Deal Monitoring Report only includes data up to 2013-14. This review will update the findings with respect to the TRUST and FOCUS principles. In updating the 2014 NDMR, it will assess whether the inclusion of data from 2015 makes any difference to the overall findings.

This will mean assessing the extent to which the FOCUS principles have made an impact in planning and consultation processes at country level in g7+ countries and at global level. This will also include documenting any changes perceptible in the content of planning documents and planning processes in partner countries (ministry of finance, other line ministries), as well as local government agencies/decentralized authorities that appear to reflect the influence of the New Deal. It will assess the relevance of the FOCUS principles and quality of country ownership by asking questions about who is involved in formulating and implementing priorities both in government and outside of government; and about how Fragility Assessments, Compacts and One Vision/One plan are conducted and linked. The Review will explore whether civil society and marginalized groups are involved (i.e., how has inclusivity been championed/supported).

PSGs

While the PSGs will be a focus of the Review, this will not be an assessment of progress in achieving the PSGs themselves at country level. Given what evidence tells us about the long timeframes needed to transform institutions, the short timeframe of the Review (2011/12-2015) does not allow for any assessment of impact at this stage. The Review will look instead at the extent to which the PSGs feature in funding instruments and practices, and the extent to which g7+ governments are referencing the PSGs in their national planning and monitoring frameworks.
Crisis Situations

Variations across countries – particularly where progress in implementation has stopped and restarted, or stopped altogether – will need to be highlighted with an assessment of their consequences, particularly of more loose and more rigid interpretations of New Deal implementation (and especially in crisis situations). The effects of shocks like Ebola or conflict relapse (South Sudan, CAR) on New Deal implementation will be examined as part of the country case studies.

What difference has a template-based approach made?

The Review will look at the added value of the New Deal in improving on past best practice approaches in fragile and conflict-affected situations. In this section, the contractor will look beyond the extent to which the New Deal has been implemented to the letter (a ‘box-ticking approach’). It will instead examine the extent to which the existence of the New Deal has actually enabled development partners and g7+ and other FCAS country governments to improve upon the delivery of core New Deal principles, arguably originally in the Fragile States Principles (2007, http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates/fragilestatesprinciples/principle1.htm). The aim is to capture the extent to which these core principles (taking politics/context as starting point, inclusivity, building effective institutions and sound state/citizen relations, basic aid effectiveness) have more generally shaped government and donor practices at a country level since the existence of the New Deal.

iii. International Dialogue

This section will look at the International Dialogue’s overall output, working practices and arrangements in order to ascertain whether they have served as an effective support mechanism for the implementation of the New Deal in the different contexts of the g7+ pilot countries, as well as for global advocacy and standard/practice setting. In terms of output, it will examine to what extent the production of knowledge products and guidance tools have served to shape the global agenda and New Deal implementation in g7+ pilot countries. It will also look at other International Dialogue-inspired forms of ‘engagement’ to assess their impact on New Deal implementation, including “high level visits” by the OECD DAC Chair, in conjunction with g7+/Dialogue co-chairs.

It will then look at the operating practices/ways of working of the Dialogue (governance structures, statutory meeting arrangements, working groups, working relationships between each of its member constituencies and secretariats, and the role of the Dialogue secretariat) and the extent to which these have helped shape global standards and country-level implementation. In this regard, a key question will be the role played by the Dialogue in enabling the New Deal to remain a ‘relevant’ framework for response to recurrent (CAR, South Sudan) and emerging crises (outside g7+ countries, rising violence, repercussions of Arab Spring) and shocks (Ebola virus outbreak).

iv. Recommendations for Taking the New Deal to the Next Level

This section will identify blockages to progress in all three areas, and put forward recommendations for New Deal and International Dialogue actual and potential stakeholders about how to overcome these blockages and move forward a more effective and reinvigorated New Deal. This year the MDGs will give way to a universal framework based on the Sustainable Development Goals,
yet to be agreed upon. At the same time, two major UN reviews took place in 2015. Both are likely to shape the context in which the New Deal Review is received. The UN review of Peace Operations was undertaken by the High Level Independent Panel (HLP), and a review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) was undertaken by the Advisory Group of Experts. This Review’s recommendations will take account of the results of these processes. It will show how the lessons of the New Deal and the International Dialogue can best feed into the post-2015 development framework. It will also examine the overall re-thinking of the international peacebuilding architecture which both the New Deal and the International Dialogue aimed to shape.

5. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A Learning Process

The Review is principally a reflection on lessons learned, rather than an evaluation. It aims to identify what has worked well and what has not worked so well. Yet two key OECD-DAC evaluation criteria – ‘effectiveness’ and ‘relevance’ – will guide it. In terms of effectiveness, the Review will assess the extent to which the Dialogue and New Deal have achieved their objectives since the endorsement of the New Deal in 2011, whether these objectives are likely to be achieved, and what the major factors are in influencing achievement. In terms of relevance, the review will look at the extent to which the New Deal and Dialogue continue to be aligned with the priorities of all three constituencies, and of the principal stakeholders of fragile and conflict affected countries (adapted from The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD (1991).

Learning from other Post Busan Monitoring/Assessment Initiatives

While the New Deal has its roots in processes that long predated Busan, the questions this review is asking – about the extent to which the basic aid effectiveness principles enshrined in the Busan agreement have been effectively implemented – are precisely the same questions that other parallel initiatives which grew out Busan are asking themselves. These initiatives include the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation, the Effective Institutions Platform, and International Health Partnership plus. Several Busan initiatives have or will have conducted a variety of similar monitoring exercises to assess progress. The contractor will be expected to build on International Dialogue Secretariat engagement with these processes, and the networks established, to develop useful methodological approaches for data collection, particularly where the scope exists for thematic and geographic synergies (e.g. work on the same countries and same themes). The contractor will be expected (with ID secretariat support) to engage directly with individuals and processes associated with the above, to draw out shared lessons (for example, on the use of country systems and capacity building, public and private dialogues), and feed the results into the overall conclusions and recommendations.

This Review will draw on the general lessons and results of the monitoring exercises undertaken by these initiatives, particularly in New Deal pilot countries. The aim is to enhance the observations of the Review, particularly with respect to the TRUST principles. Where necessary, the International Dialogue Secretariat can facilitate this learning process between the Global Partnership, Effective Institutions platform and International Health Partnership.
Analytical AND Forward-Looking Recommendations

One-third of the Review will be spent analyzing the current state of the New Deal and International Dialogue at global and country levels AND providing a set of forward-looking proposals which map out what the New Deal and the Dialogue could look like in the future. The review should analyze over time what differences the New Deal and the Dialogue have made, and also provide recommendations for how both can be improved/changed/restructured. Analysis and recommendations should be both general and specific to countries. The Review should examine progress and gaps in New Deal implementation relative to country specific situations and make country-specific recommendations about tracking progress with clear targets and timelines.

The Review will take full account of other significant evaluation processes and events (see above), which are likely to shape the development cooperation and peacebuilding and statebuilding landscape. By the time the review is completed, the post-2015 discussions will have given birth to an SDG framework in which a goal on peaceful and inclusive societies may have been secured. By that time, the UN Financing for Development conference in Addis will have paved the way for new commitments likely to impact directly or indirectly on the g7+ constituencies of fragile states. In addition, the UN will have concluded two broader major reviews on its Peacebuilding Architecture and Peace operations. The Security Council will also have conducted a High Level Review, with in-country consultations, of its Resolution 1325, to eliminate all forms for violence against women. In West Africa, the agenda for post-Ebola recovery in the three affected countries will have been mapped out. The Review report will need to adapt and tailor is recommendations for ways forward, to speak to the results of these global processes and ensure maximum traction.

Data Sources

The Review should involve the triangulation of information/data derived from three main sources (literature review, key informants and case study-based field work) with the purpose of providing answers to the four key questions:

1. What impact has the New Deal had so far in shaping global norms and ideas about how to engage in FCAS and, more generally, about peacebuilding and statebuilding?

2. Has the New Deal changed the ways development partners and fragile states governments are doing business, and what difference (if any) is this beginning to make in addressing conflict and fragility issues in these contexts?

3. What has the contribution of the International Dialogue been to the above, if any?

4. What have the main gaps and weaknesses been with the New Deal and Dialogue, and how could both change to give a renewed boost to the New Deal and make it relevant to recurrent and emerging crises and new forms of fragility?

Desk Review and Inception Report

The Review will begin with an examination of externally-generated literature on the New Deal and a review of internal (ID Secretariat generated, INCAF Secretariat and INCAF member generated) documentation: policy framework and OECD-DAC peer reviews, the INCAF stocktaking exercise/political strategy, and other externally commissioned reports (from research institutions, think tanks, NGOs). The Review will also engage with ongoing research processes, particularly about the New Deal or related peacebuilding/
statebuilding reviews (e.g., UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review, Peacekeeping Review, ODI PSG studies, and ODI New Deal case study pilot country studies). The inception report submitted should include detailed indications of the methodological approach and the sources to be consulted, with timelines.

**Place of the New Deal Monitoring Report**

The New Deal Monitoring Report 2014 will be used to gather information, as well as the sources referred to above. In addition, the methodology used to develop the report (survey of INCAF donors and g7+ country survey) will be used to update the report for 2015. The methodology will be adapted in light of recommendations made by the International Dialogue Steering Group and Implementation Working Group meetings in October 2014. This will enable more qualitative and participatory country case study-based approaches, which allow for more inclusion of multiple stakeholder voices in g7+ countries (see Summary Record of IWG meeting, and ID Steering Group meeting, October 2014).

**Key Informant Interviews**

A range of key informants will need to be identified and interviewed by the contractor. These will include a focus specifically on the Dialogue, its secretariat, its membership and governance structure past and present, and a targeting of influential Dialogue members who have championed the New Deal in the past and present. The potential contractor will be expected to outline a methodology for identifying key informants, which ensures the widest possible consultation and integration of a variety of perspectives, from New Deal initiates/champions and others. A potential contractor would be expected to provide a structured categorization of key informants accompanied by a rationale, which reflects a grasp of the complexities of the Dialogue’s organizational structure, the manner in which it has evolved over time, and the separate but related question of New Deal implementation.

Snowballing techniques, semi-structured questionnaires and more general qualitative research methods should be privileged, but in ways that allow for comparability of results/responses. Key informants could include members of each of the three International Dialogue constituencies: donors, g7+ country governments and civil society organizations (New Deal focal points and non-focal points for all three). Additionally, informants could include academics/think tanks with experience/involvement in New Deal implementation/influential policy analysis, past and present, and with relevant expertise on humanitarian issues, gender and conflict sensitivity. The International Dialogue Secretariat and Dialogue networks will guide and facilitate access to potential interviewees, both at headquarters and country level.

Qualitative interviews with the International Dialogue steering group and wider International Dialogue membership should seek to gather member views on achievements of the Dialogue, suggestions for improvements, and how the Dialogue and New Deal must adapt to the post-2015 Sustainable Development agenda context. Interviews should also analyze the International Dialogue as a whole and as a sum of its different parts (donors, g7+ countries, and civil society), and how they work together. This should include the Governance structure (co-chairs and three secretariats); the Steering Group; the working groups (new and former, reference groups) and their output (e.g., guidance notes, global advocacy e.g. on post 2015) and institutional procedures (meetings).
Case Studies and Field Work

Country case studies on all the New Deal pilot countries (Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste), one non-pilot g7+ country (Somalia) and one non g7+ country (tbc) will be carried out. This will not necessarily mean that consultants will conduct field work in each country. Five countries (DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Timor-Leste) will be the subject of “deep dive” field research, with secondary documentation and parallel consultations via Dialogue processes used to build up a picture of New Deal implementation in those countries where field research will not be conducted (South Sudan, CAR, Afghanistan). Where field visits are conducted, consultants will be expected to conduct consultations outside the capital cities, and consult with a variety of stakeholders, including civil society actors, both within and outside the New Deal focal point networks. As part of the financial offer, the contractor will be expected to advance a feasible breakdown of costing of the field work proposal.

The New Deal Monitoring Report will be used to provide important information which will feed into the country case studies and other sources cited in the “desk review/Inception report” section. Ongoing country consultations (country dialogues on transparency and use of country systems, fragility assessment and compact guidance lesson learning workshops, and other New Deal-related processes) will be used as sites of observation, particularly where fully-fledged separate field work exercises are not feasible, as well as pre-New Deal documentation. The contractor will also draw on documentation on donor engagement and government planning practices in the g7+ case studied pilot country prior to New Deal implementation, to assess any difference the deliberate implementation of the New Deal has made. The contractor will be expected to draw up a methodological framework which will allow comparisons between and within country case studies (over time) and to extrapolate general conclusions. The methodology adopted for the case studies should allow for maximum comparability. The results of each case study can be written up in summary form in short annexes (no more than five pages each).

The country case studies will particularly bring to light how, whether and in what ways the International Dialogue has played a role (Secretariat/ID constituency/individual member level) in facilitating New Deal implementation. The Review will also take context as the starting point, and include consideration of the political, social and economic trajectories within each pilot and non-pilot during the New Deal implementation period, as well as of the development cooperation and peace and security landscape. The purpose will be to weigh up how context-specific factors, donor practices and donor behavior have both shaped New Deal implementation and been shaped by it.

Interpretation

The contractor will be expected to design a clear and explicitly laid out methodology for interpreting the information from all three sources and extrapolating from the country case studies to come up with more general answers to the core questions.

Weighting - New Deal vs. Dialogue

In compiling the Review report, the consultant will be expected to focus more on the New Deal than on the International Dialogue. When assessing the contribution of the International Dialogue, the focus will be more on substance (i.e., what the Dialogue has done, output, etc.) than on its internal processes. Yet some consideration will be given to how the working practices and methods of the Dialogue have shaped, helped, and/or hindered New Deal implementation and uptake at global and country levels. The Review
will be expected to put forward recommendations about the design of the most appropriate institutional architecture to drive the New Deal forward in a post-2015 context. A team leader/manager should be appointed, with responsibility for pulling the report together. Research units at universities, particularly from g7+ countries where possible, should be tapped into by the consortium, which should preferably involve some collaboration with consultants working in the Global South. Individual members of the team will have a specific remit on specific case studied countries, and/or assigned to particular questions. Consultants conducting the pilot country-case studies will need to have specific county knowledge as well as of the New Deal, Dialogue, fragility, peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas. The consortium team will have to demonstrate three further relevant competencies: knowledge and experience of the humanitarian field, conflict sensitivity and gender.

The team should be able to demonstrate some expertise in organizational/change management to increase the scope for uptake of final recommendations to improve New Deal implementation at country level. The team will include a mix of individuals with excellent command of written and spoken English (particularly overall team leaders) and a good working knowledge of French and/or Portuguese given the languages spoken in the g7+ pilot countries and the need to conduct interviews.

The team will need to ensure good knowledge management and adequate quality control of the process. How this will be undertaken needs to be explained clearly in the proposal required for candidates interested in this work.
ANNEX B: NEW DEAL HISTORY AND MEMBERSHIP

Box B.1 outlines the chronological history of the New Deal. In 2008, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) was established at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra to advance policy dialogue on peacebuilding, statebuilding and development between actors in the OECD and the g7+.

**BOX B.1: CHRONOLOGY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Deal Related Events</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States</td>
<td>1/2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness</td>
<td>2/28/2005</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (FSPs)</td>
<td>4/2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FSPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness</td>
<td>9/2/2008</td>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Accra Agenda for Action and IDPS Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Global Meeting of IDPS</td>
<td>4/2010</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>Dili Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of the g7+</td>
<td>4/2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Global Meeting of IDPS</td>
<td>6/1/2011</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>PSGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monrovia Roadmap on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding finalized</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st g7+ Ministerial Retreat</td>
<td>10/18/2011</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness</td>
<td>11/29/2011</td>
<td>Busan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>New Deal launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone launches Fragility Assessment</td>
<td>6/25/2012</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Fragility Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia launches Fragility Assessment</td>
<td>7/2012</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Liberia Fragility Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste launches Fragility Assessment</td>
<td>7/12/2012</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Fragility Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan launches Fragility Assessment</td>
<td>8/1/2012</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Assessment not complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South Knowledge Exchange on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding</td>
<td>10/2012</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>64 indicators agreed upon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd g7+ Ministerial Retreat</td>
<td>11/14/2012</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti Declaration and indicators presented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Deal Related Events</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Meeting of the Indicator Working Group</td>
<td>1/2013</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>ID feedback on indicators, 34 of 64 remain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd g7+ Technical Meeting</td>
<td>3/2013</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>Dili Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Deal Implementation Working Group</td>
<td>3/10/2013</td>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Global Meeting of the IDPS</td>
<td>4/19/2013</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Washington Communique</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd g7+ Technical Meeting</td>
<td>5/27/2013</td>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th g7+ Technical Meeting</td>
<td>7/29/2013</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Compact finalized</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somali Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Deal Dashboard launch in Liberia</td>
<td>9/27/2013</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th g7+ Technical Meeting</td>
<td>11/27/2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>Dem. Rep. of Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPS Working Group on New Deal Implementation</td>
<td>12/2/2013</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Accountability Framework signed</td>
<td>2/4/2014</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary meeting of g7+ in Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>3/9/2014</td>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch of the Comoros Fragility Assessment</td>
<td>3/10/2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch of the Guinea-Bissau Fragility Assessment</td>
<td>3/17/2014</td>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd g7+ Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>5/29/2014</td>
<td>Lome</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Lome Communique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPS Steering Group Meeting</td>
<td>6/17/2014</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Global Meeting of the International Dialogue</td>
<td>6/17/2014</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Freetown Communique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPS Implementation Working Group Meeting</td>
<td>10/10/2014</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Deal Related Events</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPS Steering Group Meeting</td>
<td>10/13/2014</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-level preparatory mission to Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>11/24/2014</td>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g7+ Technical Meeting</td>
<td>4/2/2015</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPS Steering Group Meeting</td>
<td>5/25/2015</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debating ND Monitoring Report - IDPS and AfDB Side Event</td>
<td>5/25/2015</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd International Financing for Development Conference</td>
<td>7/13/2015</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BOX B.2: NEW DEAL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS**

**Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Rep. of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of the Congo</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation (ILO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund (IMF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX C: FIELD RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR FIELD RESEARCH

Below is a list of standardized open-ended research questions for key informants and workshops. Remember to ask follow-up questions when informants share insights, and never ask “leading questions” (suggesting the answer by the way your question is put). It is important to emphasize that this project is not an evaluation of any particular agency, project, or policy, but part of a broader learning process.

Research Questions:

Identifying information

1. Name

2. Position/job title and approximate ‘level’ within organization (junior, mid-level, senior, director)

3. Sector of job/position: National government, civil society (specify), donor/foreign government

4. What is your role in peacebuilding and/or statebuilding? How long have you participated in work around peacebuilding and/or statebuilding? (not limited to the New Deal or ID)

5. Have you heard of the New Deal and/or the International Dialogue? If so, in what context/under what circumstances? When did you first hear about the New Deal and/or ID?

Knowledge around New Deal

6. Were there common goals, coordination, consultation and mutual accountability among governments, donors, and civil society on peacebuilding and statebuilding before the New Deal? (Baseline)

7. In your opinion, what is the meaning of the TRUST, FOCUS, and PSGs elements of the New Deal? (3)

8. From where have you received/obtained information about the New Deal and/or ID? What is the best source of information on the New Deal and/or ID?
Identifying change

9. What, in your view, are the main differences achieved through the New Deal so far, if any? (TRUST, FOCUS, PSGs, other)
   a. What kind of change happened – e.g., to government-civil-society-donor relationships? To national planning and priorities? To budget support from countries? Other?
   b. On the donor side, were the changes consistent between OECD and non-OECD donor countries? Was there a difference in the extent/magnitude of changes between OECD and non-OECD countries? (1c)
   c. How did it happen?
   d. How broad-based was the change (political, social, economic, finance-related, among sectoral actors, senior officials, mid-level officials, subnational actors, HQ, the field, state and non-state actors, etc.)?

Expectations of the New Deal

10. What were your expectations of the New Deal?
   a. Identify expectations – financial, technical, political, relationships, accountability, transparency, impact on peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, etc.
   b. Positive or negative opinion of ND when first implemented?

11. Has New Deal implementation met your expectations so far? Why or why not?
   a. Of these three factors: 1) Broad-based political ownership at the center of government and across ministries, 2) Donor behavior change, 3) Managing national political processes, interests, and participation:
      i. Which has been the most important factor in explaining progress toward implementing the TRUST and FOCUS principles?
      ii. Which has been the greatest obstacle to implementing the TRUST and FOCUS principles?
   b. High/medium/low/no impact on finances, politics, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, other?

12. What is the value-added of the New Deal in your experience (if there is one)?

Building context

13. What were the conditions for progress or challenges in peacebuilding and statebuilding in your context?
   a. Who or what can create opportunities to meet expectations/achieve progress? Who or what prevents meeting expectations/achieving progress?
Recommendations

14. What, in your view, are the main gaps and challenges in New Deal implementation? (TRUST, FOCUS, PSGs, other) (Identifying change)
   a. How serious (from 1-10) are the gaps and challenges for you/for addressing conflict and fragility in your country?
   b. What causes the gaps and challenges?

15. Would you recommend boosting the New Deal?
   a. If so, what would you recommend in your country? And at the global level?
   b. If not, what would you recommend instead?

International Dialogue

16. What role has the International Dialogue played in your country? How would you rate its role, assistance, and impact on you?

17. What experience would you like to share with other g7+ countries/civil societies/donors?

If the interviewee is not familiar with the New Deal

7. Are you familiar with any common goals, coordination, consultations, mutual accountability, or frameworks between governments, donors, and civil society on peacebuilding and statebuilding?

8. Before 2011, were there common goals, coordination, consultation and mutual accountability between governments, donors, and civil society on peacebuilding and statebuilding?

9. How are common goals, coordination, consultations, mutual accountability, or frameworks between governments, donors, and civil society on peacebuilding and statebuilding usually communicated to you (if at all)? How are you included (if at all)?

10. Since 2011, has there been any change in:

11. Planning/coordination in addressing fragility?

12. Behavior among national actors regarding coordination between government, civil society, and donors, with regards to national planning frameworks, and/or projects/planning that address fragility?

13. Donor behaviors, in terms of communication with the host country, transparency in aid, transparency in planning/coordination, and/or aid and national budget allocations to peacebuilding and statebuilding?

14. What, in your view, are the main gaps in addressing fragility in your country?
15. What, in your view, are the conditions for continuing gaps or progress on peacebuilding and statebuilding plans, coordination, relations and implementation in your context?

16. Follow-up question: who or what can create opportunities to achieve collective progress? Who or what prevents achieving collective progress?

17. What would you like to recommend for giving a boost to peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in your context?

**International Dialogue**

18. What role has the International Dialogue played in your country? How would you rate its role, assistance, and impact on you?

19. What experience would you like to share with other g7+ countries/civil societies/donors?

**MALI – ‘CONTROL’ COUNTRY CASE STUDY**

The Mali country case study relates to the study’s overall hypotheses in the following ways: in investigating Hypothesis #1, we will attempt to gauge changes in donor/government behaviors and practices and then attribute these changes to the implementation of the New Deal. For the case of Mali, we also want to identify change in donor/government behaviors and practices over the last five years to see if change occurred outside New Deal countries. The same data sources and research methods can be applied to Mali, but different/additional research questions need to be asked:

1. What is your role in peacebuilding and statebuilding? How long have you been involved?

2. What are Mali’s national plans for peacebuilding and statebuilding?

3. What international and national policy guidance do actors in Mali use for peacebuilding and statebuilding, and which actors help you/do you draw upon? (Identify who is involved)

4. Were there common goals, coordination, consultation and mutual accountability between governments, donors and civil society on peacebuilding and statebuilding before you initiated peacebuilding and statebuilding plans? (Baseline)

5. What were your expectations of your peacebuilding and statebuilding process and partners? (Identify expectations – financial, technical, political, relationships, accountability, transparency, impact on peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, etc.)

6. What, in your view, are the main differences achieved through Mali’s peacebuilding and statebuilding partnerships and processes so far, if any? (Identifying change)

7. Follow-up questions: Ask what kind of change happened – To relationships? To programs, projects and finance? To policies? To accountability and transparency? To addressing conflict and fragility?

8. Who made the change happen?
9. How did it happen?

10. How broad-based was the change (political, social, economic, finance-related, among sectoral actors, senior officials, mid-level officials, subnational actors, HQ, the field, state and non-state actors, etc.?)

11. What, in your view, are the main gaps and challenges in peacebuilding and statebuilding implementation? (Identifying change)

12. Follow-up questions: How serious (from 1-10) are the gaps and challenges for you/for addressing conflict and fragility in your country?

13. What causes the gaps and challenges?

14. Has implementation met your expectations so far? (Perceptions of success or failure)

15. Follow-up questions: Why/why not? High/medium/low/no impact on finances, politics, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, other?

16. Why, in your view, has implementation met/not met your expectations so far? (Causality)

17. What were the conditions for progress or challenges in peacebuilding and statebuilding in your context?

18. Follow-up question: Who or what can create opportunities to meet expectations/achieve progress? Who or what prevents meeting expectations/achieving progress?

19. Are you familiar with the ID, New Deal and the g7+? If so, are you able to articulate the reasons for the establishment of the ID, New Deal and g7+?

20. If so, has the ID, New Deal or g7+ played in your country? How would you rate its role, assistance and impact on you?

21. What are the key factors behind Mali’s decision to not participate in the New Deal?

22. Follow-up questions: What is the likelihood that Mali would participate in the New Deal in the future?

23. Would you recommend to boost the new deal?

24. If so, what would you recommend in your country? And at the global level?

25. If not, what would you recommend instead? What experience would you like to share with other g7+ countries/civil societies/donors?
DATA SOURCES

Working to a standard methodological framework will permit comparability across case studies. The first 2014 New Deal Monitoring Report will provide important baseline information about implementation to build upon through the field studies. Three main sources of data for the independent review will be produced and triangulated to answer the four main research questions and test the four main hypotheses:

a. a literature review on peacebuilding and statebuilding in the country concerned (history, conditions, priorities, trends and processes and policies/frameworks);

b. a review of available qualitative and quantitative primary and secondary data, including aid data and policy and program documents at the field level; and

c. key informant interviews.

Primary data should include an assessment of national development plans, frameworks and aid flows before and after New Deal implementation began in order to assess what, if any, observable and verifiable change occurred as a result of the New Deal (TRUST, FOCUS, PSGs, compacts, one vision/one plan documents, indicators, etc.). Where possible, consultants will be expected to draw upon ongoing ID processes. These include Country Dialogues on Use of Country Systems and Transparency, Compact and Fragility Assessment Guidance Note development consultations, and the New Deal Monitoring Round 2 survey process).

Secondary data sources such as on-going country-level research and monitoring exercises on the New Deal will also be helpful starting points for identifying qualitative changes and causality/attribution.

Key informant interviews will draw on a standardized set of open research questions (below). Surveys include open-ended questions to allow free-flowing conversation and for all stakeholders to share the analysis that matters most to them: the New Deal is fundamentally about improving the quality of relations and partnerships, and therefore accurately capturing perceptions is key to understanding its successes and challenges.

The consultant should conduct one-on-one interviews and two half-day workshops or meetings, enabled by an ID member, at the beginning and end of the field data gathering mission. These meetings/workshops will inform stakeholders about the process, identify and manage their expectations, guide your data gathering, flesh out key informants lists, and at the end of your field work, help you to obtain feedback on preliminary results. Interviews and workshops/meetings must at least include focal points for the g7+, civil society and donors, as well as independent actors. Contacts are provided at the end of this document, and the ID Secretariat and CIC can provide further contact details as needed.

Consultants will be expected to conduct at least one field visit and have consultations outside the capital cities, and to consult with a variety of stakeholders, including civil society actors, both within and outside the New Deal network. Key informants should include ministerial and director-level stakeholders, senior donor organizational leaders, civil society leaders, experts in governments, civil society and donors and independent analysts. You are looking for technical, political and wider awareness of the New Deal, too. Can politicians, activists and journalists also tell you about the New Deal?
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<th>Example of government departments/ministries:</th>
<th>Key informant types:</th>
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<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Justice</td>
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<td>Judiciary</td>
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<td>Prime Minister/President's office</td>
<td>Civil society leaders and advocates</td>
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<td>Embassies/donor offices/missions, especially:</td>
<td>Independent analysts</td>
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<td>Lead partners in-country for the New Deal; at least the three largest OECD and three largest non-OECD countries in terms of aid into the subject country; multilateral donors and missions (UN, IFIs)</td>
<td>Subnational representatives of civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society focal points listed by the CSPPS and others</td>
<td>Donor organizations' leaders and experts</td>
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<td>UN mission representatives</td>
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ANNEX D: BIBLIOGRAPHY


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# ANNEX E: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND PARTICIPANTS IN DISCUSSIONS

Anonymity has been respected when requested.

**HQ interviewees and participants in IDPS, INCAF, g7+ ad CSPPS consultations**

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<td>1</td>
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34. Elina Kalkku (Finland)
35. Theo Kanene Mukwanga (DRC)
36. Lydiah Kemunto Bosire (UN DPA/World Bank)
37. Anne-Lise Klausen (World Bank)
38. Louise Lombard (Columbia University)
39. Susan Loughead (DFID)
40. Diane Koester (OECD)
41. Kristiina Kuvaja-Xanthopoulos (Finland)
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43. Claire Leigh (UNDP)
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55. Kathryn Nwajiaku (IDPS Secretariat)
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<td>Danish Embassy</td>
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<td>216</td>
<td>Adrian Hunt</td>
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<td>217</td>
<td>Paul Tholen</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy</td>
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<td>218</td>
<td>Abdel Kader Ba</td>
<td>Direction Financiere Comptable</td>
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<td>219</td>
<td>Julie Chevillard</td>
<td>PTF</td>
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<td>220</td>
<td>Jordi Ferrari</td>
<td>French Embassy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SIERRA LEONE

221. Anonymous (Donor 1)
222. Anonymous (Donor 2)
223. Anonymous (Donor 3)
224. Anonymous (RUF-P)
225. Anonymous (District administrator)
226. Anonymous (District politician)
227. Anonymous (District administrator)
228. Anonymous (Donor 4 Kenema)
229. Anonymous (Paramount Chief)
230. Shellac Davies (SLANGO)
231. Abie Elizabeth Kamara (g7+)
232. Lucy Brewah (Ministry of Finance)
233. David Abu (Ministry of Finance)
234. Abdul Kaikai (Ministry of Finance)
235. Ester Sesay (Ministry of Finance)
236. Abdul Kareem Jalloh (MRC)
237. Anonymous (Security Services)
238. Anonymous (Ministry of Local Government)
239. Anonymous (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
240. Henry Mbawa (Ministry of Justice)
241. Bridget Osho (Ministry of Justice)
242. Andrew Keilli (Cemmats Group Ltd.)
243. Edward Jombia (Wannep)
244. Yeama Caulker (Wannep)
245. Charles Kefkobi (SDI)
246. George Mustapha (SDI)
247. Sheik Bawoh (Awareness Times)
248. Ato Brown (World Bank)
249. Abubakarr (Statistics Sierra Leone)
250. Turay (Statistics Sierra Leone)
251. Abdul Koroma (Local government)
252. Frank Kanu (Local donor coordination committee)
253. Valnora Edwin (CSO, Makeni)
254. Sinead Walsch (Irish Aid)
255. John Caulkner (CSO)
256. Chief Fasuluku (Traditional leader)
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

SOMALIA

259. Mohamed Aden (Federal Government of Somalia)
260. Abdirahman Aynte (Federal Government of Somalia)
262. Hodan Osman (Federal Government of Somalia)
263. Mustakim Waid (Federal Government of Somalia)
264. Louise Cottar (Federal Government of Somalia)
265. Abdirahman Hosh Jibril (Federal Parliament of Somalia)
266. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali (Puntland State)
267. Saad Shire (Somaliland Government)
268. Mikael Lindvall (Swedish Embassy)
269. Daria Fane (EU Delegation to Somalia)
270. Laila Shaikh-Ruttman (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation)
271. Hodan Hassan (USAID Somalia)
272. Tyler Beckwith (USAID Somalia)
273. Davinia Sesay (US Mission to Somalia)
274. Michael Thyge Poulsen (Danida)
275. Phil Evans (DFID Somalia)
276. Elisabet Hedin (SIDA)
277. Hugh Riddell (World Bank)
278. Marc Jacquand (UN)
279. Hanna Schmitt (UN)
280. Sofia Carrondo (UNSOM)
281. Pau Blanquer (UN)
282. Sergei Pushkarev (UN)
283. Gavin Roy (UN)
284. Abdirashid Hashi (The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies)
285. Deqa Yasin (IIDA Women's Development Organisation)
286. Paul Simkin (Conflict Dynamics International)
287. Abdurahman Sharif (Somali NGO Consortium)
288. Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle (CRD Somalia)
289. Kathryn Achilles (Saferworld)
290. Mohamed Ahmed (Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum)
291. Rima Das Pradhan-Blach (International Affairs and Legal Consulting)
292. Anthony Njue (Mott McDonald)
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>Nik Soni</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>Susan Marx</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>295</td>
<td>Todd Wassel</td>
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<td>296</td>
<td>Hugo Fernandes</td>
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<td>297</td>
<td>Palwesha Yusaf</td>
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<td>298</td>
<td>Joao F. Boavida</td>
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<td>299</td>
<td>Pat Walsh</td>
<td>AJAR</td>
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<td>300</td>
<td>Cameneza dos Santos Monteiro</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Anacleto Ribeiro</td>
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<td>Guteriano Neves</td>
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<td>303</td>
<td>Tim Cadogan</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
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<td>304</td>
<td>Shane Rosenthal</td>
<td>ADB</td>
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<td>305</td>
<td>David Freedman</td>
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<td>306</td>
<td>Vin Ashcroft</td>
<td>Independent Consultant</td>
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<td>307</td>
<td>David Hook</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Institutional Strengthening</td>
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<td>308</td>
<td>Caitlin Leahy</td>
<td>CEPAD</td>
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<td>309</td>
<td>Peter Van Sluijs</td>
<td>CSPPS</td>
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<td>310</td>
<td>Bolormaa Amgaabazar</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>311</td>
<td>Bernadino da C Pereira</td>
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<td>Elizabeth McMillian</td>
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<td>Nelson Belo</td>
<td>Fundasaun Mahein</td>
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<td>Uidon Chung</td>
<td>KOICA</td>
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<td>Sarah Dewhurst</td>
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<td>316</td>
<td>Mericio Akara</td>
<td>Luta Hamutuk</td>
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<td>317</td>
<td>Knut Ostby</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>318</td>
<td>Lorraine Reuter</td>
<td>Office of the UN Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>319</td>
<td>John H. Seong</td>
<td>USAID</td>
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<td>Arsenio Pereira da Silva</td>
<td>FONGTIL</td>
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<td>Cancio de Jesus Oliveira</td>
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<td>322</td>
<td>Silvio Decurtins</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
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<td>323</td>
<td>Alex Tilman</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>324</td>
<td>Santina Soares</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>Pedro Figueiredo</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>326</td>
<td>Emilia Pires</td>
<td>g7+ Special Envoy</td>
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<td>327</td>
<td>Miguel Pereira de Carvalho</td>
<td>Ministry of State Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>328</td>
<td>Marcelo Amaral</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>329</td>
<td>Kerry Brogan</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
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</table>
330. Vincent Vire (Delegation of the European Union)
331. Gilamina Saldania (Ministry of Interior)
332. Edio Guterres (Office of the Prime Minister)
333. Helder da Costa (g7+ Secretariat)
334. Charles Scheiner (Lao Hamatuk)
335. Luis da Costa Ximenes (Belun)
336. Meabh Cryan (Australian National University)
337. Habib Mayar (g7+ Secretariat)
338. Antonio Gutteres (Ministry of State Administration)
339. Francisco Xavier da Silva Guterres (Ministry of Administration)
340. Maria do Carmo (Chief of Village)
341. Constancio do Rego (Chief of Village)
342. Felicia Carvalho (Ministry of Finance/g7+ Secretariat)
343. Lisa Denney (ODI)