
A think piece drawing on collaboration between OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and the World Bank, supported by the Center on International Cooperation

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**Addressing Protracted Displacement: A Framework for Development-Humanitarian Cooperation**

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Executive Summary

There are more than 60 million people forcibly displaced by conflict or persecution worldwide – the highest level recorded since World War II. The Syrian conflict is the largest cause of the recent spike in refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), but pressure is growing to address refugee and IDP displacement across developing countries. Many conflicts have not been resolved, and refugee and IDP returns are at an historic low. The average length of displacement is now 17 years. The cost of meeting increasing levels of humanitarian need has grown steadily, with global expenditure on humanitarian aid increasing from USD 12.4 billion in 2010 to USD 24.5 billion in 2014 – and estimated to end out even higher in 2015.

This paper is a think piece on how approaches to protracted displacement need to change if the world is to reverse the escalating crisis seen in recent times. It is not a prescriptive paper, but is designed to spur further thinking and to inform debates on policy and programming. The think piece drew on collaboration between the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank, supported by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) to inform their own policy and practice, but it is hoped that the analysis will also be of interest to other development and humanitarian actors.

The approach in the paper is based on four proposed shifts in how development and humanitarian assistance works in countries with significant numbers of refugees and displaced people:

- From seeing the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons as a challenge separate from development and meeting them through short-term humanitarian strategies and appeals…to ensuring their welfare as a core part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) commitment to “leave no-one behind”, requiring joint analysis and multi-year planning and engagement from development and humanitarian actors to achieve collective outcomes.

- From care and maintenance regimes targeted primarily at displaced people in camps…to localised systems that benefit both displaced people and host societies/communities.

- From approaches that marginalise refugees and internally displaced persons…to ones where the legal, regulatory, fiscal and organizational actions necessary for them to contribute to economic and social life are in place.

- From treating refugee-hosting situations as a short-term, country-specific resourcing problem and meeting the needs of IDPs through international humanitarian aid…to supporting refugee-hosting countries for the global public good they are providing and ensuring internal financial transfers are in place to help municipal, state and local governments absorb IDPs.

This approach by no means implies that all refugees and IDPs will integrate into their host societies or communities – it is simply designed to improve outcomes for both displaced people and host communities during periods of protracted displacement, irrespective of whether displaced individuals eventually return to their origin communities, integrate or resettle in other areas.
Refugees and IDPs as part of development planning

In the past, discussions of assistance for refugees and IDPs have been kept largely separate from development planning, both globally and at national level. Yearly humanitarian strategies and appeals are developed separately from national development plans, as if forced displacement was a short-term crisis without impact on national development. There are several reasons why these silos should be broken down. First, the SDGs provide a normative base. Central to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is the commitment to leave no-one behind, in pursuit of ending poverty and promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. “The special needs of people affected by complex humanitarian emergencies” are specifically recognized, as are refugees, displaced persons and host communities.

Second, protracted displacement is clearly a central development challenge for both origin and host communities, simply because it is protracted in nature: the costs, benefits and dynamics caused are not transitory and need to be taken into account in development planning. This paper argues for joint risk and resilience planning between humanitarian and development actors, national and international.

Localised systems that benefit host societies and communities

Societies hosting displaced people may face a political bind unless clear benefits can be demonstrated for host communities. Under traditional approaches, humanitarian assistance is typically provided through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international agencies and focuses more attention on refugees or IDPs, mostly in camps, than on host communities. In the classic case, this means that very little of the money disbursed to countries hosting refugees benefits their own citizens, because it does not strengthen the national systems (of health, of education, of food security, of social protection, of infrastructure) that national citizens use. It also gives less attention to refugees and IDPs living outside camps.

By contrast, the localised approaches advocated in this paper would provide benefits to displaced people wherever they are and to host communities, assisting countries to manage the politics of displacement. These approaches also reflect good past practice in many cases where refugees are hosted in isolated, underdeveloped regions and services to nationals are limited or non-existent. Services set up for refugees in these situations are often accessed by nationals and may be the first ever to be provided. In cases such as these, the presence of refugees has successfully resulted in increased development for all.

National legal and policy action to foster positive contributions from displaced people

Changes in the national policy of host countries may also be necessary for host societies to fully realise the potential benefits (and manage the politics) of displacement. Displaced people who cannot work (or move to regions where labour is in demand) will contribute far less than those who can. Without access to legal documentation and banking services they will not be able to start businesses that employ local people. Groups who are vulnerable to violence and discrimination in hosting countries or, for IDPs, in areas of refuge within their country, will be more challenged in their ability to make positive contributions.

And local communities who undergo significant impacts from internally displaced persons or refugees (housing, schools, health facilities) may need fiscal transfers from central government to meet these costs. Inclusive policy of this kind is of course also critical for the welfare of displaced people themselves, who generally aspire not to be dependent on humanitarian assistance but to have the opportunity to work, save and create opportunities for their children.
A new financial architecture — global public goods and collective development-humanitarian outcomes

A new financing architecture to manage protracted displacement and support the achievement of short-, medium- and long-term outcomes is needed. Funding needs to be multi-year in nature, support development-humanitarian cooperation and foster localised approaches. There is a clear argument for offering additional grant-based or highly concessional funds to refugee-hosting countries that are implementing programmes that lead to a more dignified life for refugees, even when their normal terms of financing would be commercial: the host is providing a global public good by adopting an inclusive approach towards the refugees and facilitating their participation in economic life and national development.

For internal displacement, the crucial incentive is that municipalities, state or local governments who are absorbing IDPs from other areas of the country be provided with adequate and appropriate financing. This would normally be done by national fiscal transfer: donors may provide additional support. In order to receive incremental international funds it will be important for governments hosting refugees or with significant internally displaced populations, to put forward credible mechanisms for their transparent use and for inclusive decision-making. This is particularly crucial in country situations where donors are not currently working through country systems.

The limits of what a new development-humanitarian framework can achieve

These shifts are centred in political and policy incentives. They aim to address some of the main barriers to better outcomes for refugees and IDPs, host communities, and development and humanitarian donors.

In promoting this approach, it is, however, important to be clear on the limits. No matter how much strengthening goes into development-humanitarian assistance, some countries may face too much strain on their national institutions to absorb and effectively protect the number of refugees that initially cross their borders through local systems. The needs of refugees, IDPs and host communities will also differ and require adapted, contextualised and variegated responses in some aspects, but designing complementary humanitarian and development interventions can deliver gains in efficiency and effectiveness and, potentially, better outcomes for all. Better analysis of these dynamics should be part of initial assessments and planning. Second, better development-humanitarian approaches do not target the failures of political will and governance that permit conflicts to flare up, escalate and continue without resolution – recognizing the centrality of politics and the need to take political action to prevent and resolve these remains key. A better development-humanitarian framework can help mitigate some of the consequences and make long-term recovery easier to achieve, but it cannot substitute for conflict prevention.

Now is the moment to act

The current refugee crisis in the Mediterranean has laid bare the inadequacies of current approaches on the part of all stakeholders. There is growing awareness that failure to invest in local social protection systems for refugees and host communities is inefficient. Several countries hosting refugee and IDP populations have pursued - with their international partners - new approaches for building the self-reliance and development of the displaced and their host communities, upon which it is possible to build. The new commitment to the SDGs creates the space to view the welfare of refugees and IDPs as a development challenge meriting development investments. If the world is to uphold common values of civil rights and respect for the refugee convention – and to deliver on its commitment to leave no-one behind in the SDGs – a new approach to preventing and resolving protracted displacement is urgently needed.
Introduction – A Growing Crisis Of Protracted Displacement and Poverty

This paper describes a new operational vision for how the international community – including the humanitarian and development communities, governments and donors – can better address situations of protracted displacement at the local, national and regional levels in line with the 15-year vision of the SDGs. The political tensions and human and economic costs of protracted displacement are mounting. The goal of this paper is to present a better development-humanitarian framework to address prolonged displacement. The annex to this paper outlines existing data on the benefits and relevant experience in supporting more localised approaches.

There are more than 60 million people forcibly displaced by conflict or persecution worldwide – the highest level recorded since World War II. The Syrian conflict is the largest cause of the recent spike in refugees, but pressure is growing to address refugee and IDP displacement across developing countries. Many conflicts have not been resolved, and refugee and IDP (internally displaced persons) returns are at an historic low. The average length of displacement is now 17 years.

Most displaced people live in a form of “second exile” or limbo, caught between the inability to return to their homes and the barriers to integrating locally or resettling in a third location. The majority of refugees and IDPs are women and girls: They are at risk of violence and sexual abuse and are often the last to get access to economic and social opportunities.

The Existing Business Model Is Not Working

The political and economic ramifications of protracted displacement are enormous, with expenditures on humanitarian crises increasing from USD 12.4 billion in 2010 to USD 24.5 billion in 2014 – and estimated to end out even higher in 2015. Considerable political tensions are engendered in protracted displacement because host communities perceive displaced people as a burden, and because developing countries have existing development challenges that make it harder to absorb displaced populations without additional support. Yearly humanitarian strategies and funding appeals, divorced from national development planning, are neither the most strategic nor the most cost-effective way to address these long-term challenges. This is, truly, an area where the existing policies and approaches have contributed to a growing crisis of dependency on the humanitarian system on the one hand, and political tensions on the other.

The problem can be represented as a “double bind” dilemma for handling prolonged displacement at the political and policy levels as outlined in Figure 1.

At the political level, governments hosting refugees or with large IDP populations face high popular opposition to long-term solutions, because refugees and IDPs are often perceived as “takers” from local services and economic opportunities rather than as contributors. Host governments also have national security concerns about controlling the movement of large populations over their borders, and about conflict spilling over their borders from conflict-affected countries via displaced populations.

Figure 1: A “double bind” creates unsustainable humanitarian dependency for the displaced and their hosts

The political bind – low incentives for governments and communities to integrate displaced people into the economy and services.

The policy bind – low incentives for development and humanitarian actors to jointly reduce humanitarian and host communities’ needs.

Inadequate, costly and unsustainable programs
This creates an incentive for political leaders to frame the problem as temporary and to separate displaced people from local social and economic development, even when evidence shows that displacement is usually long-term and that social and economic contributions from refugee communities can be considerable. Yet handling protracted displacement through temporary and ring-fenced humanitarian programmes impedes opportunities for more equitable and productive investments that assist both refugees and host communities:

- When refugees and IDPs do not have formal livelihoods opportunities and employment rights, they are more likely to become dependent on humanitarian aid and cannot contribute to economic growth, social services and public sector revenues;

- Refugees and IDPs in urban areas often scrape by on a living in the informal economy. Policies that encourage the inclusion of refugees in the formal economy are more likely to yield benefits in the form of increased productivity and improved fiscal revenue;

- Thus the policy choices taken mean that the costs to host communities are usually high as pressure grows on public services, housing and land and food, yet the needs of host communities are also frequently neglected;

- Given the costs to refugees/IDPs and their host communities, it would be more desirable to re-think employment policies and to design livelihoods programmes for refugees/IDPs and host communities that are grounded in robust market analysis and developed on the basis of concrete development and economic baselines or targets. Initiatives geared towards social protection, health, education and access to justice are also likely to be priorities for building resilience and greater self-reliance.

At the policy level, catering to refugees and IDPs through separate, parallel systems has led to an artificial distinction in protracted displacement situations between humanitarian assistance and development investment in national/local social protection systems, social services and economic development:

- There is a compartmentalized approach, with little coordination between humanitarian and development actors. Humanitarian and development funds are channelled through different budget lines and departments in donor organizations. Development plans, projects, and funding mechanisms bypass refugees and IDPs. Humanitarian funding that is earmarked for refugees and IDPs often bypasses host communities and is devoted first and foremost to “care and maintenance”;

- Development interventions have greatly increased in gender-sensitivity, but do not take into account the particular vulnerabilities of displaced women and children;

- Most development programming, including at the international financial institutions (IFIs), has not considered refugees and IDPs to be part of the target population for social protection, livelihoods assistance, health, education or local infrastructure, despite the high poverty rates prevalent in these groups and the long duration of displacement (17 years spans more than the full educational cycle for a young displaced child, for example). The effects of protracted displacement on both the displaced people themselves and host communities merit viewing this as a central development challenge.

- There is limited and declining grant-based and concessional finance for middle-income countries affected by protracted displacement, who are left to carry the cross-border burden alone.

Thus, everyone loses under the business-as-usual model. Host communities carry a heavy burden and are under-supported; the displaced subsist on aid and in the shadows of the informal economy; governments carry costs of crisis, but do not receive more aid or tax revenues; and humanitarian aid actors are stretched to meet protracted demand and respond to new crises.

But suppose that the international community opted for a different approach, in which…
A Better Approach: Four Elements of Joint Humanitarian-Development Action

... All stakeholders recognize that protracted displacement is the norm and that the primary constraint to developing more sustainable solutions is political. One part of addressing political constraints should be a new development-humanitarian framework that increases the dignity and quality of life during displacement as well as providing clear benefits for host communities. Four elements would be important for such a framework:

• From seeing the needs of refugees and IDPs as a challenge separate from development and meeting them through short-term humanitarian strategies and appeals.............to ensuring their welfare as a core part of the SDGs commitment to “leave no-one behind”, requiring joint analysis and multi-year planning and engagement from development and humanitarian actors to achieve collective outcomes.

• From care and maintenance regimes targeted primarily at displaced people in camps.............to localised systems that benefit both displaced people and host societies/communities.

• From approaches that marginalise refugees and internally displaced persons.............to ones where the legal, regulatory, fiscal and organizational actions necessary for them to contribute to economic and social life are in place.

• From treating refugee-hosting situations as a short-term, country-specific resourcing problem and meeting the needs of IDPs through international humanitarian aid.............to supporting refugee-hosting countries for the global public good they are providing and ensuring internal financial transfers are in place to help municipal, state and local governments absorb IDPs.

(I) Joint Development - Humanitarian Assessments and Multi-year Planning & Programming for Collective Outcomes

Protracted Displacement as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development specifically references refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as their host communities:

“Those whose needs are reflected in the Agenda include all children, youth, persons with disabilities (of whom more than 80 per cent live in poverty), people living with HIV/AIDS, older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees and internally displaced persons and migrants. We resolve to take further effective measures and actions, in conformity with international law, to remove obstacles and constraints, strengthen support and meet the special needs of people living in areas affected by complex humanitarian emergencies.

We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development. We also recognize that international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries. We underline the right of migrants to return to their country of citizenship, and recall that States must ensure that their returning nationals are duly received.”
If protracted displacement needs to be seen as just as much of a development as a humanitarian challenge, what are the implications for how development and humanitarian actors can work together to address it? There are already well-established humanitarian processes to identify the basic needs of displaced people, both material and in terms of psychological support, and these are clearly critical to preserve basic welfare and human dignity. This information is also critical for development planning. But a more fundamental shift in thinking about developmental links would require a much deeper assessment of the implications of displacement for national development plans.

Successfully integrating refugees and IDPs into national development plans would need to take central account of the impact on the political economy of both the origin country/region and the host country/region. Significant political economy dynamics can be caused by changes in the religious or ethnic balance of areas due to displacement, as well as by the capital and skills that displaced people bring with them. Displaced people can spur economic growth in the areas that receive them (think of the Huguenots in Geneva) but there will be winners and losers from these dynamics. Specific developmental questions with political implications to consider beyond regular humanitarian assessments include:

**Economic and social:**

- **The developmental aspirations of displaced people.** What do displaced persons and families prioritise developmentally (security, social protection, access to health and education for families, work opportunities, business opportunities, etc.) and what are the main constraints they face (access to labour markets, documentation, mobility, credit etc.)?

- **The impact on the labour market.** What is the skill balance of displaced people, and in which sectors do they bring skills? What is lost to origin regions? Which groups will win and lose if displaced people are able to freely enter the labour market in their host locations?

- **The impact on private sector development.** What entrepreneurial skills and capital do people bring with them, and what is lost to origin regions? Which groups will win and lose if policies are adopted to enable displaced people to start businesses in their host locations?

- **The impact on social indicators and social services.** What are the risks in lost generations who will not receive education or adequate nutrition and healthcare? What is lost to the origin communities in terms of professional service workers (e.g. doctors, teachers)? What is the impact on services in the host communities? The main calculation here will be of additional demands – children needing to be in school, healthcare – but it is also important to factor in the professionals such as doctors or teachers who may have been displaced.

- **The impact on social cohesion.** What is happening to young people's aspirations, and to the degree of cohesiveness within communities (origin, host and displaced people) as a result of the displacement?

**Institutional: Regulation, administration and donor relationships**

- **Absorptive capacity.** What is the capacity of national and local institutions to cater to the additional displaced population now in their neighbourhood? In core services (social protection, health, education, local infrastructure)? In regulation and administration (issuing of legal documentation, land, residence, business and labour market activity)? What are the priority administrative and regulatory actions that would assist in a positive outcome for both displaced and host communities?

- **Absorptive capacity with additional aid.** If additional aid finance was to be directed to strengthen national systems to absorb the displaced communities, would they be able to cope? What are the existing national and local programmes that can be scaled up quickly with international support?
Financial:

- **The impact on domestic revenues.** Under different policy scenarios for providing displaced people with rapid access to local economic opportunities, what is the projection of the impact on direct and indirect taxation? What strengthening of domestic revenue collection systems is required?

- **The dynamics of the host country or sub-national government with humanitarian and development donors.** Are donors accustomed to working through country systems in the host country/region, and is a reasonable level of confidence in place regarding the risk of national systems (corruption, human rights, inclusion)?

There are two qualifiers to put forward with regard to these questions. First, they are framed to interrogate the impact on the origin country/community as well as the host. Of course, in many situations of conflict which spur large-scale displacement, economic activity and services in the origin community may be entirely disrupted due to the scale of the violence, indeed halted completely – it may seem frivolous to ask about the impact of displacement on these communities when they have been completely devastated by conflict. Yet these questions remain key to eventual recovery of conflict-affected societies, in considering the prospects of return and the costs of permanent displacement. There are also cases of partial forced displacement (for example, of one ethnic group) where analysing the impact of their loss is of more immediate relevance.

Second, there are of course other questions that more directly address political and security concerns. For example, what are the sensitivities around political activity by displaced communities and the perceived security implications of their presence? How do these affect the willingness of host countries/regions to allow them to engage in economic activity, associate freely and move around the country without impediment? What policies under consideration to address perceived risks, and what is the humanitarian and developmental impact of these policies? Developmental and humanitarian actors will not be in the lead in considering these questions, but they should gain an understanding of these dynamics to better tailor their responses.

Even given a consensus on the need to examine these questions from a developmental perspective, the question will remain as to how to do it. Humanitarian responses need by their nature to be fast: they cannot wait for assessments that take several months, however important. A practical suggestion to improve humanitarian-development planning over these issues would therefore be threefold:

- Convene a rapid risk and resilience assessment after the onset of an emergency to cover the regular humanitarian assessment and the best information available at that time on the questions above, using the format of a one day workshop with briefs prepared on both the humanitarian assessment, a shared crisis risk analysis and the developmental impact and policy choices. This would aim to produce interim measures to inform the plans of national authorities and development partners.

- Identify during this assessment the next stage of national planning for origin and host countries (or host regions in the case of IDPs), and commit to incorporating the questions above in a more comprehensive form in these plans.

- Stakeholders would then work together to help national governments identify common outcomes that both humanitarian and development actors can support, based on comparative advantages, aiming to reduce dependency on international humanitarian aid overtime in favour of more sustainable solutions. This should involve measurable and disaggregated flexible benchmarks over a three- to five-year timeframe – outcomes, goals, targets, and indicators – for achieving common results. It should support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, focusing on making sure that the SDGs commitment of “leaving no-one behind” becomes a reality.
The outcome of this type of assessment would inform one critical and normally urgent question – to what extent and at what pace can host countries (or local areas in the case of IDPs) look to include displaced people in local services and economic activity, requesting humanitarian and development donors to provide support through local systems rather than through temporary care and maintenance regimes? This will not always be possible – where national institutions are very weak in capacity, unable to absorb the political impacts of displacement, or have a history of deep mistrust with donor partners localised approaches for inclusion may be impossible. But in many cases the answer to the questions above will indicate that a much better outcome for both host societies and donor countries could be gained from using localised approaches. How to do this is discussed below.

(II) Localised Approaches to Humanitarian and Development Assistance

A major operational element needed to create incentives for both host governments and development actors is the adoption of more localised humanitarian and development approaches. This should involve government systems but by no means implies only state systems – it can also involve the private sector, local NGO partnerships and community-based approaches.

The approach adopted will vary by country and will be dependent on the analysis described above. Key elements may however include:

- Emergency humanitarian needs (life-sustaining support);
- Support to country systems for health and education to incorporate the displaced and hosts;
- Expansion of local social protection systems to include the displaced in existing safety net programmes;
- A mapping of existing local infrastructure and programmes to expand water and sanitation, school or clinic coverage to benefit displaced and host communities;
- Livelihoods and private sector development programmes that include both members of host communities and displaced populations;
- A mapping of buildings/land (in particular public assets) which can be rehabilitated/used for durable housing for refugees and IDPs;
- Expanding security and justice provision (e.g. community-based policing, mobile courts, legal aid, targeting gender-based violence and child protection) to benefit displaced and host communities;
- Local peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives (mediation, building social cohesion, rights awareness, women’s empowerment);
- Developing municipal capacities and services;
- Programmes that direct cash benefits at both displaced families and host communities, such as voucher programmes that benefit both constituencies.

While localised approaches can benefit many different sectors, they do not need to be designed only sectorally: in some cases, conditional and unconditional cash transfers to displaced families and vulnerable families in host communities may be good modalities because they enable families to purchase a wide basket of services and may have a multiplier effect for the entire community by creating local demand for goods. Such cash transfers can also be used as an incentive for small communities that are integrating displaced people.

Measures can be taken to empower actors in the field to implement this model. Programme design principles could be shared among all actors on how to localise services and support host communities and refugees/IDPs. These might be developed by, for example, the Solutions Alliance, or by the United Nations (UN) and World Bank systems. Evidence on the benefits and experiences of countries to date in pursuing a better model can also be shared with national and international actors in relevant contexts, building on the evidence base summarised in the annex to this paper.
(III) Flexible, Additional Multi-Year Development Financing Instruments

Crucially, funding for this approach needs to be provided in addition to existing development investments. Such “additionality” in new grant-based or concessional finance is instrumental in securing the host government’s (national or local) support for action to integrate refugees and internally displaced populations. It is also essential to ensuring that operational priorities -- not existing and available national funding levels -- dictate programming.

In this sense there is a difference between the financing instruments needed for refugees and those needed for IDPs. For IDPs, the crucial incentive is that municipalities, state or local governments who are absorbing IDPs from other areas of the country be provided with additional finance. This would normally be done by fiscal transfer: donors may provide matching funds. Donors will generally give grant-based support for displacement and crises considered to be beyond the country’s control, including natural disasters – but in many cases of internal conflict, finance will be provided on the terms that already exist for the country: grant-based or highly concessional for the poorest countries, commercial or with a lower level of “concessionality” for countries that are better off.

In the case of refugees, there is a clear argument for offering grant-based or concessional funds to host countries for implementing more sustainable approaches, even when their normal terms of financing would be commercial, because in effect the host is providing a global public good by adopting an inclusive approach towards the refugees. Such grants or loans could be branded “spill-over instruments.”

For both types of financing, IFI involvement is important – to help design internal fiscal transfers, with or without donor matching funds for IDPs and to amend allocation criteria to provide concessional “spill-over instruments” to middle-income host countries/countries with IDPs.

As a complement to IFI instruments, a new global fund, or national funds, could be considered by bilateral donors as a means to pool multi-year and predictable financing for localised approaches.

Finally, existing and new sources of funding could be pooled where practical so as to eliminate the “two worlds apart” that humanitarian and development actors too often inhabit. Aided with country-based pooled funds, or at least shared plans and approaches, all stakeholders could better align and coordinate their approaches and funding as part of a new financing architecture for addressing protracted crises, within the boundaries of their respective mandates (including within or between individual ministries or agencies). Development and humanitarian interventions can then be sequenced, blended, merged or expanded to build upon the success of shared efforts.

(IV) Implementing the Plan through Government Law and Policy

In return for increased international assistance and evidence of mechanisms to garner positive economic benefits from the inclusion of refugees, host states will in general have legal, regulatory and fiscal tools at their disposal to improve the incentives for refugees to stay in countries of primary relocation. Three areas of law and policy are fundamental for host community and refugee/IDP self-reliance and resilience: work; inclusion in development and local markets; and freedom of movement.

These areas may include fiscal transfers to regions or municipalities particularly affected by displacement. The host governments can also provide the regulatory framework to enable refugees’ access to labour markets, to open and own their own businesses, and to engage in other income-generating activities. They can provide refugees with documents and permits that are recognized as valid by relevant actors with whom refugees regularly interact, including police, security officials, civil servants, employers, landlords, banks and other individuals for whom refugees’ legal and economic status is relevant. Refugees would also have access to banking and other financial services. Indeed, experience suggests that access
to documents providing legal identity (an SDG target), capital, credit and banking is often no less important than jobs or access to land in terms of fostering self-reliance.

Overriding prior encampment policies, governments can also provide for refugees and IDPs to move freely and to choose their place of residence in order to pursue productive and taxable economic activity. Specific mechanisms to protect vulnerable groups amongst displaced populations such as women and children may also be adopted. Across all groups, there must be a dedicated outreach strategy to women, who are usually last to be provided with legal documents, permits and access to services.

All governments can support specific initiatives to counter xenophobia, gender-based violence and, more generally, discrimination. For refugees, the host state can support effective mechanisms for reporting and remedying instances of discrimination while humanitarian and human rights agencies can engage in robust protection monitoring. For IDPs, there is a need to take into account that national governments may be a party to the conflict, and may not see the protection of IDPs as a priority. National human rights institutions can play a role in reporting and remedying violations of their rights.

Lastly, it will be important for governments to put forward credible mechanisms for transparent use of funds and inclusive decision-making. This is particularly crucial in country situations where donors are not currently working through country systems and where mistrust over governance exists. In these situations, new commitments to manage localised programmes through shared government-civil society or government-international oversight may be needed to enable programmes to go forward. In other country situations, there may be a greater history of working through country systems, but mechanisms to strengthen transparency and fiduciary oversight can still be critical in unblocking international assistance.

In the legal area there are differences between refugee and IDP situations: enshrining legal status for refugees generally may involve more change and more political challenges than is the case for IDPs. It will also be important that the national legal and regulatory framework includes the basis for donor partners to deploy additional development funds to benefit non-citizens, at the government’s request. The political basis for this is that when such programmes use localised approaches they also benefit host communities and national citizens.

While IDPs have the same rights as other citizens in the country, they generally face social and political obstacles to access livelihoods, enjoy freedom of movement and choose their place of residence, while retaining the right to return to their home of origin. It is essential to ensure that IDPs can effectively enjoy those citizenship rights. Specific laws and policies, including for identification, public services, housing, land and property issues, may have to be adopted in that regard, consistent with the targets to which all countries have agreed in the SDGs. In this regard, dedicated efforts may be required to identify, register and integrate IDPs and host communities into national policies, plans and programmes. In addition, protection of civilians, particularly IDPs in conflict situations, may require collaboration with regional peace and security institutions.
The changes above could be brought together into a compact, affirmed by host governments (national and where relevant local) financing partners, and in the case of IDPs, also involving sub-national government entities. Host governments can offer four main types of action: (i) legal and regulatory protection for refugees and IDPs; (ii) fiscal commitments, to provide (within their means) some budgetary assistance; (iii) structural and organizational change, strengthening the authority and capacity of national response systems; (iv) mechanisms to ensure transparency of funds use and inclusion in programme governance. Partner countries and agencies can in turn offer four main types of action: (i) additional finance; (ii) providing finance through country systems rather than parallel systems, in localised programmes that benefit host communities and refugees/IDPs; (iii) changing the terms of finance (from commercial to concessional); (iv) changing the timing of financing – both providing support more quickly, and making it multi-year, predictable support.

Such a compact could and should also involve refugees and IDPs themselves. Community leaders amongst refugees and IDPs could, for example, commit to respecting local laws and customs, preventing illegal or anti-social behaviours and contributing to the welfare of host communities.

The key elements of the compact are outlined in Figure 2 on page 14.

Does the compact apply to both refugees and IDPs? The compact applies to refugees, IDPs, and marginalised or vulnerable members in the host communities. The first two changes are very similar for IDPs and refugees: solutions require integration into development planning and localised approaches. The legal and policy actions, and the type of additional financing instruments needed, are underpinned by the same consideration of incentives, but have different applications because refugees are not citizens of the host country, and host governments may not be willing or able to provide permanent legal status.
Host states and host communities would need to adapt more inclusive policies, with popular support influenced by additional financial assistance for local services and proof of refugee/IDP economic contributions.

Donor contributions would need to provide finance for national/local responses, influenced by short-term results and long-term cost savings and political/security gains.

Humanitarian agencies would need to adopt more localised approaches, contingent on international humanitarian norms and influenced by better ability to meet short-term needs.

Development agencies would need to finance local institutions which care for the displaced, influenced by national development priorities and social protection/institutions/resilience benefits.

Figure 2: Solutions for reducing the dependency of displaced people and host communities.
needed roads, schools and energy grids, as well as large-scale livelihoods interventions that link the capacities of refugees, IDPs and host communities to larger value-chains and market opportunities. The capabilities as well as the demands of displaced communities will need to be incorporated in service delivery models. Policies and plans will have to incorporate gender-sensitivity.

Finally and most importantly, all stakeholders will need to collaborate to include host communities, refugees and IDPs in national service-provision systems. The host state ensures that all vulnerable citizens, refugees and IDPs have access to health, social security and educational services. Meanwhile, humanitarian and development agencies bolster and expand those services, making use of funds previously devoted to establishing parallel systems.

**Conclusion**

Protracted displacement inflicts a “second exile” upon refugees that denies to host states the potential benefits of refugee self-reliance. It also has a tremendous impact on IDPs who stay in limbo for years without sustainable solutions. An approach is needed that empowers refugees and IDPs to live with dignity while contributing to, and benefiting, their local community. Such an approach requires the active involvement of both the humanitarian and the development worlds and political commitment. Without it, the harms of protracted displacement will remain serious and palpable.

The work of leaving no-one behind in the SDGs must start now. All relevant humanitarian and development actors will need to collaborate without delay at the operational level to develop the modalities, multi-year programmes and priorities for implementing the model, tailored to each relevant context.
Evidence of Benefits of Joint Approaches

There is a growing evidence base on the positive contributions of both refugees/IDPs, and of joint development-humanitarian approaches, to local economies and services. These initial findings need to be rigorously tested through extending research and robust and consistent monitoring and evaluation systems that can support a comparable evidence base across countries and communities. So far, it is understood that:

Market- and development-led models can promote the positive economic contribution of refugees and IDPs to host communities. For example:

- In urban contexts, refugee communities have established vibrant new commercial suburbs, for example, a 2006 study of Nairobi found that Kenyans benefited from the community of Eastleigh's (Somali diaspora) commercial enterprises, through local job creation and through lowering the cost of certain commercial goods.4

- Cash transfers and commodity vouchers have integrated the displaced into local markets and benefited host communities through cash injections into local markets that stimulate local supply and demand.5

- Evidence also suggests that the monetization of humanitarian aid through cash transfers has empowered people as agents of their own wellbeing and self-reliance instead of perpetuating victims who are dependent on aid.6

- In rural contexts, the presence of refugees and IDPs can be beneficial for attracting investment in infrastructure in borderlands.

There is also evidence that joint humanitarian and development plans and programmes can improve IDP, refugee and host communities’ access to services and livelihoods. For example:

- In Colombia, the Transitional Solutions Initiative (2012-2016) supports IDPs and host communities to move from dependency to self-reliance. It focuses on local urban integration, and rural relocation and return processes. Through the multi-year programme, communities have exceeded or are on track to meet expectations: 200% of target communities (host and displaced) initiated community land legalization processes, 125% of target communities developed housing programmes, and 40% of communities improved access to water and sanitation. New community organizations have emerged around key local development issues, and host and displaced communities benefit from improving local organization and access to services and budgets aligned to local priorities.7

- In Eastern Sudan, UNDP and UNHCR found that joint approaches in the first year of the joint “Transitional Solutions Initiative” (2012-2014) appeared to have contributed positively to social and economic outcomes for refugees and host communities. For example, through a survey of beneficiaries, the programme reported a 30% increase in income levels in the first year, a 60% employment rate of refugees and host community members following VOTECH training, crop yields improved by at least 50% following watershed assistance for host community and refugee farmers, and a record number of host community and refugees had access to local healthcare and education services.8

- UNICEF Lebanon has adopted a three pillar approach to programmes which straddles humanitarian and development: a) assistance for basic humanitarian needs, b) access to quality basic services, and c) strengthening government systems. In 2014 alone, USD 99 million of programme funds contributed to the
Lebanese people, national institutions and economy through improvement of public service infrastructure, training of public service providers, procurement of local supplies and services, and partners’ local staff salaries and operational costs. Two examples of this are the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) National Plan, which brought together resources and partners in direct support to the SDC network (providing a range of social public services to the poorest children and families); and the RACE initiative, which had the primary objective of providing access to learning for over 400,000 annually, as part of a package that included access to WASH, health and child protection services.

- In Jordan, an initial intervention of psycho-social support to Syrian refugee children has now been expanded into a comprehensive package of interventions for Syrian and Iraqi refugee children as well as vulnerable Jordanian children. The Makani (My Space) initiative makes use of the over 180 child friendly spaces nationwide, with a package including alternative education for out of school children (also home-based and IT-supported), life-skills development (for all 10-24 years old), psychosocial support, as well as outreach activities and child rights monitoring by local Child Protection Committees. Support will be expanded in 2015 to over 200 sites, reaching about 200,000 children.

- In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Turkey, investment in local health and education services has been extended by the UN to assist host communities and Syrian refugees. Meeting refugee needs also requires investing extra resources to help countries to resolve existing long-term development challenges, thus additional joint development-humanitarian finances have been provided to renovate schools in Jordan and Turkey, to train additional primary care health workers in Iraq and to extend polio vaccinations to host communities across affected countries. In Turkey, the UN invested in a new olive oil facility in order to create local jobs in one of the areas most affected by a refugee influx.

**National policy changes can promote self-reliance.** For example:

- In Afghanistan, the national policy on internal displacement adopted in 2014 provides for measures to secure land tenure. The policy permits IDPs in informal settlements to upgrade their accommodation to meet the internationally agreed “Sphere standards” for emergency shelter, to pursue community-level initiatives to lend, rent or sell land in areas in which they have settled, and to identify other options that would grant them security of tenure, such as usufruct schemes.

- In Iraq, the No Lost Generation (NLG) Initiative, led by UNICEF, targets host communities particularly affected by displacement, together with Syrian refugees and IDPs. It aims to mobilise and support community actors to protect and provide for all at risk children (including IDPs, refugees and vulnerable host children) within their communities. The five response pillars under the NLG programme include: i) increased child, adolescent and youth access to protective and enabling environments; ii) learning opportunities; iii) opportunities for recreation and socialisation; iv) opportunities for developing skills and competences, and v) participation and leadership in matters affecting their lives. Through community assessments, the NLG initiative identified 7 communities in Dohuk Governorate to participate in the NLG programme for rollout in 2015.

- In the wake of the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008, UNICEF was permitted for the first time by the government to establish Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) in emergency areas. The government has now adopted the model, and 90% of communities will have CFS. Similarly, for the first time after the earthquake, the government allowed the use of micronutrient sprinkles for children affected by anaemia and malnutrition. Levels of anaemia and malnutrition were greatly improved and UNICEF is now routinely distributing them to 4-6 year olds, promoting their use through C4D.
Examples of Investing in Linkages with National Social Protection Frameworks

• In Ethiopia, the Joint Resilience Initiative (UNICEF, WFP, FAO) targets food security and nutrition, in support of the National Nutrition Plan. The three agencies will work together in 2 districts in each of six regions affected by shocks to plan and execute convergent activities to build household and community levels of nutrition and food security. The programme includes strengthened access to social services; support for livelihoods; predictable transfers; protection from shocks through DRM at community level and strengthening local and national systems to build resilience. Programming approaches are holistic and area/community based rather than sector based, and will identify bottlenecks to community access to challenging issues during both normal and emergency periods. The overall resilience strategy will remain in place for 10 years or more to underscore the importance of sustained and consistent engagement. The first programming cycle will be for 3 years under the current UNDAF and the second programming cycle will include more agencies and sectors. Initially, funding will be used from existing budgets of the three agencies involved to start to demonstrate the potential of the joint initiative. For the next funding round, joint proposals will be submitted.

• In Palestine, despite the impact of intermittent war on the national health system, the Ministry of Health continues to be able to deliver prompt support during crises. It is supported in this by UNICEF through procurement services and through complementary programmes such as cash transfers that help to meet out-of-pocket expenditure on health care. During the 51-day conflict in 2014, UNICEF worked with MOSA and WFP to scale up social protection activities to support 52,000 vulnerable households. The existence of a function social protection system was a necessary condition for a timely and effective emergency response.

• In Yemen, long-term partnership and capacity strengthening of the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) allowed UNICEF to involve the SWF and its frontline staff centrally in the design and implementation of a humanitarian cash transfer programme to respond to the most recent humanitarian crisis. The involvement of SWF and the use of its staff and procedures will help to retain the capacity of the SWF and will contribute to the resilience of the national social protection system as well as the resilience of children most affected by the current crisis.

• In Jordan, the child cash grant for Syrian refugee children living in host communities has demonstrated innovations that are of interest to the Jordanian social protection system as well. With regard to technology, the National Aid Foundation (NAF) has shown some interest in testing and possible using the iris scan technology used in ATMs for Syrian refugees to withdraw their cash grant. The NAF is also interested in the vulnerability assessment tools that have been developed to determine eligibility for the humanitarian child cash grant, which it feels may be helpful in further refining its own targeting tools.
Examples of Existing Approaches and Initiatives

A range of relevant joint development-humanitarian approaches and initiatives for building self-reliance of IDPs/refugees and host communities have been underway since 2011. Recently, these have grown in scale and profile in response to the Syria refugee crisis in particular. Many initiatives are under design or are in the first phase of implementation. Therefore, it is not yet possible to draw lessons and conclusions, but it is clear that joint, sustainable approaches must be tailored to each unique context and must reflect the local political economy and incentive systems and pressures experienced by governments, communities, the displaced and donors:

IDPs

- **Colombia’s Transitional Support Initiative (TSI), 2012-2016**

  The TSI supports transition from dependency to self-reliance. There are more than 6 million Colombian IDPs. The TSI works in communities where the conditions are favourable to peaceful development solutions for local integration, relocation and/or return. It focuses support on local level institutions and solutions with three lines of action to: improve daily living conditions of hosts and IDPs, strengthen community and local governance and institutions; and protect victims and their rights. Priorities focus on land, housing, WATSAN, economic development, dialogue between communities and government, victims’ assistance and local planning and budgeting processes. The plan is led by Colombia and UNDP and UNHCR and funded by multiple donors over a four-year timeframe.

- **Haiti Transitional Appeal (TAP), 2015-2016**

  In Haiti, the humanitarian and development community, under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), developed a multi-year transitional appeal that tries to bridge the gap between short and long-term solutions for IDPs. Its first objective is to ensure protection and basic services for persons living in camps and support their transition from camps to more stable communities. Despite many hurdles in terms of tracking funding to the TAP, and the fact that it was designed among different aid systems that were not ready to support hybrid approaches, it has managed to generate momentum for tackling displacement through a more integrated approach in Haiti. Its strong government ownership component contributed to that. It built on government-led initiatives for managing displacement-related housing, land and property issues such as the “16/6” project. The project, launched in August 2011, envisaged the reconstruction of 16 earthquake-affected neighbourhoods and the closure of six major related camps by providing grants to the IDPs living in those camps to rent housing, to construct a new house, or to repair their own houses that were damaged by the earthquake.

- **Colombia – Local government policies to support IDP self-reliance**

  In Bogota, the mayor’s development plan for the city, which seeks to create “a more humane Bogota”, puts at its core the promotion of the human rights of victims of the armed conflict who fled to Bogota, and the implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Act adopted in 2011. Article 12 pertains to the implementation of the Act, article 21 relates to the housing programme for internally displaced persons and article 42 deals with how internally displaced persons will receive health services. Elected mayors of the various localities within Bogota have also initiated projects for the economic development of internally displaced persons living in those localities. In January 2014, the mayor of the Bosa locality developed a project to promote and assist entrepreneurial projects for vulnerable populations, specifically for internally displaced persons and persons with disabilities.
• **Somalia – mainstreaming IDPs into the New Deal Compact for peacebuilding and statebuilding (design in progress)**

In 2014, the Danish Refugee Council and the Solutions Alliance conducted an analysis of the needs of the displaced and the opportunities to integrate solutions to the issue of protracted displacement into Somalia’s New Deal “Compact” for peacebuilding and statebuilding. The analysis recommended to develop solutions for transitioning Somali IDPs from humanitarian to long-term development assistance. The report emphasised integrating durable solutions for IDPs into national development and peacebuilding plans. The World Bank also conducted an analysis of displacement in Somalia in 2014. It recommended targeted programmes for IDPs who have the intention to either remain in urban areas or to return home to rural areas, and recommended to integrate these specific IDP groups and their specific needs and vulnerabilities (contingent on factors such as gender, clan and disabilities) into development and poverty-reduction programmes.

The report recommended to achieve this through mainstreaming IDP issues into local and national development planning, and through providing technical assistance for the government. It also recommended further research on local labour market opportunities and sustainable returns to rural areas. In 2015, the Solutions Alliance and UNHCR held a workshop with stakeholders to advance plans for mainstreaming of IDP issues into implementation of the New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs).14

• **Iraq**

Iraq currently faces a large-scale political and security crisis. Since January 2014, approx. 3 million people have fled their homes as a direct consequence of violence and conflict in addition to 250,000 Syrian refugees, who have been staying mostly in the Kurdistan Region. In response to the on-going crisis in Iraq, UNDP Iraq has implemented the Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP), focusing on the following five key thematic areas: 1) Government coordination and strategic planning; 2) Basic services and accountability; 3) Livelihoods recovery; 4) Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) and women protection, and 5) Social cohesion. The project has been instrumental to establish a government crisis response coordination body for both the Federal and Kurdistan Regional Governments.

The project enhanced provision of basic services, such as shelter, health, education, electricity, water and sanitation, to total of 11,444 households from the displaced and host community population, benefitting 57,220 individuals and provided access to livelihood opportunities for 3,920 households, benefiting 19,599 vulnerable individuals. Legal services, such as legal consultation, full legal representation and follow up on various court matters and legal documentation support, have been provided for over 5,000 vulnerable women of Syrian refugees and IDPs, including victims of SGBV, through 7 legal service centres (3 in IDP camps, 3 in Refugee Camps and 1 in host community) as well as mobile legal services.

• **Syria**

As the Syria conflict enters its fifth year, it has taken a terrible toll on the population. There are now 6.5 million people displaced inside Syria. In addition, nearly 4.2 million have fled the country, with neighbouring countries in the region bearing an enormous burden. UNDP has provided support for resilience for the most vulnerable, and above all, both the communities hosting IDPs and the IDPs themselves. In support of the UN’s Strategic Response Plan for Syria, UNDP realigned its work to an approach focused on emergency livelihoods and early recovery through the Resilience and Livelihoods Programme (RLP). UNDP has operated where access and safety as well as local partners have allowed for delivery in two major sectors, namely Rehabilitation of community infrastructure and support to Livelihoods.
UNDP’s activities are implemented with over 100 implementation partners, including NGOs, and community and faith-based organizations (FBOs) active in communities all over Syria. Achievements to date include bolstering the well-being of nearly 2 million Syrians – directly and indirectly – through cash-for-work schemes linked to the removal and disposal of solid waste and rehabilitation of infrastructure. In addition, more than 400,000 people benefited directly from livelihood support, including close to 200,000 women through employment generation and livelihoods and productive asset restoration support. Persons with disabilities, a highly vulnerable group that is expanding due to the crisis, have also received support in the context of cash-for-work.

Refugees

- **Jordan Response Plan (2015)**

Jordan is hosting over half a million refugees from Syria, over half of whom are children. Four out of five refugees live in host communities, and in some municipalities, refugees outnumber citizens. The economic costs so far total around $2 billion. The impacts on the economy, inflation, unplanned and informal settlements and the illegal use of natural resources have all fuelled tensions. Thus, the government decided to supplement humanitarian responses, which are inadequate for managing the task, with development-led approaches for building resilience and sustaining the quality of public services. The plan aims to meet immediate humanitarian needs; rapidly scale up government capacities to respond; reinforce municipal services; rapidly expand employment and livelihoods opportunities; and support social cohesion for Jordanian communities that are hosting large influxes of refugees. Relevant service delivery sectors have developed costed response plans for refugees and host communities, and the government appealed for budget support to meet both its income loss from the crisis and the extra costed needs incurred by the crisis.¹⁵ The budget support requirement $2.9 billion in 2015.

- **Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (2015-2016)**

Lebanon’s plan recognizes that the Syrian refugee crisis is testing Lebanon’s stability. Lebanon has lost approximately $7.5 billion due to the crisis, and it has an estimated shortfall of $2.14 billion to respond. Approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees are in Lebanon, and approximately 1.5 million Lebanese people are vulnerable to the effects of the crisis (and the spill-over armed groups) as this compounds pre-existing challenges of underinvestment in development. The government’s preferred durable solution is the repatriation of Syrian refugees, but it recognizes that the conditions for the safe return of Syrians is not in place. Therefore, Lebanon’s integrated humanitarian and stabilization strategy has three objectives: to ensure assistance and protection for refugees and the poorest Lebanese nationals; build the capacity of national and local service delivery systems; and reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, environmental and institutional stability. The plan aims to fill the $2.14 billion finance deficit for meeting these needs. The most vulnerable refugees and Lebanese nationals have been grouped geographically for targeted responses by government sectors and municipal authorities.¹⁶

- **Sudan UNDP/UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) Joint Programme, Phase I (2012-2014)**

The TSI Sudan programme works with relevant Sudanese ministries to target camp-based refugees and host populations to increase self-reliance. It focuses on a broad range of services- and livelihoods-related objectives: generating income opportunities through VOTECH training, increasing education enrolment and attendance, improving access to healthcare facilities, potable water, improved sanitation, providing protection services and legal support, diversifying and improving rural livelihoods, improving access to microfinance, improving environmental and energy conservation and management, and women’s empowerment. In support of these areas, it has an objective to develop local governmental capacity. The programme has targets for refugee and host
populations. The programme reported a number of successful outputs (see above).

However, first the programme was suspended in the second year for a number of months by the government owing to concerns about the programme’s intention to integrate refugees. A second related challenge has been cooperation with line Ministries to commit to taking over basic service delivery. A third related challenge was that the programme also became seriously underfunded, which severely impacted upon its feasibility once it was restarted. All these challenges suggest that viable models must be framed politically from the outset, addressing all actors’ incentives and concerns through a compact approach, and that sufficient multi-year funding must be made available.

- **Zambia UNHCR Strategic Framework for the Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia (2014-2016)**

The Zambia Framework is distinct in that it has dialogue with the governments of Angola and Rwanda on integrating former refugees of these countries in Zambia. To this end, Zambia’s priorities are to develop a policy and legal framework for alternative legal status for former refugees, stakeholder engagement and consensus-building, sustainable local integration into development, and resource mobilization in order to fund local integration. Zambia is thus pursuing three pillars for local integration – legal (alternative status for former refugees), economic (priorities for infrastructure, services and livelihoods) and social/cultural (support to Chiefdoms in settlement and surrounding areas). These pillars are slightly differentiated for Angolan and Rwandan legal caseloads and their circumstances. Local integration is led by development actors, and priorities are aligned to achieving Zambia’s national development plan. The UN aligned its UNDAF to supporting Zambia’s national development priorities, including in communities where local integration will occur. Development priorities include roads, markets, housing, electricity and water.

- **UNHCR/WFP Joint Strategy and Operational Framework for Enhancing Self-reliance in Protracted Refugee Situations: Uganda, Chad, South Sudan**

Building on the lessons and recommendations from a 2012 joint corporate evaluation into the impact of food assistance on durable solutions in protracted refugee situations, UNHCR and WFP are finalizing a Joint Strategy and Operational Framework for Enhancing Self-reliance in Protracted Refugee Situations. The Joint Strategy sets the parameters for a renewed inter-agency collaboration between UNCHR and WFP on refugee self-reliance focusing on two objectives: 1) strengthening livelihoods in protracted refugee situations, while ensuring basic food and nutrition needs are met; and 2) encouraging an enabling environment for increased self-reliance for refugees. The Operational Framework sets out what the two agencies might realistically expect to achieve over the course of a five period, in terms of both programmatic results and organizational learning. Experiences from the joint UNHCR/WFP refugee self-reliance programme in Uganda (below), as well as new refugee self-reliance programmes in Chad and South Sudan, have informed the development of the strategy and operational framework.

- **Uganda UNHCR/WFP joint refugee self-reliance programme**

In Uganda, a joint UNHCR/WFP self-reliance programme focuses on both farming and non-farming livelihood activities to increase refugee self-reliance. In May 2015, UNHCR and WFP signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Project Framework for the UNHCR/WFP Uganda Refugee Livelihoods Project with the Government of Uganda’s Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). On the farming component of the programme, refugees are assisted to engage more profitably in the thriving agricultural economy outside the refugee camps. Having already been provided with land for
cultivation by the Government of Uganda, refugees are now provided with training in post-harvest handling and storage equipment. Non-farming activities focus on income generation and skills training in economically viable fields, such as trading, restaurants, and transportation. In carrying out these activities, UNHCR and WFP are working in an integrated manner across refugee and host communities in Uganda. Through this more inclusive approach, UNHCR and WFP are building social capital, reducing tensions across the two communities, and ensuring that the benefits are shared equally.

**Regional approaches for refugees and IDPs**


  The plan combines UN development and humanitarian resources. It recognizes the scale and regional dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis, and is premised on supporting implementation of the nationally-owned plans of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey in response to the Syrian crisis. The plan aims to advance regional coherence by coordinating the responses and funding of governments, non-state actors, the UN and donors. The plan has two main components: refugee protection and humanitarian assistance aimed at providing rapid support to communities; and a resilience-development component aimed at stabilizing vulnerable and affected communities. Approximately 75% is invested in refugees and 25% in building local resilience/supporting stabilization measures.

  The plan spans protection, food, education, health, shelter, water, sanitation, livelihoods and social cohesion. It is coordinated by UNDP and UNHCR.19 The resilience-based approach gathers the efforts of 22 agencies, 19 donors, 5 governments in the sub-region and more than 200 implementing partners engaged in the 3RP. In addition, the 3RP Regional Strategic Overview reinforces the resilience development approach in protracted crisis. As stated by the UNDP Administrator and the UNHCR High Commissioner, the 3RP is designed “to break down financial silos, challenge the existing aid architecture and deliver an integrated response to the protracted crisis”.

  **First**, 3RP has succeeded in decentralizing a regional response in favour of promising national plans. Today, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) and the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) represent unique integrated and nationally owned response plans with regional coherence. **Second**, and for the first time in the context of a humanitarian pledging conference (Kuwait III), a resilience-pledging pillar was introduced, attracting the attention of a group of donors that used combined humanitarian and development resources for resilience purposes. **Third**, and again for the first time in a crisis context, key donors (e.g. Germany, European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK)) adopted a multi-year contributions approach in Kuwait III, reinforcing financial predictability in a protracted crisis.

  **Fourth**, 3RP has significantly contributed to shift the response thought local systems –chiefly municipalities. Certain donors (e.g. the UK and Canada) have decided to make municipal services in Jordan and Lebanon their priority. **Fifth**, 3RP has rationalized a wide range of alternative funding mechanisms (Thematic Trust Funds, Multi-Partner Trust Funds (MPTFs), budget support, NGO modalities, UN windows, etc.) within a single national framework –national plans- offering donors a menu of options to engage development or humanitarian resources. This model constitutes concrete evidence of integrated funding for protracted crisis. **Sixth**, some donors, such as US and Switzerland have introduced – within the 3RP – projects with dual benefits (refugees and host communities) as a concrete approach to address social cohesion issues.
• Sahel Strategic Response Plan (SRP), 2014-2016

In 2014, under the leadership of the regional humanitarian coordinator, the UN and its partners launched a regional response plan covering 9 Sahel countries with coordinated outcomes across the region. The plan covers the needs of both refugees and IDPs and articulates sustainable solutions as part of a more integrated strategy with development actors.
Endnotes

2 See OCHA (2015) “An End in Sight: Multi-year planning to meet and reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises”, Fit for the Future Series Think Brief, July
3 This approach is based on situations where government controls the relevant territory where displaced persons are located and has a regular dialogue with donors over national and local planning. There are some extremely fragile situations where this is not the case (in Somalia for example): an empowered RC/HC in those situations help bring together national and international development and humanitarian stakeholders to facilitate the achievement of collective results.
5 Cited by Roger Zetter, Ibid.
6 Roger Zetter, Ibid.
7 TSI Colombia, Progress Update April 2015
8 UNDP, UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), Joint Programme Phase I (2012-2014), Final Report 2015, funded by the IKEA Foundation, Netherlands, Norway and Japan
11 TSI Colombia, Progress Update April 2015
12 UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs report on Durable Solutions in Urban Settings, A/69/295, 11 August 2014
16 “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan” (2015-2016), Government of Lebanon and Lebanese and international partners
17 UNDP, UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), Joint Programme Phase I (2012-2014), Final Report 2015, funded by the IKEA Foundation, Netherlands, Norway and Japan
18 “Strategic Framework for the Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia” (2014), Government of the Republic of Zambia, UNHCR