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The year 2011 could have been a disastrous one for peacekeeping. At the start of the year, Côte d’Ivoire appeared to be on the brink of renewed civil war in spite of the presence of UN and French forces. South Sudan’s independence referendum also had the potential to unleash mass violence. From Haiti to Liberia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeepers were charged with overseeing elections that might result in instability. In Somalia, African Union (AU) forces were locked in combat with Islamist rebels.

The risk of one or more of these situations spiraling out of control was high. Some came very close to doing so. For the first three months of the year, the UN was on the defensive in Côte d’Ivoire, and thousands of civilians lost their lives before the Security Council ordered the peacekeepers to take more robust action. The UN force in Sudan, having facilitated a successful referendum, was rendered helpless when northern and southern forces clashed in the disputed region of Abyei. The UN had known its contingent there was vulnerable, but it was necessary to deploy an entirely new mission to restore order.

Nonetheless, the most striking fact about this edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is that it is not a chronicle of peacekeeping failures. Instead, peace operations demonstrated an unexpected degree of resilience throughout 2011. The UN reasserted itself in Côte d’Ivoire, and helped ensure that the Haitian, Liberian, and Congolese elections were relatively smooth, if far from flawless. In Somalia, the AU scored a series of tactical victories, and the Islamists pulled back from Mogadishu. While these established peace operations may have been relatively successful, the year brought unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Many commentators (including the Center on International Cooperation’s team) believed that it might be necessary to deploy a peace operation to conclude the war in Libya. The EU briefly offered to send troops on a humanitarian mission, but a military operation in Libya ultimately proved unnecessary, with the UN sending a political mission instead. By the end of the year, the Arab League was deploying monitors to Syria—the league’s first peace operation since the 1970s.

The instability in the Middle East is not yet finished. At the time of writing, it is still more than conceivable that Syria or another country in the region may require a peacekeeping force in 2012 (Turkey has alluded to the possibility of a military mission in Syria, for example, although only as a last resort). In the meantime, the peace operations already deployed in the area have to adapt to an increasingly uncertain environment. In December 2011, the UN mission in Lebanon was the subject of a series of terrorist attacks. With tensions with Iran growing, such risks may increase considerably soon.

Yet all these events and challenges have had surprisingly little impact on policy debates about the future of peacekeeping at the UN and in other organizations in 2011. Rather than talking about the effects of operations, diplomats and officials have developed one overriding obsession: what operations cost.

The last year has seen the financial crisis finally make itself felt in the world of peace
operations. From 2008 to 2010, the global economic downturn had only a marginal effect on peacekeeping. Representatives of the main financiers of international operations—the United States, Europe, and Japan—noted that there was a need for austerity. Missions saw their budgets constrained or trimmed. But there were relatively few calls for deeper cuts in international peacekeeping. This is starting to change.

In New York, 2011 saw a fierce debate over the rate of reimbursements to troop contributors and quieter but serious arguments among Western countries about the costs of the UN missions in South Sudan, Haiti, and Liberia. US, British, and French officials traded barbs privately and even in the media, betraying unusual tensions among the Western powers that traditionally dominate the Security Council. Cost issues are not solely confined to the UN. The European Union, which mandated an increasing number of missions prior to the financial crisis, has now become very negative toward new operations. Analysts are still trying to interpret how North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense cuts will restrain future operations.

What will these developments do to peace operations? Advocates of peacekeeping tend to react badly to being challenged over the costs involved. They point to the relatively low costs of UN and the AU missions (at present less than $10 billion a year combined) and compare this to the sums devoted to stimulating the US economy in 2009 or trying to save the euro in 2011. The current level of spending on operations across all organizations is also soon likely to fall significantly, as NATO draws down in Afghanistan and the UN plans to reduce its missions in a number of cases, including Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

But there is little to be gained from avoiding or dismissing debates over the costs of peacekeeping. Instead, there is a strong case for using the current combination of strategic and financial pressures as the basis for launching a much more serious debate about how international peace operations are run.

A real debate about peacekeeping would start from two basic presumptions. First, the financial pressures are real and denying them is foolish. Second, the demand for effective peace operations is equally real, whether in Côte d’Ivoire or Syria. Trying to cut peacekeeping costs just to save money is, therefore, a mistake. Refusing to accept the need to use money more effectively is just as mistaken.

Instead, it is necessary to take a hard look at the political economy and strategic logic of peacekeeping. The ongoing debates over the reimbursement rates for countries supplying peacekeepers, for example, need to be tied to more honest evaluations of the quality and impact of the forces involved. Can the systems for funding the supply of personnel and assets to the UN (or any other organization) be better calibrated to improve their effectiveness and commitment in the field? Is it possible to distinguish more reliably between those cases where significant long-term deployments are a necessity or a luxury?

The reimbursement debate in 2011 did at least result in the creation of a Senior Advisory Group of international experts tasked with reviewing how UN contributors are compensated. If the members of this group are ambitious, they could spark a broader rethinking of how to make peacekeeping work. In 2012, there will also be a debate at the UN on revising member states’ “assessed contributions,” the percentages of the peacekeeping and regular budgets that each country has to pay. Whereas it will be tempting to treat this as a purely financial exercise, it could also be a platform for wider strategic discussions of peacekeeping’s future and the responsibilities of states in sustaining operations. In this context, this seventh edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is intended, like its predecessors, to provide the hard data and analysis of peacekeeping necessary for a real debate.

—Bruce D. Jones
Director, Center on International Cooperation
Strategic Summary 2011

Jake Sherman and Megan M. Gleason
The United Nations Security Council authorized two new peacekeeping missions during 2011—the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)—the first missions since the joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established in 2007. The Council also authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, clearing the way for a NATO air campaign that divided members of the Security Council. Following the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, the Security Council mandated the civilian UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a political mission, to help reestablish state authority.

These authorizations exhibit the range of options at the disposal of the Security Council in supporting countries in crisis and those emerging from conflict. For the past decade, the default mode of UN peacekeeping has been deployment of large, multidimensional operations. Recent missions, driven by the global financial crisis and by realities on the ground, offer alternatives to this model. UNISFA, a
border-monitoring operation, was able to rapidly deploy by drawing its entire force requirement from a single, regional troop contributor. In Libya, none of the options tabled for a UN (or indeed non-UN) mission involving military troops were acceptable to the National Transitional Council. Agreement on a light civilian support mission is in line with the patterns of deployment elsewhere in the Middle East, which have favored monitoring missions and political missions.

Rapidly changing environments also tested the ability of existing missions to effectively respond to violence. Electoral crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti, and at the time of writing also unfolding in the Democratic Republic of Congo, exposed limits in the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations to support political processes and reestablish legitimate state authority. Only the advanced military capabilities of France’s Operation Licorne kept the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from irrelevance. Globally, these capabilities are predominantly—though not exclusively—possessed by Western countries largely absent from peacekeeping. Due to the dearth of advanced military participation in peacekeeping, several of the UN’s largest missions—including UNMIS, UNAMID, and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)—have also struggled to uphold their mandates and protect civilians this past year. At the same time, NATO’s experience in Afghanistan cautioned against placing too much stock in capabilities in the absence of a viable political framework. If the UN is to sustain confidence in peacekeeping as an effective means of crisis management, it requires member states to support it not just militarily, but politically as well.

Yet peacekeeping has faced increasing strain at UN headquarters and in capitals, as member states struggle with the ongoing fallout from the global financial crisis. Budgetary constraints, particularly among Western governments, have further frayed the relationship between financial contributors and troop/police contributors, and resulted in calls to quicken the pace of mission drawdown—both where missions have achieved stability and where they have not—without appropriate, practical, and
cost-effective alternatives to prevent reversals and mitigate further violence.

The Year in Numbers
This year UN peacekeeping deployments experienced their first contraction since 2003. In 2011, 98,972 uniformed personnel were deployed, compared with 99,172 in 2010—a change of less than 0.5 percent. However, a number of significant changes underlie this relatively stable figure. The closure of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was roughly offset by the establishment of UNISFA and UNMISS, as well as smaller increases in a number of other missions. The post-electoral crisis prompted a troop increase in UNOCI of over 20 percent in 2011. In addition, the post-earthquake troop surge in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) continued, though the mission will return to pre-earthquake levels in 2012. Peacekeepers in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) also downsized, the latter in preparation for the expected withdrawal of UNMIT in 2012.

The decrease in UN peacekeeping was offset by increases in NATO and African Union deployments. Thus, despite a decline in UN numbers, overall global peacekeeping continued to grow in 2011, though at a reduced pace compared with previous years; there were 263,118 peacekeepers deployed in 2011, compared with 256,170 in 2010, an increase of just 2.7 percent. NATO deployments increased this year, though troop numbers in its mission in Afghanistan remained stable. Additional contributions to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from Burundi and Uganda strengthened the peacekeeping force by 35 percent this year, with further reinforcements pledged by Djibouti and Sierra Leone.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were once again the top three troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping this year. However, Uruguay, Jordan, and Fiji supplied the most troops and military observers on a per capita basis. A number of countries—Ghana, Nepal, Rwanda,
and Uruguay—were among the top ten troop contributors both in total and as a percentage of population.

During the past five years, military deployments to peace operations have increased by 65 percent and police deployments have grown by 56 percent. Within the UN, in the past five years military deployments have grown by nearly 13 percent, while police deployments have increased by 80 percent. Over the same period, civilian staff in UN peacekeeping missions, including international staff, national staff, and UN volunteers, increased nearly 27 percent.

### Peacekeeping and the Extension of State Authority

This past year was also marked by the release of the World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011* on conflict, security, and development, and the *Review of International Civilian Capacities*. The former suggests ways in which peace operations can enable countries to sustainably transition away from cycles of violence, including supporting the development of accountable, legitimate security and justice institutions. The latter provides a roadmap for UN reform and international partnerships to strengthen timely deployment of appropriate expertise to support countries emerging from crisis.

In this context, this volume of the *Annual Review* focuses on the extension and consolidation of state authority. This year’s thematic essay charts the international community’s experience in supporting the extension and consolidation of state authority and identifies a number of important lessons as well as ongoing challenges. As the mission reviews highlight, support to state authority has become a central function of peace operations in states recovering from protracted violence and armed conflict.

Sudan and South Sudan, which together host one-third of the UN’s total global troop deployment, remain the most complex and most watched theaters in UN peace operations. The celebrations that followed South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in July 2011 have been overshadowed by the failure to resolve the administration of Abyei, border demarcation, and revenue-sharing, among other contested issues. Escalating border violence in South Kordofan State and Blue Nile State and reported bombings by Sudanese armed forces in South Sudan’s territory threaten a return to war between north and south, as well as a humanitarian emergency. UNISFA, unable to prevent the buildup of armed forces by both sides, has struggled to contain

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<th>Total Troops Contributed</th>
<th>Per Capita Troops Contributed</th>
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<td>1 Pakistan</td>
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<td>3 India</td>
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*Note: Per capita calculations based on 2010 population data from the UN Population Division. Troop contributions include troops and military observers.*
the violence. The increased tensions have complicated the role of the newly established UNMISS, which is already facing the monumental task of establishing state authority and managing myriad internal conflicts among tribal groups, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and breakaway factions. Meanwhile, in Darfur, the political process has failed to gain traction, and UNAMID has struggled with stabilizing the region and protecting civilians.

Millions of voters queued, some for days, to vote in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s general elections in November 2011. In the lead-up to the vote, significant logistical delays and sporadic incidents of violence raised concern that the election could plunge the country into renewed conflict. A shortage of helicopters limited MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians and support election preparations. National and international observers criticized the November elections for lacking credibility in the face of significant irregularities. The political opposition rejected official election results, which showed a victory for incumbent president Joseph Kabila, and the main rival candidate declared himself president. The heated rhetoric on both sides and heightened political tension run the risk of inciting large-scale violent protests and clashes, further exacerbating this political crisis.

In Haiti, MINUSTAH continues to provide critical political, security, judicial, and logistical support following the January 2010 earthquake. Following contested first-round presidential elections that triggered protests and violence,
Michel Martelly won a generally calm runoff election in the country’s first peaceful transfer of power to the opposition. In October 2011, MINUSTAH began downsizing to pre-earthquake troop and police levels amid tense debates in the Security Council on the overall timetable for transition, and amid public outrage in Haiti over the mission’s link to a deadly cholera epidemic and the alleged rape of a Haitian teenager by mission troops.

Mission drawdown is also proceeding in Timor-Leste, ahead of the national elections scheduled for 2012, and in Liberia, where in October 2011 President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was reelected in the first nationally managed polls since the end of the civil war. While the elections were largely peaceful, clashes occurred between Liberian police and opposition supporters on the day before the runoff, requiring UNMIL peacekeepers to step in to restore order. UNMIL has faced mounting international pressure to quicken its withdrawal, despite domestic and regional security threats, including land disputes and organized crime. The regional dimensions of instability in the West African region were underscored during the post-election crisis when Liberian mercenaries crossed the porous border to join the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, and refugees seeking to escape the violence crossed in the other direction.

Following months of worsening conflict between forces loyal to president-elect Alassane Ouattara and incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and France’s Operation Licorne intervened to ensure the integrity of the election and protect civilians. During a series of assaults on pro-Gbagbo positions, the peacekeepers destroyed heavy weapons, enabling the military victory by Ouattara supporters. The involvement of Operation Licorne, along with the deployment of attack helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI, reversed months of humiliation suffered by UN peacekeepers, including restriction of movement, disarming of and attacks on peacekeepers, and cutting off of supplies, all of which undermined the integrity of the mission.

In Afghanistan, escalating violence and de-
clining domestic support for military deployments among the key international partners prompted a shift in strategy from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism operations targeting militant leaders and enhancing the capacities of the Afghan government. In advance of the planned 2014 withdrawal of international forces, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been handing over security responsibilities to the Afghan army and police—despite security concerns and doubts about government capacity. The timetable for drawdown, combined with minimal progress on negotiating a settlement, has fueled uncertainty within Afghanistan about the future of the country.

Finally, in Somalia, the unexpected withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu has enabled the government to establish control over the capital for the first time in decades. Nonetheless, continued asymmetrical attacks by Al-Shabaab against AMISOM have exacted high casualties. The entry by Kenyan ground forces into southern Somalia—and the announcement that Ethiopia will redeploy to support AU and Kenyan operations—demonstrate the fluidity of the security situation.

**Conclusion**

The resulting picture underscores the contradiction facing peacekeeping. Developments on the ground—including election-related violence—demonstrate the continued need for international action, as well as the critical role for peacekeepers in stabilizing and consolidating peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. After a decade of large multidimensional missions, peacekeeping may be moving away from this template to respond more flexibly to the needs on the ground, with authorizations in 2011 reflecting the complex reality of peacekeeping needs in the future.

Yet in response to budgetary pressure, several key member states are eager to draw down existing peace operations and to limit large deployments. In fact, negotiations between troop and financial contributors this year threatened to bring UN peacekeeping to a standstill. These tensions remain. The deepening financial crisis is certain to dominate discussions on mandates and resources—including troop reimbursement rates and the scale of assessed contributions—for peacekeeping in the year ahead. Nonetheless, these negotiations also present an opportunity to galvanize support for peacekeeping as an essential tool of crisis management, and to define its future strategic direction—including strengthening partnership arrangements, mobilizing civilian expertise and military assets, and developing flexible, alternative models of deployment.

**Notes**

1. Uniformed personnel include military troops, military observers, and civilian police. When disaggregated, deployment of UN military personnel decreased 0.5 percent over the year, while deployment of civilian police increased slightly, from 14,025 to 14,237.

2. Year-to-year comparisons are made between September 2010 and September 2011 for non-UN-commanded missions, and between October 2010 and October 2011 for UN-commanded missions.